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	Page 9	
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	Py 10 01 331	
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	Page	12
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	Pg 13 01 331	
		Page 13
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	Pg 14 0f 351	
		Page 14
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## PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Good morning. This is Judge Drain.

We're here in In Re Purdue Pharma L.P., et al., on the second day of oral argument in relation to the Debtors' request for confirmation of their amended Chapter 11 plan.

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, with apologies, we're not hearing any audio. I'm not sure if the Court needs to be heard yet or not. I apologize for interrupting.

THE COURT: Thank you. I thought it was off of mute, but it wasn't. Let me start over again. Thanks.

Good morning, this is Judge Drain. We're here in

Good morning, this is Judge Drain. We're here in

In Re Purdue Pharma L.P., et al., on the second and last day

of oral argument on the Debtors' request for confirmation of

their amended Chapter 11 plan.

I have the order of topics and time that the parties have agreed to allocate to them, which the parties circulated overnight. And I'm happy to follow that order for purposes of today's hearing.

MR. HUEBNER: Perfect, Your Honor. Good morning.

For the record, Marshall Huebner, from Davis Polk &

Wardwell, on behalf of the Debtors.

Your Honor, two things before we start the agenda.

You know, as always, we have sort of a dual role as a plan

proponent and as an advocate sometimes for our stakeholders,

but also a shepherd of the process.

Your Honor, I think it was not lost on anybody on Monday that Your Honor expressed strong views about attempting to get to a deal with a final very small number of stakeholders not yet onboard. I believe three times you mentioned the heroic effort of Judge Chapman, who worked in Phase 3 of mediation.

I do want to advise the Court that Judge Chapman seems to have heard that, and she is absolutely back in the saddle, working extraordinarily hard, again, as a sitting judge, for, of course, no compensation, just part of public service, to try to see if anything can be done.

As I'm sure it's also not going to be a surprise for the Court to hear, further work tailoring and narrowing the releases is something that is the subject of many of the objections, and certainly the subject of a fair number of very clear thoughts from the Judge.

And so while on one hand, because there are elements that are being discussed among the parties. And I won't say more than that, except that the Debtors are working around the clock to try to facilitate to see if something can be done assisting Judge Chapman.

There are other elements as well, as there were in round 3 of mediation. There were new covenants and economics and other things. And I can't say more than that. That would be inappropriate, and so, of course, I won't.

But a fourth or additional element is the releases. Strategically, one might have argued for a position that that should be sorted used as part of a potential big set of final trades in a ground-floor mediation by Judge Chapman. But I think that would not have been the right answer.

The right answer is to fix (indiscernible) it now and give the Court and all parties comfort that people, including on the Sackler side, and facilitated very strongly by the Debtors and others, continuously recalibrating and trying to make this the best possible deal for all Purdue stakeholders.

In the middle of the night last night, we filed the ninth amended plan of reorganization, which really does one thing primarily, which is substantially further narrow and tailor the third-party releases that I think it's fair to say lie at the heart of much of the colloquy and objection at this hearing.

And so rather than saving it to be offered in mediation, which is now basically ongoing, it's in already and there for people to see. I think some people understand it. Some people, I think, are still having it explained to them. It's very complicated. We are working around the clock on located things.

So in about 30 seconds, I will turn the podium

over to Mr. Uzzi, who will, I think, probably be in the best position to describe to describe those releases, and how they have changed, and how it is hopefully important to the objectors, and also quite important to the Court.

But before I do that, one over item in my other role, which is I do want to let the Court know that the Gulf objection, as Your Honor may remember, was argued by Mr.

Luskin (indiscernible) with Mr. Tobak, negotiations towards settling that also continue, as we are. Obviously, as you've seen, you know, every time I get up, we have either another settlement or fewer objections to announce. I think everyone knows that's our MO, and we're still doing it here at the last day of oral argument. And so those are the two procedural matters before we get to the agenda.

So with that, with the Court's permission, I'd ask
Mr. Uzzi to help explain the changes, and certainly in the
minds of the Sacklers, you know, the changes that they made.

THE COURT: Okay. Before I hear from Mr. Uzzi, I think I ought to say two things. First, I have not spoken to Judge Chapman about her continuation as a mediator in the case, either before or after what you have just described. Nevertheless, I'm quite grateful to her, you know, if she's been willing to take on that role. And I obviously encourage the parties to try to resolve their differences, including with her really dedicated and expert efforts,

which she brings to every mediation, and certainly from my reading of her mediators report that was filed earlier in the case, she brought to this one. So I welcome that development. Although it's a surprise to me. But I'm grateful for it, and it's certainly in line with the admonition I gave to the parties on Monday.

Secondly, unfortunately, I have not had the opportunity to review the change in the ninth amended plan.

opportunity to review the change in the ninth amended plan.

So I'm largely in listening mode here, not commenting mode.

But again, I welcome the parties continued work on the scope of the release and injunction of third-party claims.

So, having said that, I'm happy to hear from Mr. Uzzi.

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, before he begins, just two very quick notes. To give credos where they're also due, the first round mediators also continued after mediation formally entered (indiscernible) mediation --

THE COURT: I understand that.

MR. HUEBNER: -- privilege --

THE COURT: And, you know, we've been really fortunate to have world-class mediators in this case, and they take their role -- they took their role and take their role seriously and continued beyond the original time allocated. And you know, again, I encouraged that under the mediation order. And similarly, even though my mediation

order for Judge Chapman set a specific deadline for the parties, and as everyone knows, deadlines are important, based on what you've described to me, the discussions that are ongoing now are similarly under that order. If you face a similar deadline, which is I intend to rule on Friday on this request for confirmation on the plan.

MR. HUEBNER: Yeah, Your Honor. That was the tentative point I was going to make. I actually did not have time to double check it, but hopefully my memory is right, that the order actually expressly contemplates post-mediation conversations that I actually believe keep our --remained governed by the confidentiality shields. And so, everyone who is having those conversations is treating them as such.

So with that, Your Honor, let me turn my microphone off and turn it over to Mr. Uzzi to explain what was filed overnight.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. UZZI: Thank you, Your Honor. Gerard Uzzi of Milbank, on behalf of the Raymond Sackler family.

Your Honor, I think what I'd like to do here is explain to you what we try to accomplish and the changes, but not necessarily go through those changes line by line.

Obviously, if you'd like us to do that, we can do that as well. But at least, you know, first give you the conceptual

overview, and then I'll take direction from the Court.

Your Honor, I mean, I would agree with Mr.

Huebner. You know, we did not and weren't interested in

(indiscernible) these things up as a bargaining chip in

mediation, further discussions. What we've tried to do is

be sponsored, not only to the Court's comments, but also to

comments of some of the objectors, to the extent that we

Before I get into the actual changes, Your Honor, just for the sake of clarity of the record, I think there are a few things that I can say that I hope is helpful as it relates to what the releases don't cover, never have covered. And you know, one of those things, of course, is criminal liability.

And I know Your Honor knows that the releases don't cover criminal liability. There continues to be, you know, some innuendo and clouding, I think, that issued both inside this courtroom and outside. And I thought it might be helpful, just for on the record, to hear a Sackler representative say these releases do not cover criminal liability. Hopefully, that puts any debate on that topic to an end.

There's been a number of suggestions of the tax liability being released. Tax liability is expressly carved out. There is no release of tax liability. It doesn't

could.

matter who the taxing authority is. There's no release of tax liabilities.

There also has been some suggestion that we were attempting to shield releasing parties from their future conduct. The release never contemplated that. We've clarified that. But it was something that was never in the release, and I thought it might be helpful just to clarify that.

As far as the comments we've tried to address now, that were admittedly picked up by the release, the first one is one that I would characterize as the undiscovered McKinsey issue, or the undisclosed McKinsey issue, or something to that effect. And the release was drafted, Your Honor, against a backdrop of the Sacklers and their entities having been thoroughly examined and thoroughly investigated. And we just, in the drafting of the releases, believe that if there were that type of party, somebody would come to us, they would identify it, and of course, we would add to that excluded party list. And that's the spirit of how we had drafted that release in (indiscernible).

What we originally proposed on Monday to address what I'll call the undisclosed or undiscovered McKinsey issue, is a carve out for -- we used the defined term willful misconduct, which was probably not a good defined term -- but to really pick up some intentional wrongdoing.

As we worked on this over the last day, we decided to make really what I think is a material change here as it relates to the third-party releases of the shareholder consultants. And that is to simply carve them out. And so the shareholder consultants are carved out -- with one exception I'll talk about in the second -- are carved out of the release, the third-party release, completely. And we hope that that just dispenses with the issue.

The one consultant that's not an outside thirdparty firm, which then exists on what used to be Exhibit H - and we've updated it to be Schedule X, I believe, now -is simply Norton Rose, Your Honor. And they do fit into a
different category. They have been both the family and the
Debtors' -- with their predecessor, Chadbourne & Parke,
counsel to the firm for decades. They have been subject to
discovery here. They have been investigated. And we do
think it's appropriate to keep them on the exhibit. But
we've otherwise carved everybody else out.

Because of that, we then removed the defined willful related party claim, as we just don't believe it's necessary anymore and doesn't and shouldn't probably apply to the other parties that were in the release who are similarly situated to what I would call the core releasees here.

I'll note further, Your Honor, if the exhibit had

my permanent, Milbank -- and I don't think I'm stretching to say the release of professionals is pretty standard in any release -- but we heard the commentary of why does a certain named firm need a release.

The fact is, my firm doesn't need a release, so we carved ourself out. And we did that because I, along with all of my co-advisors here, we do not want to be a distraction here. So Milbank is out, and the other named third-party advisors are also off the schedule. And we hope that that goes a material way to addressing all of the concerns.

The other issue we tried to address, Your Honor, is to be further responsive on the non-opioid-related claims. And as you'll remember from Monday, Your Honor, there was some colloquy over what did that mean. First, I'll say we've added "reckless" to the definition there of the type of conduct, the predicate conduct or the predicate state of mind, I should say, that would trigger that.

Your Honor asked me if that definition picked up fraud, and I incorrectly said no. And I apologize for that. I went back and read it and I think under that definition, it already picked up fraud. And actually, things are a lot broader than fraud, are not limited to fraud. And the operative word, when you take a look at it, Your Honor, is "unlawful." All right? So, clearly, fraud is unlawful, but

unlawful isn't limited to fraud. And I think that that word really does it. But we did add fraud or fraudulent conduct to the definition, just to be clear.

We changed then, Your Honor, the definition from willful misconduct to non-opioid actual misconduct claim.

We just think that that is a more descriptive term. I've had a lot of semi-scholarly colleagues try to tell me that willful misconduct was confusing, so we just try to take that confusion out. That, Your Honor, applies to all the releasees. So if all the releasees are on for non-opioid liability are subject to the non-opioid actual misconduct claim.

And then, if you look -- when you go through this, Your Honor, and you know, I will give you the cite. In 10.7(v), where the heaviest blackline is, that is simply to pick up the indemnification claims that could otherwise be asserted against the Sacklers. If we're carving out from the releasees the -- I'll call it the McKinseys of the world -- we can't have, of course, a backdoor coming back in. And we just clarified that language in there. It was always like that, Your Honor, but we just needed to change the words in order to pick it up because of other changes we've made.

Your Honor, that's the overview. I'm happy to go into some detail. I'm also happy to answer any questions

you might have.

THE COURT: Well, again, I haven't had a chance to parse the language, but I appreciate the overview. I guess what I would say -- and I appreciate that these changes, as you've described them, are constructive and have narrowed considerably the release -- is that I'll carve out some time at the end of today's argument for people who have objected on the basis of the breadth of the release, and that only. Not any other aspects of the release, but just the breadth of the release, to have the chance to point out to me their view, if they still have it, that the releases still overly broad.

on the Zoom today have the proposed allocation of time for oral argument today. And just at some time at the end of that schedule for people to point out to me if they want to, and for the Debtors and others to respond, issues that remain as to the breadth of the release language. And that will --

MS. UZZI: Thank you --

THE COURT: -- give me a chance to look it over at the lunch break also.

MR. UZZI: Very well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. HUEBNER: Okay. So, Your Honor, I believe

that brings us to the first item on the agenda, which is best interests of Ditech. Mr. Goldman asked for 35 minutes, so we're fine with that. I may run a little bit longer than my initial plan of 20, for fairness and symmetry, and because I have something I want to begin with before I actually head into best interests.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, there was some interesting colloquies from the Court, pretty scholarly, frankly, for those of us who are, you know, bankruptcy folks. On Pages 180-182 of the transcript, and then again on 57-259, about the factor of Metromedia that requires, or seems to contemplate, creditors being paid in full, which just makes no analytic sense, because there's nothing to release if creditors are paid in full. And Your Honor cited millennium labs and their fairness test, the much more recent Third Circuit decision, as seemingly a logical imperative and much more sensible.

In addition, Your Honor, you actually cited ourself to 1129(a)(7) on Page 181, Line 12-16, and said, you know, isn't this the right answer? Because if 1127 requires -- 1129(a)(7) requires that you're getting more than you would get in another scenario, is not definitionally fair, so that proving the best interests test may actually be kind of what the Third Circuit meant.

Third Circuit Standard, as of course I think all litigants in this case know, in their recent decision from 2019, is that, "The hallmarks of permissible nonconsensual releases are fairness, necessity to reorganization, and specific factual findings to support these conclusions."

That's Metromedia at Page 139. I'm sorry -- Millenium -- I'm just so tired -- at Page 139.

know, when I now will launch into my best interests argument, which is really so important because it is the view of basically everybody in the case, rather than one objector, implicitly or explicitly, that this is the highest and best recovery for creditors, and it is better than a liquidation, plus the pursuit of third-party claims. I think that actually the Third Circuit maybe had it right. And fairness means, you know, if you can't do better than what we're getting for you under this plan, what else should we be doing but this plan?

So with that, if Your Honor will let me launch it.

THE COURT: Can I -- and I, at risk of -- and I don't think it's -- it doesn't derail your argument, but I want to be clear. The best interests test, as set out in Section 1129(7), is a statutory test, and one needs to follow the words of the statute. And the courts to some extent disagree about what the statute says, based on its

plain terms.

What I was addressing contemplates one interpretation of the best interests test. But even if one takes the other interpretation of it, which is that you don't look at what one gets on one's claim in the case, you just look at what you get on the claim in the case, I think that fairness, in the sense described not only by the Millenium Court, but actually in the earlier section of Quigley by Judge Bernstein, requires some analysis, if it can be done, into what sort of recovery the enjoined parties would have if the plan were not confirmed. And that's not applying strictly the best interests test. That's a more rigorous view of fairness than one might normally apply to a 9019 settlement, in other words.

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, I agree completely. And as you'll hopefully here in a few minutes, I'm going to cover every alternative interpretation of 1129(a)(7), and show you why we are extraordinarily comfortable that we meet the statute's 24:16 we meet the statute's \_\_\_\_

Your Honor, 1129(a)(7), as of course everyone knows, requires that the Debtors demonstrate that rejecting impaired creditors who receive no less under the plan than they would in the hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation.

Here, Your Honor, the Debtors' proposed plan is expected to distribute well in excess of \$5.5 billion in

cash on account of contingent liability claims. There is no dispute that creditors will recover billions more under claims against the Debtors than they would recover if the Debtors had to liquidate.

The only possible dispute is whether the rejecting creditors could actually recover, in a Debtor liquidation on their own third-party claims against the Sacklers and others, value that exceeds all of their many recoveries under the plan, including the settlement of those third-party claims, but as to a very small number of parties is being imposed by the will and the votes and positions of the overwhelming majority. There are three principal objections why this objection fails.

First, as Your Honor just noted, the Second

Circuit has not actually determined whether third-party

claims should be considered at all in the best interests

analysis. And other courts that are also thoughtful, do not

agree with Quigley and Ditech.

The AHC argued this in their brief at Pages 155158. I will actually rest of their papers on this point,
because I actually prefer to spend my time on the assumption
that it is obligatory, including for the larger fairness
reasons, for us to get the Court and all parties comfortable
that even rejecting creditors do better under this plan than
any other alternative we know of.

So, Your Honor, if you accord with Quigley and Ditech, which is just fine for us and many others, it is clear beyond peradventure that under the holdings of those cases, we are not required to assign a specific dollar value to the potential recoveries on rejecting creditors' unknowable, inestimable third-party claims.

To the contrary, both of those cases make it crystal clear that the value of third-party claims is only to be considered when the claims are both, one, not speculative, and two, capable of estimation.

Let's take a close look at those cases. Quigley is an asbestos case in which Judge Bernstein estimated the value of third-party claims against Pfizer, Quigley's parent, based on a 19-year track record of settlements, for which Pfizer had paid over \$1.2 billion and a mathematical average of 23 percent of the claims asserted against it over almost two decades. 437 B.R. 134, 146. But that two-decade track record, the claims at issue were not speculative and were capable of estimation.

In Ditech, the Debtor tried to do something really pretty sneaky, and they were caught. They actually, in fact, estimated the settlement and resolution value of the varied third-party claims for some purposes under their plan and (indiscernible). And then -- but not for these purposes. And Judge Wiles said, no way, you can't pick some

purposes and not others. You have already told me that the claims are not speculative and hypothetical, but rather that you can estimate them. 606 B.R. 544, 620-621.

The contrast to the instant facts could not possibly be greater. Unlike Quigley, there is no multi-decade history of judgments or settlements or percent allocations against the third parties to draw from.

And unlike in Ditech, the Debtors have consistently stated that the value of an individual rejecting creditor's direct claims, what they would actually recover some day if this plan failed, is the very definition of unknowable and unquantifiable.

Your Honor, given the Debtors' extensive record evidence on liquidation, including its DelConte expert report, Paragraph 9, et seq., the disclosure settlement Sections 173-175, the objectors really need to demonstrate that their own actual recoveries on direct claims in a liquidation would be massive, knowable and quantifiable.

I will stop at 11 reasons why that quixotic endeavor cannot succeed. One, the terrible destruction of estate value in a liquidation. It is uncontested and uncontestable that the liquidation of the Debtors would greatly reduce the value available to go to these very creditors. DelConte at 9; Turner at 22; disclosure Appendix B at 11. So those billions get wiped from creditor

recoveries in a liquidation.

Two A and two B, massive professional fees and totally uncertain allocation of any recovery to specific creditors from the estates in a liquidation. Liquidating the estates and resolving the hundreds of thousands of claims filed, will require a multi-year massive investment of professional these.

Eliquidating the claims and resolving the relative entitlement of creditors vis-à-vis one another, once Phase 1 mediation is erased, would be an intercreditor litigation maelstrom of victims and stakeholders against victims and stakeholders, whose outcome is unknowable. The only thing we do know is that rational fees will be at least half a billion and maybe more than \$1.5 billion. DelConte declaration at Paragraph 36.

And as Mr. Shore, who actually represents tens of thousands of PI victims, told the Court: "Do not forget. We are the largest group, the largest number of voters, the largest claimants." And as he had told many of us, they will be back if there is no deal under this plan.

Number 3, reduced recovery on the estate claims against the Sacklers. The estate might recover less on its claims against the Sacklers in a liquidation. Mr. DelConte sets forth multiple reasons for this in his report. See DelConte declaration at 33. This result is also described

in our disclosure statement. It's painful, but it's true.

No party cross-examined Mr. DelConte on this sworn

testimony.

And then we have the testimony of Ms. Conroy, who has been suing Purdue for 19 years under his partner and (indiscernible) partner, named partner, who was there alongside her. Her testimony, August 16, transcript 18, 9-22, is that this deal reflects a peace premium where we're getting more than we would get if global peace were not able to be on offer.

Four. The DOJ's claims. The DOJ has an agreed \$2 billion forfeiture claim with superpriority status. They also have billions of dollars of other claims, that if the deal falls apart, they will likely assert, or likewise, in rem claims, priority claims, nondischargeable claims, because they're the federal government, et cet.

Those claims might absorb every dollar of net estate liquidation proceeds, leaving nothing for anybody else. Because among so many other things, even if parts of the deal stuck, we don't think we can satisfy the conditions for getting the \$1.775 billion forfeiture credit that is in fact on offer in the settlement this Court approved, with them ironically over the objection of the remaining objectors to confirmation.

Five -- which is a coalition of sorts. Instead of

four or five or more billion dollars that non-federal governmental creditors in Class 4 are getting, they will likely get close to zero. The consequence, when you add up all the predecessor points of the value destruction in seismic into creditor reallocations that I have outlined, is massive and uncontroverted.

Mr. DelConte's liquidation analysis lays out in two of the three scenarios, Class 4 creditors get zero.

Only in a high case scenario, there's \$699.1 million for all creditors to share, not just the rejecting creditors in Class 4.

The objectors did not question any of these conclusions, although they had ample opportunity in days of trial testimony. I talked on Monday about my simplistic view that we're here to apply facts to law. No objector designated a competing expert. No objector submitted an expert report with a competing liquidation analysis. No objector designated a rebuttal expert, critiquing Mr.

DelConte's analysis. No party even deposed Mr. DelConte.

And no party spent any material time on cross-examination on these issues. If they meant it, we should have tried to prove it.

There is no evidence of any kind from any party at all that the likely recovery on their own direct claims is concrete for estimable. The Debtors' evidence that the

claims are speculative and not capable of estimation is overwhelming.

Six -- and a lot of these are tied to the public good and to helping America and Americans -- abatement. Dr. Gaurisankaran testified, without contravention, and I quote, "Abatement programs that reduce opioid misuse for a population will confer economic value to all entities that serve the same population and claim to incur costs because of opioid misuse." Declaration at 47. And that abatement results in "multiplier effects" that provide creditors, especially governments, I believe, with value that may well exceed the dollar value distributed under the plan.

In the liquidation, there can be no guarantee that all or most or even a substantial portion of the funds creditors someday recover from the Sacklers would actually have to go to abatement, and thus, this important multiplier is gone.

I do want to reiterate, Your Honor, one last time, my apology to Washington and Maryland, who seemingly passed statutes -- who did pass statutes -- of course, what they said to the Court is true -- directing their recoveries must go to abatement. I got that wrong and I'm very sorry about that. But as I also then noted, there are many, many other states whose situation is exactly the contrary, and there are tens of thousands of other creditors who would be in

line with no obligations, as they have extraordinarily agreed to in this case, to dedicate all of their recoveries, other than the PIs, to abatement.

Seven. Objectors would need to bridge a chasm of billions of dollars to win an 1129(a)(7) argument, because they are billions in the hole due to the total wipeout of their plan recoveries. And it's from there they must begin to try to argue that exclusively and solely from their own potential recoveries on non-speculative claims against the third parties, they would get more than the billions that they would make unavailable to everybody if the plan was not confirmed.

Eight. It is utterly impossible for any of the few objecting rejecting creditors to demonstrate that they, and only they -- and that's the critical phrase -- and only they, will when the frenetic race to the courthouse against third parties.

The objectors' suggestion that the Debtors could have hired a damages expert to addressed the objectors' best interest argument only highlights the staggering depth of their misunderstanding of the law. Damages are about claims that one could assert. The best interests test is about recoveries; what I actually do better than this plan at the end.

It is beyond cavil, Your Honor, that no claimant

could possibly credibly predict that the actual recovery on their claim against the Sacklers, after years of internecine warfare among creditors and disorderly races to hundreds of thousands -- or for thousands of courthouses -- is knowable. It's like trying to solve a single equation that has hundreds or thousands of variables. 4(a) plus 5(b) minus 5(c) plus 8(d) equals X? It cannot be solved.

And it has nothing to do -- nothing -- with the merits and strength and validity of the claims of any individual entity against the Sacklers. Because for an individual rejecting creditor to prove that it itself would actually recover more, it can't only show that it's likely to get a big judgment. It has to show that no one else would, and only they would.

Because logic dictates that if the three rejecting states who have made a best interests objection have meritorious claims, so do all the non-rejecting states. And if all the states have meritorious claims, then it stands to reason that many other public creditors also have meritorious claims. And if all states and tribes and municipalities have valid claims against the Sacklers, likely so do the hundreds of thousands of private contingent liability claimants.

And every one of these groups for whom the Debtor is a fiduciary has filed proofs of claim under penalty of

perjury, that they believe that they have those claims against the Debtors and the Sacklers, which is why the States' \$2.156 trillion claim, as large as it is, is dwarfed 20 times over by the \$39 trillion of other filed claims.

And that's only 10 percent of them, because while the states' claim was liquidated, most of the other claims, 90 percent of them, were not.

Nine. Thousands of claimants would be chasing a smaller and possibly (indiscernible) of assets. Let's assume that direct claimants are able to recover every penny of the aggregate personal wealth of the individual members of the Sackler Family, named as Defendants in the third-party litigation. Claimants would still come up billion short of the \$4.375 billion that the Sackler Families have agreed to pay under the settlement, and even more billions short of the \$5.5 billion total in minimum projected value that those creditor standard receiver under the plan.

And during the years that people were suing the Sacklers, one would imagine the Sacklers will pay hundreds of millions or more in legal fees, and might, for example, use their assets to settle with non-rejecting creditors. So if non-rejecting creditors get settlements, then rejecting creditors even more can't do better than they would do under the plan. Which is why the intercreditor complexity, which seemingly, virtually every single party in the entire case,

except for nine, seemingly understands and has reluctantly and painfully led them to conclude that this settlement, which does leave the Sacklers with material wealth, is better for them, the claimants, than any other alternative.

Ten. Claimants cannot reasonably estimate the prospect of they themselves successfully recovering on their direct claims. I am not going to cite -- and I am most certainly not ever going to accord with or endorse the evidence and argument submitted by the Sacklers about their lack of culpability and their defenses to collection with respect to their trusts. Not now. Not ever. They are the Defendants and estate is the Plaintiff, along with many others. And if we do not settle, we will be suing them for billions of dollars. Make no mistake.

But what I am is the fiduciary and spokesman for the shareholders. The Debtors didn't vote on the plan.

That's not our job. But 38 attorneys general, and the UCC, and the AHC, and the MSG, and the adult (indiscernible), and the pediatric (indiscernible), and the tribes, and the hospitals, and the TPPs, and the rate payers, and the Board's Special Committee, considered a great, great many things in deciding to accept this settlement.

I think it is fair to say that while we disagree,

Jersey law, Wyoming and Connecticut trusts, and Mr.

Cushing's testimony, do raise litigable issues with respect

to the ability to recover on direct claims against the Sacklers from the very material assets held in their (indiscernible) trusts.

As I noted on Monday, Your Honor -- ironically, I think it was Paragraph 239 of our brief -- the Debtors have the strongest claims against those trusts, because we have in rem claims based on the irrevocable vested in the estate of the fraudulent transfer and analogous claims. Those are not direct claims. So they don't figure into the hypothetical 1129(a)(7) showing when you're trying to weigh a direct claim as an add-on to what you might get in a liquidation.

And Your Honor, in this regard, the litany I just read to you, it is incredibly telling that in this case, with over half a million creditors, there is one objection, one, that makes a best interests objection. One. Mr. Gold's pleading on behalf of DC, Maryland and Connecticut. And with no disrespect intended, because I think he's doing a terrific job and he's a very serious lawyer, he made that objection in one page of his brief. No factual support for the types of claims that would need to be proved.

THE COURT: Actually, I thought it was just

Connecticut --

MR. HUEBNER: Finally, Your Honor --

THE COURT: I thought it was just Connecticut and

Maryland on that one. DC joined the other one --

MR. HUEBNER: Oh, Your Honor, I apologize. I thought that objection said filed on behalf of DC, Maryland and Connecticut. But if DC didn't join that argument, then it's one objection on behalf of two parties, as opposed to three. But I think, you know -- I think the point is the same.

THE COURT: You know what? I was wrong. It does include DC.

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, Judges are never wrong.

THE COURT: Well, I was wrong.

MR. HUEBNER: Number 11. Your Honor, Number 11.

Claimants rejecting creditors making a best interests

argument cannot possibly quantify or know or estimate the

massive cost and delay to them of lengthy and chaotic

jurisdiction, because as many as 58 jurisdictions all over

the world. No creditor could possibly allege without

speculating what they would actually recover net of the cost

of litigation and collection and delay, after years of

(indiscernible) warfare by thousands of creditors with all

against all.

For these 11 reasons, Your Honor, among others, the direct claims of three creditors out of the hundreds of thousands who have raised a best interests test, I believe are literally the archetype -- actually the archetype of

claims that in these complex circumstances are speculative and not capable of estimation.

Your Honor, that brings me to my third and final meta point. While I hope that my reasons each individually, and certainly collectively, demonstrate the views of so many for whom I'm speaking today, that rejecting creditors would not do better in the liquidation, and would do ever so terribly worse even inclusive of their direct claims. I have overwhelmingly, in fact, perfect empirical evidence from July and August of 2021 for the unassailable veracity of this position.

done the work for years, litigating against Purdue and the Sacklers, weighing the alternatives, and fighting like hell for their citizens against Purdue and the Sacklers. And they have concluded that the Plan provides superior value to states than does liquidation. This is true for this -- many other creditor groups, who I will not again list, who support this Plan. And between all these parties, they are represented by many of the most sophisticated, and one might argue fearsome, mass tort plaintiffs' firms and other litigation firms in this country whose clients I can guarantee you, having done almost nothing else for three and a half year, have suffered at least as much loss and have unthinkable antipathy for the Sacklers as any of the Plan

objectors.

In stark contrast to the wild speculation to the nth power, they would be involved in assessing what an individual rejecting creditor, out of 614,000 competitors, would actually recover in liquidation, the market of states identically situated to the one best interest set of objectors, has spoken on this point with extraordinary clarity, and chosen which gives them the better recovery.

And of course, Your Honor, the bankruptcy system under the guidance of the Supreme Court, love market tests to prove things. See e.g., 203 N. Lasalle, 119 S.Ct. 1411. There's no better way to know what something is worth than what people will actually choose when faced with a choice.

80 percent of identically situated claimants clearly think that their direct claims against the Sackler cannot close the more than \$5.5 billion gap between what people are getting under the Plan to help their citizens in these terrible times. And the alternative, whose worst feature would be creditors fighting one another and competing another.

And for the record, Your Honor, the \$5.5 billion number that I have been using is exceedingly conservative because it does not take into account, as our evidence shows recoveries on insurance proceeds, which we hope are the billions, and terminal asset value when NewCo is monetized,

that it's slated also to flow all but exclusively to governmental creditors, these very objecting creditors, for abatement with its multiplier under the Plan.

I also didn't count PHI, which many people believe itself could be worth billions, especially to states by avoiding further damage, and helping their citizens, or the public spillover multiplier. None of that is in the math. \$5.5 billion is just the cash in the sworn evidence and nothing more.

And, Your Honor, this is therefore a much more central plaintivist case than just best interest. The value hold that any alternative to this Plan, and certainly liquidation, would create for all creditors, but for the states far more than anyone else, is way bigger than \$5.5 billion, and it cannot possibly be refilled and then exceeded by a liquidation and direct suits against the Sacklers.

I should also note, Your Honor, that I did not include or take into account Mr. Prices argument that Your Honor Mr. Gold about on Monday, that over \$4 billion out of the \$10.4 billion in cash that the Sacklers took out of Purdue, which in 2008 and 2019, went directly -- directly to state and federal governments at the Sacklers' request to pay their person income taxes. Because they set Purdue up as a limited partnership, the Sacklers, it's not a taxpayer.

I believe, Your Honor, cited a figure of \$285 million in the Atkinson declaration about Connecticut; ironically, the objector on best interest ground. And the federal government whose number is 10 times that, who might face serious exposure as the transferee's a preferential transfers that were made for the benefit of the Sacklers. There is a day they have to pay that money back so that all creditors could share it, not just the data to keep it.

And that also goes into best interest because in a liquidation, that money might come back into the estate to be shared by all. But as I said, I left many, many things out of my core analysis because it was enough.

To assume, Your Honor, that 80 percent of the states are wrong about what is in the best interest of states is not rational. And even out of the nine objectors, only two states and D.C. even made the objection at all, which is more telling. States have accepted the Plan, as all other creditors have, by an overwhelming margin -- all other creditor classes and groups have because they believe that while it is painful and difficult and horrible to the lives of many to leave the Sacklers with wealth, the Plan furthers their best interests and provides value billions in excess of what would result from the meltdown of the estates and resuming the litigation free-for-all that prevailed before these cases began.

Page 48 1 Your Honor, except for lawyers, nobody does better 2 in a liquidation, nobody, which would destroy so much that 3 so many have worked for so long to bring -- to bring to fruition, to help victims and abate the opioid crisis. We 4 ask that the best interest objection be overruled. 5 6 THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. 7 Mr. Goldman, I think you're taking this on behalf of Connecticut, Maryland, and D.C.? 8 MR. GOLDMAN: Yes, Your Honor, and I can add to 9 10 that list since we have been coordinating among all the 11 objecting states, and the states of Oregon, Delaware, 12 Vermont, Rhodes Island, and Maryland, and Washington. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Although I don't think any of 14 those actually raised this issue. 15 MR. GOLDMAN: I would correct the record, Your 16 Honor. Washington and Oregon did join in our objection at 17 Paragraph 104 of their objection. 18 THE COURT: Okay. MR. GOLDMAN: So, there are actually five -- well, 19 20 four states and the District of Columbia that are advancing 21 this objection. 22 THE COURT: Okay. MR. GOLDMAN: So, let me proceed. I think Mr. 23 24 Huebner did a good job of explaining the best interest test, 25 but if I could just go over it briefly to set the framework

for my argument? As you mentioned, it requires that in a peered class of creditors, each of the class members must either accept the Plan or will receive under the Plan, at least as much as they would receive in a Chapter 7.

THE COURT: Actually, that isn't the specific
language of 1129(a)(7), right? The provision says, "With
respect to each impaired class or claims... each holder of a
claim or interest of such class has accepted the plan; or" - and then here's the key language -- "will receive" will
replayed -- "or retained under the plan on account of such
claim... property of a value as of the effective date of the
plan that is not less than the amount that such holder would
so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated under
chapter 7 of this title". I emphasize the word, "so"
because I think it's arguably there for a reason. And as
the AHC objection points out, it would seem to modify on
account of such claim, and therefore, focus the Court on the
claims' recovery in Chapter. 7, as opposed to just recovery
generally.

I don't know if you have a response on that point?

MR. GOLDMAN: Of course, both the courts in

Quigley and Dietech have rejected that --

THE COURT: They -- well, actually, they didn't reject it in that the argument wasn't made to them. There's no discussion of that reading or the meaning of the word, or

-- of "so" in that provision, in either of those cases that they cite. But I appreciate that Judge Garrity and Judge Bernstein are certainly -- or -- but Judge Bernstein's now retired, so are or were certainly excellent judges, but it's an argument that's been made to me that I don't think was made to them.

MR. GOLDMAN: Well, I would point out first that the Debtor has not argued for any back in their brief --

THE COURT: But AHC did. The --

MR. GOLDMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: -- the Ad Hoc group of governmental entities.

MR. GOLDMAN: I would -- I would respond that I don't think "so" would change the idea that was expressed in the Dietech and the Quigley cases, that in the Chapter 7, those creditors would be retaining on account of their claim, rights against third parties. That plan proposes two weeks.

So, I would argue that the single word "so" would not alter the analysis that was articulated in both of those cases that where they distinguished between the Chapter 13 test, which doesn't include the word "retain," to conclude that what they would retain in Chapter 7 is the right to go against third parties who are proposed to be released.

THE COURT: Okay. Well --

MR. GOLDMAN: That's -- that's fair.

or not it's under 1129(a)(7), too.

2 THE COURT: -- again, I -- as I said to Mr. Huebner, I'm not sure ultimately this matters because I 3 think consistent with the section of the Quigley case as 4 5 well as other cases that have considered plans that have sought to impose a third-party release or injunction, it is 7 incumbent on the Court to look at what's being given up 8 under the plan in terms of evaluating that request, whether

So, I just wanted to note the issue. I -- to me, I can't ignore the word. I will note also that "claim" is not defined as a claim against the debtor in 1015 of the Code. On the other hand, it would, I think, open up a fairly large can of worms if courts started to look at all sorts of recoveries from third-party sources, that one would get under it in Chapter 7 as a mandatory exercise for confirming a plan.

But maybe it's -- maybe it's academic given the larger point that I think controls here, which is that I have to look at -- beyond the 9019 analysis because that really applies to the Debtors' estate and creditors -- what it is that the injunction of third-party claims would deprive the objectors of, or alternatively, whether it's actually a fair deal for them.

MR. GOLDMAN: May I proceed, Your Honor?

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Pg 52 of 351 Page 52 1 THE COURT: Sure. Yes. Go ahead. 2 MR. GOLDMAN: Okay. So, as the Dietech court 3 observed, according -- from an earlier Southern District 4 case, the command of Section 1129(a)(7)(ii) is perhaps the 5 strongest protection creditors have in Chapter 11. 6 I think Mr. Huebner's argument that because 80 or 7 90 percent of the states have accepted the Plan, should 8 somehow mean that the best interest test is satisfied. 9 Well, if you go with the majority or super-majority of 10 creditors who are voting in favor of the Plan, that 11 essentially wipes out the purpose of the best interest test, 12 which was -- is to protect the dissenting creditors. It's a 13 totality to say that because the majority voted yes, they 14 must be right. 15 That is a sophistic, S-O-P-H-I-S-T-I-C --16 THE COURT: Right. 17 MR. GOLDMAN: -- argument. 18 THE COURT: Right. The purpose of the test is --MR. GOLDMAN: So --19 20 THE COURT: -- really to protect the minority on 21 your -- I understand that. 22 MR. GOLDMAN: Fine. And the Plan proponent bears 23 the burden of proof to demonstrated with evidence that the 24 test has been satisfied. They can't shift to the burden to

the dissenting creditor, as suggested by Mr. Huebner, to

Pg 53 of 351 Page 53 1 prove what it would recover on its direct claims. It's the 2 Debtors' burden of proof on best interest. 3 And just to remind the Court, the dissenting creditors here are California, Connecticut, Delaware, the 4 5 District of Columbia, Maryland, New Hampshire, Oregon, Rhode 6 Island, Vermont, and Washington. 7 And the best interest of creditors requires a 8 comparison of what those dissenting creditors would receive 9 under the Plan, and what they were to receive in a 10 hypothetical litigation. It doesn't say what all of the 11 Class 4 creditors would receive under the Plan in relation 12 to what they all would receive in a liquidation. 13 analysis is focused on the dissenting creditors. And for 14 that first part of the test, the Debtors did not even 15 present evidence of the amount the dissenting creditors 16 would receive under the Plan. 17 Now, although Mr. DelConte testified that it would

be a multiplication exercise --

THE COURT: No, I actually have --

MR. GOLDMAN: -- based on the allocation --

THE COURT: -- I actually have a chart of what each of those states would receive under the Plan and I don't think that's controverted.

MR. GOLDMAN: Well, my point is, they didn't present evidence of that, Your Honor, prepare a chart.

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Page 54 1 - like --2 THE COURT: I mean, I believe it's -- I believe it's in the record. I -- we -- I didn't -- we didn't make 3 4 it up. 5 MR. GOLDMAN: Be that as it may, they didn't 6 present it in their brief as to what we would receive or in 7 argument to make the comparison of what we would receive in 8 a liquidation. 9 And on the other side of the equation --10 THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. I thought you -- I 11 don't have a specific number of what they would receive in a 12 liquidation. I do have what they would receive under the 13 Plan, at least an estimate of what they would receive. 14 MR. GOLDMAN: That's what I meant. That's what I 15 meant, so I acknowledge that. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. GOLDMAN: All I'm saying is there wasn't --18 that wasn't presented by Mr. DelConte, it was presented in 19 the Debtors' brief as to what we would receive, to make the 20 comparison. 21 And on the other side of the equation, because in 22 Chapter 7 there would be no third-party releases, it's our contention there must be some proof of what the dissenting 23 24 states would receive if they were permitted to go forward 25 against the Sacklers. And yet, no such proof was provided.

Mr. DelConte testified that no attempt was even made to estimate or project what the dissenting states would recover on claims against the Sacklers. That was at the 8/13 Transcript, Page 61. And that his liquidation analysis did not include the value for any of the direct claims of Purdue creditors against any of the Sacklers. Ant that was at Page 58 of his testimony.

Indeed, the Debtors did not even attempt to ascertain university -- universal creditors in these estates that are asserting claims against the Sacklers. We acknowledge that Mr. DelConte, at Page 57 of his testimony, that failure stands in stark contrast to the evaluation that was done in the Dietech case by Alex Partners. He should have at least attempted to identify and put a settlement value on the consumer claims that would have survived in Chapter 7 case in Dietech, and could have been asserted against the buyer of the consumer credit agreements there.

The Debtors attempt to excuse their lack of proof with the argument that the claims are speculative but not capable of estimation, that is not supported by anything other than the Debtors' counsel's say-so. The same argument was made by the debtors in Dietech and it was squarely rejected.

THE COURT: Well, it --

MR. GOLDMAN: There, the --

Page 56 1 THE COURT: -- it was made, but obviously it was 2 rejected because they'd actually quantified them. 3 MR. GOLDMAN: They tried -- they tried to quantify 4 them, and the court held that that was not acceptable proof. 5 And the consumer claims there that would have been 6 extinguished if --7 THE COURT: But even as -- even as quantified, there was no countervailing benefit at all in return for 8 9 them. 10 MR. GOLDMAN: In the sense of -- I'm not sure I 11 understand what Your Honor means. 12 THE COURT: There was no showing of any real 13 benefit to the -- to the consumers that were giving up those 14 claims other than the \$5 million. So, you had \$252 million 15 versus \$5 million. 16 MR. GOLDMAN: Well, I understand that, Your Honor, 17 my -- my point is that the claims -- the consumer claims --18 that would have been extinguished under the Plan by the 363 Sale of the consumer credit agreements, would have been 19 20 available to assert against the buyer in Chapter 7, a buyer 21 of the consumer credit agreements. And they were based on 22 very attenuated claims. 23 There were account misstatements, claims -wrongful -- claims of wrongful foreclosure, unfair 24

collection practices and the like, and they gave rise to

potential claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures

Act, the Truth in Lending Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act,

and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. All those claims

were unliquidated.

And based on the analysis done by Alex Partners,

3,900 proofs of claim were identified as being consumerrelated, and 265 proofs of claim having been matched to
pending litigation. No such analysis was done in this case.

THE COURT: But in -- in Dietech, Dietech and its predecessor had a history of dealing with these types of claims and with settling them, which was a basis for Alex Partners' analysis.

What I have here is something more attenuated. I have the settlements from the 2007 period. I have the settlement with the State of New York where the Sacklers themselves paid \$75,000. I have the settlement more recently with the State of Oklahoma, where they paid \$75 million. And I have a number of complaints, some of which have survived motions to dismiss, although largely on procedural grounds -- those motions being made largely on procedural grounds, such as noncompliance with federal law, preemption, or jurisdiction grounds. So, you just don't have the same type of track record here.

MR. GOLDMAN: You don't have the same type of track record, but I would point out that in neither of those

cases did the court hold that some sort of settlement history was a prerequisite to, you know, the finding that they weren't speculative or remote.

THE COURT: That's true.

MR. GOLDMAN: There was a settlement --

THE COURT: But they -- but they did rely on the settlement history.

MR. GOLDMAN: Oh, well, it's -- it would be hard to dispute that, Your Honor, and I do agree. However, I would point out in Dietech that the settlement history was only for about a year and a half, and it didn't include that many claims. That's not to say that because there is no settlement history, by necessity, claims are speculative and remote.

Remember, the Debtors, as Mr. Huebner pointed out in a prior hearing, there were a total of 18 experts that were hired in this case, albeit not all of them by the Debtor. And I find it more than curious that on this one issue, given all those experts and how creative the Debtors have managed to be in this case, didn't present any expert even on the issue of whether the claims themselves were speculative and incapable of estimation. They're just asking you to make that conclusion based on their say-so.

Mr. DelConte was not an expert on estimating claims or affixing damages. He said -- he gave the party

Page 59 1 line, that, well, we just didn't feel comfortable that we 2 could estimate these claims. But he wasn't the expert that was hired to do it. In fact, he acknowledged that the 3 Debtors didn't hire an expert to do that or even to tell the 4 5 Court that they weren't estimable. 6 THE COURT: Fair point. 7 MR. GOLDMAN: I just, again, point out and I recognize the difference on settlement history, but in 8 9 Pfizer -- or Quigley as well, the claims were unliquidated 10 and disputed, albeit there was some history for the court to 11 evaluate. But again, my point is, it's not a necessary 12 condition. No court has held that. And in Dietech, none of 13 the consumer claims at issue have even gone to judgement. 14 I would also point out that --15 THE COURT: But there had been -- but there had 16 been other consumer claims that had gone to the stage where 17 they were settled. 18 MR. GOLDMAN: Correct. And my point is they hadn't gone to judgment. 19 20 THE COURT: These particular ones, yeah. 21 MR. GOLDMAN: Yes, yes. 22 THE COURT: But I think there were similar claims 23 that had gone to judgment as well as some being settled. I 24 mean, frankly, I think they're some that have been ruled on

in the Southern District Bankruptcy Court.

MR. GOLDMAN: Your Honor, I'll defer -- I'll defer to you on that. I just -- I don't -- my -- I thought that based on the settlement data they had, that none had gone to judgment, but I'm not completely sure about that --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLDMAN: -- now that Your Honor has raised the point.

The fact -- it's ironic that the fact that no settlement and litigation data is available here is the result of the Debtors' own doing. I mean, the states have been prevented from continuing with actions against the Sacklers for almost two years by the preliminary injunction, that the Debtors were asked -- weren't even successful in getting. They shouldn't be able to turn around now and use that standstill to argue that the claims can't be valued because there's no settlement data.

But if the states had been permitted to go forward, we may very well have had some settlement data or judgments in either direction for the Court to make a decision on this task.

THE COURT: But I guess that goes to the other

point, which is the primary point I think that the Debtors

have been making, which is they have focused only lightly on

the strength of the states' claims against the Sacklers and

very heavily on the recovery that the states would have on

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Page 61

those claims.

MR. GOLDMAN: They haven't focused.

THE COURT: They have focused primarily on the recovery that the states would have on those claims.

MR. GOLDMAN: Yes. And I -- I will get to that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLDMAN: Point, Your Honor. But before I do that, I'd like to address the argument that they make in their brief that in order for it to be true that holders of all third-party claims would be better off in a liquidation because of the value of claims released under the Plan, the aggregate recovery due in those claims, it would be -- it exceeds \$4.8 billion.

Now, Mr. DelConte confirmed, the Debtors made no attempt to even ascertain the universe of creditors that are asserting claims against the Sacklers. The Debtors are simply assuming that every creditor in the case would assert claims against the Sacklers and that all those claims would be completely homogenous, would not vary in their merit, or type of claim, and that is simply not a valid assumption.

They did not do the analysis that was done in

Ditech to see which creditors were asserting claims against

the Sacklers, and I'm not aware of any proof of claim in the

case that was asserted against the Sacklers as opposed to

the Debtor.

Second, the best interest test requires looking at what the dissenting creditors would receive on their direct claims. We'll recover, I acknowledge recovery, and now with the holders of all third-party claims, which the Debtors haven't even identified, would receive, in a hypothetical --

THE COURT: But I think the point is the dilutive effect of the claims that actually are, we know, just leave it to that. The claims of the individual states filed against the Debtors, and I think we know a fair number of the governmental entities, non-state governmental entities, as well as the liquidated value of those claims.

I think their point is that even if you confine it to that aggregate amount, there would be an enormous dilutive effect, not that you would measure what the others got, but that the effect of their pursuit of those claims would dilute the objector's recovery, along with various other things too, like the cost and delay.

MR. GOLDMAN: I do understand the point, but I'm not sure that it's a valid assumption that every state is asserting claims against the Sacklers; not all states did file claims against the Sacklers. I don't think any effort was made to identify which complaints were actually filed. And if they weren't filed, which states intended to make claims against the Sacklers, but not because of the Chapter 11 filing in September of 2019 and the preliminary

injunction.

So my point is they simply haven't been identified. They've asked Your Honor to assume that everyone would make claims against the Sacklers, but there really is no evidence that all of them would is my point.

And as to the competing claims of the estates against the trust, I would submit that analysis ignores that if just three states get judgments against one or more of the Sacklers, they could be put into involuntary bankruptcy where the interest in their offshore trusts would be susceptible to becoming property of their estates. No analysis was done on the effect of a potential bankruptcy filing and what that would mean in terms of their interests in the trusts and whether the estates' claims against the trust would prevail or have priority over those interests that could possibly become property of the estate.

THE COURT: Can we just --

MR. GOLDMAN: There's no --

THE COURT: I think you're making two points there and I want to just make sure I understand them.

There would be estate claims that would be asserted by Purdue in a liquidation against the trust, fraudulent transfer claims. We do have expert testimony on that, and as well as the recoverability of that. Parties have said that they would dispute it if, in fact, there was

litigation, but they haven't disputed it in this case.

Under the stipulation, there's no adverse consequence to them for having not disputed it.

And then I think you're saying that in a Sackler parties bankruptcy, the assets of the estate or his or her estate would become property of the estate. But there is testimony, I believe, that most, if not all, of those trusts are spendthrift trusts, which you would have to adjudicate in, I believe, Jersey.

MR. GOLDMAN: Well, to the extent those trusts are self-settled with monies from the settlors, I think they're vulnerable to attack. The cases cited by the Debtor in its brief about the Greenwich v. Tyson case in Connecticut, they all presume that the trusts were not self-settled. Self-settled trusts are not given protection from creditors.

So I would just make the point that they could be vulnerable to that type of challenge in an individual bankruptcy. But even getting beyond that, you know, the --

THE COURT: But again, there would be a factual determination of that in a Sackler bankruptcy, an individual Sackler personal bankruptcy, but then you'd have to enforce that judgment against the assets of the trust, which I think mean you'd have to go through Jersey. And when I say Jersey, I don't mean the state of New Jersey, I mean the bailiwick of New Jersey.

Page 65 1 MR. GOLDMAN: I understand. I understand what you 2 mean. 3 THE COURT: Right. MR. GOLDMAN: And I acknowledge that, Your Honor. 4 But I know the states, the states would be poised to do that 5 6 I'm sure. 7 THE COURT: Well, they might well be poised, but 8 they didn't cross-examine Mr. Cushing on their ability to 9 actually move from being poised to collecting. MR. GOLDMAN: Well, I'm merely pointing out that 10 11 that analysis on the bankruptcy aspect of this was not done 12 in terms of an individual bankruptcy of any of the Sacklers 13 that might suffer judgments from the states. 14 And beyond that, I'm presuming since they would be 15 themselves the subject of Chapter 11 cases, their post-16 bankruptcy income would also become part of their estates 17 and, you know, going forward. 18 So the trust would not be the only source of recovery. You'd also have their interest in the IACs that 19 20 would come into their bankruptcy estates and potentially --21 well, basically, all of their assets and interest in 22 property, and no analysis was done on that. And I think that it's important that it had to 23 24 have been done because in the absence of a confirmed plan 25 and if the states are committed to go forward, we would

maintain it's likely that the estates would obtain judgments against one or more of the Sacklers and is a likelihood that they could be subject to a bankruptcy proceeding.

And I would just also note that this idea that the disclosure statement and the assumption that these claims are just speculative and not capable of estimation shouldn't be held to satisfy their burden of proof on the best interest of creditors test, given its importance to dissenting creditors like the ones we have here.

As the Bankruptcy Court stated in In re. Mcorp,

137 B.R. at 228, a proposed plan of reorganization may not

be confirmed where the evidence is not sufficient on which

to base an independent determination that the proposed plan

is in the best interest to creditors. And I submit that was

not done here.

Just to briefly address a few points that Mr. Huebner made. I don't want to forget those.

I viewed his point that we can't prove the authority that we can prevail on our claims or get a recovery as effectively shifting the burden of proof on the best interest of creditors test. It's not our burden to prove what we would recover. They made this point in their brief that we didn't submit expert testimony on what we'd recover. It's not our burden of proof.

On this issue of the taxes that Connecticut and

Page 67 1 other states may have received from the tax distribution, I 2 think is a complete red herring. Each of the states was 3 immediate transferee of that money. So if we took in good 4 faith and without knowledge, we're protected under Section 5 550, and there's no colorable claim that the states didn't 6 take tax money in good faith. 7 With that, Your Honor, I --THE COURT: So the states -- I mean, I think -- I 8 9 don't want to really -- I think that the personal injury 10 claimants would say, well, who was supposed to be regulating 11 Purdue if not its home state and the federal government, the 12 two of which got the most taxes. So I guess that comes down 13 to whether a failure regulation warrants any sort of either presumption of knowledge as to the taxes or some basis to 14 15 subordinate claims. 16 MR. GOLDMAN: I understand the theory, Your Honor. 17 I'll just say that is quite a stretch. THE COURT: Well, I think it would be an argument. 18 Let's leave it at that. 19 20 MR. GOLDMAN: I'm happy to leave it at that, Your 21 Honor. 22 THE COURT: And personal injury lawyers, I'm sure wouldn't hesitate to make it; whether it'd win or not is 23 24 another story. 25 MR. GOLDMAN: With that, Your Honor, I'll give the

floor to any rebuttal.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Goldman.

MR. GOLDMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, I think I'll be relatively brief, but there are some things that were said that -- there were quite a few things that were said factually, but I think it's worth letting everybody know it.

And, you know, this is actually a much more important conversation that he raised than just best interests because in many ways, this is the heart of everything, which is why are so many people in favor of doing this as opposed to its alternative. And so, I actually embrace a demanding Third Circuit standard that this is the fairest, best outcome under extraordinary outcomes, which is why we didn't actually brief that Ditech don't really apply, someone else did, because we're fine within the plan.

And here you asked me a few days ago during cross-examination to not get into conceptions of justice and fairness, but let's talk about a few things that are more directly relevant to the statute. Number one, Your Honor, is you've heard me say many times, I have never once ever defended Purdue's past conduct or the Sacklers. We arrived in March 2018.

But the facts are that it was not the Sacklers who

paid \$75,000 to New York State; it was Purdue. And in Oklahoma, the Sacklers were note even sued; Purdue was sued. And Purdue paid to settle that for a variety of reasons and the Sacklers were not parties to the consent judgment and made a voluntary contribution of \$75 million. Might those suits have expanded and were they thinking lots of complex things when they settled? They are not my clients and never have been, so I don't know and it's not my business.

But the facts are that there is no track record, I believe, which is part of what angers so many people, of the Sacklers actually having had judgments entered against them. I believe there are none.

Your Honor, the first point -- and I appreciate the references both to sophistry and to tautologies -- are simply not correct. In many cases, an individual member of the class is differently situated and has a third-party claim that many others might not have. They might be properly classified in the same class vis-à-vis the Debtors but have a unique opportunity to recover more than in a liquidation because they have third-party claims that could be pursued that the plan would take away.

And if those claims are not speculative and reasonably capable of estimation, which is the best possible law for Mr. Goldman's clients, then they have a real argument.

Here, it is absolutely appropriate to take judicial notice of 50 states, 48 states, 38 states that I will argue in more detail in a few minutes are, in fact, virtually identically situated, have made the same choice. So, in fact, it's neither a tautology nor is it sophistry.

Number two, Your Honor. We fully accept that it is our burden, but the Court has to consider everything including what the objectors bring as part of raising an objection and one page in a brief with no claims that they would actually do better and nothing to suggest it. Even now, no one has ever said I know a better way where creditors get more, I know a better way where victims get more redress. If someone thought that was really the case after \$500 million in legal fees, maybe they should have just said it.

Your Honor, with respect to burden, let's talk about the facts in the record. The allocation chart among the states about what each one is getting goes to, like, nine decimal places. I'll read one example: Alabama, \$1.6579015983 percent. The Debtors had no involvement in that. The states worked it out amongst themselves and decided how much each one was getting and then handed it to us and said please staple it to the documents and file it on the docket, which we did at No. 3232, Exhibit C, Schedule 3. Don't take it from me. Take it from them.

Then there's Mr. DelConte's testimony under oath in these proceedings that perhaps the objectors did not remember. We're all dancing faster than anyone should have to. So I quote, this is from the transcript on August 13th at Page 72, beginning at Line 9. The questioner was Mr. Kaminetzky. The witness under oath was Mr. DelConte.

"Q: And could you tell the Court why is it that you didn't account or put a value on those causes of action?" This is in response to the questions that he got about direct claims.

"A: We did not. We determined that we couldn't adequately estimate the value of those potential claims, you know, based on the fact that, as I testified before and as laid out in the disclosure statement, the fact that there's a number of different causes of action that various third parties could have against the shareholders, as well as a number of defenses that the shareholders could have against those particular causes of action and the fact that none of these causes of action had been taken to judgment to date. We didn't think that we were accurately able to estimate what the total value should be, so we determined that we should not include that in the liquidation analysis."

He testified under oath in a Federal Court that the claims were not estimable.

THE COURT: But he is not --

MR. HUEBNER: (crosstalk) requires --

THE COURT: He is not a lawyer, and Mr. Goldman's point is that he thinks you could have provided a lawyer who would testify as to why it would be speculative. What is your response to that?

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, apologies, Your Honor.

I'm actually going to get to that with cites and more in a

few moments if that's okay with you as part of the flow.

Your Honor, the next issue is that, you know, with all due respect, he actually ignored every single one of my 11 points, right, and it's basically now agreed, as the record makes clear, that the five to six to seven billion dollars of Debtor value is gone in a liquidation.

What he did was he said there's no evidence of what we get in a liquidation; that's false. In two of the three scenarios in the declaration, Class 4 creditors share zero. If Connecticut's percentage is 1.3490069542 of zero, it is still zero.

The third scenario, which is the only one where they would get anything, they share \$699 million, compared to the five to six to eight billion dollars that states alone are sharing under the plan. I can't get anyone -- I couldn't get a bevy of supercomputers to testify what Connecticut would likely end up with out of \$699 million. When all the intercreditor deals were voided, Mr. Shore

moved to subordinate their claims. We had \$400 trillion -trillion of projected non-state claims against their 2.156
trillion.

To say that I need a lawyer under oath to say nobody could possibly in the universe credit a material recovery that Connecticut in a liquidation I think is not what -- that's arguably sophistry. I mean, the facts are so clear, and they're not arguing to the contrary. They're just saying we don't have to prove anything. We think we've met our burden by miles.

And let me keep explaining why, Your Honor. Your Honor, we sort of covered this and, you know, it's not curious that there's no expert. There's no expert because it's so obvious and so unassailable that if everyone chases the Sacklers -- and everyone is everyone -- it's unknowable what any individual creditor gets.

Think about what Mr. Goldman had to argue. Oh, maybe many of the states won't sue the Sacklers. They'll just say, you know, even though we're going to get nothing from this case because the Debtors melted down, the company was destroyed, and we couldn't get that value and we lost PHI, we'll let our brother and sister states go through the Sacklers and we'll just stay home and wish them the very best while our citizens get zero, zero from the Sacklers, zero for abatement.

I mean, it's not -- it's just so far beyond the pale to have to respond to an assumption. I mean, I could ask Mr. Eckstein to speak after me and confirm that there's no state anywhere that's going to allow others to sue the Sacklers while they do nothing. They all have identical, similar, analogous, different causes of action. The only reason the Sacklers are named in some complaints and not others is because of the Chapter 11, which we'll discuss in a minute.

In fact, you know what? Let's discuss it right now, because it's just so not right that almost two years in, we're still hearing what is truly -- and I don't mean this unkindly -- a canard about the PI blocking information flow.

So let me remind everybody. The preliminary injunction was supported by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors on behalf of everybody as the statutory fiduciary appointed by the Department of Justice to vindicate all of Purdue's creditors as best they know how. They were supported by the AHC.

THE COURT: If I could interrupt. I think Mr.

Goldman's point was not about -- he was not saying there was a lack of information about the Sacklers or claims that might be asserted against them.

I think what he was saying is that they -- certain

Page 75 1 states at least would have gotten a judgment but for the 2 injunction and, therefore, the claims could be -- the face amount of the claims could be treated as something that 3 there is evidence on. 4 5 MR. HUEBNER: So, Your Honor, that's exactly where 6 I was about to go. 7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 MR. HUEBNER: I was first noting, because people 9 keep implying that the injunction was somehow put in place 10 for the benefit of the Sacklers --11 THE COURT: Well, I don't think Mr. Goldman was 12 doing that. 13 MR. HUEBNER: -- and wanting to be farther --THE COURT: I don't think he could because that's 14 15 not -- he wasn't doing it and he couldn't have done it 16 because it's not --17 MR. HUEBNER: Correct. THE COURT: -- the fact. 18 MR. HUEBNER: So now let me address the actual 19 20 point. 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 MR. HUEBNER: I agree, and it was both nothing and too much at the same time. As Your Honor might remember the 23 24 state of Washington actually said when reading the 25 injunction, please let just us proceed to trial because

we're very far along and we think it would be helpful.

You've never heard me ever dispute the strength or validity of any individual claimant's claim against the Sacklers. The problem is one creditor winning against the Sacklers only supports the likelihood that all creditors would win against the Sacklers, and if all creditors win against the Sacklers, no individual creditors' recovery is knowable. But what is knowable is that four, five, six, seven, eight billion dollars that is already on the table evaporates and creditors have to do better trying to share only what they get against the Sacklers in that scenario, and that's my argument.

You know, the notion of Mr. Goldman having to say, you know, only a small number of states might sue them, it's just so -- I don't even know what to say in response to that. We can line up 100,000 creditors right now at the podium to say I swear I will sue the Sacklers along with suing Purdue to recover for the acts of this company and its owners, and everyone on the planet knows it.

Your Honor, Mr. Gold then -- Mr. Goldman, I'm so sorry. Mr. Goldman then sort of testified and sort of speculated that in a subsequent Sackler bankruptcy, if that happened, we would all do better because maybe they go into Chapter 11 and maybe their trusts would be brought in and maybe they're not self-settled trusts and maybe we could get

all their assets.

Well, here's my answer to that. With all due respect to Mr. Goldman, who is in the 1/500th of 1 percent of our creditors who objected to confirmation, many of us have spent years figuring out how to get the best deal and analyzing the all risks and rewards.

And here's the testimony, which is in evidence, from Mr. Atkinson, whose declaration is extraordinarily important and attaches the UCC letter which went out to all creditors and is extraordinarily important. Paragraph 11:

"At the outset of these Chapter 11 cases, Akin and Province commenced an investigation on behalf of the Official Committee of among other things, the claims that could be asserted against the Sacklers and related entities on behalf of the Debtors' estates. This also included an investigation concerning the likelihood of success of any potential estate claims against the Sacklers and related entities, the likely damages associated with such claims, and the likelihood of collecting on any judgment rendered in favor of such claims."

Everyone looked at collectability. What does Mr. Goldman think we were all doing for the last three years?

This is a huge part of what people were doing, people like the AHC and the UCC and the PIs and the special committee thought about all of these thing. So like an intellectual

colloquy about what might happen in a hypothetical Sackler bankruptcy which Jersey law and Connecticut and Maryland law, this is the work that was done for tens of thousands of hours and all the people suing Purdue and suing the Sacklers.

And nobody but this one objection apparently believes that there's a better alternative, and this objection doesn't really believe it either because you'll notice you never heard anybody say, and you certainly didn't hear Mr. Goldman say, I actually think my clients would do better. Nobody could say that, not under oath and not in a signed pleading.

I have tremendous respect for how seriously Mr. Goldman takes his signature, and unlike other pleadings in this case, there is nothing in his that an officer of the court should not be comfortable saying, but I think the silences are also important. And ironically, I think that you can take judicial notice of the silences as well.

Two final points, Your Honor. In case the record is somehow not clear, I have never ever said that any state would not prevail against the Sacklers. My point is different, and it has always been different, which is we're back to the tragedy of the commons, is that everybody would prevail. And we discussed this or there's a risk and the odds are the same for everybody.

And so, Connecticut on its \$50.1 billion claim is likely to prevail. o are 47 or 48 or 42 other states and tens and tens of thousands of other Creditors who suffered similar injury.

Finally, it's not really relevant because I said it's Mr. Preis' argument and I'm not making it, but right is right. So let me be very clear. Purdue as you have heard in other context, often in very strong tones, pled guilty to multiple crimes in 2007 and had a corporate monitor in place that many of these states participated in the monitoring and had rights and access to information. Suffice it to say that if the Estate is forced to go in a different place and has to seek fairness in recoveries for all, Mr. Goldman's sort of testimony again about we're a BFP. We have no knowledge, we weren't on notice -- not my theory, not in my pleadings, but that's something that a lawyer can represent to a court and I daresay Mr. Goldman has no facts to support that some day some court might find about who might have been able to stop this years ago. I have nothing further.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Why don't we move on then to the next topic on today's agenda which is the classification argument made by the objecting states other than West Virginia, which frankly, I'm not sure at this point, given the vote, matters that much, but it's on the agenda and I'll hear it briefly for the time that's been

allotted.

MR. MCCARTHY: Your Honor, for the record, Gerry McCarthy of Davis Polk on behalf of the Debtors. Can Your Honor hear me clearly?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MCCARTHY: So the next item on the agenda, as Your Honor just noted, which I now will address are the classification objections of Washington, Oregon, as well as Connecticut, Maryland, and the District of Columbia. I believe there were also some joinders by California, Delaware, Rhode Island and Vermont.

The objecting states contended the plan improperly classifies them with cities, municipalities and other local governments. That objection should be overruled for two basic reasons. First, and most importantly, the Debtor's classification framework is entirely proper. The objecting states arguing to the contrary is simply incorrect.

The Court, I know, is more than familiar with the straightforward rules governing classification, the first set forth in Section 1122(a) is that claims or interests may be classified together if they're "substantially similar."

The second is that a Debtor has a great deal of flexibility to place similar claims into different classes and can do so as long as there is a legitimate reason for it, but doesn't have to. It's the first of these rules that disposes of the

issues here.

The claims of the states and municipalities are substantially similar, and thus are properly classified together. As to the initial matter, these claims are all unsecured and thus have an identical relationship to the property in the Debtors' Estate. That alone is sufficient to classify them together.

These claims also arise out of the Debtors' production, marketing, and sale of opioid medications. In other words, they arise from the same facts. And although there is no need whatsoever to get this granular, and there may so variation state to state, state and municipal claims also allege many similar theories to recover. For illustrative purposes, one could compare the complaints of Seattle and Washington State at JX79 and JX944 respectively. They both have a certain public nuisance claims under the same statute, Revised Code of Washington Chapter 7.48. They both assert consumer protection claims under the same statute, the Washington Consumer Protection Act.

Or one could compare the complaints of San

Francisco and California at JX825 and JX947 respectively.

They too both assert public nuisance claims under the same statutes, California Civil Code Sections 3479 and 3480, and the two both assert consumer protection claims under the same statutes.

In addition to the foregoing, the Class 4 claims were all recovering under and through NOAT, treatment that the states and local governments specifically negotiated for and that arose out of the Phase 1 mediation. It is not at all unusual in Chapter 11 cases that claims arising -- claims recovering under the same trust are classified together.

All in all, the states had no case that even purports to require, let alone actually holds that states must be classified from other creditors as a general matter because that case doesn't exist. To the contrary, multiple states invariably hold claims in sizeable Chapter 11 cases including for things like taxes and environmental matters and the Debtors invariably had discretion to classify states with other creditors.

Here, the states are classified with other non-federal government creditors which is entirely proper under the circumstances.

Second, Your Honor, as you mentioned at the onset, the states' objections are essentially moot. If the states were to be separately classified, the class would be an accepting class, overwhelmingly so any way you look at it.

Christine Pullo from Prime Clerk testified in Exhibit B of her declaration -- that's at Docket No. 3372 -- that of the 48 states that voted on the plan, 38 voted in

favor and 10 voted to reject. That's 79.17 percent of the states that voted to accept. The number stays basically the same if one equates the District of Columbia and other U.S. territories. In that case, Ms. Pullo testified 79.25 percent of the states voted to accept the plan. And that's Footnote 5 of Ms. Pullo's declaration.

If we were to count by population, one would reach approximately the same results as Washington concedes in Paragraph 67 of its objection and Connecticut concedes in Paragraph 63 of its. The states voting to reject the plan account for roughly 20 percent of the U.S. population.

That's a number that doesn't really vary if you include the U.S. territories.

If one were to go by states on proof of claim, you would again reach the same result as Washington and Connecticut concede in those two paragraphs. And if we were to count by the percentage of allocations each state received from NOAT, one could reach approximately the same result too.

For all these reasons, Your Honor, the objecting states classification objection should be overruled. It shouldn't pass without mention that the objecting states evoke a number of irrelevant legal doctrines that they believe demonstrate that their claims are different in class from those of local governments. These certain notions of

state sovereignty and a so-called Dillon Rule. Suffice it to say that none of these doctrines in any way mandate separate classification here.

I will now turn the virtual podium over, unless Your Honor has any questions, to Mr. Maclay who represents the Multi-State Entity Group and who I understand will address some of the points that I just mentioned briefly.

THE COURT: Okay, that's fine, thank you.

MR. MACLAY: Thank you, Your Honor, Kevin Maclay for the Multi-State Governmental Entities Group. Cognizant of Your Honor comments, I will keep this argument brief.

your Honor, despite the fact that local governments have strong claims that they've expended significant efforts in pursuing opioid defendants, including Purdue, despite the fact they have suffered substantial harm and despite the critical role that local governments play in abatement efforts, including under the proposed plan here, objecting states seek to challenge the plan's classifications of the non-criminal domestic governmental claims in Class 4.

Your Honor, just to make a very important overarching point, local governments are at the front lines of the opioid crisis. If you're in your local community and you call 911, Your Honor, whether it's because of the criminal emergency related to opioids or a medical emergency

related to opioids, the person who comes, Your Honor, is a local policeman, a local firefighter, a local county hospital member, et cetera.

It is the local governments who brought most of the claims against the Debtors prepetition as set forth in the Debtors' docketed filing at 718 earlier on this case and it is a clear fact, as has been noted by many of the cases cited to in our brief, that cities and counties and other local governmental entities have numerous claims including for increased healthcare costs, increased foster care costs, increased crime-related costs, info, and tax revenue. And a number of cases, such as the City of Surprise case, Your Honor, lay this out.

Secondly, Your Honor, it is surprisingly absent from any of the objections filed by the objecting states any mention of the Home Rule Doctrine. They mention Dillion's Rule which has been largely superseded as a point of matter by the nearly ubiquitous entry into the Home Rule Doctrine by almost every state and this is laid out quite cogently, Your Honor, in our brief in the dispatch of the City of New York versus Beretta Corp, which is the District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

For example, in that case, the court reasoned that precluding the City of New York from bringing a suit aimed at redressing the problem of gun-related violence would

interfere with its authority to promote the safety and well-being of its inhabitants. It is quite clear, Your Honor, that local governments have both the duty and the authority to pursue defendants of mass tort-related incidents including opioid defendants. And the record is replete with examples of that.

For example, Your Honor, if you were to look at Paragraph 20 of the MSGE Group reply is support of plan confirmation, we list a litary of cases demonstrating that local governments have standing to bring such claims and in Paragraph 16 to 19 and 21 to 24, we have another litary of cases demonstrating the survival of motions to dismiss by those same governmental entities.

It is also clear, Your Honor, that very recently in Tennessee, nine counties and eighteen cities and towns reached a tentative 35-million-dollar settlement with Endo Corporation, another opioid defendant, on July 22nd of 2021.

And in three other state courts, Your Honor, California, New York, and West Virginia, county and city plaintiffs are either currently in trial or have recently concluded trial and are waiting verdicts seeking billions of dollars in damages.

And, of course, as the Debtor's counsel aptly noted, Your Honor, it is, of course, true that under the proposed plan, cities and counties are part of the abatement

efforts and a very important part of the abatement efforts set forth in the plan that we week confirmation of here today.

And, of course, one final point, Your Honor, the parens patriae argument made by the objecting states is overstated first of all, because parens patriae powers do belong to the various states and localities in their various circumstances as our brief pointed out. And secondly, the proprietary actions that all local governments can bring heavy overlap with such parens patriae actions as pointed out also in the authorities that we cited you to.

To make a long story short, Your Honor, there is no valid basis to argue the states must be classified separately from local government and the surprising suggestion in the states objections that local governments don't have valuable and important rights to pursue against opioid defendants is just incredibly shortsighted as well as misleading and just flatly wrong. And so for those reasons, Your Honor, we support the Debtors in this particular example of argument as well as overall with the plan. We restate Your Honor that local governments and states, in fact, are appropriately classified together in Class 4. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. I think Mr. Gold is handling this for the objecting states, but I may be wrong.

MR. GOLD: Your Honor, you are correct, Matthew Gold, Kleinberg, Kaplan, Wolff and Cohen, representing Washington, Oregon and District of Columbia. Your Honor, can you hear me?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GOLD: Okay. Thank you. I will proceed. I will first note that this oral argument is based on coordination and cooperation with the Attorneys General Offices of Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Vermont and will be provided in a unified fashion as we've discussed before, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GOLD: And, Your Honor, I, too, will be brief in my comments in this regard. First, I want to emphatically say that our argument is not meant -- and we don't believe it is -- in any way to be disrespecting to local governments and the first responders and anyone in that group. We have not been arguing that they do not have claims. We are not arguing that their claims do not, in certain respects, overlap with claims that are brought by the states.

But we are arguing is that the states, the totality of the claims brought by the states and the objecting states in particular, contain many significant areas that cannot be brought by the municipalities which

supports why the states should be classified separately.

For example, in Washington, only the state can seek as a remedy civil penalties with respect to violations. That is not something that can be brought by municipalities. Now particularly with respect to classification, I will first --

THE COURT: Have the states asserted a different priority based on that right?

MR. GOLD: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLD: I will first note that it is the Debtors' burden to prove that the classifications were proper. The Debtors have argued that the argued that the classification error can be fixed by going back to the voting results and preparing a count of what the results would have been had the states been in a separate class.

And frankly, Your Honor, I find this is amazing.

The Debtors waited until after the votes had been cast to rearrange them into a better classification.

A classification error cannot be fixed through a hypothetical analysis of how the votes might have been arranged under a different classification. The Debtors certainly cite no cases to support this theory that classification can ex post facto be revised. The disclosure statement certainly did not disclose to the voters that

their claims might be rearranged into separate classes for purposes of determining how the plan would go.

And, Your Honor, as you, yourself, stated, show me an election where that was done. I'm not aware that that's how elections are handled in this country that the votes can be re-scrambled and realigned if they were not properly counted in the first place.

THE COURT: They are counted.

MR. GOLD: They are counted.

assuming votes that weren't counted. But let me just cut to the chase. I just frankly do not understand this argument. The caselaw could not be clearer that the focus as far as 1122 of the Bankruptcy Code is concerned, which refers to substantially similar claims, goes to the right of the claimant against the assets of the estate. So you can, although you don't have to, classify claims based on breach of contract in the same class with claims based on tort because each of them is unsecured and has the same right against the debtor's assets, general unsecured claims. Is there any aspect of your argument that is consistent with that proposition?

MR. GOLD: Your Honor, I'm not disputing that the claims as treated in the plan are all general unsecured claims.

Page 91 1 THE COURT: Okay. So I think you lose. 2 move on to the NOAT allocation. MR. GOLD: I simply --3 THE COURT: This is just a waste of time, Mr. 4 5 Gold, and I don't understand frankly -- it's just -- I've 6 read your brief. The only question I had is whether you had 7 some sort of priority claim, which you told me you don't or 8 your clients don't. There's been no attempt to designate 9 any vote in the class as to, you know, being for a claim 10 that is only held by a state, which would be the remedy 11 under the brief's argument that only the states can assert 12 certain types of claims as opposed to a classification 13 argument since concededly there are general unsecured claims 14 held by the other governmental entities. There's no 15 contention of any vote manipulation here given -- and this 16 is where the actual votes, I think, are relevant. 17 So this is just, this argument makes no sense. 18 MR. GOLD: Your Honor, I was simply responding to 19 the argument that the Debtors' had just made and they made 20 in their papers. 21 THE COURT: Well, okay. 22 MR. GOLD: I have one other response to the argument that the Debtors have made in their papers, Your 23 I will be brief with respect to this as well. 24 25 THE COURT: All right.

MR. GOLD: It relates to feature that the claims
were all accorded one dollar votes. We submit that the one
dollar claim setup was preposterous on its face. There may
well be cases where that is the right approach, but not in
this case. While the amounts of the claims might not have
been fixed, the one dollar setup lumped together claims that
were known to be different and several orders of magnitude
different in size. The Attorneys General of the states
represent the entire state and are not simply the sum of the
municipalities that are contained therein. And by arranging
the class and one dollar votes for every party in it, the
Debtors were setting up a structure where they knew that
they would be able to prevail in the ultimate voting and in
a way that was inconsistent with what they had to be aware
were the significant differences in the sizes of the claims.
We submit that it is improper in this case. I have nothing
further to add, Your Honor, unless you have questions.
THE COURT: No, I don't. Thank you.
MR. GOLD: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I don't know if the Debtors or the
MSGE want to respond on the one dollar point?
MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, I'll hit that one. The
answer is very simple. The NOAT allocation and he actually
answers a bunch of the sort of points that were made, the
NOAT allocation was agreed to among all the states and

entities as their Class 4 shared distribution. The one dollar was agreed to basically by everybody to avoid what could have been an unthinkable 3018 process. No 3018 motions were ever filed. We've never heard from anybody ever in this case until this objection was filed. And these procedures, as Your Honor remembers, were worked out with the AHC, with the NCSG, and with the UCC and the disclosure statement and these mechanics were agreed to by no objection from either today's objectors or I believe anyone else that was unresolved. To say now that the one dollar thing justifies some sort of infirmity is totally inappropriate.

And one other very brief point, speaking of inappropriate, to recharacterize Mr. McCarthy's presentation or brief as the Debtors have conceded they made a mistake and now they're trying to fix it, is just misrepresenting to this Court, just ridiculous.

THE COURT: I don't need to hear on that point.

MR. HUEBNER: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. MACLAY: Your Honor, Kevin Maclay for the MSGE Group. On the legal aspects of the one dollar claim, I would direct Your Honor to Page 16 of our confirmation brief and No. 27, where we go through a number cases that have held a one dollar -- in a mass tort case, a one dollar voting amount is appropriate. And I would just like to read to Your Honor the A.H. Robbins analysis, which was affirmed

by the Fourth Circuit: "Any attempt to evaluate each individual claim for purposes of voting on the debtors plan of reorganization would, as a practical matter, be an act of futility and would be so time consuming as to impose on many deserving claimants further intolerable delay not only to their detriment but to the detriment of the financial well-being of the estate as well."

And I think, Your Honor, that analysis totally applies here and clearly justifies the one dollar voting amount because to liquidate the various and complex interrelated claims of all of the claimants here would have been essentially an impossible undertaking and certainly the gain would not have been worth the gamble, Your Honor, as noted by A.H. Robin and a litany of other cases cited in our brief.

THE COURT: Okay. Very well. I guess to me, ultimately the fact that the class that the objecting states say that they would want to be in, which would be a class of states only, voted overwhelmingly in favor of the plan, suggests that they would want to fight it out with these other 38 states as to the amounts of their claims, which I don't think is what Mr. Gold was saying, which is that the local governments have smaller claims. I actually think it is a nonmaterial amendment to a plan to allow a plan to be amended to reclassify in a class if one believed that the

class needed to be reclassified.

So I guess, to me, this seems to be unlike some of the other arguments that the objecting states have made, just an attempt to throw sand in the gears without any real merit to it whatsoever.

So why don't we move onto the next topic, which is the NOAT allocation issue raised as the only basis for West Virginia's objection to the plan and I think here, counsel for the Ad Hoc Committee of States and other Governmental Entities will argue in support of the plan and then we'll hear from West Virginia's counsel in support of the objection.

MR. WAGNER: Thank you, Your Honor. Can you see and hear me? It's Jonathan Wagner from Kramer Levin on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee of Governmental and Other Contingent Litigation Claimants.

THE COURT: Yes, I can.

MR. WAGNER: Before I start, I just want to thank my Kramer Levin colleagues who have worked on this matter.

Your Honor, there are difficult questions that you need to answer in this hearing, but allocation is not one of them. And while we take the objection every seriously, it's not really a close question. The context is very important. We have 49 states on one side and 1 on the other. And when does the majority of the states in this country agree on

anything?

Here, you have 49 states who agree, or at least didn't object -- I don't want to overstate it -- and only one has disagreed. In fact, 49 --

THE COURT: I actually think it's 47 to 1, but that's okay.

MR. WAGNER: I won't round up to 49, but it's 1 on the other side and if the plan is so grossly unfair, why is it that only one state is objecting? These numbers alone could be used to justify compliance with the code, but even if you put aside those numbers and address the objections on its merits, it's clear that this plan satisfies the code.

And as Mr. Huebner noted, no plan is perfect, but this one is pretty good. It's also fair to West Virginia.

As we heard during the testimony, West Virginia has about half a percent of the nation's population, but is getting more than twice that under the plan. And the reason is because the plan takes into account the intensity and severity measures that have been advocated by West Virginia itself. It just doesn't take them into account at the same extent.

Now Your Honor has to decide this issue based on a record that's before you and I don't know what Attorney General Morrisey is going to raise, but in this case, we have two witnesses, one was John Guard from the Florida

Attorney General's Office who was a very credible witness, and on the other side, we had Dr. Cowan who was the only witness offered by West Virginia and his testimony was full of admissions and contradictions. And his admissions on fairness and the reasonable nature of the plan and good faith are prone to objection.

Let me bring up the specific objection. The first is that the plan was not proposed in good faith in violation of Section 1129(a)(3). Under 1129(a)(3), a plan has to be proposed with honestly and good intentions. That's the Chassix case, 533 B.R. 64 at 74. To get in on one side, we had John Guard's testimony and his declaration. And Dr. Cowan's testimony to the contrary just does not overcome that testimony.

Mr. Guard was extremely credible and as Your Honor will recall, there was no significant cross-examination of him. He testified to years of negotiations and compromises back and forth. That was at Paragraph 10 to 47 of his declaration, and the testimony on Day 2, Pages 95, 105-106, and 118.

Now, could it really be that an allocation plan that was negotiated by all of the country's Attorneys

General was negotiated in bad faith, that there was some national conspiracy among the top legal officers of the various states? Just to state that proposition shows how

farfetched it is. These are negotiations that had to balance the interests of fifty different states. And nobody ganged up on West Virginia.

Now the two -- there were two specific complaints raised by West Virginia under 1129(a)(3). The first is that the plan is a political compromise. As Your Honor is well aware, compromise is de rigueur in bankruptcy and is, in fact, favored. Compromise is not a dirty word.

A second specific objection is that the large states somehow took control of this process. This is not consistent with the outcome here. The small states, including West Virginia, do very well under this plan, and, Your Honor, should ask what proof has been offered here that the large states seized the process. There's been no fact witness offered by West Virginia, and on top of this we have the admission by Dr. Cowan, that the plan, that reasonable people may differ. That's at page 230 of the fourth day of the hearing.

Another (indiscernible) issue of good faith, Your Honor, is whether the plan achieves the result that's consistent with the Bankruptcy Code. That's the Chassix case at 533 B.R. 74, and as -- my -- the others who have made presentations before have noted, this is a plan that -- that confers substantial value on many different creditor groups, and it not only delivers value to creditors, I think

it's fair to say it's a plan that's in the national interests. It's a plan that literally saves lives, and how often can -- how often can somebody say that about a bankruptcy plan?

On this score that (indiscernible) that the statements pre-litigation by Dr. Cowan, I think, are very relevant, "spending more now in an effective way, though, will reduce damages". That's Exhibit 389 at Page 12, and as he also admitted, all the plans here are effective, at the pages 241 to 242 of his testimony. So how could a plan that's in the national interest somehow be bad faith? That -- is that an objection raised by West Virginia is that it is one of equal treatment under 1123(a)(4) of the plan, of the code.

Now here, all the states are subject to the same criteria, the treatment is identical, and under the W.R. Grace case, "what matters is not the claimants recover the same amount, but they have an equal opportunity to recover on their claims". That's W.R. Grace 729 f.3rd after Page 327. Since all the states are treated equally, you could argue that the proper standard is Rule 9019, and here the settlement clearly falls above the lowest point in raise of -- in range of reasonableness.

There's no argument to the contrary and Dr. Cowan's admissions that the plan -- that the plan is

reasonable really ends the matter, and I'd also note his admission that he prefers the bankruptcy plan to no plan. That's at Page 242 to 243 of the fourth day of the hearing. But even if Rule 9019 is not the standard, and you simply apply 1123(a)(4), the objection still fails. West Virginia has characterized this objection as -- as follows, "same treatment does not mean identical treatment, and courts have approved settlements where the class members received different percentages of recovery to take into account different factors. So long as the settlement terms of fashionably based on legitimate considerations." That's the West Virginia objection at Paragraph 28, citing cases.

The objection that West Virginia raised is -- is that the plan places too much emphasis on population, however, we have Dr. Cowan's statement, prelitigation, that "large communities likely should receive more than small communities". That's Exhibit 380 -- 388 at Page 6. In any event, West Virginia overstates the importance of population under this plan.

Just to go into a little bit of math, population is 31 percent of 80 -- of the first 85 percent and the balance is intensity measures, and then you have the remaining 15 percent that's all intensity measures and you all have the -- you also have the 1 percent intensity fund, and for all of those reasons, that's why West Virginia,

which has about a half a percent of the population, is getting more -- is getting 1.16 percent of the funds.

But, Your Honor, may legitimately ask why (indiscernible) the population at all? It's not at a political -- or it's not a political criteria. rational criteria. It's not like throwing darts against the wall. Mr. Guard testified that there are issues concerning the intensity and severity measures, which make them subjective in some sense, and population is an objective measure. And I'd refer the Court to Mr. Guard's testimony at Pages 90 to 91 of the second day of the hearing, where he noted issues concerning under reporting as to those severity and intensity measures, inconsistencies among the states in reporting cause of death; and he said at Page 91, "population was added to try to deal with the issues that existed for the other metrics", and -- and he went on to say, "population was and is a typical metric that is utilized in State Attorney General settlements", again, Page 91. And we cited in our -- in our response a couple of -- a couple of among many instances in which national settlements used population as the only factor. In Recompact Disc, 216 F.R.D. 197 at 200, in re Toys-R-Us antitrust litigation 191 F.R.D. 347 at Page 350, and significantly, Dr. Cowan admitted that this settlement is a lot more fair than other national settlements, including the national tobacco

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settlement. That's at Page 2 -- (indiscernible).

Just a minute on California, I don't know whether Attorney General Morris is going to raise that issue. It's a minor point, whether they contribute to the intensity fund. But during cross-examination, it was established that had the plan used expenditures on criminal justice as a factor, as Dr. Cowan did in his prelitigation hypotheticals, then California would have been far better than the 9.9 percent it gets under this plan.

The one final point, Dr. Cowan's plan, it's legally irrelevant under NII Holdings 536 B.R. at 125, but even if you plan more than (indiscernible) it doesn't really advance the objection. And when an expert changes his opinion so dramatically, as I think Dr. Cowan did from prelitigation to post-litigation, really has no credibility. And he admitted during his -- during the cross that his post-litigation plan is not remote -- does not remotely resemble his pre-litigation plan. And then also, he admitted before litigation -- he admitted before litigation that "there is no simple answer to the question how to allocate one large settlement -- one large opioid settlement. Too many questions remain. Too many issues need to be resolved." That's Exhibit 388 at Page 14. He had admitted that what's fair under these circumstances is complicated. That's Pages 233 to 234.

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He said that spending more money won't necessarily get you better results. That's Exhibit (indiscernible) at Page (indiscernible). He said, "treatment in terms of offerings may not translate into increased efficacy", and just -- "just spending more to achieve equality may not be the best outcome". That's Exhibit 392 at Page 12. And then also, his plan produces very odd results. Washington, which has one fourth the population of Texas gets more than Texas. Kentucky, one fourth the population of New York, gets more than New York. Virginia, with a growing population, four times the population of West Virginia, which is loosing population, gets less than West Virginia. And Your Honor, the point of that exercise was to understand the point that if you change this plan to make it more fair to one state, for example, West Virginia, you have problems elsewhere in the plan. But I think it underscores how difficult it was to reach a compromise here, a balance, and I think all of that allows, Your Honor, discretion to (indiscernible) allocation under this plan.

To sum up, Your Honor, allocation under this plan is based on rational and legitimate considerations. It's actually quite an achievement. It confers the benefit on the States and on the Nation as a whole. And I have to say no good deed goes unpunished because West Virginia, does pretty well under this plan, and West Virginia's criticism

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really fail on their own terms, but certainly in the large context of this case. And the larger context is as the West Virginia expert, himself noted, the more time that this problem festers without additional spending on opioid abatement, the worse the problem will become. And that's probably why the West Virginia expert admitted that he prefers the current plan to no plan. And for all those reasons, Your Honor, the Court should reject the objection. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. So again, Counsel for West Virginia, Mr. Morrisey, I think is going to handle the argument in support of the objection.

MR. MORRISEY: Your Honor, this is Attorney

General, Patrick Morrisey, and I'm grateful for the

opportunity to appear before you today. I would mention, at
the outset, that the issue of the opioid epidemic is quite
severe in our state, and regardless of all of the issues
that you're hearing about, I think one area that we can find
in common with virtually every party, is everyone would
mention that West Virginia was ground zero at the opioid
epidemic. If you looked at many of the metrics, West
Virginia had the most horrific of experience with the level
of intensity and severity that I think virtually all counsel
would concede.

The reason I'm very appreciative to be before you

today is because this decision represents the first of likely many in a series of court cases which will determine how abatement is going to occur in the country, and I recognize that many of the states spent many years and they worked on it. But just because many states agree on a flawed formula doesn't make it correct. And so we are asking the Court to look at the grave issues associated with this particular case in having the predominant population based model, contrary to Counsel's argument that it's 31 percent population, effectively, a vast majority of this formula is based upon population. It's not based on severity. In fact, the one severity measure that everyone can point to is the 1 percent fund that's been discussed a lot. If you actually looked very carefully at what the principle public health agency of the country, whose task was charged with looking at these issues comes up with, they've indicated that intensity should represent 15 percent of the overall formula. The difference between 1 percent and 15 percent is obviously very stark. Now Counsel --THE COURT: Can I just say that --MR. MORRISEY: -- indicated --THE COURT: -- let me just interrupt you --

THE COURT: -- Mr. Morrisey, that -- you're --

Sure.

MR. MORRISEY:

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Pg 106 of 351 Page 106 you're referring to the, it's an acronym, it's S A -- S H --I'm not trying to letter --MR. MORRISEY: SAMHSA? THE COURT: SAMSA, but it's SAMHSA? MR. MORRISEY: SAMHSA -- I think it's Substance Abuse Mental Health Services Administration. THE COURT: And -- and as I understand it, that has changed -- that comes out once a year or every other year and it is changed from time to time? MR. MORRISEY: It has changed. I know that the most recent formula that we've looked at, they have an intensity fund applying to ten states that then would be able to claim up to 15 percent of the aggregate dollars that Congress appropriates. THE COURT: Okay. MR. MORRISEY: So if we step back to Counsel's arguments that this plan was made in good intention, I think that that statement could be torn apart fairly quickly. Let's start with something that Counsel indicates is a very small issue, and you can make an argument about whether 1 percent of the aggregate funds going to a particular state is small or large, but when you're talking about the largest state in the country for all the states to come together

behind, what I would call, the California carveout or cash

grab, you're talking about a significant amount of money.

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Not only with respect to the amount with this Purdue bankruptcy, but all those in the future. And so, that 1 percent is not indicative of good intentions.

How could every state contribute to a particular intensity fund showing that at least on a minimal basis, all states believe that intensity's important and one state be afforded the opportunity, due to political consideration, to argue well, we shouldn't have that in there.

Your Honor, the arguments we bring before you today, we think are straight forward and don't contain some of the same controversy that you had on Monday, or you've had throughout. These issues that we'll bring in with respect to No. 1, trying to eliminate the California carve out. That's straight forward. That could be easily adjusted because there's no rational basis, whatsoever, no legitimate consideration that one state should ignore intensity considerations. I would defy Counsel to come up with one good reason. They cite an 18 percent issue with respect to judicial enforcement and other matters, but nothing in the record indicates that that's even tied directly to opioids.

There are many reasons why a state ultimately might have more resource needs with respect to law enforcement and other areas. But everyone that's gone through this process would acknowledge that the California

piece is one of the blites on this deal that needs to be changed, because once again, it's not good faith to allow one state to not contribute to a fund that every other state does.

The second piece, which I think is equally powerful, is that most of this formula is once again based upon population. Counsel cites 31 percent, but if you look closely at the formula when you're looking at morphine equivalents, when you're looking at several other factors, it's clear that we're effectively quadrupling the population count, and Counsel and our expert witness, Chuck Cowan, testified to that fact without any contravention.

That's something that's not rational when you're trying to solve a problem. It -- Counsel states that this is consistent with many other matters that get settled by the state, but frequently, when states are involved in a consumer or an antitrust matter, there could be discouragement and there could be something focused on a population. This particular issue deals with the disease state of individuals and what's happening within specific communities.

So to be able to say there should be a population based formula to solve the problem, rational economic theory would never suggest that you're going to go in and say how many people live in a state? That's how we're going to deal

with the opioid epidemic? It's an embarrassment and an affront to any attempt to have good faith when the focus is so much on population. And of course, there were rigorous discussions about this for years. I recognize that many of my colleagues ultimately decided to move in a different direction, but the importance for this Court, for this precedent, to get it correct, to do two things; eliminating that California carve out, and two, asking to go back and to either: a) change the population based system and move it more to an intensity system, or b) simply taking an easier tactic, which would be to move from 1 percent of intensity fund to 2 percent or 3 percent, which I would note is very different than what SAMHSA recommends, at 15 percent. That would create a much different abatement structure, which is going to allow money to flow to the communities that actually need it most. And I think that's what we're all here to do, to make sure that money gets out quickly. That's why we've tried to work collaboratively with the states, and we haven't objected to other provisions, but we see this as a fatal flaw of the agreement.

But, Your Honor, you have the ability to help change that and to convince the parties that a California cash grab, or carve out, is inappropriate. It should make America very, very upset, and separately, the intensity fund is still inadequate, given the fact that when you solve a

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problem, you look at healthcare capacity. You look at the structure or what's being done to deliver healthcare within a particular community. You look at the opioid deaths and you look at the people that are not treated, currently.

Based upon all of those factors, it's clear that West

Virginia is a unicorn, so it's not surprising that we would get voted out on a particular issue like this because our numbers are so bad, compared to every other state.

We're asking the Court to help bring that good faith back to the process by making those two modest considerations: 1) eliminate that carve out, and 2) increase the size of the intensity fund so that many years from now, we're not going to go back and look at this like we all looked at tobacco, that the moneys were actually not put in adequately to solve the problem. That is just ended up being a political grab bag. That's what we should all oppose.

This is a court of law where everyone expects to get the best treatment under a quality of law. It's not Congress, it shouldn't be compared to that where they make political deals all the time. We have a chance to actually focus on solving the problem, the right way, in a manner that this allocation formula does not.

Your Honor, I'm very grateful for the opportunity to personally come before you today. This is the number one

issue facing our state, and I wanted to amplify how important it is that we fix this because what this Court decides to do is likely to serve as a president going forward for all the other litigation that we have against manufacturers and pharmacies. And what we've found through all the years, West Virginia's been out in front, leading on this issues, is that we have to focus on intensity and severity. And this allocation formula does not do that, and the record makes that clear.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. WAGNER: This issue has to be decided on the record and there's a -- there's a record before your Honor. I don't think I need to dwell on it any longer. Second, Mr. Guard, I think testified eloquently why population is not some random (indiscernible). It covers some of the subjective problems with the other factors; and third and for this, I'm going to have to defer to my bankruptcy colleagues, but as I understand it, Your Honor, doesn't get to redline this part of the plan. It's either plan or no plan, and it's significant that Dr. Cowan, when he was asked plan or no plan, he said he prefers the plan. Thank you.

THE COURT: Well, don't go away yet, Mr. Wagner.

I -- I agree, the record is pretty -- is not pretty, it's

well developed on this issue, with one possible exception,

which is why California, of all states isn't contributing to

the 1 percent small state fund. I understand there was testimony that California has the highest, I believe there was testimony, I'll have to go back and look at it. Either has the highest or a significant amount of criminal justice expense. But and I appreciate your, and Mr. Guard was (indiscernible) limited in what could be discussed about the party's negotiations, particularly given the sensitive nature of individual states negotiations. But I -- I -again, I'm dealing with a specific statute, which is 1123(a)(4), which says that a plan shall provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class, unless the holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to less favorable treatment. And I understand that you said that this proposal, just like the State of West Virginia's proposal, isn't a straight or simple pro-rata treatment, it's a formula that has adjustments to it to take into account various different states or groups of states interests. But they all seem to have acted as a group, except on this one point, where only California is carved out, unless I'm missing something. MR. WAGNER: No it's only -- it's only California. So a couple of points. First, the class -- first of all the class has voted for this. Everyone else has gone along with it --No, but that's --THE COURT:

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MR. WAGNER: -- second of all --

THE COURT: -- that's not -- but that's not -
1123(a)(4) applies notwithstanding the class vote, if

there's an objector, like West Virginia, then they can raise

1123(a)(4).

MR. WAGNER: Well, look, I -- I can't speak to California's motivation, but this is not -- it's not a big issue. It's a contribution to 1 percent, and California does have an argument, as I noted during the cross of Dr. Cowan, that had a different set of factors been used --

THE COURT: I understand that, but again, the statute I'm dealing with is provide the same treatment for each claim. Now here, I get it, it's in the context of a heavily negotiated settlement among the states, the 48 states that are participating in this plan. The other two having settled with Purdue, pre-bankruptcy. So I think to some extent, one looks at the fairness of the overall settlement as opposed to the same treatment, and that's corroborated by the fact that the -- Mr. Cowan's proposal is depends on different factors too, it's not the same, you know, it's not just a prorata under one measure for -- for any state.

But it -- it is -- unless there's a really good explanation for it, it is somewhat anomalous that California, alone, is not contributing to the small state

Page 114 1 fund. Unless I'm missing something. 2 MR. WAGNER: Well, again --3 THE COURT: I mean, I think, I mean, maybe I'm 4 putting words in Mr. Morrisey's mouth, but if it's not that 5 big a contribution, why doesn't California just agree to it? 6 MR. WAGNER: Again, I can't speak to California's motivation, but I would say it's in the general context of 7 8 the plan. It's not -- it's not material. 9 THE COURT: Well --10 MR. WAGNER: The contribution --11 THE COURT: -- but -- I -- (indiscernible) I don't 12 know. I don't -- I think that argues both ways, frankly. 13 All right. 14 MR. WAGNER: I -- yeah, I take, Your Honor's 15 point. 16 MR. MORRISEY: Your Honor --17 THE COURT: I mean, I -- I -- the reason I've had 18 -- and I'm sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Morrisey, the reason I'm asking this is you do have a very good record here, Mr. 19 20 Wagner, generally. But all I have, I think on the 21 California piece, unless I'm missing some piece of it, is 22 that one can argue that if you took law enforcement as an allocation factor and Mr. Cowan, did testify that that could 23 24 be taken as an allocation factor, California would actually 25 be getting a lot more. What I don't have is whether that's

any different than all the other 47 states or whether they're just saying my way or the highway. Even though they really aren't that different than the other 47. But maybe there's something in the record that suggests that they are unique, or that of the states contributing to the 1 percent fund, they have a highly disproportionate amount of law enforcement activity, particularly related to opioids.

MR. WAGNER: Well, again, I think -- again, I think the (indiscernible) of California could have argued otherwise, and this was a -- this was (indiscernible) and a compromise among the states, and they've all gone -- they've all gone along with it, including others similarly situated (indiscernible) West Virginia, but I take, Your Honor's point.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I hate to --

MR. MORRISEY: Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- I hate to -- if I could just get
this out, Mr. Morrisey. I hate to suggest more issues for
people to negotiate over in the next couple of days, but
this may be one that the states may want to discuss with the
State of California. I -- I under -- I think I do
understand both sides arguments on this point. But I'll
hear Mr. Morrisey on it.

MR. MORRISEY: Your Honor, I would address the materiality issue that in light of the sums of money that

are involved, when you're talking about 1 percent of a state's share, if you look at \$10 billion, hypothetically, that's \$100 million.

THE COURT: No I -- that's --

MR. MORRISEY: And so it --

THE COURT: -- I agree.

MR. MORRISEY: -- from a West Virginia

perspective, when you're talking about a small intensity

fund, we could be talking millions of dollars, and so that's

the first piece. So it is material, and second, once again,

we would point out that the record is very clear, that John

Guard testified that California said this was good enough,

and that they weren't going to give any more, but once again

that doesn't meet a good faith standard, and that's why

we've always asked, at a minimum, not only to increase the

intensity fund but this is a blight on the deal, and it

doesn't meet any rational considerations. It's not based on

a legitimate consideration.

THE COURT: Well, I -- I do -- I would put a qualification on what you just said, sir, which is I don't think this is a good faith issue. I think it's really a same treatment issue and I -- I have a hard time seeing one state, whether it be West Virginia on one side or California on the other, having a unique treatment that other hadn't negotiated, you know, for some very good reason, and I'm not

sure I see one here. But I'll have to -- I'll have to consider this carefully.

MR. WAGNER: And just one more point about the math, if the intensity fund is 1 percent, 1 percent of 40 -- \$4.5 billion, if my lawyer math is right, is \$45 -- \$45 million, the West Virginia --

THE COURT: I -- but look, it's the, you know, it's the (indiscernible) Webster's line it's a small school, but there are those that love it, you know, money's money here. It's important.

MR. WAGNER: The West Virginia share of that is \$450,000.

THE COURT: Well, that -- that can help -- that can help someone in West Virginia.

MR. HUEBNER: But Your Honor, one very small point from the Debtors, if the states are able to work this out amongst themselves in connection with the Court's, I think, pretty strong direction, we think that'll be fabulous. If the Court, nonetheless, felt in the absence of such an agreement, that the Court was essentially going to direct it, this is not the debtor's fight, but we would certainly not have no objection to that as the plan proponent it is our plan that would be changed. I think that the Debtor's view has at least some small relevance and we would not object.

Pg 118 of 351

1 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

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MR. ECKSTEIN: Your Honor, I would just make one point. This is Kenneth Eckstein. I do want to point out -and I hear Your Honor's suggestion, and I think we would obviously love to have that consensus achieved. I do want to point out that California remains an (indiscernible) state and I don't --

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. ECKSTEIN: -- hold out the likelihood that we're going to be able to resolve this specific issue with a state still objecting to the plan. So from a resolution standpoint, I don't want to give the wrong impression, Your Honor, about what's (indiscernible).

THE COURT: That's fair. I just -- I want -- I think -- and I don't know whether specific counsel from California is listening, although they've joined in. California's joined in the Oregon and Washington objection and others. It's -- look, I'm just pointing out my concern about this issue. That's all.

MR. ECKSTEIN: And we do understand, Your Honor. And obviously, the states worked as hard as they possibly could to bring the broadest possible consensus.

THE COURT: Well, that's clear.

MR. ECKSTEIN: There is this --

25 THE COURT: I -- look, that is clear to me. That

Page 118

Page 119 1 is clear to me, but nevertheless, I have to apply 2 1123(a)(4). 3 MR. ECKSTEIN: I believe, Your Honor, that you can, and I believe that there is equal treatment. But 4 5 you're correct that that equal treatment includes an exception, in a sense, for one state that would've argued 6 7 for more. They believe they were entitled to more --8 THE COURT: I agree. 9 MR. ECKSTEIN: -- than they're getting, and this 10 is where the settlement came to rest. Can it be improved? 11 Like all settlements, yes, but I just --12 THE COURT: Well, that's --13 MR. ECKSTEIN: -- want to suggest, Your Honor, that this one may be difficult for us to change. And I 14 15 don't --16 THE COURT: That's fair --17 MR. ECKSTEIN: -- want Your Honor frustrated by 18 the inability to make that movement right now. 19 THE COURT: Okay. Very well. 20 MR. ECKSTEIN: Thank you. 21 THE COURT: All right. Thank you both counsel on 22 that issue. So I think we are next, on the topic list, for 23 the objection by the Canadian municipalities and First People's listed in Mr. Underwood's objection. And again, 24 25 this is to cover points other than the third-party release

Pg 120 of 351 Page 120 1 point, except for one sort of overarching jurisdictional 2 point that Mr. Underwood wanted to discuss I think, which is 3 sovereign immunity or foreign sovereign immunity. So the Debtors have reserved a very brief time for their remarks, 4 5 and then I'll hear from Mr. Underwood. And then they have 6 some time for rebuttal. 7 MR. TOBAK: Thank you, Your Honor. 8 MR. UNDERWOOD: Your Honor, Allen --MR. TOBAK: Oh. 9 10 MR. UNDERWOOD: Go ahead. 11 MR. TOBAK: Anyway, this is Mark TOBAK, Davis Polk 12 for the Debtors. The Debtors' response to the Canadian 13 objector's objection is set forth in full in our brief, and 14 there's no need to repeat it here. It appears that over the 15 course of the hearing, Mr. Underwood's argument may have 16 evolved since the filing of our reply brief. So the Debtors 17 do reserve their time for rebuttal. 18 THE COURT: Okay. So --MR. UNDERWOOD: Thank you. 19 20 THE COURT: -- Mr. Underwood, you can go ahead. 21 MR. UNDERWOOD: Thank you, Your Honor. Allen

I think the way that we have always viewed this

Underwood on behalf of -- Allen Underwood with the firm of

Lite Depalma Greenberg and Afanador on behalf of certain

Canadian municipal creditors and Canadian First Nations

creditors.

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proposed plan (indiscernible) and it's a (indiscernible) short period of time that it may be leading this Court to error. In particular, irregardless of any of the other arguments made by other creditors, that may be leading this Court to errors particularly with regard to the Canadian Municipalities and First Nations.

wealth beyond the jurisdiction of this U.S. court, and that wealth was largely derived from the U.S. enterprise that is actually before this Court. In so doing, and unfortunately at least as this plan is drafted, the Sacklers have made themselves in their trust something along the effect of -- and it's not (indiscernible) themselves. And in effect, in the manner in which they're contributing assets to the plan, they are not -- they're not bowing to this Court. Rather, they're seeking to direct it.

THE COURT: Mr. Underwood, this is --

MR. UNDERWOOD: In essence --

THE COURT: -- really far afield from, not only your objection, but also from what I just said, which is that you had your chance to argue about third-party release already. I -- it's also, I think, just not -- I'm not quite sure where you're going on this. They actually are submitting to the Court's jurisdiction to perform the settlement, including the injunctive provisions of the

Page 122 1 settlement. So --2 MR. UNDERWOOD: 3 THE COURT: And as far as the -- your clients, whether the Court would have jurisdiction over your clients, 4 5 they've all filed claims in this case. They're looking to 6 recover --7 MR. UNDERWOOD: That correct. 8 THE COURT: -- money in this case. 9 MR. UNDERWOOD: That's correct, Your Honor. 10 where I was going from the outset was this notion, 11 effectively, that the Sacklers cast a dark pale over this 12 entire settlement by suggesting that -- there's a pinhole 13 that they suggest that they would walk away from this plan 14 in the event that these releases are not approved. And I 15 don't know whether that's true or not. 16 But what they've done is to -- effectively, this 17 Court is administering non-Debtor assets in Canada by way of the IACs and the rights of the Canadian Claimants in Canada 18 to bring claims against the Sacklers. And I think that 19 20 jurisdictionally in the first instance here, that's a bit of 21 a problem. 22 Now I'll go to Section 106, and I guess the 23 related issue, which is the way that this plan was 24 structured, if you were an international creditor, you were 25 given the devil's choice of filing a claim and affirmatively

participating in this process or not filing a claim and seeing how it played out. And I guess reserving your rights to pursue assets elsewhere.

The problem is that this Court -- because of the fact that the overall resolution here is actually administering non-Debtor assets in such a vast manner, that it's a bit unfair, generally, I think, to hold the Canadian Creditors to the kind of global Section 106 waiver that the Debtors would suggest. And the Debtors cite no case law about the scope of 106. And I think in principle, my understanding of what Section 106 is, is it's a defensive provision effectively to make sure that there are counterclaims under the Bankruptcy Code that can be brought so that if a sovereign submits to this Court an affirmative claim, there can be counterclaims.

Now, in this case, there's been no allegation of any form of Debtor claim, counterclaim, avoidance action claim against Canada. All Canada's set to do by participating is preserving its rights. And in fact, obviously the Canadian Municipal Creditors are glad they participated because, frankly, assets in Canada are being directed under the plan confirmed here to U.S. trusts, and those are U.S. trusts, which the Canadian Municipal Creditors and First Nations are not -- they're not beneficiaries.

And this is really because of the manner in which the Debtor has structured this plan. And when I say that, I -- we would have no argument here today had the Debtor effectively put the Canadian Municipal and First Nation Creditors in Classes 4 and 5 under the plan. And in fact, actually, factually, that's exactly what my clients thought up until -- and the Debtor admits this -- up until virtually a week before the plan objection on the sixth amended plan was due, at which point the Canadians were advised, well, despite the fact that you received ballots in Classes 4 and 5, you're actually going to be treated in Class 11C.

And it was at that point that the Canadian Municipalities and First Nations realized that merely filing a claim in this case was not going to be enough to preserve their rights before this Court, and that they would have to take the actions they have taken since that point. But bear in mind, Your Honor, that was a point 30 days ago. I think there was a presumption on the part of the Canadians that by filing a claim, their claim would get -- again, in same manner and fashion, and fairly with respect to other similarly situated claims.

Now, the Debtor clearly will make a distinction between the Canadian Municipal claims and Canadian First Nation claim, and the municipality claims, the State claims, the City claims that are filed by the United States

entities. And they make that distinction by a nebulous reference to how different those claims are. They've never actually factually driven down why is a Canadian state different -- or excuse me, a Canadian municipality different from a U.S. municipality. I would assert that the main difference is that there was a coalition of U.S. states and later municipalities that understood that they were -- and did press in their own direction to establish the classes under the plan, and that that was something that the Canadians presumed that ultimately they would be brought into. And

THE COURT: Well --

MR. UNDERWOOD: And that, again, is why we're here.

THE COURT: -- the objection itself acknowledges that the plan says what it says, which is that --

they waited patiently, and ultimately, that never happened.

MR. UNDERWOOD: Right.

THE COURT: -- they're in the -- that the class that would receive the governmental entities and the class that would receive Native American tribes that would receive distributions for abatement purposes through the trust would be U.S. governmental entities and tribes governed by U.S. law. I mean, that's -- that is clear in the plan, and it's acknowledged. So I think the issue here, the legal issue,

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Page 126 1 is not that your clients have a right to be in that -- in 2 one of those two classes depending on whether they're a 3 First Nations Creditor or a Canadian Municipal Creditor, but 4 whether their treatment in the Class 11 is somehow improper. 5 Now, Class 11 --6 MR. UNDERWOOD: And --7 THE COURT: -- Class 11 voted for the plan, right? MR. UNDERWOOD: It --8 9 THE COURT: In favor of the plan. 10 MR. UNDERWOOD: Interestingly enough, Your Honor, I think if you look at the voting tabulation for Class 11C, 11 12 and we did examine (indiscernible) tabulation, the 13 tabulation -- had the Canadian Creditors been able to 14 (indiscernible) dollar claim, the tabulation would have been 15 -- I think in terms of numerosity, the majority of creditors 16 in 11C, no matter how you slice it, would have voted in 17 favor of 11C. But in terms of overall value, but for the dollar 18 value restriction, if you attribute any reasonable value to 19 20 the Canadian First Nations claims in terms of dollar value, 21 that class would've voted against the plan. And I don't --22 THE COURT: But those claims are unliquidated. 23 And the Debtors, I think, are correct. Having received the 24 proofs of claim myself, it's very hard to see from the 25 claims whether they're against the Debtors or against Perdue

Canada or one of the Canadian entities. So there's been no motion to estimate. I don't know why you don't count the dollar amount.

MR. UNDERWOOD: And I don't want to waste a lot of the Court's time on that subject. I think what we really come down to is the Debtor hasn't presented anything to suggest these Canadian municipalities and First Nations are any different than tribes or cities in the U.S. Now what does that mean --

THE COURT: But I would push back on that too.

They do say that there's a substantial issue, which again, I could not get to the bottom of in looking at the proofs of claim and the complaints attached to, as to whether these claims are against Perdue Canada or against the Debtors.

And it's only to the extent they're against the Debtors that they would even have a right to recover.

And of course, if they're against Perdue Canada, they're not covered by the injunction under the plan. And on top of that, and we just spent about 40 minutes on this issue, it's quite clear to me that as far as the allocation under the plan is concerned on the public side, the governmental entities side, it's pretty much a minor miracle, but it did happen that those public entities were able to agree on an allocation.

But I have no basis to think that that agreement

would then include folding in foreign creditors who did not participate, and I don't think sought to participate, in the mediation on that issue. And --

MR. UNDERWOOD: I think --

THE COURT: And so, you know, I think courts have been recognized that there is a basis for separate classification. In fact, making a distinction even between foreign claimants and U.S. claimants as long as there's a rational basis for it, and including in the Sixth Circuit in the Dow Corning case, Class 5 Nevada Claims v. Dow Corning Corp., 288 F.3d 648, 642 (6th Cir. 2012).

Now, that was a case where there was evidence as to the different types of recovery in different countries.

So -- but the principle is you don't have to -- you can discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors if there's a rational basis for it. And it seems to me there's a rational basis.

I -- what is not clear to me is whether these three -- I'm sorry, I think it's -- not three, I think it's six creditors, would have any right to get involved in the allocation abatement aspect of this, and frankly, how much, if they even did, would go to them as opposed to their share of the \$15 million in cash, which is coming out right away, which they could certainly apply to abatement if they liquidate their claims and they're against the U.S.

MR. UNDERWOOD: I think the difficulty that I'm seeing here, Your Honor, is that I haven't seen anybody distinguish what makes the international border here. What makes Windsor, Canada different from Detroit? What makes a Canadian Mohican different from a New York State Mohican?

THE COURT: I --

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MR. UNDERWOOD: And that I understand, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. UNDERWOOD: I understand.

THE COURT: -- but I'll answer that -- I'll try to answer that question from my own perspective, and you could try to persuade me otherwise. I think the answer is we had a many-months-long process in the mediation with Messrs. Fineburg and Philips, as well as a mediation among the states themselves, regarding the public side allocation, which was incredibly difficult. And frankly, I don't see how do we open that. I just -- you know, there was -people -- look, I -- people did ask to be involved in the mediation. The NAACP asked to be involved in it. okay, but I think not having participated in that, and I can't predict how that would've turned out if the -- if your clients had sought and been granted the right to participate in it, whether the U.S. entities would've said, no, it's just too complicated.

But leave that aside. They didn't participate in

it. And at this point, we would be rewriting rules that just, you know, I think the Debtor has the perfect right under the Bankruptcy Code to have separate classification and given the acceptance of the plan, separate treatment by these two -- well, it was -- really would be four because you have the Native American tribes and the First Nation tribes, four different classes. So, you know, it's not as if the class in which the -- your clients are classified are getting nothing. They're getting money upfront. There's no argument that they would be getting more in the -- if they had participated in the no-added Native American tribes class. And indeed given the acceptance by Class 11, I don't think that argument flies because that's a cram-down argument. That's an 1129(b) disparate treatment or unfair treatment argument. So I just -- I don't -- to me, this objection sort of tries to fit within applicable sections of the Bankruptcy Code, but it just doesn't -- it doesn't -- to me it doesn't. It doesn't fit in. MR. UNDERWOOD: Your Honor, I appreciate your explanation, and I'm going to try to convince you otherwise --

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MR. UNDERWOOD: -- in the few minutes allowed.

Okay.

THE COURT:

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Page 131 1 THE COURT: And I'm going to (indiscernible) --2 MR. UNDERWOOD: (indiscernible) 3 THE COURT: -- to make a good -- you can hear if 4 they have that chance. 5 MR. UNDERWOOD: I greatly appreciate it. And I 6 will -- I am reserving to subsequently here address the 7 jurisdictional question. But as to this issue, the counsel 8 for these Creditors did reach out to the Debtors. 9 Debtors, in my opinion, were the first parties that had the 10 last clear chance to address these claims in what I think is 11 a more equitable fashion. 12 Mr. Dubel testified that the Special Committee 13 never reached out to these Creditors. These Creditors filed 14 their proofs of claim. Ultimately, Your Honor, what I would 15 go back to here is reference to the In re Dana Corp. case in 16 the Southern District, and Public Airways and this notion 17 that all claimants that are in a class must have the same 18 opportunity for recovery. I understand the notion that that 19 you're driving --20 THE COURT: They're not in the same class. 21 They're in a different class. 22 MR. UNDERWOOD: All right. I'm not going to beat 23 a dead horse there. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MR. UNDERWOOD: I think the placement of them into

a different class was a problem, and that's why I actually started this argument at a different -- perhaps a higher level, which is ultimately what happens here is material to the global perception of U.S. courts and their manner in which they deal with creditors.

And I think that the perception of the Debtors not having addressed foreign municipalities in the same way that they addressed U.S. municipalities when -- and let's face it. If they were all vendors, the fact that they were across the state border would not have impacted -- all other things being equal would not have impacted their classifications, and they would have this (indiscernible).

THE COURT: I agree with that.

MR. UNDERWOOD: All right.

THE COURT: I agree with that. On the other hand

MR. UNDERWOOD: So --

THE COURT: On the other hand, if they were personal injury claimants, a la the Dow Corning case, the Court -- the plan proponent wouldn't be within its rights to have a separate classification if there was a rational basis for it based on the different nature of their recovery. And again, there is a -- there was a very lengthy, expensive, and well-publicized process here to mediate the allocation and treatment of public creditors that those who wish to

participate in, really pretty much just had to file something if they were let in the door in a timely fashion, and they would've participated, including the NAACP for example and the school districts.

Canadian court in it's -- in response to a motion for final recognition to decide this issue. But I think the record should be clear that there was no exclusion of the Canadian Municipal Creditors and First Nations Creditors from that process, and the process was a lynchpin of this plan. To now reopen it would be, I think, impossible to bring other parties into it.

On the other hand, the class in which the Canadian Creditors were classified, voted to accept the plan, and I don't -- I have no evidence that they're -- even setting aside that they -- because of that vote this is irrelevant to me legally, under the Bankruptcy Code it might be relevant to a Canadian court of recognition. I don't know, but there's no evidence that they're getting a worse deal than if they had been included in the trust structure. They're getting their pro rata share of \$15 million in cash right away that wouldn't happen but for, I believe, the other aspects of the plan.

MR. UNDERWOOD: I think, Your Honor, I just want to make clear that at least the Canadian Creditors view this

as a conscious choice by the Debtors in the manner which they classified these Creditors. And ultimately, it's impossible to say how the mediation might have ended. It never even started, and that again there was a conscious choice by someone other than this Creditor.

So, ultimately -- I don't want to necessarily belabor this point any further, but it does raise the ultimate implication, which is an issue for this Court and for the United States, which is it would not be a good thing generally for the Canadian (indiscernible) to accept this Court's confirmation of a plan. And specifically with regard to this case, there is no question that that outcome would affect the implementation, I think, of the plan. So it is material, I think, in a larger perspective. I'm willing to move onto jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. UNDERWOOD: And essentially, with regard to that -- and even there, it's still a release issue, I suppose. Because what we're really talking -- what I'm talking about is under (indiscernible) Petroleum Network, and I'm sure you're more familiar with the case than I am, what these (indiscernible) are affecting is an involuntary release of a foreign sovereign's, effectively, claims against the U.S. Debtor.

Now, in terms of those claims, the proof of claims

attached complaints that assert fraud, public, nuisance, a variety of forms of relief. And those are the very same forms of relief that are sought by United States municipalities.

In terms of the jurisdiction of this Court to enter a nonconsensual release under Section 1141 of the Bankruptcy Code, I think there is fundamentally -- and this is absolutely without offense to the Court, but I think that there is a jurisdictional question at the outset of whether a non-Article 3 judge actually has that authority.

I'll pull very quickly back to the second aspect of this issue, which is, all right, we all agree about what Section 106 specifically says, but what was it really intended to do and what does it really mean in this case? And are there other statutes that abrogate 106 for the very specific purposes of this case? And I think in terms of 106, the Debtors, who really don't cite any case law or analysis of 106, I think -- I think the way that I look at 106 and the way other courts have looked at Section 106 is that it is to preserve defensive rights.

Meaning preserve avoidance actions, preserve, you know, separate Debtor actions against foreign sovereigns so that they can't sneak in and sneak out of the court without having full relief on both sides. But I think here, as I stated earlier, there is no -- there are no such claims that

have been asserted. So ultimately, with regard to 106, the -- ultimately, the way that the foreign sovereignty immunity statute actually trumps Section 106 in the Code. To be frank, I couldn't find any law on that either way.

And maybe Davis Polk can correct me on that, but ultimately there is no exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act that would otherwise apply here. So other than filing a claim, which unquestionably my clients had to do, wanted to do, they wanted to participate in this case, it was important that they did it because, frankly, Canadian assets are affected by the proceedings before this Court, and there's no denying that.

I think ultimately there's a real question here about whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, under this very specific factual circumstance, may trump the plain language of Section 106. Because what we're talking about here is really the relationship between two countries, and I'm certain that the people of Canada will not be happy when they come to understand that there is an entire abatement procedure that they were effectively left out of. Maybe that is what it is, but that's fundamentally, I think the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act jurisdictional Section 106 issue before this Court. And I hope I was able to frame that in some fashion.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. UNDERWOOD: And we'll certainly raise it on an objection.

THE COURT: I understand your objection, and I think it really comes down to the Court's, the Circuit Court's, analysis of, first, what is being done when a plan does enjoin the prosecution of a third-party claim; and secondly, whether, by its plain terms, 106(a)(1) and (b) permit that with regard to an entity, a governmental entity that has sovereign immunity.

But I will note, though, that the injunction is, as argued by the Debtors and their allies, the committee and the other ad hoc groups that are supporting the plan, serve an integral role enabling any recovery under the plan, including the recovery in Class 11, which is what your clients would have.

And again, as far as participating in an abatement program, the -- I have no -- nothing to suggest that the pro rata share of the Class 11 consideration that would flow to the Canadian Creditors that you represent would be anything less than the value of the abatement program that would flow to them, which is, you know, obviously something that, I mean, directly flow to them. To the extent they're right across the border from a state or municipality that has that type of program, there would be some indirect effect, as was testified. But notwithstanding the size of the value that's

going into the NOAT and Native American tribes' trusts, when you look at the denominator, if you added your client's claims to it, it's quite possible to me that, even if they had asked to participate in the mediation, and had been included in the procedures, these creditors wouldn't have any aliquot share of that abatement program that would come close to their pro rata share of the cash that they're getting right away that they can themselves apply to abatement.

MR. UNDERWOOD: I think, Your Honor -- and it's a funny thing because I have always said I would never, ever listen to a client who says -- that says to me that it's just about money. This isn't just about money, and I think we cannot say because there never was an allocation to Canada as to what it might have received as to these claims. But that be -- I would also say that, and sincerely, very sincerely, the municipalities and First Nation's interests in the Class 4 and 5 programs wasn't just money. They were genuinely interested in the other aspects of the abatement programs that they are also not partaking in.

THE COURT: Well, they have every opportunity to use those programs as a model for their own use of the money that they're getting, and frankly to -- if they -- if there are other municipalities that would oppose that, try to convince the court in Canada that the condition of

recognition is that the recoveries by Canadian creditors be used towards abatement.

MR. UNDERWOOD: I -- I'm sure that someone will make those arguments in Canada before the NCAA. I guess my concern also is that the result of this confirmed plan will be, to a degree potentially, a handcuffing of the Canadian Creditors to recover presuming that they are locked out of any recovery against the U.S. assets. They're not a part of the NOAD or the tribal trust.

And presuming that the liquidation value or net sale value of the Canadian entity is then conveyed to those very trusts, which the Canadians are not participating, and presuming that as (indiscernible) --

THE COURT: That's a mistake. Your clients, to the extent they have claims against the Canadian entities, can go against the Canadian entities. There's -- they're not being enjoined from doing that. To the extent they have claims against the Canadian entities, they are not being enjoined from proceeding against them. There might be a race to the courthouse on that point, but they have those claims.

MR. UNDERWOOD: I understand.

THE COURT: There's no doubt about that. So I just --

MR. UNDERWOOD: I understand the fundamental

difficult position, and I'm greatly appreciative of the work that everyone in this case has done to achieve any kind of result in an otherwise insoluble case. But I think ultimately when we look at the liquidation value of those Canadian assets, they pale in comparison to the U.S. assets.

THE COURT: But --

MR. UNDERWOOD: Or their treatment of the note. I think ultimately if we believe that the Canadian Creditors will be handcuffed in their ability to collect against the Sacklers under Canadian actions, we've left Canada with very little from this proceeding, and that is what it is. And I told clients that on the first day that I took this case. I think ultimately I appreciate Your Honor's work in this case.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. UNDERWOOD: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Any rebuttal?

MR. TOBAK: Briefly, Your Honor. The first point

I'll note -- and this is Mark TOBAK, Davis Polk for the

Debtors, is that oddity that we had earlier in argument that

it was illegal for the Debtors to classify states in the

United States together with the municipalities of counties

within that state. And now we have an argument that it is

apparently illegal for the Debtors to classify cities in an

entirely different country separately from the states and

Page 141 1 municipalities in this country. And I think that gets to 2 the point of, you know, it was asked many times why the 3 Canadian municipalities and First Nations are being (indiscernible). 4 5 THE COURT: You cut out. I'm not sure what 6 happened there. Are you there? 7 WOMAN: (indiscernible) 8 MR. TOBAK: All right. Your Honor, can you hear? 9 THE COURT: Yeah, now I can hear you. 10 MR. TOBAK: Thank you. I don't know where it cut 11 out, but I'll say that the suit (indiscernible) --12 THE COURT: You got -- you cut out again. Yeah, I 13 think when you move your paper you might mute yourself. MR. TOBAK: Oh. There's a (indiscernible) 14 15 keyboard underneath my lectern. THE COURT: There you go. 16 17 MR. TOBAK: Your Honor, I apologize for that. 18 THE COURT: That's fine. MR. TOBAK: In any event, the point is that Canada 19 20 is a separate country, and that's fundamentally important 21 for many reasons. The most important reason, as Your 22 Honor's already noted, is that there is an independent 23 company, an IAC, in Canada called Purdue Canada, and that 24 entity sells and markets pharmaceuticals in Canada. 25 importance of the border, which Mr. Underwood asked about,

is particularly important in the context of highly regulated pharmaceutical products which are subject to a great deal of regulation in the United States, an entirely separate regime of regulation in Canada under that country's laws. That is why Perdue Pharma does business in the United States and not in Canada.

To the point of the Canadian municipalities'

desire to participate in an allocation and abatement scheme,

fundamentally we hope, as Your Honor has already noted, that

perhaps this plan of confirm can be used as a model for a

similar scheme in Canada with respect to Canadian

municipalities and assets of the Canadian company.

I will note, however, that in this plan here, the testimony is that it has taken literally years, including years before Perdue filed for bankruptcy, to develop this plan and to develop an abatement model that was targeted to the communities in this country. It would be entirely inappropriate to attempt to in-graph that model into different communities in the different country under different legal regimes with different allocations of national, provincial, and local responsibilities, and to address different conduct by different companies and solve the different needs.

With respect to the jurisdictional point, I think it can't really be said better than 106(a), which

specifically provides that it abrogates the sovereign immunity of any governmental entity, including a foreign state with respect to Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code. I can't find in the Code any suggestion that it is limited only to the assertion of a counter claim by a Debtor.

As Your Honor also noted, the jurisdictional basis for this proceeding is a simple, Section 1334, and this is on the basis of any other aspect of a plan being confirmed. With respect to whether there's any case holding that sovereign immunity is abrogated by Section 106, one case is the In re RMS Titanic case, which is at 569 B.R. 825 from the Middle District of Florida 2017 which states that pursuant to Section 106(a), foreign states can no longer assert sovereign immunity from liability under the Bankruptcy Code.

And then it notes that Section 106 abrogates sovereign immunity as to a governmental unit. It cites to several cases. One from the Ninth Circuit and others from other bankruptcy courts across the country. I think that's really all there is to say with respect to sovereign immunity other than, also, the fundamental point that the municipalities and First Nations did come to this court and seek to participate in this proceeding, which is also a waiver of whatever immunity they might have had otherwise.

Unless Your Honor has any further questions, I

Page 144 1 think we rest on that and our papers. 2 THE COURT: No, I think that's fine. Thank you both. 3 4 MR. UNDERWOOD: Your Honor, may I make one comment as to the reference to the RMS Titanic case? 5 6 THE COURT: Sure. 7 MR. UNDERWOOD: And I think it came through in 8 what counsel said. The RMS Titanic case refers to the 9 liability of a foreign sovereign. It doesn't refer to the 10 taking of a right, and I'll rest on that, and I appreciate 11 it. Thank you. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right. 13 1:30. We have probably another two or three hours at most. Does it make sense to take a break for lunch? 14 15 MAN: Your Honor, that actually is exactly what I 16 was going to suggest. And just for people who are following 17 the hearing, we have the (indiscernible) and Bridges, I 18 think, objection up next, then insurers, then pro ses, and 19 then whatever miscellaneous matters are remaining with 20 respect to the releases. I think the allocated time for 21 those things is actually a little bit under three hours. 22 hopefully we will be able to keep to that, but we'll see how 23 the afternoon goes. THE COURT: Okay. So I'll come back at 2:30 then. 24 25 MR. UZZI: Your Honor, if I may, just before we

Page 145 1 break, I have a comment that I hope is helpful as it relates 2 to narrowing the release a little bit. And again for the record, Gerard Uzzi of Milbank for the Ray Sackler family. 3 Now, I realize, Your Honor, when I made the presentation 4 earlier, I said something, with I meant, and it's a little 5 6 inconsistent with one of the words on the page, which is 7 there is no release of tax liability. But the carve-out for 8 that is in the definition of excluded claim, and when I went 9 back and checked --10 THE COURT: But that's been there for a while. 11 MR. UZZI: Well, and it has been, Your Honor. And 12 I realize, though, I said any taxes. What it says in 13 excluded claims is income tax, and we meant any tax. And so 14 we could strike the word income. And just -- I know people 15 are preparing for, you know, possible argument after lunch. 16 And just if that helps simplify things, I wanted to make 17 that announcement prior to the break. That's all. 18 THE COURT: Okay. That's good. Thank you. All right. So again --19 20 MR. UZZI: You're welcome. 21 THE COURT: -- we'll come back at 2:30. 22 (Recess) THE COURT: Okay, good afternoon. This is Judge 23 Drain. We are back on the record In re Purdue Pharma LP and 24

the confirmation hearing.

The next matter, or next topic rather, of oral argument I believe is the argument on objections filed by Mr. Overton and his counsel to Creighton Bloyd, Stacey Bridges, and Charles Fitch. Creighton Bloyd actually had two objections. The other two people joined with him in one. And I'm sorry, I said Overton. And I apologize, Mr. Ozment, it's Mr. Frank Ozment. So I think the Debtor's counsel is going to go first on this and then we were going to hear from Mr. Ozment. MR. TOBAK: That's correct, Your Honor. For the record, it's Marc Tobak from Davis Polk for the Debtors. Reserving most of our time for rebuttal, I want to make two points with respect to the objections by Mr. Bloyd, Ms. Bridges, and Mr. Fitch to notice provided to incarcerated unknown claimants. And the fundamental point, Your Honor, is that this is not their objection to raise. They do not argue that they were not provided with the adequate notice, and they can't. That would be contradicted by the facts. According to the timestamp on Ms. Bridges' proof of claim, she filed just three days after this Court entered the bar date order in February 2020. And Mr. Bloyd filed his proof of claim in June 2020. Mr. Fitch, by the way, hasn't filed a proof of

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claim even though he is a plaintiff in an adversary proceeding against the Debtors. And we have been in contact with his counsel since at least January of this year.

So their objection to notice is raised on behalf of other parties who, as far as we were aware, Mr. Ozment does not represent in this proceeding, and as far as we are aware, not before the Court. Mr. Ozment's clients, therefore, lack standing to assert the rights of other parties in attempt to thwart confirmation of the plan.

And I quote from the Second Circuit's opinion in Kane v. Johns-Manville, which is 843 F2.d 636 at 642, "Generally, litigants in federal court are barred from asserting constitutional and statutory rights of others in an effort to obtain relief for themselves." That rule precludes Mr. Ozment's clients from raising the alleged notice rights of others.

Indeed, the Second Circuit's decision in Kane is almost an exact parallel here. There, an asbestos claimant in Johns Manville bankruptcy attempted to appeal on the ground that other asbestos claimants had not obtained adequate notice. The Second Circuit refused to entertain that appeal, and it held that an objector who had himself received notice could not assert the alleged rights of third parties.

Judge Newman, for the panel, noted that, "The

general rule that third party standing is particularly relevant in bankruptcy proceedings, as parties may often find it personally expedient to assert the rights of others in attempt to block confirmation of a plan." And that quote is from 843 F.2d at 645.

I don't doubt the sincerity of Mr. Ozment or his clients. But in this case where his three clients stand, just as in Kane, opposed to over 95 percent of the voting creditors in their class, opposed to the statutory fiduciary, all unsecured creditors, and also opposed to the Ad Hoc Group of individual victims, there is more than sufficient reason to conclude that his clients lack standing to assert the rights of others.

I also briefly note that the objection was quite untimely. Your Honor approved the Debtor's extraordinary and exhaustive noticing program in February 2020. And that program was expanded through the extended bar date order, which is at Docket 1221, on June 3rd, 2020. And as Ms. Finigan testified earlier, the Debtors engaged in yet another additional and extensive noticing program in connection with the confirmation hearing. And that was approved on June 3rd of this year at Docket 2988 in the exposure statement order. Mr. Ozment and his clients never before raised these issues until filing their objections on July 19th.

Page 149 1 With all respect, had they wished to alter the 2 notice program rather than belatedly point to it as an obstacle to confirmation, it could have been raised earlier 3 at a time in 2020 or 2021 when it might have -- when things 4 5 might have been changed. 6 With that, I will reserve the rest of our time for 7 rebuttal. THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to -- there is a 8 9 second declaration. Are you going to deal with that 10 separately? A second objection by Mr. Creighton. 11 MR. TOBAK: I believe we addressed all -- both the 12 Bloyd and Bridges and --13 THE COURT: I'm sorry, Mr. Creighton Bloyd. MR. TOBAK: Mr. Bloyd, correct. So that's the one 14 15 at -- I think it's Docket 3277. THE COURT: Right. 16 17 MR. TOBAK: We'll rest on our papers with respect 18 to that unless the Court has any questions and rebuttal to 19 Mr. Ozment's argument. 20 THE COURT: All right. So you're reserving 21 rebuttal on that one. Okay. 22 MR. TOBAK: Correct. Thank you. 23 THE COURT: Okay. All right, Mr. Ozment. 24 MR. OZMENT: Your Honor, thank you. This is Frank 25 Ozment, and I represent Creighton Bloyd, Stacey Bridges, and

Charles Fitch.

With respect to the Article Three and case or controversy issue, I'm not familiar with the case that he cited. But I would point that we are not bringing a case or controversy here. There is a case or controversy already. I think, you know, the power of Congress to regulate bankruptcy under Article 1, Section 8, is really what this is about, is our coming in and saying, you know, we don't think this is fair.

With respect to Ms. Bridges in particular, while she is not presently incarcerated, she certainly has been. And, you know, that threat remains. So to the extent that there is some issue there, perhaps it's capable of repetition but (indiscernible).

The more important thing I think is to get to the heart of what we're saying here. And I normally don't read a closing argument to a judge, but in the interest of time, I wrote this one down.

In Mullane v. Central Hanover, the court recognized that due process requires a debtor to give notice to a creditor before the creditor's claims could be extinguished. If the identity of the debtors and their whereabouts are unknowable, then those can be by publication. If the identity and whereabouts are reasonably ascertainable, the creditor cannot rely merely on those by

publication absent some other extraordinary circumstances.

Over the years, courts have recognized that creditor (indiscernible). The creditor has a lien, the debtor generally has to do a little more. The creditor is unsecured perhaps by publication by notices where acceptable if the creditor is unknown.

Here, there is no doubt, and Christina Pullo testified about it in her declaration but also in cross, the Debtors made a herculean effort to notify a lot of people.

And to a large extent, they appear to have succeeded, with one very notable exception.

Their efforts were focused on people in the free world, not so much people in prison. Normally, this might not matter much. In an ordinary case, notice provided to the free world might leak over into the incarcerated world. And if this were a case about promissory notes and the creditors were all banks, well, you wouldn't expect to find too many creditors in prison, or at least in federal prison -- I'm sorry, in state prison.

But this is not a normal case. This is a case about addiction. Addiction drives people to crime, and everybody knows that. Prisons are disproportionately likely to house people suffering from addiction. Moreover, this was noticed during a period in American History that was very nearly unique. A pandemic, when common sense dictates

that the public not go in and out of prisons, which of course are places where social distancing is pretty much impossible.

While Ms. Pullo I think gave very good testimony and certainly put some of my concerns (indiscernible) notice of the free world, it was also clear from her testimony that the Debtors did very little to alert prisoners in particular about the need to file claims.

This is particularly unfortunate in this case -and this goes somewhat to Mr. Bloyd's objection, Your Honor
-- because victims should have been lienholders under the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. The United States and
the Debtor basically agreed that victims would not get their
rights under the MVRA because it would take too long to
figure out who they were or just generally to calculate what
they would receive.

And at this point, I want to emphasize that was not a proceeding in which Davis Polk represented the Debtors.

Ultimately, that issue may be a matter for the sentencing court to revisit. It may ultimately be something that Congress wants to take up. But in the meanwhile, that deprivation of lienholder status and that effort to ignore the rights of victims under the MVRA -- sorry about that,

Judge -- aggravates this situation that we (indiscernible).

Personal injury victims might argue that their liens should prime those of the (indiscernible) states. Right now, we are merely trying to avoid the injury that resulted from the lack of notification. Interestingly -- well, I'll just skip that point.

There is a solution to all this, although this not be the time, place to take it up. Bridges and Bloyd filed proofs of claim on behalf of all people similarly situated to them. That is to say living former opioids addicts who are in active recovery. Perhaps allowing their claims to serve as timely filed proofs of claim will overcome the (indiscernible) notice, especially for those who are locked up.

As a practical matter, this may not mean much from the perspective of outsiders in the free world. For prisoners, however, the recovery of amounts as low as \$3,500 is life-changing. It can pay off fines, pay the fees necessary to get into community corrections, or pay child support.

But, again, the proof of claim issue is not before the Court today. We have filed a motion to allow those proofs of claim to be treated as adequate for satisfying the bar date. However, we don't have a hearing date on that yet. I thought we did, and I called Ms. Li yesterday and she said she didn't (indiscernible).

The issue today is whether the Debtors proved that they provided notice to one of the most densely-concentrated populations of opioid use disorder victims in the nation, that is to say the men and women who are incarcerated. I don't think it's very hard to find those people. They have publicly-listed addresses. At each address, the concentration of victims is high.

I respectfully submit, and somewhat reluctantly submit in light of all the work that's gone into this case, that confirmation should be denied unless and until the Debtors are going to get or allow the prisoners formally to file late claims.

And that ends my written statement, Your Honor.

And with respect to Creighton Bloyd's objection, I will tell
you that I filed that because I felt as if I did not file
it, then I would not be able to take it up with the United
States District Court when sentencing is concluded. I don't
know, quite frankly, that there is much that you can do
about that in this proceeding, but I did feel like it had to
be (indiscernible). And I'll be glad to take questions on
it if you like.

THE COURT: Well, I have reviewed the Mandatory

Victims Restitution Act. I don't think I have questions on

it. And ultimately that is an act that applies I think at

the sentencing stage. So I don't think I have any questions

there.

As far as the notice point is concerned, I think standing is probably an absolute barrier here since it does not seem to me that Creighton Bloyd or Ms. Bridges or Mr. Fitch have an injury to be addressed by the relief sought in the first objection to them. So I don't think I have questions, Mr. Ozment.

8 MR. OZMENT: Thank you, Your Honor. That's it for 9 me.

THE COURT: Okay. You're on mute.

MAN: Yes. I see Mr. Shore has joined, and I defer to him if he wishes to respond to any points regarding the treatment of personal injury claimants under the TDPs.

MR. SHORE: Two points, Your Honor. It's Chris Shore from White & Case on behalf of the Ad Hoc Group of personal injury victims, which includes 55,000 individuals, including incarcerated individuals.

It's unclear to me what the status is of the full objection. We've heard some argument today on it. I'd like to address the class proof of claim issue because I think to some extent what is happening today, or if the Court confirms the plan is going to affect the class claims status. Two, to address the claims and the objections that somehow either of the TDPs is disproportionally unfavorable to incarcerated individuals or otherwise does not take into

consideration their unique circumstances.

On the first point, the TDPs, which are plan supplements -- I think the 16th plan supplement was just filed -- the Court will be approving those. Those require that anybody who receives money from the TDP has an individual proof of claim on file.

So while Mr. Ozment is saying he wants to reserve the right to seek class treatment, he hasn't done it yet.

And if you -- without getting too far into it, the Musicland factors that would go into whether or not that claim would be filed, it would certainly be our position that the allowance of a class proof of claim, which would, according to the papers, take the personal injury class from 135,000 individuals to 1.5 million individuals, would affect the administration of the estate going forward because the whole TDP gets upended, distributions are made uncertain, and you're going to have to change a central feature of the TDP, which is that it's being done on an individualized basis.

So, you know, while I appreciate he's not pressing and not seeking today class treatment for the claims, we are going to have some distinct views with respect to whether that would ever be appropriate.

But to be clear, I don't think the objection is that the TDPs as drafted were drafted in bad faith. I think the point Mr. Ozment was making in the objection was it

doesn't take into consideration the unique facts of incarcerated individuals.

And I hope Your Honor can see from the TDPs and what have been said about them, there was a great deal of thought and effort that was put into balancing the due process issues on the one hand with code requirements and the need to get money out to individuals in a timely fashion. And to some extent, it was a zero sum game. The more money that's spent on process, the less money there is to distribute at the end of the day.

The -- one of the central premises of the TDPs is the requirement under the Code that people file proofs of claim. And the TDP, the notice in the TDP backs off of the Debtor's incredible notice program, both at the -- or with respect to both bar date times.

Even so, there are provisions in the TDP which allow individuals with late filed claims to either come to the Court and seek relief under Rule 9006 or go to the claims administrator, who has authority in his or her discretion to allow the claim as timely. And that's Footnote 6 in the non-NAS TDP.

So there's nothing discriminatory against individuals who are incarcerated. They have the same right and ability to file a late claim as anybody else. Nor is the actual claims process discriminatory. Every claim under

the Code is required to be substantiated with proof.

There are two -- and maybe Mr. Ozment can address it with more specificity. There are two ideas I think buried in the concerns of incarcerated individuals. One is it just takes them longer to get the health records that are necessary to substantiate their claims. Again, under the TDP, the claims administrator has discretion to elongate the deadlines for any given individual. That's Footnote 8 in the non-NAS TDP. So there is already built-in flexibility to the extent it's a question of timing.

We extended the question of being able to gain access to records at all, which is an issue faced by some incarcerated individuals. Again, the TDP provides that if the individual is not able to gain access to their medical records, they can file declarations to that effect and make the necessary showings to obviate the need for their actual medical records to substantiate.

So, you know, I'm not sure what else we can do consistent with the law and the Code to relieve the obligations that exist under the Code with respect to people having to file proofs of claim and people having to substantiate proofs of claim with proof. Because we just can't have a TDP in which any individual can come forward without any proof and take money out of the PI trust that is otherwise slated for real individuals with real proof and

Page 159 1 real harm. 2 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 3 MR. OZMENT: Your Honor, may I briefly address that? 4 5 THE COURT: Well, I just want to make sure -- do 6 the Debtors have anything more to say on this point, or 7 shall I just hear briefly from Mr. Ozment? 8 MAN: With regard to the TDPs, no. With regard to 9 notice, while Your Honor's ruling with respect to standing 10 probably disposes of the issue, just given the importance of 11 notice and its scope of notice provided, I want to note just 12 two points if that's appropriate right now. 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 The first is that under the law, constructive M: 15 notice by publication is sufficient notice to unknown 16 claimants. It's not accurate to say that everyone who is 17 incarcerated was provided notice through a constructive 18 means such as publication or television or other forms of To the contrary, any known claimants, as is set forth 19 20 in Ms. Finigan's declarations, were provided with actual 21 notice by mail. 22 Secondly, in response to a question from Mr. Ozment in the hearing, she testified that there was actual 23 24 specific outreach by mailings directed to prison outreach

organizations and to entities responsible for the management

of prison facilities, which is set forth in her testimony of August 12th, 2021 at Transcript, Page 76, Lines 10 through 18.

And the third point builds off those two. And on the other hand, we don't have any record evidence to support Mr. Ozment's and his clients' assertions regarding the scope of notice and what is or isn't available in prisons. And while, again, we don't doubt the sincerity of any of them or in any way discount the importance of providing relief to those who are incarcerated, on the other hand, there just isn't record evidence of those assertions. And with that, we rest on our papers.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. OZMENT: Your Honor, first, a quantitative issue. This would not amount (indiscernible) the claims. There are roughly 1.2 million in physical custody of state prisons. And, you know, roughly 20 percent of those probably use opioids even while in custody. But that doesn't mean that they product manufactured by Purdue. So we're not talking about flooding the trust with those claims.

With respect to the issue regarding trust distribution procedures, we are not asking for relief on it.

As a practical matter, by the time a prisoner arrives in prison as opposed to jail, the people who run those

correction facilities know pretty much everything there is to know about them. And so hopefully to the extent that people have had an opioid use disorder, problem that's well known, and also perhaps even a level of what drug was it. So, for example, you know, some drug courts will keep up with, you know, was it OxyContin, Lortab, what led you astray.

So we're not asking for relief on it. But as a practical matter, as you saw in the hearing involving Augustus Evans earlier, I think it was last week, you know, prisoners need help navigating this. And it's very difficult to motivate and engage people to help them, especially volunteers, when, you know, it could be sort of a dry well and in the discretion of my fellow bar member here in Birmingham, who is a fine fellow, Ed Gentle, who is the claim administrator.

I think, you know, we're going to get people engaged in helping these folks, as we did with voting rights issues and things of that nature. They need to have some understanding that, you know, if you get your stuff together and it's in order, you're not totally wasting your time.

Otherwise, these claims are not going to get filed. It's just going to be too overwhelming for them.

And finally, in terms of filing a proof of claim late and so forth, one of the last things in the world we

want to do is snow the Court, or Mr. Gentle, or anybody else with a ton of paperwork on whether somebody should be allowed to file a late claim.

What we're talking about here is just one

(indiscernible). Okay? We're not asking for the right to

vote as we did -- as one of the earlier petitioners did.

We're just saying there's a problem with notice. And it

needs to be addressed so that those people who are, you

know, perhaps not as poignant and heart-tugging as some of

the other stories, can file claims where it's appropriate.

So much of this is getting ahead of ourselves. But since we touched on this issue, I wanted to clarify that we're not, you know, going (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right, thank you both.

I think the next topic that is on is objections by certain insurers to either aspects of the plan or proposed aspects of the confirmation order. And the Debtors, again, will go first, as will the -- they will be followed by the Ad Hoc Committee of Certain States and Other Governmental Entities. And then we'll hear from Navigators' counsel, I think Mr. Anker.

So who is going to be speaking on behalf of the Debtors on this?

MR. SINGER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. It's

Paul Singer from Reed Smith on behalf of --

THE COURT: Okay, afternoon.

MR. SINGER: Thank you, Your Honor. We are special counsel -- special insurance counsel to the Debtors. I will be (indiscernible) with provisions of Section 510 of the plan, which we believe as written is appropriate and consistent with appliable law. Emily Grim will be speaking on behalf of the AHC and will address the findings of fact and the conclusions of law to which the insureds have objected.

Section 526(I) of the plan, Your Honor, provides that the Master Disbursement Trust will receive the Debtor's rights under any insurance policy that may -- and I emphasize may -- provide coverage for opioid claims.

The purpose of the transfer is to enable the MDP to pursue recoveries under the Debtors' policies, and if successful, would distribute any proceeds recovered to opioid creditors pursuant to (indiscernible) the plan.

This arrangement is typical of those found in mass tort cases. The assignment of insurance rights has been proved under Section 1123.05, most notably by the Third Circuit in the Federal Mogul case.

To be clear, the plan does not require any findings as to the value of the insurance or the extent to which the policy would actually cover opioid claims. But

the plan does seek findings intended to insure that the plan itself doesn't somehow create additional risk to recover that the Debtors would not have faced prepetition. For that reason, the plan includes language in Section 510 that confirms, consistent with applicable law, that this Court's findings are binding on insurers but then any other defenses to coverage insurers may have are preserved.

According to certain insurers, they should be entitled to argue in first confirmation coverage litigation that keep components of the plan vitiates coverage. Under objection, they assert that the plan would insulate them from any aspects of the plan or the confirmation order that may be detrimental to these arguments. They make these assertions notwithstanding the understanding the adversary proceeding that findings of the Court would be binding on them in the coverage litigation.

Quite simply, the law does not permit the insurers to undermine the plan's settlement framework, but to use it as a basis to stake their coverage obligation. To the contrary, the Bankruptcy Code, the policies underlying it that the parties should negotiate a plan that settles claims, and the insurers' own policies, may of which contain provisions that, notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the insured, they remain in effect. All of that prohibit the insured from seeking an exemption from the (indiscernible)

of the plan, the confirmation order for the Bankruptcy Code.

To be sure, neither the Bankruptcy Code nor its prior iteration in 1898 or 1939 requires the inclusion of the broad neutrality language sought by the insureds.

Indeed, the term neutrality as used by the insureds is a misnomer. What the insurers are seeking are special exemptions from rulings that are otherwise binding on them as they would be on any other party in interest. There is no law saying matters that are decided in connection with the plan confirmation can't be used in a subsequent insurance coverage action. Indeed, Your Honor confirmed this we believe in the insured's adversary proceeding --

WOMAN: Quiet. I think they heard me yell.

MR. SINGER: Am I being heard, Your Honor?

THE COURT: People should keep their phone on mute unless they are speaking.

MR. SINGER: As I was saying, the principle that plan confirmation orders can be used in other proceedings is longstanding. Discharge orders are often used with effect to the release of claims under a plan in a state law proceeding. And indeed, free and clear orders likewise issued under Section 363 are often used in state court proceedings to demonstrate that there's no success or liability.

The carveout that the insurers seek here, if you

call it neutrality, was developed in the early 2000s in the Combustion Engineering and Pittsburgh Corning cases as a tool to limit the ability of a debtor's (indiscernible) frustrate or delay the plan confirmation process.

Indeed, each of those cases went to the Third

Circuit several times, and the Pittsburgh Corning case took

over a decade to get to confirmation.

The neutrality language that the insurers seek indicate that they would have no -- the confirmation would have no impact on their rights. And by that, they would be deprived of standing to object or interfere with confirmation. Such provisions (indiscernible) on the specific considerations of each case. Here, no one has concluded the insureds are deprived of standing. Indeed, they have appeared and are being heard here.

As such, as any other party in interest, the insurer should not be able to deny the existence of a plan confirmed by this Court in conformity with the Bankruptcy Code and the findings by this Court contained in the order approving the confirmation and the settlements embodied in the plan. Accordingly, we believe that the language as set in Section 510 of the plan is appropriate and (indiscernible).

Unless the Court has questions, I would like to turn the podium over to Ms. Grim on behalf of the AHC.

THE COURT: I don't think I have any questions for you, Mr. Singer. If I have questions, it goes to -- or they go to what besides the transfer of the policies to the trust, to the MDT, are the Debtors and their allies seeking to put in the confirmation order. But I think Ms. Grim is going to discuss that.

MR. SINGER: If she doesn't, I can come back to it, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay, fine.

MS. GRIM: Thank you, Mr. Singer. And good afternoon, Your Honor. Emily Grim, Gilbert LLP, counsel to the Ad Hoc Committee of Governmental and Other Contingent Litigation Claimants.

Your Honor, the Debtors have included a number of findings and conclusions in the proposed confirmation order that are necessary to preserve the value of the insured's rights being transferred to the MDT.

We provided Your Honor with a list of these findings in Exhibit A in our joint reply to the insurer's confirmation objections, so I won't read them word for word unless you'd like me to. But generally speaking, they provide that the settlements embodied in the plan are reasonable and were negotiated in good faith, that the insurers had notice and an opportunity to participate in the negotiations, and that the negotiation and resolution of the

Debtor's liabilities through these bankruptcy proceedings shall not excuse any insurer from its coverage obligations, regardless of any contrary policy terms.

The purpose of these findings is to ensure that nothing about the plan itself or the Debtor's actions in negotiating and proposing the plan diminishes the value of the insurance assets being transferred to the MDT.

Now, certain of the Debtor's insurers have argued in their plan and confirmation objections that this Court can't issue these rulings. Their view is that they should be entitled to argue in coverage litigation that key components of the plan release them from any and all liability under the policies.

One of the defenses that they've specifically said that the plan must preserve for them, that the plan's settlement of the opioid liabilities violates the policy's consent to settle provisions. They argue that these are just your typical, non-core, state law based coverage defenses, and therefore that they must be decided in the insurance adversary proceeding and not here. We would argue that that's not accurate for a number of reasons.

The first, these findings don't require the Court to rule on garden variety coverage disputes. They don't require the Court to rule on whether the policies provide coverage for opioid liabilities, they don't require the

Court to determine the value of any such coverage. What they seek is a determination that the insurers cannot disclaim coverage based solely on the Debtor's actions in this bankruptcy or on the contents of the plan itself.

We would argue that that's an issue that's inextricably intertwined with the Debtor's ability to marshal, preserve, and distribute their assets to creditors, satisfaction of their liabilities, and that it couldn't exist outside of bankruptcy. That makes them core issues properly decided by this Court as part of confirmation and not, for example, by a Bermuda arbitration panel considering coverage disputes post-confirmation.

The second reason that these findings are appropriate for confirmation is that they are required by the plan. The Ad Hoc Committee and the other creditors that voted in favor of the plan did so with the understanding that the MDT will be entitled to access the same rights to coverage as the Debtors for the opioid liabilities.

Now, they agreed to take on the risk that insurers could raise garden variety coverage defenses. For example, that an occlusion bars coverage for the claims. But they did not agree to take on the additional risk that the plan itself would destroy the value of the insurance asset. And in fact --

THE COURT: Could I interrupt just for a second?

Page 170 1 MS. GRIM: Of course. 2 THE COURT: Sorry, you can go ahead. 3 MS. GRIM: Of course. They negotiated language in 4 the plan specifically intended to protect against that risk. 5 And I'll give you some cites. 6 Section 9.10 of the plan requires that the 7 confirmation order contain a finding that the insurance rights transfer is effective, notwithstanding any policy 8 9 provisions to the contrary. 10 THE COURT: Can I interrupt you? I understand 11 this is a negotiated provision of the plan. But if it -- if 12 that violates the Bankruptcy Code in some way, then it 13 doesn't matter, right, other than that the parties' 14 intentions with regard to the plan are frustrated. It 15 doesn't --16 MS. GRIM: Yeah. I think Your Honor has to 17 determine -- sorry. 18 THE COURT: The argument to override this is really the argument under 1123(a)(5) and the caselaw. 19 20 MS. GRIM: That's correct, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 MS. GRIM: Section 5.6(I), just to give you the 23 other cite in the plan so that you have it, requires that 24 the confirmation order contain findings necessary to 25 preserve the MDT insurance rights. These provisions have

been in the plan since its inception. And omitting the findings they require would be a material change to the plan.

A third reason these findings are appropriate is that they are consistent with the Bankruptcy Code and the policies underlying it. The purpose of the Code, as Your Honor well knows, is to enable debtors to use their existing assets to resolve liabilities promptly and efficiently.

If insurers were entitled to control a debtor's settlement of its liabilities in bankruptcy, that would frustrate that purpose. It would give insurers, who have no fiduciary obligations to the estate and who, frankly, have every incentive to use the reorganization process to delay or minimize their coverage obligations, an effective veto right over the plan.

Accepting the insurers' argument would mean that this Court is powerless to prevent a debtor's insurers from frustrating the Chapter 11 process, and we just don't think that's an outcome that the Code contemplates here. We think that's the very reason Congress gave bankruptcy courts tools like Section 1123(a)(5) to be implemented into the plan.

I would also like to address briefly the insurers' reference to other cases where the plan and confirmation order may have, for whatever reason, preserved all coverage-related issues (indiscernible) confirmation. And I have two

responses to that.

The first is I think there is emphasis that not all plans have preserved coverage issues for resolution post-confirmation. The Babcock case we cited in our reply to the insurer's plan objections included findings in the confirmation order that the plan did not violate any consent to settle provisions.

Second, these other cases cited by the insurers are largely irrelevant because every case is different. I can't really speak to the specific considerations at issue in those cases, but I can tell you that the findings the Debtors seek here are critically important to this plan because of its unique abatement-based trust structure.

If you look at the more traditional asbestos trust structures, claims typically are channeled to a trust, and then the trust liquidates and pays individual claimants post confirmation. So in that scenario, if the insurers (indiscernible) about what the claims were worth or whether the trust's award was reasonable, the parties would have an opportunity to litigate that dispute and its impact on the coverage post-confirmation.

But here, there is no post-confirmation
liquidation process for most of the creditors' claims.

There is no point, for example, at which NOAD is going to be valuing individual claims. So there's really no other

opportunity for the insurers and the MDT to establish the value of any liabilities dissolve by the plan or the reasonableness of that resolution. So that's why any dispute should be resolved here during confirmation and why this Court's ruling on these issues should be binding on the insurers.

As Your Honor knows, we have addressed the insurers' objections to specific findings and conclusions in our papers. So in the interest of time, I'll just address any specific findings on which you have questions. But before I do that, I do have one issue I would like to clean up the record for. And that is on the finding that you referenced earlier on the assignment of insurance rights.

The insurers seek to modify Confirmation Order

Finding LE, which states that the Bankruptcy Code authorizes
the transfer and vesting of the MDT transferred assets

notwithstanding any terms of the Purdue insurance policies
or provisions of non-bankruptcy law.

The objecting insurers have asserted that since they previously notified the Debtors that they don't object to the transfer of the MDT insurance rights, the Court shouldn't render what they call an advisory ruling regarding the Code's authorization of such transfer. Instead, they propose a finding that basically says the objecting insurers have not challenged the validity of the transfer.

In our joint reply to the insurers' confirmation objections, we noted that a ruling on this issue would not be advisory because another insurer, Chubb, had objected to the transfer. We understand that Chubb has formally withdrawn its objection on that point, so we do want to make the record clear on that.

But I do think it's important to emphasize that this withdrawal doesn't obviate the need for the finding. The finding addresses a crucial component of the plan, including in the confirmation order, and a condition precedent to plan confirmation. And in addition, the language proposed by the certain insurers doesn't indicate universal commitment from all insurers, including those insurers subject to Bermuda arbitration who have not appeared at confirmation. So it really just doesn't provide sufficient protection for the Debtors (indiscernible).

So I will pause now to address any questions Your Honor might have. And otherwise, I'll save any of my remaining time for rebuttal.

THE COURT: Okay. I think it's probably better to hear from Mr. Anker first and then I'll see if I have questions for you if you want to raise anything in rebuttal.

MS. GRIM: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thanks.

MR. ANKER: Thank you, Your Honor. Philip Anker,

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, for Navigators. Can you hear me okay, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, fine. Thank you.

MR. ANKER: I am in a -- I apologize, Your Honor.

I am on the West Coast. Came out for a niece's wedding.

And so I'm in a hotel. And if the connection gets bad, I will do my best.

Your Honor, I am not in the habit -- and this will be the first time when I quote Admiral James Stockdale, who Your Honor may remember was Ross Perot's vice presidential candidate I think in '92, when at his debate, he said in a puzzled way that looked like it wasn't rhetorical, "Why am I here?" He got crucified for that, and I think that was unfair. History has shown it. But I am raising it as a rhetorical question, at least in part, because I don't know why we are here.

You have lots of complicated issues to resolve, and I echo the sentiments that someone had expressed earlier that, frankly, this is a case about the public interest more than a typical commercial bankruptcy.

Insurance coverage, however, is not one of the issues. And frankly -- and I will say this and it's not directed at Mr. Singer, it's not directed personally at Ms. Grim, it's certainly not directed at Davis Polk. But what I think we are fundamentally about here is an attempt by the

Gilbert firm and for coverage reasons to get precedent for other cases not before you where there are in fact tricky issues. There is nothing here that warrants the Court's intervention.

Let me start with the plan, which I hope I can deal with quickly, and then move to the findings and conclusions, which I think are where Your Honor is principally focused.

What I didn't hear Mr. Singer address was the basic point. We are prepared to live with the language -- we suggested a minor tweak, a minor tweak -- the language that was in the plan that went out to vote. This is not our language. I agree, insurers have sometimes asked for five pages on insurance neutrality. The Debtor went out with a single sentence in their Fifth Amended Plan. That sentence we are prepared to live with. As I said, we asked for one tweak to it, which was to add a sentence that made it clear what we think Your Honor already said in the ruling in the adversary that while Your Honor would be making findings, the legal consequences of those findings for coverage would be for another day.

We made that clear to the Debtors on July 5th. We did not hear from the Debtors until they actually filed, they actually filed their Sixth Amended Plan very late on the night of the 15th. I saw it for the first time on the

morning of the 16th when I got up. And it was a complete rewrite. Instead of saying nothing in the plan, the plan documents or the order will one way or the other have any affect on the rights or obligations of the insurance companies or the rights or obligations of the Debtors, they then said, provided, however, everything can change it. The plan can change it, the plan documents can change it. Any order Your Honor has entered at any point in time in this bankruptcy, any order in other litigation can change it.

And think about that for a moment, Your Honor.

Most of the plan documents we have not seen yet. They are
going to be filed with -- ultimately at the time it's

defined to include any document necessary when the plan goes
into effect or to have it go effective.

There are provisions in documents that have already been filed that state, for example, that insurance policies provide coverage, something we may well dispute given products exclusions and the like. There are references to policies that we think were -- in fact at least some insurers think were settled and released long ago.

Think about every order Your Honor has entered. I have not, I will confess, followed this bankruptcy. One of the things that I think may be lost here is that until the adversary was filed, which was in 2021, no insurer thought

that this bankruptcy affected them at all because, frankly, given the products exclusions, my client and every other client thought that there would never be an attempt to get coverage here. You will hear the merits of that later. But I don't know what happened in 2020 in various adversaries or other cases, yet their language would cover that.

Debtors go back to the language they had when they solicited acceptances of the plan. We have suggested a tweak. I will leave it to Your Honor whether it's appropriate or not. But frankly, the main issue there is just the basic language that went out in solicitation. And no one can argue on the other side the new languages required for confirmation, but the creditors overwhelming voted in favor of confirmation with the original language, and no one is suggesting that anyone is changing their vote, and no one is going to make that suggestion and file the motion and seek relief.

With that, unless Your Honor has questions, I thought I might move to the findings and conclusions. First

THE COURT: Could I --

MR. ANKER: Sure.

THE COURT: And maybe this goes to the findings and conclusions point. But the first sentence that -- or the first question that the Admiral asked was who am I. And

then he said why am I here. And Ms. Grim has said that you don't represent all of the insurers. In fact, there are other insurers that are covered by arbitration agreements. Am I right about that? So when I hear you talk about the revised language for the proposed findings of fact and conclusions, that's just from your clients, right? MR. ANKER: Your Honor, let me try to take that on, the language with respect to the transfer or assignment of the policy. First, I represent Navigators, but I have been asked to argue on behalf of all objecting carriers. So none of the other carriers objected, including the ones in the arbitration. I also think -- and I will ask coverage counsel to correct me if I'm wrong -- they have -- and I think they've proposed this to Your Honor, to have a stay of the arbitration until and unless Your Honor, or if the reference is withdrawn, the district court, decides the insurance coverage action. But the language we have proposed with respect to the transfer issue would specifically --THE COURT: So much for arbitration being fast and efficient. But go ahead. MR. ANKER: Your Honor, on that point I'm not going to disagree with you. But let me just read to you the

last sentence. And this is our language. Your Honor, I

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don't know if you have it in front of you.

THE COURT: I do.

MR. ANKER: I am looking -- okay. If you look at our blackline, the last sentence says, "In the absence of any outstanding objections, such transfer (indiscernible) the MDT insurance rights is authorized." It doesn't simply say no one will object, it says it's authorized. The only real difference is we want a predicate that says it's based on the absence of objection by those parties who actually filed an objection. And that goes to the point I was raising earlier.

Look, I think it's a very different case. But one of my insurance clients is in another case right now that almost has as much publicity as this case. And so is Ms. Grim on the other side. And there is an effort there to assign to the trust non-debtor insurance policies. We think that is not something that 1123 authorizes, including in the Third Circuit. And I think this is all about precedent for another case not before Your Honor that can be resolved then. Our language would make it a hundred percent clear that the transfer is authorized to the trust. That is going to preclude anyone from arguing that the transfer vitiates coverage. We simply want it as the predicate that there is no dispute over the issue. And because there's no dispute over the issue, the Court can go on and not resolve -- not

reach it.

As Ms. Grim notes, the only party that objected on this ground, Chubb, has withdrawn that objection. Mr. Copper of the Duane Morris firm is I believe on the line and can confirm that if Your Honor has any doubts. But I spoke to him specifically and got that representation and therefore feel comfortable that I can confirm with Ms. Grim set on the record.

I will also say that Debtors and the Committee suggested the stay of the arbitration. So it wasn't other insurers. But that's not my fight, Your Honor. That's an issue for another day about the wisdom, or lack thereof, of arbitration.

Let's look at the other findings. The second issue on which there is some slight disagreement is over Finding JJA, where we have stricken the second sentence and added the words, "viewed collectively" in the first sentence. This is a finding, quote, "The settlements reached between the Debtors, we would add viewed collectively" and the opioid-related claimants as embodied in the plan are reasonable and were entered in good faith based on arm's length negotiations. We then would strike such negotiation, settlement, or resolution of liabilities, shall not operate to excuse any insurer from its obligations under any policy notwithstanding any terms of such insurance

policy, including any consent to settle or pay first provision or provisions of non-bankruptcy law.

Let me explain what's going on here. But let me start with a predicate. No one is asking on our side for a finding (indiscernible) the finding Ms. Grim (indiscernible). We are not asking that Your Honor find that in fact the settlements do create any defenses (indiscernible). That is a question for another day to be decided again by Your Honor with full briefing and a full record.

Let's talk now about the two things, the two tweaks here. First, why viewed collectively? Well, this is an issue specific, Your Honor, to my client. My client, with respect to some of its policies, insured a particular debtor, Rhodes, R-h-o-d-e-s. The disclosure statement notes that Rhodes did not advertise or market any opioids at all. It just manufactured generics. There is nothing in this record, nothing in this record about it at all and whether to the extent it's contributing any settlement is or is not reasonable.

You may remember in the examination -- and if I butcher her last name, Your Honor, I apologize. Ms.

Horewitz, the expert for the Committee. She acknowledged on cross that her evaluation of comparing the liabilities to the assets was done on an aggregate basis looking at all of

the debtors collectively, not individually.

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So that brings me to the second point. Why strike the second sentence? Your Honor, I don't know whether --I'm not a coverage lawyer, as Your Honor knows. I am a bankruptcy lawyer. I don't know whether there are or are not defenses here relating to whether the Debtors violated policy provisions. But I do know this. There is no record before Your Honor. I know the following chronology. The mediation occurred in 2020. And it was not until 2020 there was an adversary and anyone had a clue -- I think you will get this when the evidence comes in in the insurance coverage action -- that the Debtors were even mediating and -- there was no clue that the Debtors would seek any coverage. What will the evidence be about whether the Debtors in connection with their mediation reached out to the carriers, spoke to the carriers, consulted with the carriers, sought the carriers' consent to any settlement? That -- and none of that evidence is before Your Honor today. What are the implications (indiscernible) about what that evidence is? That's going to turn on what state law may apply. Is it the law of New York, the law of New Jersey, the law of Oklahoma, the law of California? None of that in that briefing is before Your Honor, in part because the Debtors didn't seek these findings and didn't put them in their proposed order until after briefing had closed by a

month on plan confirmation objections.

We are not asking Your Honor to make any determination that somehow the Debtors have impaired coverage that otherwise would exist. We simply think that is an issue to be decided in this adversary proceeding upon a full factual record and a full legal briefing, none of which is before Your Honor today. And so not only would (indiscernible) due process where we had no notice before plan objections came in that these findings would be sought.

I will pause there. Section 9.1 and 5.6(I) that Ms. Grim and Mr. Singer referenced are all about transfer. The headings are about transfer and assignment. They have nothing to do with reasonableness of settlement. And so, no, there was no notice they would be seeking this finding or conclusion.

So, A, it's inconsistent with due process for them to seek it now. And, B, Your Honor doesn't have the evidence and doesn't have the briefing. And I will say it as clearly as I can. We are not saying, therefore, that there has been a waiver by the Debtors that they can't later argue that of course they can seek coverage, of course there is no problem here. But this is not the occasion.

And I'll just make one last point on that this is not the occasion. Your Honor has determined

(indiscernible). This is not a case where insurance

coverage is a predicate to plan confirmation and feasibility. Your Honor has determined that whether or not there is coverage, this plan is feasible.

There's only two other findings, and I'll just go through them really quickly. One is a finding in Paragraph E, as in Earl, H as in Harold, in our objection, Your Honor, to the findings. I think we discussed this one in Paragraph -- I actually skipped over it. I think it was in Paragraph 1, Your Honor. Yes, it is. We are perfectly with a finding that all parties, including the carriers, had notice of the filing of the Chapter 11 cases. We are not going to claim that we were ostriches that put our heads in the sand. was all over the front page of every newspaper in the country. But whether as a result we had an opportunity participate or notice that the liabilities were being mediated, negotiated, and resolved, that's the sentence we propose to have stricken. It's really the same point. No, until the adversary was filed, I don't think the evidence will show any carrier who had any reason to think there was going to be any effort to get coverage here. And again, Ms. Grim may dispute that, but the evidence is not in front of you, and the briefing is not in front of you, and it can be resolved in the coverage (indiscernible).

The final provision, Your Honor, is I think in our objection covered by Paragraph 5. I'm skipping over the one

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in Paragraph 4, Your Honor, which deals with Plan

Confirmation Order JJB. The Debtors no longer seek that

finding, so there is no reason we need to discuss it. But

as to the last one, Paragraph NN, again, I don't know what

we're arguing about. We do not deny that Section 524(e) of

the Bankruptcy Code says what it says. We are not arguing

it's unconstitutional. The discharge of a debtor does not

discharge anyone else in their liability. No one is arguing

that. What effect, if any, any release may have, whether we

had notice of it or not, are things to be argued later.

Your Honor, I want to end, unless Your Honor has questions, where I started. We didn't have due process about these findings. We didn't have an opportunity to address them. We didn't have an opportunity to retain experts and the like. And more importantly, now there is no record before Your Honor on any of them and there is no reason why you need to reach them in a case where insurance coverage is not core to confirmation in which the adversary is before Your Honor, the arbitration will be stayed. And we will proceed on a full record with full briefing. And it's particularly inappropriate in a case where whatever coverage there is or isn't will not be outcome determinative in the feasibility of this bankruptcy, and the creditors overwhelmingly voted for the plan without any such findings and with the plan and with the neutrality language in 510

that the Debtors went out with and we are perfectly comfortable with.

So with that, Your Honor, I would be happy to

address any issues Your Honor may have. I see you're flipping pages. If I can be of help, happy to do so.

THE COURT: Well, I guess I wanted to focus on the language in JJA and the third sentence. What's being referred to here is settlements of the opioid-related claims. It would seem to me that any insurer of an entity that has opioid-relate liability, including the D&O insurer, should be covered by this provision. And you're just confining your remarks to insurers of companies that don't have opioid-related liability, right?

MR. ANKER: Your Honor, you referred to the third sentence of JJA, and I see two sentences.

THE COURT: Well, the third clause. Maybe it's the third clause. You don't like the phrase, you want to strike the phrase, "Such negotiation, settlement, or resolution of liability shall not operate to excuse any insurer from its obligations under any insurance policy."

MR. ANKER: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Including any consent to settle or pay first provisions. And I want to set aside an insurer of a company that does not have opioid-related claims. I don't see why this sentence shouldn't have that language in it as

to every other insurer.

MR. ANKER: So by every other insurer I take it,
Your Honor, you mean an insurer of Purdue, insurer of those
Debtors who marketed --

THE COURT: Who have opioid-related claims.

MR. ANKER: Your Honor, there are insurance policies -- and again, I'm going to get a little bit over my skis here because I'm not a coverage lawyer. But insurance policies as a basic predicate have as a term of them dealing with the moral hazard. If you're going to ask me, the insurer, to pay, then you've got to bring me in. You can't settle without talking with me --

THE COURT: Right. But that law is different in bankruptcy cases. So I'm just trying to figure out -- I think your point was -- and you made it by focusing on Rhodes -- that how can a settlement be reasonable of opioid-related liability if it applies to a insured that doesn't have opioid-related liability. And there is some logic to that. But I don't understand the logic otherwise. I mean, the parties have briefed the bankruptcy issue otherwise. So I mean, I just --

MR. ANKER: Let me try to address the bankruptcy issue. Your Honor, I think 99 percent of the cases about whether bankruptcy law preempts -- my apologies Your Honor -- bankruptcy law preempts state law with respect to

insurance policies and contract rights deals with the transfer question. Really two questions. Can the transfer occur on the initiation of the bankruptcy from the prepetition debtor to the estate and (indiscernible) transfer later to the trust. That's the issue in Federal Mogul, the case Your Honor cited. And it in fact goes off on the language in 1123(a)(5) that addresses whether -- that specifically says a plan can provide for the transfer of rights.

There is not a lot of law, there is very little law on whether consent to settle provisions are or are not overwritten by the Bankruptcy Code. I would ask Your Honor to resolve that issue. I'm not asking you to rule my way, but I would ask you to let that issue be briefed with a record. I think you will find a record here that there was no effort to consult with the insurers. That's not what typically happens in bankruptcy. I can tell you or represent to you that I am in other bankruptcies where the debtors come to us and say here's what we're thinking of doing. What do you think? What are your views? How do you think about it? Would you consent to this? And that's not going to be the record here I think, but Your Honor doesn't know one way or the other. And I'd like to have an opportunity to full brief that issue with an opportunity to convince you that that's not what Federal Mogul stands for.

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But neither the factual record nor the legal briefing is there. And again, I'm not asking by striking this language out. I want to be a hundred percent clear. And if you think language needs to be added to be neutral to make the point express, I don't have any objection to that. I am not arguing that by striking this language, you're implicitly ruling our way on the merits. I am simply, if I can use the colloquial expression, suggesting we kick the can down the road so that down the road there can be full briefing, and to the extent it matters, a factual record. But, Your Honor, I'll just end on this. Federal Mogul and 99 percent of the cases, Combustion Engineering and others, are about the transfer question, not about whether a debtor can settle without -- not about provisions and policies -- not about anti-assignment provisions, but about -- they are about anti-assignment provisions, but they're not about provisions that require consent or at least consultation. And obviously lots of insurers' rights are fully preserved. Let's look at one that's going to be -- frankly may make all of this moot in the end of the day. The policies overwhelmingly have products They exclude any liability of a carrier to the exclusions. extent that the insured, Purdue's liability arises out of its manufacture of a product. No one is arguing, including

Ms. Grim or Mr. Singer, that somehow the Bankruptcy Code

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overrides that. No one would argue that the Bankruptcy Code overrides limits, aggregate limits in policy. No one would --

THE COURT: All right. But I was really going to a different question. I can look at and will look at further the cases on consent or pay first, et cetera. I'm really focusing just on the point you made with regard to insureds that don't have opioid-related claimants.

I don't see how -- this is really a question for both of you. I don't see how a settlement with opioid-related claimants would affect one way or another an insurer's obligation with respect to a consent or pay first provision unless the insured -- I mean, I don't see how they could be claiming on that insurance policy to pay the opioid claims. By definition it seems to me that your Rhodes issue wouldn't come up.

MR. ANKER: Your Honor, the Debtors are seeking coverage from Rhodes. I think we're conflating multiple issues. So let me try to help divide them up in a way that may be helpful.

First, the Debtors are seeking coverage from Rhodes. Our position is that they are not entitled to that coverage, and the Court should not be making a reasonableness finding that affects Rhodes. That goes to reasonableness.

1 THE COURT: Well, are they looking for coverage 2 for opioid-related claims? 3 MR. ANKER: I believe they are, Your Honor. I don't know that there are any opioid -- I mean, I don't know 4 5 that there are any -- we actually looked at proofs of claim 6 and could hardly find a proof of claim against Rhodes. 7 THE COURT: Okay. MR. ANKER: But I do think in the adversary, they 8 9 are seeking coverage under the Rhodes policy with respect to their settlements of opioid liability, including I think 10 11 settlements by other debtors. And so we simply want to be 12 able -- and this is one issue -- preserve as to Rhodes the 13 ability to argue that whatever reasonableness there may be 14 of the aggregate settlement, as to Rhodes there is no basis 15 for there to be a claim for coverage. Because if it is 16 contributing, it is doing so as a volunteer because it does 17 not face opioid liability having not marketed opioids. 18 That's one issue. THE COURT: Again, this language just goes to 19 20 opioid-related claimants. So I don't see how --21 MR. ANKER: Yes. Your Honor, I confused you, and 22 I apologize. When I was making the Rhodes point, it was the first part of this clause, the words "Viewed collectively". 23 24 There's two different points going on here. One is why did

we want to add the words "Viewed collectively"? Because we

Page 193 1 don't want a finding that's specific to Rhodes. 2 strikeout on the second sentence --THE COURT: Well, I don't think there is one. It 3 4 says Debtors, plural. 5 MR. ANKER: If we have a clear record on that, 6 Your Honor, and there's going to be no argument, we want it 7 viewed collectively to be clear. But the (indiscernible) is going to be in front of Your Honor. Your Honor understands 8 9 that that is about the Debtors -- Debtors, S, plural -- I 10 can accept that. 11 The second sentence has nothing to do with the 12 Rhodes issue. And I apologize, Your Honor. I evidently 13 confused you. So --14 THE COURT: Okay. So I don't think we need to 15 cover the second sentence further, because now I understand 16 where we are on this one. 17 MR. ANKER: Okay. 18 THE COURT: Okay. MR. ANKER: Thank you, Your Honor. Are there are 19 20 any other questions Your Honor has? THE COURT: Well, I guess I want to go back to the 21 22 first part, which is I have the proposed findings, I have 23 the plan. I don't -- you expressed a concern that under the 24 language of the plan, the Debtors could sneak something in 25 besides what's in the proposed findings. And say, for

example, the coverage limits or the coverage exception is waived. I mean, I don't -- is that the concern? I mean, I think I have what is before me that they're actually seeking.

So, Your Honor, let me focus you on Section 510 of the current plan as opposed to the one that went out for solicitation.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ANKER: It is very much like the one we have. But then it has a proviso. After saying nothing in the plan, the plan documents, or the confirmation order shall alter, supplement, change, decrease, or modify the terms of the Purdue insurance policies, including the MDT insurance policies. That's all that was in there when it went out to the creditors.

Now they've added the following, quadruple the number of words. "Provided that notwithstanding anything in the foregoing to the contrary, the enforceability and applicability of the terms, including conditions, limitations, and/or exclusions of the Purdue insurance policies, including the MDT insurance policies. And thus, the rights or obligations of any of the insurance companies, the Debtors, or the trust, including the Master Distribution Trust, arising out of or under any Purdue insurance policy, including any MDT insurance policy, whether before or after

the effective date, are subject to the Bankruptcy Code and appliable law, including any actions or obligations of Debtors thereunder. The terms of the plan and the plan documents, the confirmation order, including findings," -- and they (indiscernible) -- "and any other ruling or order entered by the Bankruptcy Code.

So they have a proviso that says --

THE COURT: So -- so I understand that. So I think you are worried about the plan documents and any other orders or rulings, including in the future. Right?

MR. ANKER: And the past.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ANKER: Correct, Your Honor.

know, the insurers didn't have notice of those issues. And maybe it should be dealt with that way. I'm not -- as far as I'm concerned, what they're asking me to find and rule on is what we're just been talking about for the last half hour or so. It's the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law provisions that we've been discussing. And if they actually -- and I don't believe this is the case -- sought something from the Court that was not on notice to your clients, it couldn't be encompassed by that language because you wouldn't have notice of it. And if that's what needs to be clarified, it should be. I mean, I just don't -- that

should be an easy fix.

MR. ANKER: Your Honor, I think it is an easy fix if it's limited to the plan and the confirmation order. But let me -- what I'm looking at. First, I am concerned about the plan documents. I don't know what's going to be in them, when we're going to have an opportunity to look at them. But going back in time, it says under any order entered by the bankruptcy court without any temporary limitation, without any language about notice on us. That would include any order you entered at the outset of the case before the adversary --

THE COURT: I understand. But that has to be qualified by notice, obviously. I mean, Mr. Singer's point is insurers can't sit back and say everything that happens in a bankruptcy case on notice to us doesn't matter. You know, the normal rules of judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel, and law of the case just don't matter for insurers. That's just -- that's not right. But those principles all require notice. So that could be --

MR. ANKER: And, Your Honor, I think that can be fixed with a notice provision, adequate notice. I will say, Your Honor, there's a lot of law on whether findings in a contested matter are in fact res judicata for purposes of a future adversary. That's an issue we can brief with you later.

But I will say, Your Honor, let me go back to this provision for a moment. Why can't we have the language that was there when the plan went out that the creditors wrote it on? This is a last second change.

THE COURT: But it's not a last second change.

You all have been able to blackline the proposed order, for example. I mean, you -- as you said, you and Ms. Grim and Mr. Singer have been living these issues in multiple cases.

You know the caselaw. You know the issues. This is not really a surprise here. And if you just have that language, then you have the potential for the coverage exclusions.

And I don't think that's right given the record as far as the transfer.

And I think, although I will double check the caselaw with regard to the pay first and consent points --

MR. ANKER: Your Honor, this is not a pay -- I want to make sure we're drawing issues --

THE COURT: I understand. But that's why I don't think it really matters. And, frankly, I don't think the consent really matters, either. I mean, to me, if the claims are being settled, they will only be settled in this context. They will be settled for a lot worse in some other context. So what -- the deletion of this language would mean that the insurers could go -- could raise this whole issue, that we've had six days of trial and two days of oral

argument on as to whether the settlement is proper or not all over again. That just doesn't make sense.

MR. ANKER: Your Honor --

THE COURT: And I think the underlying principle is right, that in bankruptcy it's a collective proceeding. The insurers' rights are to object on the context of the collective proceeding. And if they really believed that these settlements were on their backs properly or improperly, they would have objected. They would have raised their voice. And they've just not.

MR. ANKER: So, Your Honor --

narrow, primarily. They're basically saying we didn't cover this sort of stuff. And the settlement doesn't say they did. This is not a -- this is very different from a case where they're asking for a finding that there's X degree of insurance coverage that actually applies to these claims. They're not seeking that relief. They just want to prevent settlements that if I approve them, I will find are reasonable on notice to the insurers, the insurers coming back and saying no, we have to relitigate that whole thing. And to me that just is not right.

MR. ANKER: I understand Your Honor's position.

Do I understand correctly that either we'll have the words

"viewed collectively" added or at as clear to Your Honor

that this is not specific to -- is not a finding with
respect to Rhodes --

THE COURT: It's to all the debtors. It says debtors, plural.

MR. ANKER: That's correct.

THE COURT: We're not allocating, you know, X to one debtor and Y to another. But at the same time, I don't -- I think that the language that insurers have proposed be stricken really should stay, because it's -- I think under these circumstances, isn't a settlement that is being proposed to be funded primarily by the insurers. In fact, the evidence suggests -- Mr. Huebner's presentation today was exclusive of insurance. So that was on top. And so I think all things considered, I understand why the insurers haven't objected, because to them it's -- it actually ensures that, frankly, as much money as possible goes out to reduce their potential liability.

MR. ANKER: Your Honor, so I take it you believe the language should remain in Paragraph JJA. Does Your Honor have any questions about any of the other provisions that are --

THE COURT: Well, I don't really agree with them.

I just think, again, I think there should be a reference to the withdrawal of the objections. That's fine. I think that's an important aspect of the record. And that may well

help you in your concern about precedent, although I don't think what we're dealing with here involves insurance of non-debtors being used to pay debtor obligations. But I think the objection should be noted and the withdrawal of objections and the lack of objections by any others.

MR. ANKER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. And as far as the language in the plan itself, I mean, I think I've been clear. If the Debtors or the MDT try to alter the insurers' rights other than as set forth in the findings of fact or in the confirmation order itself or in the plan documents that you have, without due notice, you just can't -- that's not operative. That can't be operative.

MR. ANKER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't know how you word that. I imagine you'll probably come up with some language to cover that. But it's basically a fundamental principle. So even if you can't in the next day or so come up with that language, I think the record is clear that, you know, you can't have super-secret probation.

MR. ANKER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Thank all three of you.

I do, that is.

MS. GRIM: Your Honor, may I have the opportunity to address a few of Mr. Anker's points?

1 THE COURT: Sure. I'm sorry. Go ahead.

MS. GRIM: On Mr. Anker's point as to why are we here, I just want to reiterate I think we've made it pretty clear that we're here because the insurers have made it clear that they seek to negate coverage solely based on the plan. And even if Mr. Anker agrees not to object to any aspect of the plan, that we need these findings to preserve the value of the MDT insurance rights.

Mr. Anker is correct and we agree, the recovery of proceeds is not a predicate to confirmation, but transfer of the insurance rights is a predicate. And the MDT's ability to access those rights without having the transfer itself or any other aspects of the plan vitiates coverage is also a predicate. And 1123(a)(5) preempts any policy provisions that may impede the Debtor's ability to implement this plan.

I also need to address Mr. Anker's suggestion that our firm, Gilbert, is seeking confirmation findings solely for precedent in other cases. Because, frankly --

THE COURT: Well, it wouldn't work anyways. So that's fine.

But I just want to -- again, can I go back to something? I am not aware of any other provision of the plan that -- other than what we've been talking about today, that affects the insurers' rights. Is there any? I'm not aware of any.

MS. GRIM: No, Your Honor. And I know certain insurers raised some concerns regarding -- I believe it was the definition of the MDT insurance rights or the schedule that listed certain policies that fall within that definition. We want to make clear the plan is not presupposing that those policies provide coverage for the opioid liabilities. You know, if any of these provisions give Mr. Anker heartburn, I think he's had a number of weeks now to raise them. We have addressed other concerns by other objecting insurers to clarify language, that we're not trying to do that. So I think what you see is what you get here. We are seeking the findings that we are seeking. THE COURT: All right. MS. GRIM: And that's it. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. MS. GRIM: I do think it's important, if I could just have two minutes to address his due process arguments. And I don't want to drag this out, but I do think it's important to correct the record on this. We've had numerous conversations about the scope and intent of this provision,

language that the intent was to preserve the same rights and

obligations the insurers and debtors had under the policies

starting back on May 9th. The Ad Hoc Committee and the

Debtors made clear from the get-go even with the old

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prepetition, but not to permit the insurers to limit or escape their coverage obligations based on any aspects of the plan for the Chapter 11 process. The insurers expressed a contrary view, and that's why revised the provision to begin with. So I think it's a little bit of a stretch to say that they were taken off guard. But even if they were -- and I'm not going to beat a dead horse on this because I think Your Honor made the point effectively -- what exactly have the insurers been deprived of? They've had the opportunity to object to the plan, to the confirmation order. We are here right now. They had the opportunity cross-examine witnesses during trial last week. And so any due process confers here being unfounded. And in fact, I believe we provided these confirmation order findings back on August 11th, which might have been before the Court even had them, although Debtor counsel can correct me on that. So, again, I just need to correct the record on that point. Again, if Your Honor has any specific questions on the particular findings that were not already addressed, I'm happy to address those. But otherwise, I'll --THE COURT: I don't think I do. I think you've gone through them. MR. ANKER: Your Honor, this is Mr. Anker. not going to reargue anything. I will say I assume that --I note Your Honor is talking about working on language in

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the next two days. I think we heard you loud and clear about the notice points and other points. I assume and will request that the Debtors furnish us with a copy of any revised confirmation order and plan documents so we can see them. And not formally settling the order, but so that we can see them and give our comments.

THE COURT: Absolutely. That's fine.

MR. ANKER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But again, as far as these proposed findings are concerned, except for the references to the withdrawal of the objection and there being no other objections and just the record being clear, the Debtors means Debtors, plural. I am actually comfortable with the language as proposed by the Debtors here. And that includes the release point, which is really tied into the settlement point which we discussed for a while.

MR. ANKER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

The next thing for oral argument is time that I asked be reserved for the people who filed pro se objections to the plan, i.e. people who were not represented by lawyers who filed a timely objection to the plan. And I think two of those people have, as I understand from my clerks, either signed up for the Zoom for Government feed to address their objection or at least been given the information to do that

1 because of an earlier request to speak.

So the Debtors at this point don't have anyone to speak first. I think they reserve their rights to respond. But I am happy to hear from the individuals who did want to speak who filed a timely objection.

am pronouncing that right. I see you there. And you can go ahead, ma'am. I want to assure you and the other pro se objectors, even if they've not signed up to speak, that I have reviewed each of the plan objections. And actually, there were some statements by claimant that were not expressly couched as an objection, but they were riled around the time before the -- around and before the deadline for objecting to the plan. And I think actually Ms.

McGaha's filing was one of those. But I was treating it as a plan objection. So I am happy to hear from you, ma'am.

MS. MCGAHA: Thank you, Your Honor. Before I -- my name is Carrie McGaha.

THE COURT: McGaha, okay.

MS. MCGAHA: McGaha.

THE COURT: Thank you. Okay.

MS. MCGAHA: You are not alone in mis pronouncing.

23 Before I begin, I would like to ask a couple questions, if I

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25 THE COURT: Okay.

MS. MCGAHA: I was confused on the voting. I've heard you all talk about it. And I was kind of under the -- it sounded to me -- now, I'm not a lawyer. I don't know if this is all like -- plus, I have a damaged mind from all the opiates I took, and I process information kind of like sand through a colander. And so -- but when I was reading the voting and the ballot, it seemed like if I voted no, I was kind of relinquishing some of my claim amount. Like I was almost ready to vote yes just to --

THE COURT: No.

MS. MCGAHA: And so I don't know if anyone else had that understanding, but --

THE COURT: No one has raised that point. And I think the ballot materials were clear. The vote was just a vote on the plan. It had nothing to do with whether your claim would be allowed or not.

MS. MCGAHA: Okay, thank you. Also, my broad understanding of this plan is that the new company will be able to -- is going to continue the sale of OxyContin and partial opiates, opiate antagonists, and other drugs in order to fund abatement. Is that an improper understanding?

THE COURT: Well, it depends what you mean by the word continue. It will be under a very strict set of operating guidelines in the form of an injunction. It will have, as it has had during the whole course of this case, a

monitor. The first monitor I think is now the Health and
Human Services Secretary. People of statute. It will have
governance by representatives of, you know, the Claimants.

So your answer is -- again, depends on how you define the word continuing. I think it's quite clear -- and the Debtors already have represented and the monitors have I think made this clear -- that whatever marketing practices that Purdue had that have been alleged to have flooded the country with opioids, of just its opioids, will not -- has not and will not be occurring, that the salesforce doesn't exist. There is no salesforce.

So if you've been listening to the trial over the last week or so, there is a balance for a regulated company like this that sells products that are inherently dangerous where nevertheless the regulators contend that they agree that they are not prohibited and can be used for proper purposes.

So it's not going to stop selling opioids, but it will not be selling them in a way that existed at least through the period that it was marketing them with the salesforce and trying to drive up prescriptions, et cetera.

MS. MCGAHA: Okay. Thank you. I appreciate the previous speakers and yourself for giving me an intro into what I feel like I need to say. I don't have a script written here. I'm just going to try to pray that the whole

experience speaks for me and anoints my words. Because this is all very confusing.

But who am I? I am someone who has had -apparently I am the only on this list that's willing to speak to you today who has been through this. But I feel like I have relevant life experience with this. Because I did work around, as I have indicated in my submissions, drugs, you know, a lifetime ago. And I've never been in trouble with the law. I never did anything, you know, illegal and all that kind of stuff while I was working. But way back in the eighties, you know, somehow people didn't need long-acting opiates to get their relief from pain. And when the Oxycontin was introduced by Purdue onto the market and then pushed out by the doctors -- who I also hold highly responsible, because one can't function without the other. That having taken these drugs for over 15 years and survived, those long-acting opiates act completely different than short-acting opiates.

And I know that there's a lot of testimony concerning the diversion, that that's why they formulated OxyContin the way they did, to prevent diversion, and it's not 100 percent -- or however they adulterate it or whatever. I don't know.

I don't have a lot of experience with the illegal, incarcerated, all that kind of stuff, but having taken those

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drugs, when you're taking those long-acting drugs for chronic pain -- and I'm not talking about acute pain -- I think that these drugs are miracles to help people with acute pain. But these long-acting drugs, they take away your individual ability to kind of manage your own pain.

You know, used to it was as-needed for pain. Once you get over that, you know, three to -- three days to 10 days of post-op or whatever the injury, or whatever it is, and you kind of start to heal. You know, you should be decreasing the usage, and your pain should lessen.

and what they did to me was they just kind of -and then they -- the doctors still give you the breakthrough
pain pills, and so either way you're getting a long acting
drug that's supposed to prevent you from abusing it, but
then they still give you the short-acting drugs to help with
the breakthrough pain because every time you take them and
if you're on a constant level, your tolerance is constantly
building up, and so you're just always building up this
tolerance to the drug, and your tolerance to the pain goes
way, way down.

And so it's a vicious snowball of psychic hell that happens on these drugs. And as a patient who still suffers from chronic pain, but the Lord really helped me in dealing with it, the -- see, this is the sand going through the colander. I just lost my thought, but I do have a few

notes here.

It's the risk of reinjury. That's what I was going to say. When you're taking those drugs just constant long term, especially for chronic pain that you really need to address in non-pharmaceutical ways if possible, which I think the introduction of these drugs pushed like they were onto the market prevented a lot of development of the alternatives that, you know, could've been really developed over the past 20 years rather than just relying on all these opiates and then, you know, we're in the situation that we're in.

But when you take opiates for pain and injury, like I have a really bad back, and so it does take away that (indiscernible) of the pain, and so you think you can do stuff that you really shouldn't do it. You know, you are feeling less pain. It's really not that -- I never felt no pain unless I was unconscious, but your pain is -- whatever happens to you, you do -- you do more than you really should do. You don't allow yourself to heal so that you -- and you know, eventually heal fully, and I'm going on and on.

THE COURT: No, no. I think I understand your point.

MS. MCGAHA: Okay. I'm sorry. I'm going to try to keep this short because I don't want to cost anyone --

That's fine.

THE COURT:

MS. MCGAHA: -- any more money than necessary. You guys get paid beaucoups of money, so I don't want to take away from --THE COURT: Well, I don't get paid by the hour, so you can go ahead. MS. MCGAHA: Okay. I think it delays healing, anyway, the OxyContin especially. I feel like the way that that was approved by the FDA and all of the experts that have -- not all but a lot of experts that approved these -- that regulate and approve these decisions, I -- I mean, I just really kind of -- I don't understand it because OxyContin -- no one should really need constant opiate of OxyContin if they're still going to get the short-acting drugs. I mean, it just doesn't make sense to me. But I think I tried to make that point in my submission also, that there's a symbiotic relationship between the healthcare system and the pharmaceutical industry. And it's like hand in glove, and the -- all these people out here would not have been prescribed these drugs if the doctors hadn't have been, you know, benefiting somehow. And that, I feel like, is kind of a missing link or whatever in this plan is that it -- I know this is a pharmaceutical bankruptcy and all this kind of stuff, and I

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just hope that whoever, you know, the state leaders or whoever gets to introduce the solutions or decide how the money's spent in each state remembers that people out here like myself in, you know, Podunk USA where you have to drive an hour just to get, you know, anywhere, and if you want to go to a good -- a really good doctor, you're going to drive three hours.

And so a lot of the solutions that I've outlined in my submissions are alternatives that I personally have been trying to use some of them on my own, but if they'd have been more available, you know, years ago, if this had not been offered as a solution, I would not have gone out on the street and looked for illegal drugs to ease my pain.

I would've had to -- I mean, I was the type of person -- I would've done what I -- you know, what the doctor recommended, and I relied on those doctors to put my best interests at heart and to, you know, follow their Hippocratic Oath and not just get the country addicted to opiates like that's the only solution.

I mean, you've got these task forces who know all of this. All these doctors, they know this. But down here in these -- you know, out here in no man's land, it's a different world, and the way that they're doing the funding of the abatement programs, you know, and a lot of this, it is based on population and the MMEs.

And I fear that there's just going to be these huge bureaucracies of these agencies who are going to -- you know, it's all going to funnel through. And by the time it gets down on the ground to the people that really need it, there's not going to be very much left, and I know there's all sorts of formulas that they go by and everything, and that's kind of necessary. But from where I'm standing, that's just what I see, and that's what happens in rural areas.

The drug-induced decline that we experienced over the years, you know, people leave. And they go to nice areas, the big city where, you know, those places, their population grows, and they get more money, and people leave here because, you know, less money. And so it's just kind of -- the problem gets bigger, and it's all because of the drugs. And --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. MCGAHA: I just wanted to say also that on the unit dose thing, I tried to describe how that would've helped me, and I feel like if they're going to continue to sell especially OxyContin -- but I feel like all narcotics should be in like a card.

I don't know if you're familiar with Accutane, but it's a drug, and it's sold on a card so the you can see, okay, I took that. You don't want to overdo it. You know,

or birth control pills. You can see when you took it and, you know, how many you took.

And that was one of my problems because for a long time, I was on fentanyl patches. I had 100 microgram fentanyl patch every 48 hours, and I was taking 120 Dilaudid a month along with it, and it went on for years. And it was either fentanyl or OxyContin along with the Dilaudid or other drugs.

And so the doctors that prescribe these and the doctors that are in the Sackler family and executives with the pharmaceutical company, you know, they're uniquely trained and credentialed to know the pharmacology and the human anatomy and how all this kind of interacts. And you know, they should've known the history of opium in this country and, you know, for hundreds of years, the addiction that can happen from it.

But the side effects, you know, you get memory loss and confusion, and then you combine that with Valium or whatever, and it's just even worse. And so I can just remember, I mean, you're looking down the barrel of a bottle of pills, and you can't tell how many are in there, and you're in pain. You're suffering and you're vulnerable, and you know, we're depending on the doctor to not give us something that really is going to harm us.

But when you're in that situation, and I was the

only one that could manage my drugs. I was like the healthcare drug expert in my family. And you know, I didn't do a very good job. There was never a time that I ever diverted my drugs or mis -- abused my drugs or did anything like that, but there were times that I made my mistakes, and one of those times caused me to almost die, and my children found me. And you know, they were traumatized by that, and you know, they probably should've filed a claim for all of the trauma that they went through, but that's beside the point.

But the diversion that the Sacklers talk about when they testified, like that's the biggest problem, which I get that that is a big problem in this country. In fact, before I even filed this claim, I had written letters to my governor, and the attorney general, and my local sheriff kind of similar to the things that I've written in my submissions because I felt like the -- that's what I felt like God was trying to tell me what to do.

But they kept talking about diversion. In this case, you're only going to get paid money as a personal injury person if you have proof, you know, medical records and pharmacy records that you actually took these drugs, from my understanding of it.

And so -- but it seems like all of these abatement programs and a lot of the talk that the Sacklers had was all

about diversion, and they kept mentioning, you know, heroin was on the rise anyway, and kind of like it was inevitable that opiates were going to be a crisis, and if they knew heroin was already on the rise, why they thought introducing OxyContin and pushing all these drugs out onto the market would be a great solution, I don't know.

I think that's negligence, and I think not putting those drugs, knowing the side effects of those drugs on the patients taking them and expecting those people to manage the consumption of those drugs -- when you go in the hospital, you know, the nurses chart every pill. They count every pill. They keep up with every pill like it's some kind of piece of gold or something. But if you're a patient, you're supposed to manage all this on your own while you're suffering, and suffering the side effects? It just seems like negligence to me.

And the quantities were just outrageous. And I've had multiple surgeries over my lifetime, and I do know what -- the quantities and how drugs were prescribed in the '80s, and somehow people managed to recover from surgery, and recovery from injury, and recover from all sorts of things without being -- having it necessary to be put on long-acting opiates. And that's my biggest concern --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. MCGAHA: -- is (indiscernible).

THE COURT: I hate to do this, Ms. McGaha, but I think -- I read your objection. I think we're now circling back to things we've already discussed, and --

MS. MCGAHA: Okay.

THE COURT: -- you discussed them quite clearly, so I'm going to --

MS. MCGAHA: Okay.

THE COURT: -- thank you.

I want to make two observations. First, the abatement programs under this plan are not locked in stone, except for the fact that the money has to be used for abatement, so my hope is -- and I believe this is the hope of the states, and local governments, and hospitals that had a hand in putting together these abatement and treatment programs is that people learn as they go along, and part of the learning is going to come from the reports that have to be filed in this case as to effectiveness of treatment and the effectiveness of the abatement programs, how to do this best.

And I think -- it is clear to me at least that
this -- that that task is a complicated one, but it includes
the ability of people like yourself, people who run
community groups, who run associations of both people who
themselves have suffered from opioid use disorder and their
relatives to have input, to speak to their councilmen, their

Page 218 1 mayor, their governor, and the local health authorities, to 2 give them their input. And I think that's important, 3 obviously. So this is not -- you know, I think this money is 4 5 to come in over a substantial amount of time, and it is not 6 going to -- if I confirm the plan -- always going to be a 7 2021 abatement program. We'll learn from it, and so your 8 observations are important there. 9 MS. MCGAHA: Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate 10 the opportunity to voice my concerns and speak to the Court, 11 and I really appreciate all your time and effort. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 13 All right. I don't know if -- I just have on my 14 list Ms. McGaha, but I don't know if anyone else who filed a 15 timely objection as a pro se wants to speak. Otherwise, I 16 guess I'll hear from the Debtor's counsel. 17 Okay. Oh, I think there is one other person. Ms. 18 Eck? MS. ECKE: Yes. Judge Drain, please, please 19 20 forgive the unmuting, the untimely unmuting of my computer. 21 THE COURT: Oh, that was -- that's --22 MS. ECKE: And the --THE COURT: That's fine, ma'am. That was for like 23 24 one tenth of a second, and I'm sure Mr. Singer has 25 experienced much worse over the pandemic on various Zoom

Page 219 1 calls that he was on, including probably dogs and children 2 and all sorts of things, so don't worry about that. 3 MS. ECKE: Thank you. Anyway, I'm going to --THE COURT: And Ms. Eck, I don't know if you want 4 5 -- if you want to be on the screen. You don't have to be, 6 but I'm not able to see you. If you don't want to be on the 7 screen, that's fine. 8 MS. ECKE: It's okay. I just don't know how to do 9 it. 10 THE COURT: Oh, okay. 11 MS. ECKE: Any way. 12 THE COURT: The person who's running this in the 13 courtroom -- my tech person says your camera is actually 14 covered by something. 15 MS. ECKE: Oh. Oh, oh, oh. I got it. 16 still not -- that's the lights above. 17 THE COURT: Yeah. It has to be pointed --18 MS. ECKE: It's not helping. THE COURT: Anyway, it's all right. 19 20 MS. ECKE: Okay. Anyway, my objection to the 21 restructuring of Purdue Pharma LP et al, case number 19-22 23649. 23 Dear Judge Drain, I began researching OxyContin, 24 and its generative derivatives as my son prescribe -- my son's doctor prescribed this to him at an early age. After 25

my dearest firstborn died December 17th, 2015, nine days after my birthday on December 8th, and nine days bore my poor, deaf, Vietnam veteran's ex-husband's birthday on December 26th in 2015, I was immediately awoken to learn about this overprescribed drug.

At first when I started to -- trying to write a motion for claim payment in early November of 2020, I spilled out my heart to all the following individuals in this instance. This was an extreme, extreme tragedy, as many of the attorneys, including Marshall Huebner of Davis Polk & Wardwell; Layn Phillips of Corona Del Mar, California; Kenneth Feinberg of Washington DC, and many others, including Ryan Hampton, Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, CVS Caremark Part D Services LLC; and Health LLC; Cheryl Juaire, T -- L-S --LTS Lohmann Therapy Systems Corporation, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Walter Lee Salmons, Kara Trainor, West Boca Medical Center; the official committee of unsecured creditors, care of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP; Bank of America Tower, One Bryant Park, New York, New York 10036.

Attention Attorney Edan Lisovicz and Attorney Arik
Preis who are in my letter dated December 13th, 2020. My
letter to Judge Drain July 30th, 2020 you can read in full
online. Please also view my motion for claim payment dated
December 15th, 2020.

Previously, I had begged the Attorney General of Connecticut, George Jepsen, presiding attorney general for Connecticut from 2011 to 2019 for help for the mothers of Connecticut who had lost their children due to this crisis. I had also contacted the Connecticut Department of Health previously and received no help from anyone -- or from anyone personally or for my group of bereaved mothers.

Gloria (indiscernible), head of Consumer Affairs for Attorney George Jepsen of Connecticut who was in office from 2011 to 2019 and Sandra Arenas, the new head of Consumer Affairs for Attorney George -- Attorney General William Tong of Connecticut from January 1st, 2019 had already told me that the state only sues for the state, not for the individuals.

At this point in my life, I feel in my opinion
that I have been used and abused by the state of
Connecticut. I was born in the great country of America and
always thought that I would receive help if I asked for it.
I'm really hurt by everyone's indifference to my personal
tragedy and the personal tragedies of many others.

Attorney James I. McClammy of Davis, Polk & Wardwell, the attorneys who are defending Purdue Pharma LP's actions first contacted me via e-mail, later by Jacquelyn Knudson of Davis Polk & Wardwell on December 3rd, 2020 via telephone. Then I called Attorney Knudson on December 7th,

2020. Attorney James I. McClammy wrote a letter dated

December 8th, 2020 and mail it to me December 9th, 2020

stating that I had talked to Attorney Knudson on December

7th, 2020.

My previous letter to you, Judge Drain, was dated December 15th, 2020. That was my motion for claim payment. On February 24th, 2019, there was a segment on television of 60 Minutes entitled "Did the FDA Ignite the Opioid Epidemic? A drug manufacturer Denounces his own industry and explains to 60 minutes how a label change by the FDA expanded the use of opioids" in which correspondent Bill Whitaker talks to Ed Thompson, a Pennsylvania drug manufactures -- manufacturer who tells about his lawsuit of the FDA at the beginning of the OxyContin crisis.

60 Minutes had to petition the courts of West
Virginia to get the information to issue this segment of the
television program since according to 60 Minutes, the drug
manufacturers and the FDA were holding secret meetings about
the labeling of the drug.

Ed Thompson states that OxyContin was on the market since 1990, and the FDA new how potent the drug was. Ed Thompson explains how a high-dose long-duration opioid kills people when there was no scientific evidence to condone long-term use of opioids. Ed Thompson had stopped the high-potency, high-dose drugs that he manufactured in

1962.

Therefore, in my opinion, I don't agree with the declaration of Jonathan Greville White on page 4, Article 9, which states "Beacon Trust, one of the general trusts is the ultimate owner of the 50 percent limited partner Purdue Pharma LP, Purdue, which holds for the benefit of Side A an entity for the benefit of Raymond Sackler or Side B is the ultimate owner of the blankie of the Purdue equity.

"Beacon Trust was settled in 1993 by Mortimer D.

Sackler, several years before OxyContin was launched. I am
the director of Heathridge Trust Company Limited, which is a
trustee of the Beacon Trust Company Limited, which is a
trustee of the Beacon Trust.

"Since the death of Mortimer D. Sackler in 2019, the Beacon Trust has been an irrevocable trust of the benefit of Theresa Sackler, Dr. Mortimer D. Sackler's issue, and various charitable beneficiaries. The Beacon Trust instrument provides that its trustee holds the Beacon Trust funds in its discretion with prior written consent of the special trustees to pay income and/or capital to or for the benefit of one or more Dr. Mortimer D. Sackler's spouse, defendants, and/or charitable foundations."

Later, Jonathan Greville White states, "Each of these general trusts is an irrevocable discretionary trust. Their beneficiaries are typically to the Sackler, and the

issue of Dr. Mortimer D. Sackler. One general trust confers upon Theresa Sackler a life interest over the income that is generated each year."

According to LexisNexis and the Bloomberg Law on December 17th, 2019 at 6:09 p.m., Samantha Stokes wrote, "Purdue Pharma has paid several big law firms for the legal work on behalf of the Sackler family members, including Debevoise, McDermott and Norton Rose, according to new documents" and "Purdue Pharma, the embattled pharmaceutical company at the center of the opioid crisis has paid more than 17.5 million in legal fees on behalf of the Sackler family to more than a dozen law firms, according to the new documents filed in the company's bankruptcy. Debevoise & Plimpton was paid the majority of the legal spend, more than 11.4 million for its legal work for the Sacklers from the first half of 2018 through 2018 through early 2019 according to an audit filed Monday in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York where the company is undergoing Chapter 11 restructuring."

If the Sackler family used the money that they spent on attorneys instead of for themselves -- instead of themselves, all parties would be happier.

As far as my understanding from Arik Preis,
partner at Akin Gump who called me at 6:30 p.m. on July
30th, 2021 after I sent my original July 30th letter off and

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will object if I give you actual numbers for our conversation dated Friday, July 30th, 2021, there are four main sides of this restructuring equation, one consisting of the official committee of unsecured creditors and all the others in my previous letter dated December 13th, 2020; another side consisting of a few brave pro se advocates and me who are supposedly supposed to get virtually nothing; an additional side of states with attorney generals, municipalities, and an abundance of lawyers handling Chapter 11 in case number 19-234649, getting the majority of at least three quarters of the funds, which may or may not help injured victims directly from an 18-year trust. And finally, the fourth side consisting of the Sackler family who is trying to use their ill-gotten fortune off the backs of heartbroken people who lost their loved ones.

On July 19, 2021, Attorney William -- Attorney

General William Hong filed objections to, "Bankruptcy plan

with legal shields for the Sackler family." Therefore, I'm

asking the Honorable Judge Drain for Rule number 3008-1,

reconsideration of claims. We need to object to the

restructuring of Perdue Pharma and initiate an entirely new

vote for the mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters, and all

who are now living a life of heartache, depression, and

loneliness from this drug that had been evaluated years

earlier by the Perdue Corporation and hidden from the public

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that highly addictive and shoved under the proverbial rug.

Are the Sacklers and their lawyers at Davis Polk and Wardwell willing to clone my dear son or bring him back to help me in my disabled old feeble age? I don't think so. thank you, Your Honor.

I will say just one point, and that is that it obviously took a lot of courage to say what you've said in this setting. I some people will disagree with it, and I think there are some points that just weren't right like Davis Polk being the Sacklers' lawyers, which is not true. But on the other hand, what comes through very clearly is I think the main point of your objection and your statement, which is that this company's product or products caused tremendous pain and harm.

And it is turning over all of its assets under this plan in a way that the parties interested in the case have determined best resolves that pain and harm knowing full well that it never can resolve that pain and harm, and that is something that will never be fully resolved or even partially resolved.

THE COURT: All right. We had reserved time at the end of this argument for miscellaneous matters, including further discussion of the release language in the plan. I don't know whether there is a remaining argument on

the DMP issues or not.

MR. GLEIT: Your Honor, Jeff Gleit of Sullivan and Worcester. I have a -- just a brief statement that I'd like to make in connection with it, and I'm available to answer any questions you have.

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine.

MR. GLEIT: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. On Monday morning, Ms. Duvani had stated that the Debtors, the AHC, and the DMPs reached a settlement in connection with substantially all of the DMPs objections. The plan with one narrow exception, that is the objection that the insured injunction improperly deprived certain DMPs of their rights as additional insureds under the DMVT insurance policies. With regard to that objection, the DMPs have agreed to rest on their papers, which can be found at docket 3306.

I'd like to make just one brief point, which is not in my firm's reply brief but is addressed in Davis

Polk's brief, which is at docket number 3461 at paragraph

206. As we've heard throughout this confirmation hearing,

the plan contains multiple settlements and transactions, all

of which must be approved for this plan to be consummated.

As I'm sure Your Honor's aware, the MVT insurance -- insurer

injunction is one of these essential and integrated

provisions.

The Debtor's insurance policies, the rights to

1 which are being transferred to the master disbursement 2 trust, provide a substantial source of value for the abatement distributions and the distributions the personal 3 4 injury claimants contemplated to be made under the plan. 5 The MVT insured injunction is essential to preserving and 6 ultimately realizing the value. It is integral to the plan, 7 and its applicability to the DMPs is necessary for this plan 8 to be consummated. 9 Absent questions from Your Honor, I will not 10 repeat the arguments which are fully set forth in the briefs 11 of my firm, Davis Polk's firm -- the Davis Polk firm, and 12 the AHC which are located at docket numbers 3506, 3461, and 13 3465 respectively. I do want to, though, note to Your Honor 14 that there was a joint stipulation between the Debtors and 15 the DMPs which was filed at docket number 3612, which 16 contains excerpts from the relevant insurance provisions in 17 the parties' contracts, which the Court may find helpful. 18 So unless Your Honor has questions, I'm happy to 19 cede the Zoom podium. 20 THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. Thank you. 21 Do the Debtors have any rebuttal, or are they 22 going to rest on their papers too? 23 MR. GLEIT: I think you mean the DMPs.

I'm sorry. Excuse me.

(indiscernible) counsel.

THE COURT:

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The DMPs.

WOMAN: No, Your Honor. We rest on our papers.

THE COURT: Okay. Very well. All right. So I had a chance to review what I think are the changes that were included in the ninth amended plan that was the subject of discussion at the beginning of this oral argument this morning. I'm assuming that other parties have too at this point. I don't know if there are further changes in it, but I said I would give parties who were objecting to the breadth of the third party injunction release and the plan an opportunity to comment on the revisions and as to whether there was still, in light of those revisions, an issue as to the breadth of the release.

And obviously this is without prejudice to objectors' other arguments regarding the release, which I've heard and will be considering. This just goes to the release language. And I don't know if there's been further discussion and agreement beyond what was submitted this morning, so maybe I should ask that question first and then I'll hear from objecting parties. And I see the Debtor's counsel on the screen, Mr. Vonnegut. Have there been any further changes from what was filed this morning or last night?

MR. VONNEGUT: Good afternoon, Your Honor. For the record, Eli Vonnegut of Davis Polk and Wardwell. There have been no further revisions to the drafting of the

releases. However, we have had several conversations with Mr. Edmunds of Maryland that I think have been helpful in clarifying his understanding of how the releases function. And so I'm happy to walk Your Honor and other parties through those issues so that hopefully everybody else can share that understanding, if that would be helpful.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. That's fine.

MR. VONNEGUT: Okay. So a number of the questions about the releases that we've gotten this week from Mr. Edmunds I think are premised on some misunderstandings of how they work, so I'd just like to clarify a couple of foundational issues about what is in and what is out.

First, there have been a number of references to conduct that is described as unlawful asking whether claims arising from unlawful conduct would not be released. That one is very simple. The very first provision of excluded claims is criminal claims. Criminal claims are not being released, period, full stop. What is a little bit harder and what we have had extensive discussions with Mr. Edmunds about is capacity limitations.

So a variety of parties that received revisions under the plan only received those releases for claims against them in their specified capacities. So for instance, with respect to related parties of the Debtor that Mr. Edmunds raised, there were a couple of questions along

the lines of if some participant in the pharmaceutical industry had a relationship with the Debtor, do they become released for all claims against them, and the answer is no. The only claims that are released that party are claims against them in their capacity with which they were related to the Debtor.

A similar limitation, which we've discussed before but I think it bears emphasis because it's important, is that parties are only released for claims that relate to the Debtor. So they have to be tied to the Debtor. And again, it's not the case that if you have one claim against you released because it is related to the Debtor that other claims become released. You are only released in that limited capacity. So if a party had one relationship with the Debtor and then independent conduct, claims arising from the independent conduct is not released.

Now, the most important issue that we discussed with Mr. Edmunds that I think is important to emphasize is a revision that we made in response to Your Honor's commentary on Monday's hearing regarding the settlement with the distributors, manufacturers, and pharmacies, the DMPs. So we had some colloquy about whether those parties are included in the third-party releases. The answer is no, and we've now made that very clear in Section 10.6B, which is the third-party release provision as distinct from the

releases of claims held by the Debtors.

So we've now added to Section 10.6B a footnote that says co-defendants are not released parties under Section 10.6B of the plan. This is important. As we discussed with Mr. Edmunds, we believe that this addresses a lot of the concerns and the confusion that have been raised regarding the scope of the releases here. "Co-defendant" is a very broad term. It includes any party that is a defendant in a pending opioid action commenced as of the effective date. It also includes any holder of a co-defendant claim. And a holder of a co-defendant claim is effectively anybody who has asserted or might assert a claim against the Debtors to attempt to recoup their own costs in opioid-related litigation.

So if you zoom back out, effectively the term is what it sounds like. Co-defendants in the opioid litigation are excluded wholly from the third-party releases. And the only exclusions to that are --

MAN: (indiscernible)

THE COURT: You can go ahead.

MR. VONNEGUT: Excuse me. The only exceptions to that are current a informer, officers, directors, authorized agents, and employees of the Debtors. So I'm hopeful that that helps, Your Honor. I am cognizant that these are complex, and we've been fielding many, many questions as

Pg 233 of 351 Page 233 1 quickly as we can. 2 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. 3 MR. VONNEGUT: Of course. 4 THE COURT: I have some comments, but I'm happy to 5 hear from other parties first. Maybe they have the same 6 comments. 7 MAN: Your Honor, good afternoon, Your Honor. 8 Sorry, Brian. Do you want to go first, or you want me to go 9 first? 10 MR. VONNEGUT: Oh, one more point that I forgot to 11 Mr. Edmunds also raised the question of whether clarify. 12 the releases might complicate efforts to obtain discovery in 13 unrelated litigation. The answer is that they will not. We 14 received a proposed addition to the plan from Mr. Edmunds 15 that we're working on, but recipients of releases are still 16 obligated to comply with subpoenas and other discovery. 17 We're not attempting to relieve them of that obligation. And that will be made clear in the next amended plan. 18 19 THE COURT: Okay. I know you both spoke at the 20 same time and then neither of you spoke, so I'll just look 21 to Mr. Edmunds first. 22 MR. EDMUNDS: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll be brief. I think that we've had this -- Mr. Vonnegut and Mr. 23

Huebner and I in various, I guess, combinations have had

this discussion for quite some time. The issue -- and I'm

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1 not sure that Mr. Vonnegut's presentation exactly resolves 2 it as we agreed over the lunch hour that we took when Mr. 3 Huebner, Mr. Vonnegut and I were on the call to resolve it. 4 But let me just -- the issue narrowly that I have 5 been raising and on behalf of other objecting states have 6 been raising is that the -- is the same one that you went 7 over Monday, which is that the definition of related parties, specifically Debtor-related parties who were 8 9 released under 10.6B is very broad. And we -- the position, 10 our position, is that those releases are inappropriate if 11 they release people who independently, who are not closely 12 connected with the Debtors, those who have independently 13 engaged in conduct, including conduct that involves the 14 marking and sale of produced opioids. There is -- so there 15 has been --16 THE COURT: Can I -- I'm sorry to interrupt just 17 for a second. 10.6D, is that the Debtor release or the 18 third-party release? 19 MR. EDMUNDS: It's B, Your Honor, and it's the 20 Debtor release. It's the --21 MAN: 10.6B is third-party. The Debtor release is 22 10.6A, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: All right. So --24 MR. EDMUNDS: Right.

THE COURT: -- I think it's important to keep the

Page 235 1 -- so we're talking about the third-party release? 2 MR. EDMUNDS: Yes, we're talking about the third-3 party release --4 THE COURT: All right. 5 MR. EDMUNDS: -- of the Debtor-related parties, 6 and I misunderstood your question. 7 THE COURT: Right. Okay. MR. EDMUNDS: The third-party release of claims 8 9 against Debtor-related parties --10 THE COURT: Right. 11 MR. EDMUNDS: -- which is the issue here. 12 that could be very broad, and that's as literally 13 incorporated as it's broad. There is a new footnote, and 14 this is a new understanding that I understood Mr. Huebner 15 was going to clarify this afternoon on the record, which is 16 that those actors, the related parties who, in their own 17 right, engaged in the same misconduct related to Purdue 18 should not be released and are released, they are arguably partially incorporated in -- if you go through a string of 19 20 definitions, the definition of co-defendants. 21 And the definition of co-defendants then 22 incorporates the holders of co-defendant claims under which 23 you can make an argument that those who participated in Perdue's opioid-related conduct are, in fact, released by 24 25 the footnote.

MAN: One issue I just want to clarify, the footnote makes clear that co-defendants are not released. That is the purpose of the footnote. It is not expanding in any way.

MR. EDMUNDS: I may have miss -- I may have omitted a "not", but I think that's sort of the reason that this is getting difficult. We're going through multiple layers of --

THE COURT: Well, if the intent is that they don't have that release, then the parties can make that clear.

And that's what I'm hearing, at least.

MR. EDMUNDS: I think that we have agreed. I thought it was going to be made clearer on the record. I think that there is still an issue that needs to be that -- and Mr. Vonnegut and I have been discussing this by email during the hearing this afternoon. I think that there is something -- some work that we still need to do, and I think that we will be able to do that.

But I wanted to -- we may not be arguing before
the Court again on this issue, so I wanted to explain
overall what the issue is that we are trying to resolve, and
that is that wrongdoers shouldn't be released from state
police power claims when they've not contributed to the
plan. And I think that we're -- there is an agreement in
principle as to that. I think we need to make sure that the

language is -- it incorporates that and is clear. And clear because I think we'll face interpretive questions over that if it's not in implementing our police powers. So --

THE COURT: Well --

MR. EDMUNDS: -- that's the concern, and I think

7 THE COURT: All right.

MR. EDMUNDS: -- we can work on that.

THE COURT: I want to be clear, though. I think that I heard from Mr. Vonnegut that there was an agreement generally on that point. But on the other hand there are certain causes of action that the Debtor has, such as, you know, failed to supervise vicarious liability, veil-piercing alter ego, things like that where a discharge of the Debtor, if someone was acting just without wrongdoing, you know, without their own knowledge of unlawful conduct, really shouldn't be a back door to violate the bankruptcy discharge or the injunction from those who were contributing.

should go truly to their own independent wrongful conduct, not conduct as, you know, an employee of the Debtor, just as an employee of the Debtor. And this is similar to the language in Section 524(g)(4), you know, which provides for an injunction of claims related to the Debtor based on the third-party's involvement in the management of the Debtor or

predecessor to the Debtor, or services as an officer or director or employee.

view -- and there is going to be some line-drawing here that you can't do -- inevitably, there might be someone who gets sued where you're not sure until you actually look at the facts carefully, which is why I think they have the provision to come back here. And I've done this once in another case, and I found that the injunction actually applied in one situation but not in another, and that may well happen. But I think if there is separate independent wrongdoing that's short of being illegal, a crime, which no one is protected from by a co-defendant, we do carve it out.

And that would cover any -- you know, any thirdparty like, I don't know, some pharmacy chain that Perdue
dealt with. But if you're talking about officers,
directors, employees, you know, the case law is pretty clear
that you can't, through the back door, go after them just
because they worked for a company that you would have a
claim against. So I hope that provides some guidance to you
all.

MR. EDMUNDS: It does, Your Honor, and that's not the issue. The issue is to take, for example, the seven, I think, entities identified on the -- actually, entities or individuals identified on the excluded party list, or at

Page 239 1 least the corporate ones that are there. Those are actors 2 who engaged in Perdue's marketing, but they're not 3 employees. They're not close to the company. They're not 4 of the kind that you're mentioning. 5 And the idea is just to make sure that these 6 releases do not categorically apply to what Mr. Uzzi 7 referred to this morning as, you know, the undiscovered 8 McKenzie. 9 THE COURT: Right. If -- obviously, if they have 10 engaged in their own separate wrongdoing, and I think the 11 Debtors -- I think if I heard Mr. Vonnegut correctly, the 12 Debtors agree with you on that. It's just a matter of 13 making the language clear. 14 MR. EDMUNDS: Right. I think that's the case. 15 MR. VONNEGUT: That's correct, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. VONNEGUT: Unsurprisingly, we think you've got 18 it exactly right. The independent conduct is not released. Co-defendants, period, full stop, do not get third-party 19 20 releases. 21 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Okay. Should I 22 have Mr. --23 MR. EDMUNDS: Thank you, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Should I have Mr. Fogelman then? 25 MR. FOGELMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. Good

afternoon. This is Larry Fogelman on behalf of the United States. Your Honor, as you said while preserving all of our arguments set forth in our statement, the changes made overnight do not address the very issues the Court has raised throughout this hearing concerning the extraordinary overbreadth of the non-Debtor releases, including Your Honor's admonition that the non-Debtor releases should not include fraud concern non-opioid products. Let me explain.

everything related to the Debtors, et al. The key language has not changed. The release includes all causes of action based on or relating to the Debtors, to the estates, or the Chapter 11 cases. That covers literally everything. Now, there is a carve-out to the extent that such of action "is based on such shareholder release parties actual and separate non-opioid actual misconduct".

But the definition of non-opioid actual misconduct is too narrow and does not clearly permit (indiscernible) concerning the other pharmaceutical products that the Debtors manufactured, including (indiscernible), as well as any other liabilities that could arise from owning and operating a pharmaceutical company, including police and regulatory claims. These could relate to state consumer protection statutes, state public nuisance laws, state environmental liabilities, state workplace safety laws,

Page 241 1 state employment laws, state civil fraud claims, state fraud 2 and contracting, any state ADA laws, state labor laws just 3 to name a few examples. 4 THE COURT: So, could I interrupt? 5 MR. FOGELMAN: Specifically, Your Honor -- yeah. 6 THE COURT: Could I interrupt you? I had the same 7 reaction, I have to confess, when I read the definition of 8 non-opioid actual misconduct. I had two reactions. 9 first was I -- it seemed in clause 1 to take away what it 10 gave at the beginning of clause 1. It says an action taken 11 or not taken --12 MR. FOGELMAN: I --13 THE COURT: -- deliberately or recklessly in bad faith, and with actual knowledge. So reckless is not with 14 15 actual knowledge, but so --16 MR. FOGELMAN: That --17 THE COURT: -- so it seems to take away language 18 that arguably is there, but that I think it takes away. But more importantly, I have this point. And again, I am 19 20 distinguishing between releases --21 MAN: (indiscernible) 22 THE COURT: -- that a debtor can give and is 23 giving here based on the Debtor's own analysis --24 MAN: (indiscernible) 25 THE COURT: -- and I think everyone else's

analysis, as to the types of things that are listed in the language at the bottom of the next definition. piercing alter ego, agency vicarious liability, constructive notice, controlled personal liability, failure to supervise, or otherwise, with the exception of maybe of controlled personal liability. Those are all things that a debtor can release. Those are all -- there's no contention here that any individual, as to these non-opioid matters, has taken any action that would give rise to anything like this, and it's the Debtor's claim in the first place. So I can see why one would want to make it clear in the Debtor release that this covers this type of conduct, and I don't have a problem with a strike-suit mechanism that has people -- if there's any doubt as to which side of the line it would fall on, bringing their suit here first. But I just -- I don't -- by definition, then, what we're talking about are not debtor claims, but third-parties claims. just -- I'm not -- I don't see why we are covering them in a

MS. MONAGHAN: Your Honor --

release for non-opioid conduct. I just don't -- why?

MR. FOGELMAN: Your Honor, I see both Ms. Monaghan and Mr. Uzzi looking like --

THE COURT: Right.

There's no money being paid for that.

MR. FOGELMAN: -- they're ready to address that, so

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1 I'll let them.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. MONAGHAN: I'll start, Your Honor, and then
Mr. Uzzi can talk you through the language. So I don't want
you to get the wrong idea about us. We were trying to draft
a release that matched and mirrored the claims that have
been made and not anything else. But even though claims for
things like alter ego or vicarious liability are estate
claims, the complaints here have frequently almost, you
know, without exception raised claims on the theory that the
former directors are vicariously and strictly liable for
everything the company did.

THE COURT: Yeah, and I --

MS. MONAGHAN: So for example --

THE COURT: -- want to be clear. I don't have a problem with that as far as the language of a release, again tracking 524(g)(4). But we're talking now about non-opioid conduct, and --

MS. MONAGHAN: So let me turn to that.

THE COURT: -- if someone just, you know, says
that director so-and-so or officer so-and-so, not a Sackler
person, but just -- you know, or a Sackler I suppose, is
liable for alter-ego, that's an estate claim, and it's being
released by the estate. So I don't think -- I think other
than having a mechanism to come to the court if you're going

to be asserting such a claim, you need anything more than the estate release to the Debtor release. And it just complicates things to include all this other stuff, and the alter-ego, etc.

Because what is the other stuff? It has to be something broader than that, that isn't an estate claim.

And if it's for non-opioids, I don't see -- I mean, that's not been the focus of the case. It's not the basis for the settlement.

MS. MONAGHAN: So, Your Honor, we tried to draft the release in a way that addressed what we see as the fundamental problem with the non-opioid claims, which is that they are often opioid claims in disguise.

THE COURT: Well, all right, but that would be released. And so, you could say that, again, even if it's a opioid claim in disguise, it's released and you have to come to the Court if you're saying no, it's not in disguise, so you don't have litigation in Florida by the equivalent of the people in the Madoff case that kept saying, oh, it's not really a claim against the Madoff estate, it's something else.

MS. MONAGHAN: That, frankly, Your Honor, is what we were nervous about. The concept that the release extends to or does not extend to non-opioid related activity that a person actually undertakes, as opposed to something that's

Page 245 1 just being attributed to them by virtue of their position as 2 a director or shareholder. 3 THE COURT: All right. 4 MS. MONAGHAN: That is what we were trying to 5 capture. 6 THE COURT: Okay, but --7 MS. MONAGHAN: If the language doesn't do that, I 8 think we can try to address. THE COURT: I don't think -- see if I get this 9 10 right. I don't think the way to address those concerns, 11 which are legitimate ones, is to create a category of misfeasance that is excluded from the release. I think it's 12 13 to create a category that's clearly covered by the Debtor 14 release and to make it clear that you can't get around the 15 settlement release, which is over opioid related claims, by 16 creative pleading. 17 And ultimately, the Court that imposes the release 18 should be the person that decides whether it's creative pleading or whether it's legitimate, and that is an issue. 19 20 I mean, that, as I said in the case that I was referring to, 21 the released party one on one point and lost on the other 22 one and, frankly, the only one that had any value was the 23 one they won on, so the party stopped suing. 24 But that plan didn't have the gatekeeping They had to go down to Florida and they had an 25 mechanism.

extra, you know, two stages of litigation and expense before they finally got up here. But I think I'm happy with the gatekeeping mechanism like that if the gate is clear enough.

MR. UZZI: Your Honor, for the record, Gerard Uzzi of Milbank on behalf of the Raymond Sackler Family.

Look, we take a great deal of comfort with the gatekeeping mechanism. But it does matter what those gates are or what the gate that needs to go through, I guess, is the better, you know, metaphor.

But, you know, I do think, and I'd like to address for a moment, Your Honor, what these releases were always intended to pick up and whether it's supposed to be non-opioid -- excuse me -- only opioid liability or whether it was supposed to be broader than that.

And, Your Honor, I think we need to put these releases and this plan in the context of the facts and circumstances that brought this plan before the Court. And along those facts and circumstances are that we were approached by our counterparties -- so the creditors are large, the Debtors here, the fiduciaries -- to negotiate a release that was expressly supposed to be what we've said global peace, but, you know, is a complete and clean separation from these Debtors for all civil liability.

And that's in the record, Your Honor. It's in the record, Ms. Conroy --

Pg 247 of 351 Page 247 THE COURT: It really isn't. I mean, David 1 2 Sackler said it was for opioid liability. I know others said --3 MR. UZZI: Well, he said --4 5 THE COURT: -- they wanted global peace and they 6 were going to rely on the lawyers. But look, the way this 7 reads right now, non-opioid actual misconduct, if David Sackler -- it probably hasn't happened, but if he was in a 8 9 car accident where he was negligent, it would be released 10 because this doesn't cover negligence and that can't be 11 right. 12 MR. UZZI: Well, I agree with that, Your Honor, 13 but I don't believe it's -- I believe it can't be right, but 14 I also don't believe that's what's picked up here. I mean, 15 I don't -- if he's in a car accident, whether he's negligent 16 or not --17 THE COURT: Well, all right. If he was driving a 18 company car. MR. UZZI: I don't -- I don't believe, Your Honor, 19 20 that is in the release as it relates to -- and it was Mr. 21 Vonnegut said there are capacity limiters on both ends of

> And so, you know, a car accident in a company car that is the negligence of the individual person is not an

the release, and there's a capacity limiter also with

respect to the party who's granting the release.

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action taken in the capacity as the employee or the director or the shareholder or whatever it may be of the Debtors, and we're not trying to pick that up, Your Honor.

What we were trying to do here, Your Honor, what we were trying to do is we're trying to be responsive to the allegation of or maybe a concern that if there were facts that were later discovered that people would have said, hey, you know, that was conduct that should not have been released had we identified it today that it can be picked up here.

But if we listen to the testimony, Your Honor, and the questioning in this case -- I mean, you know, in the record, you know, as far as the investigation that --

THE COURT: Well, all right, I'm going to cut you short. I just think that would mean then that this language is, I think, too narrow. I understand your point. If someone is being sued just because they were a board member, all right, or just because they were an officer because it turned out that, you know, Purdue had negligently put together the formula for a non-opioid drug and they were just being sued as an officer or an employee, I think the Debtor release covers it.

But I also think there are probably claims that are not deliberate and with actual knowledge that legitimately someone's conduct might actually -- their own

Pg 249 of 351 Page 249 conduct, not just conduct as an officer, but their own individual conduct would make them liable for that product, and we've done nothing about that hypothetical product in this case. So either this has to be really --MR. FOGELMAN: Your Honor, can I give --THE COURT: I mean, look, in the case --MR. FOGELMAN: I'm sorry. THE COURT: In the case law, the Second Circuit, including in the Quigley case and in the Manville IV case after the remand from the Supreme Court has really cabined the term derivative -- or actually expanded the term derivative from how it's normally used, which is a claim on behalf of the debtor or through the debtor to be something broader than that. But there's some limits to that, and it's not just based on, you know, actual knowledge of misconduct or bad faith or deliberate. It can be separate and independent conduct. So I want to -- I think if you're going to cover non-opioid claims, it really needs to be something more than just Debtor related and really bad stuff. MR. FOGELMAN: Can I -- sorry. THE COURT: I mean, non-debtor related or really bad stuff, because you can have debtor-related stuff that I

think would fall outside of the Second Circuit's admittedly

broad definition of what a derivative claim is, is that

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entitled to a release under the right circumstances under a plan, and I don't think this language does it.

And you can spend a lot of time dealing with that language or you can just carve out non-opioid conduct, except for conduct that is independent of one's acting under one's duty as an officer, director, or, you know, alter ego, veil piercing, et cetera, all of which is clearly derivative.

MR. FOGELMAN: Your Honor, that's all helpful, and I take to heart your comments that you believe that many of those claims, like the failure to supervise claim, would be a Debtor claim. That may be right, Your Honor, it may not be, depending upon how somebody would plead it.

I'd like to give you the example or one of the examples we're trying to solve for Your Honor, just to put it clearly out there. You've heard a lot about Adhansia in the questioning, and there's certainly a fair amount of inuendo about Adhansia and what the Sacklers involvement in Adhansia may have been. Adhansia was one of the search terms in the discovery that was taken.

There's been plenty of discovery and plenty of investigation about Adhansia. Adhansia was not approved by the FDA until all of the Sacklers were off the board.

Adhansia wasn't launched until about the petition date.

And so, anything that relates to Adhansia, the

marketing and sale of Adhansia has been done by a Chapter 11 debtor with a pristine board under the supervision of this Court and under the supervision of a court-appointed monitor. Yet, yet there seems to be a pretty clear effort that people want to string something along and tie some sort of wrongful conduct to the Sacklers around Adhansia.

Now, if in fact, one of the Sacklers or one of the released parties, not just the Sacklers, did something with respect to Adhansia that was reckless or deliberate and intended to cause harm, of course, that should be carved out, Your Honor.

But these creative legal theories on trying to -and I'm just picking Adhansia of one example of trying to
bring the Sacklers back in and seems to be intended to get
through a back door is what we're trying to solve for.

I'm not particularly wedded to how we solve for that, Your Honor, but it is something that either --

THE COURT: Again, to me, if people are suing them, I guess it's perfectly legitimate to not to want to have your clients even be sued for just being on the board, which includes getting information, or for being an officer.

But at the same time, you're putting the onus on the party suing to show not only that that isn't the case, but also that they acted deliberately, recklessly, or in some other standard that's not really tied, I think,

Page 252 1 necessarily to a cause of action that would be independent. 2 I think you might be trying, although I didn't like this 3 language, to do that. But I think a -- I mean, I just -- Adhansia is not 4 5 a control person liability type of liability, right? It 6 just isn't. That's not --7 MR. FOGELMAN: I don't know, Your Honor. I mean, 8 that's the problem that I have. I just -- I don't know. 9 THE COURT: But no one has asserted in this case, 10 it's just can't be -- and they're not paying for it. 11 MR. FOGELMAN: No, but, Your Honor --12 THE COURT: They're paying for peace of mind --13 MR. FOGELMAN: Your Honor --THE COURT: -- over something that I think they 14 15 get peace of mind on just by the fact that they can't be 16 sued as an officer and director. 17 MR. FOGELMAN: I think what we bargained for, Your 18 Honor, is a complete separate from civil liability. 19 THE COURT: No, I don't --20 MR. FOGELMAN: Now, I recognize --21 THE COURT: The record doesn't show that. 22 sorry, the record just doesn't show that. MR. FOGELMAN: I think that --23 24 THE COURT: It doesn't show that. 25 MR. FOGELMAN: Your Honor --

Page 253 1 THE COURT: It doesn't show that your clients 2 bargained, for example, for release from CERCLA liability. MR. FOGELMAN: It's (crosstalk). 3 THE COURT: It just doesn't. 4 MR. FOGELMAN: Your Honor, I mean, the settlement 5 6 agreement and this plan speaks for itself as far as what the 7 bargain was. The testimony of Miss Conroy made it clear 8 that they wanted the peace premium, that they want to be --9 THE COURT: Miss Conroy is a PI lawyer. She's not an environment lawyer. If the Sacklers have control group 10 11 liability for an undiscovered Superfund site, I'm not giving 12 them a release. It's just not going to happen period. 13 MR. FOGELMAN: But, Your Honor --14 THE COURT: It's not going to happen period. It's 15 not going to happen, and the lawyers should realize it. 16 That's it. I've given you enough time to draft it. I'm 17 telling you how it should be drafted now because you haven't' drafted it. I am not releasing them from a 18 19 Superfund site, for example, which would be related to 20 Purdue. That's not what this case is about. Had enough of 21 this. 22 MR. FOGELMAN: Your Honor, we will --THE COURT: And no court would affirm me if I did 23 24 on appeal. 25 MR. FOGELMAN: Your Honor, they think --

THE COURT: It didn't even affirm -- it wouldn't have affirmed Judge Lifland if the interpretation was right as to the separate fraud of the insurance company to the asbestos claimants. Now the question wasn't that it was fraud; it's that it was separate. So you can't define your way out of that by behavior unless you cover all of the types of claims that could be raised for separate conduct, not the Debtor conduct or as an officer and director of the Debtor.

So look, you're not going to persuade me on this, that you're just not going to persuade me.

MR. FOGELMAN: I'm not trying to persuade you to go further, Your Honor, then I think what I'm asking for. What we've tried to address is that very issue of the separate conduct. Maybe we didn't do it well. We will take another shot at this, Your Honor, and try and submit something.

THE COURT: All right, but the times a' wasting.

MR. FOGELMAN: Understood.

THE COURT: And I think there are going to be examples that you're not going to be able to cover unless you do it the other way around and not do it with the gravamen of every potential truly separate claim and instead say that this release will cover, because it's a Debtor release, as to non-opioid conduct claims that the Debtor

would have and those are expansive, including derivative claims for acting improperly on the board, for example.

But if there's a separate claim that doesn't fit into that and it comes back to the Court and the Court finds that, this release shouldn't cover it.

MR. FOGELMAN: That's helpful.

THE COURT: I think that the released parties should have the protection of strike suits brought all over the country. Instead, they should be channeled here, and you should be able to show this to a state court or a federal court in wherever, Tennessee or Florida or wherever, saying, no, you know, they had to come to the bankruptcy court first to decide whether this provision applied or not.

I understand that and I've encouraged that, but I just don't think you can define out by qualitative types of misconduct from this release, unless they're going to pay a lot more than they're paying because they're not paying to be released from a CERCLA claim, for example.

MR. FOGELMAN: And, Your Honor, we were not trying to do that, so --

THE COURT: Well, but this -- I mean, that would be the effect.

MR. FOGELMAN: Understood, Your Honor. Well, there is a separate carveout for all federal liabilities, so technically --

Page 256 1 THE COURT: Well, state law equivalent. 2 MR. FOGELMAN: But understood, Your Honor, but understood. 3 4 THE COURT: All right. 5 MR. FOGELMAN: So we will do our best, Your Honor, 6 to accommodate or to address your --7 THE COURT: All right. No, Mr. Fogelman, I think -- I mean, you have other points, but there is a balance 8 9 here under the case law. And I'm not asking you to waive 10 your rights to say that case law is wrong, but there's a 11 balance here between how the Second Circuit defines broadly 12 derivative actions that can be enjoined and separately 13 independent actions that can't. And I think what I'm 14 getting at is how you draw that line. 15 MR. FOGELMAN: I appreciate Your Honor's 16 considering our argument, and I have nothing further at this 17 time. Thank you. 18 THE COURT: Okay. All right. I mean, look, this is all over the case law. The Carter Corporation, Judge 19 20 McMahon says, you know, you address what you were settling 21 and not everything else, and they rewrote the plan in 22 Carter. It was a small plan, it's a small construction company, but they rewrote it, and they shouldn't have had 23 24 to. 25 MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

1 Paul Schwartzberg from the U.S. Trustee's Office.

THE COURT: Afternoon.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Thank you, Your Honor. I just wanted to take up the opportunity Your Honor had offered.

We do have a few comments on the recent changes, in addition to what we had filed in our objection and our oral arguments.

And I wanted to bring the Court's attention of the new definition of shareholder releases, which is now Exhibit X to the shareholder agreement, as well as the defined term, "designated shareholder release parties," which is Exhibit S to the shareholder agreement. And I wanted to point out -- Your Honor, can you hear me?

THE COURT: Yes. I can hear you fine.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Okay. All right, thank you, Your Honor.

I wanted to point out first the shareholder agreement as testimony shared, it has not actually been finalized yet, so the released parties are Exhibit X and Exhibit S could be expanded and we don't know who those are. And, in fact, Your Honor, pursuant to the shareholder agreement of Section 1106, even after it's signed, it could still be amended, and I think between agreement of the NBT and the Sacklers. So we're concerned that even after --

THE COURT: I'm assuming it will be attached to

Page 258 1 the confirmation order and the parties will have a chance to 2 review it before the order is entered. 3 MR. SCHWARTZBERG: But, Your Honor, even after the 4 order is entered, the shareholder agreement does allow --5 THE COURT: No, no, not after the order is entered 6 because that's the injunction. 7 MAN 1: Your Honor, we're not going to be adding 8 parties. 9 THE COURT: No. 10 MAN 1: Mr. Fogelman doesn't need to worry about 11 that. 12 THE COURT: They wouldn't be able to even if they 13 wanted to. They're not going to do that. 14 MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Could they make the case, 15 Section 11.06 to make it clear that the amendments that they 16 can make only are up to confirmation? 17 THE COURT: Well, put it in the confirmation 18 order. The Court's approving this and nothing further. MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Thank you, Your Honor. That 19 20 would be very helpful. 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 MAN 1: That works for us, Your Honor. 23 MR. SCHWARTZBERG: And as I said also, Your Honor, 24 Exhibit X still -- we were talking about the breadth of the 25 releases. Exhibit X still includes as related entities the

Page 259 1 businesses, the assets, and the entities owned by Side A. 2 We believe this is overly broad and, in fact, I believe it was Mr. Mortimer Sackler had indicated he couldn't even 3 4 identify all of his investments, so we think that term is 5 too broad. 6 THE COURT: Why? 7 MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Unidentified, Your Honor, at 8 this point. We can't identify. 9 THE COURT: But if you cabin the -- there's no --10 these are the payors, right? And as we've just discussed, 11 what's going to be released as far as third parties is 12 opioid-related claims. So there's no indication that any of 13 these entities, separately and apart in conjunction with 14 Purdue, was engaging in any opioid-related activity. 15 On the other hand, they are backing up the payment 16 of the plan. 17 MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Our concern, Your Honor, is 18 these are entities that even the Sacklers may not know. 19 THE COURT: But -- all right. Keep going. 20 MR. SCHWARTZBERG: I'll move on to my next point, 21 Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MR. SCHWARTZBERG: In regard to the --24 THE COURT: I guess you haven't read the discovery that the committee and the Debtors had, right? 25

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. They have.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, in regard to the non-opioid misconduct claims, we -- I think you had addressed that, and we just reserve our rights on that to see what the new drafting is regarding this because we had concerns regarding that.

And then last point, Your Honor, I had is just a concern regarding, once again, the breadth of the releases. We do note that the Debtors -- we're trying to figure out if the Debtors are including released parties that are not -- releasing parties that are not -- or causing releases that will be suffered by parties that are not creditors of this case.

The releasing parties include holders of claims and causes of action. And I know the bankruptcy code defines creditors in this case as just part of the holders of claims. So when they throw in holders of claims and causes of actions, it makes it look like they're trying to expand those who are going to give releases to those who are not creditors in the case. And if they need to limit it to just people who are creditors in the case, they should make it clear in the documents, Your Honor.

And I believe those are the only additional comments I had, unless Your Honor has any questions.

Page 261 1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. UZZI: Nothing further from the Debtor, Your 3 Honor. 4 MR. GOLDMAN: Your Honor, may I be heard briefly? 5 THE COURT: Sure. 6 MR. GOLDMAN: Irve Goldman, Pullman Comley, for 7 the State of Connecticut. 8 I had agreed to very briefly address this argument 9 under the miscellaneous topic, as opposed to separately. I 10 don't expect to take more than five minutes on this, Your 11 Honor, so I hope you'll bear with me. 12 So I'm presenting this in addition to the states 13 that joined our objection either expressly or by 14 incorporation, and also on behalf of Rhode Island and 15 Delaware. It relates to the argument in our brief that the 16 plan infringes on the states' rights to have had their 17 police power claims adjudicated with damages fixed in the 18 actions they commenced against Purdue in their own courts. 19 And this relates to Section 362(b)(4), the 20 legislative history of which provides that the purpose of it 21 is to allow a government action for a violation of a 22 consumer protection law to proceed unabated by the automatic stay in order to "fix damages for violations of such a law." 23 24 The plan takes away that right by channeling all 25 the states' claims to the NOAT Trust, which will be funded

by the Sackler plan contributions, and then distributing those funds based on a state-by-state allocation percentage. And in fact, it's a pot plan from which the states will take their allocated share of what is put in the pot.

This mechanism, we contend, eliminates the states' rights to fix damages in their own actions, and therefore, the plan doesn't comply with the applicable provisions in Title 11.

I realize it would have been administratively cumbersome and time-consuming to have allowed for the fixing of damages in those actions in this case, but that is simply the hand the Debtors were dealt when they invoked the protections of the bankruptcy court, and I would submit they must therefore live with the burdens of the Code. And that is set forth in 362(b)(4).

I would also submit that administrative convenience can't be allowed to trump the clear protection provided for states to fix their claims for damages without being held up by the automatic stay.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. GOLDMAN: And that's all I have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- that's already been litigated and affirmed on appeal, without any further appeal. I'm not quite sure what you're saying at this point. Are you suggesting that even though 362 by itself wouldn't apply

Page 263 1 post-confirmation, that somehow they would have a right to 2 liquidate their claims, even though they would get whatever 3 recovery they'd get under the plan? So they would --4 MR. GOLDMAN: No, I'm not saying --5 THE COURT: -- the states would actually spend the 6 money to do that? 7 MR. GOLDMAN: No, I'm not saying that, Your Honor. I'm saying that that was a preliminary injunction. It 8 9 wasn't a permanent injunction --10 THE COURT: Right. 11 MR. GOLDMAN: -- to stay the states. And the fact 12 that we're at the confirmation stage should not cut off the 13 rights to have liquidated those claims --14 THE COURT: That's the --15 MR. GOLDMAN: -- because of --16 THE COURT: -- whole reason that the... Look, 17 Congress, in the legislative history made it clear that one 18 could still enjoin police power under the right circumstances to liquidate a claim. And of course, the 19 20 provision itself says it doesn't apply to payment of the 21 claim. The plan is just providing for payment of the claim. 22 So I just -- I hear your argument, but frankly, it makes no sense. It's another sand in the gears. I mean, 23 24 it's just... MR. GOLDMAN: I hear Your Honor. I'm just trying 25

to make the point that I understand the injunction was issued and it was preliminary. I don't think that that means we shouldn't have had the right to -- before the plan reached the confirmation stage -- to liquidate those claims, instead of having them just put into a trust based on an allocation formula.

THE COURT: In fact, the injunction applies through confirmation, and then the stay is no longer in place, and therefore, 362 doesn't apply at all. Instead, it's the plan.

MR. GOLDMAN: I would maintain that because of that, our rights are subverted under 362(b)(4). And I'll just leave it at that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KAMINETZKY: Your Honor, if I could briefly respond? Benjamin Kaminetzky, of Davis Polk, for the Debtors.

THE COURT: Okay, fine.

MR. KAMINETZKY: I know -- I'm actually so happy that this was raised, because we've all been wondering what plan B was for the objecting states, and I think this is just a perfect way to end today. Because what they're saying is that we should go back to the first day of this case, when the Debtors basically said, we're done, we're not litigating anymore. In Your Honor's words, we've given

ourselves up.

But they're still demanding -- and then we've worked for months and months, years, on a distribution mechanism, but now they're saying, you know what, we want to have a trial anyway on the merits against the Debtors, who aren't contesting liability, just for like fun, so that we could then...

I don't know -- are they saying then they'll go back to the NOAT anyway after they have their show trial, that we're not contesting liability, and they'll abide by the NOAT? Or are they saying, no, we won't; we'll jump the line, and the State of Connecticut will ignore the last two years, and we'll get our judgment against the Debtors, who aren't contesting liability, and we'll get everything? It is just so confounding.

And I'm actually -- this is a great way to end the hearing because what we've just showed is that there's absolutely no alternative other than going back to September of 2019, relitigating the automatic stay, having Your Honor give us this day. And this isn't even what was controversial about the automatic stay.

Remember, the automatic stay that was the most controversial was the Sacklers. He's saying he wants to litigate. They want to have 50 trials. Maybe it's even more. Maybe because -- I'm not sure if this goes to all the

instrumentalities of the stay too, so we should have thousands of trials around the country against a Debtor that admitted on the first day that it's no longer contesting liability.

It is just the insanity -- or, I shouldn't say
that -- the idea that this is what's being advocated at this
point, right here, at the last minute of the confirmation
hearing, I think speaks volumes.

THE COURT: Well, look, I think... I want to say this diplomatically. There have been times in this case where the high quality of the lawyers has actually not been a good thing, because lawyers who are really creative and thoughtful sometimes come up with ideas that maybe seem well in the shower, but actually don't make any sense. And I just...

Look, Mr. Goldman, your clients have made some good points going to the merits of the Sackler settlement.

That's where the focus should be, not on something like this. This is just not constructive. So, I would hope the parties would continue to discuss the former, and not burden this case with the latter.

MR. GOLDMAN: I hear you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Mr. Underwood, I don't know if you had a comment on the release language, or you just...

MR. UNDERWOOD: Yes. I have a very quick comment, Your Honor, that I want to raise. We have a provision in the plan. It's very straightforward as well. We have a provision in the plan that regards excluded claims. There is a portion of that provision that addresses Canadian claims, or Canadian claims against Purdue Canada. We now have language in that provision that says that non-opioid actual misconduct claims are effectively, I guess, released. And this is --THE COURT: No, that's what we've just been talking about, so I wouldn't worry about that. MR. UNDERWOOD: Okay. And the second aspect of that, very quickly, Your Honor. My understanding is -- and I did ask the Debtors' counsel about this last evening, or this morning -- provision 11.1(e) would then suggest that if there's any provision such as the non-opioid actual misconduct claim in the excluded claim, we would have to come back to the United States to get approval. It seems a little untoward that the Provinces at this point would have to come to Your Honor in order to bring, you know, a federal conveyance action against a Canadian entity. I just want to put that on the record, make sure the Debtor understood where I was coming from. THE COURT: No. Look, first of all, claims against the Canadian entity would have to be for fraudulent

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-- I don't think there's any release of a fraudulent transfer claim against the Canadian entity in this plan.

MR. UNDERWOOD: Okay. I'm not -- perhaps it's not a release. But what this seems to say is -- and I don't want to delay this further, but -- a claim that is not based upon conduct of the Debtors, including opioid-related activities of the Debtors, and that effectively -- or any non-opioid actual misconduct claim.

So I would presume that any Canadian creditor could argue in Canada that the officers, directors, Sacklers, owners, whomever, have left the Canadian entity with unreasonably small capital. That, to me, would be the type of claim that may be a non-opioid claim that could not then be brought.

THE COURT: Again, but I want to be clear, if it's just against these third parties because they are an employee or officer of the Debtor, which would be, I guess, the transferee, then, yeah, they would have to come back here if there's any question about that. It would have to be based on their own independent conduct. So, for example, if they were a transferee of the Canadian company, then you wouldn't have to come back here.

MR. VONNEGUT: Your Honor, may I address this point? I think I should be able to clear up some confusion.

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Okay.

THE COURT:

MR. VONNEGUT: So, the gatekeeping function that Mr. Underwood is referring to in 11.1(e). That only applies to non-opioid actual misconduct claims, which are their own prong under excluded claims. The claims against the Canadian entity that are not tied to the Debtor, those are separately excluded claims, and there's no gatekeeping function if he's pursuing those claims.

THE COURT: No, but his point was a different one, which is if the Debtor or a released party was being sued for having received a fraudulent transfer by the Canadian company, whether they would have to -- the Plaintiff would have to come to this Court as a gatekeeping mechanism to proceed.

And this should be able to be drafted so that the gatekeeping mechanism doesn't apply to clearly independent claims such as that, where if board member X received \$100,000 as a gift from Purdue Canada, he wasn't a board member of Purdue Canada, didn't do anything for Purdue Canada, was just a -- you know, they decided to give him a gift, and Purdue Canada was insolvent. If under applicable fraudulent transfer law in Canada, that would be a fraudulent transfer law, I don't think you should have to come to this Court to sue that board member.

MR. VONNEGUT: Understood and agreed, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Right. So, on the other hand, if

Purdue Canada is suing the board member because she was a board member of Purdue when Purdue got a fraudulent transfer, you would have to come to the Court, because if the only basis for the lawsuit is -- or the basis for the lawsuit, or a basis for the lawsuit, is that she was just a board member. And that's a veil-piercing claim, and the creditors -- those types of claims are subject to the discharge, the Debtors' discharge, because you're just trying to do a backdoor to get at the Debtor through the insurance and through the former officer or director.

Okay. All right. Anything else?

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, one very last thing from the Debtor. As Your Honor noted last week, there are extraordinary letters and other filings on the docket, and actually, we just wanted to echo the courage that it takes to tell stories, and specifically to come to court as a non-lawyer is extraordinary. Those are things that all of us weigh and worked on, and we read many of those in working on all this.

We (indiscernible) for many parties. I think that
we all owe the Court and chambers -- whichever way the
confirmation hearing ends and whatever order is issued,
we're all aware that we have dumped thousands and thousands
of pages on the Court. And I think that -- you know, I just
wanted to note that as we move towards the closing of the

confirmation hearing, in probably the most difficult Chapter 11 case in history in terms of what is at stake, in terms of what was at stake, in terms of the national health issues and the impact of the crisis. And it seemed odd to end the hearing without some recognition of the just extraordinary nature, in every possible way, of these proceedings.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, certainly I want to thank the Clerk's office.

MR. HUEBNER: Yes. Including certainly that the Zooms for hundreds of people and the accessibility in the (indiscernible). So I won't belabor the record. It just felt appropriate to say something, given what we've all been working on together.

One last thing, Your Honor. There are obviously still some documents to be finalized. Those things are moving along at warp speed and the emails are being exchanged. Obviously, we're aware that those things have to be done and on file prior to entry of the confirmation orders and the like. Obviously, Your Honor gave some pretty clear guidance on some of the restructuring issues within the last hour, which we will attend to; the shareholders settlement agreement, in addition to the representations we just talked about, about not letting anyone add any further parties.

So those things will be hitting the docket in

revised forms as fast as we humanly can get the parties sort of shepherded together to do that.

I see Mr. Troop has come on (indiscernible) I assume that is not an accident, since he is quite nimble in Zoom and appears, I think, only when he plans to. So let me ask him what he wants to talk about, and maybe that will be what brings us home.

MR. TROOP: Well, thank you very much, Mr.

Huebner. Your Honor, Andrew Troop, for the Nonconsenting

States.

Your Honor, I actually don't want to divert at all from the (indiscernible) truly heartfelt comments by the Court and Mr. Huebner with respect to the individuals in this case. I think it's something that all of us who don't represent individual victims (indiscernible) that we all share, and our admiration for the two victims who spoke (indiscernible).

But do we have some process things that we have to get to, and Mr. Huebner touched on them. And we just need to make sure that we, at the appropriate time and in the appropriate way, do not lose sight of the issues that remain unresolved and may be subject to debate with regard to how, for example, the Sackler settlement is resolved.

Your Honor, this afternoon during the hearing,
Your Honor, the Debtors filed a revised perspective

injunction for NewCo, where there is an issue that is identified (indiscernible) open, and we just need to manage that process and want to do so in a way that's efficient for the Court. And so we will continue to work on that with the Debtors.

But this is a complex case with lots of threads still untied, and we just need to make sure that we don't lose sight of that.

THE COURT: Okay. Fair point. I've told the parties that I intend to rule Friday morning at 10:00. I intend to give you a bench ruling. As you know, I believe it's important in cases large and small to move the matter promptly, after having heard the evidence. And given my calendar, that's the best way to do it. As I often do with a lengthy bench ruling, I'll go over the transcript, and I may edit it, although I won't change it in terms of the substance. But I think it's important for the parties to get that ruling and know that they're going to get it on Friday morning.

However, if the parties, as I have encouraged them to do, will reach some form of agreement, either among themselves or with the efforts of Judge Chapman as mediator, they can let me know before I give that ruling, if they want to circulate it, socialize it, make sure everyone understands it. I won't be offended at all by that. In

fact, I'll encourage you, as I have encouraged you, to continue that work.

As far as other loose ends are concerned, if they are truly loose ends, I guess I will have to deal with them after I give you my ruling, which the parties have to realize will in some measure give me a fair amount of control over the outcome, if they can't reach an agreement themselves, because the issue, almost by definition, will not be so important that it would hold up confirmation.

Rather, it's just an issue that needs to get resolved one way or the other, and of course, I would rather the parties resolve it on their own, as I expect they would do. But if they can't, I guess we'll deal with that after my ruling and as part of the process of submitting the confirmation order.

I won't require the order to be formally settled if I grant confirmation. But I will want to make sure the parties have sufficient time to read any changes to it, including -- you know, obviously, as I told Mr. Anker, he would have time, everyone else falls in that boat too.

so, I want to thank all the parties. We covered an extraordinary amount of ground in six days of trial and two days of oral argument. We could not have done that without the parties working very hard to streamline the trail efficiently, which I believe by and large they did.

And I also want to thank all of the lawyers, some

Page 275 1 of whom I have made some gruff comments to. But that is no 2 reflection on the lawyers themselves, but simply to let the 3 parties know my views on that particular issue, which 4 unfortunately, when you're on Zoom, I found the Court needs to be more expressive about than if you're there in person. 5 6 I'm not quite sure what human chemistry leads to that 7 result, but it's true, based on over a year's experience now 8 in handling hearings remotely. So I hope no one took that 9 personally. It really went to the argument, and not the 10 lawyer. 11 So, thank you all, and I'll see you all again on Friday morning at 10:00. 12 13 (Whereupon, these proceedings were concluded at 6:03 PM) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Page 276 1 CERTIFICATION 2 3 I, Sonya Ledanski Hyde, certified that the foregoing 4 transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. 5 Digitally signed by Sonya Ledanski Sonya Ledanski 6 DN: cn=Sonya Ledanski Hyde, o, ou, email=digital@veritext.com, c=US Date: 2021.08.26 13:49:09 -04'00' 8 Sonya Ledanski Hyde 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Veritext Legal Solutions 21 330 Old Country Road 22 Suite 300 23 Mineola, NY 11501 24 25 August 26, 2021 Date:

[**& - 2012**] Page 1

&	<b>100,000</b> 76:16	189:7 201:14	<b>16</b> 35:7 86:11
	269:17	<b>1123.05</b> 163:21	93:21
<b>&amp;</b> 4:8,15 7:8	<b>10001</b> 4:11	<b>1127</b> 28:21	<b>1633</b> 5:11
16:20 24:14	<b>10007</b> 6:10 8:4	<b>1129</b> 28:20,22	<b>16th</b> 156:3 177:1
155:15 175:1	<b>10017</b> 3:6	29:23 30:17,20	<b>17.5</b> 224:11
220:11,19 221:21	<b>10017</b> 5:0 <b>10019</b> 5:12 6:17	38:5 42:10 49:6	<b>173-175</b> 33:16
221:24 224:13	<b>10019</b> 5.12 6.17 <b>10020</b> 7:12	51:9 52:4 97:9,9	17th 220:1 224:5
0	<b>10036</b> 4:18 220:20	98:5 130:15	<b>18</b> 35:7 58:16
<b>06604</b> 4:4	<b>1015</b> 51:12	<b>1141</b> 135:6	107:18 160:3
<b>07102</b> 5:20	<b>1013</b> 31.12 <b>104</b> 48:17	<b>11501</b> 276:23	225:12
1	<b>105</b> 143:3	<b>1177</b> 4:17	<b>180-182</b> 28:11
	<b>105-106</b> 97:19	<b>117</b> , 4.17 <b>118</b> 97:20	<b>181</b> 28:20
1 5:4 34:9 77:3	<b>106</b> 122:22 123:8	<b>119</b> 45:11	<b>1898</b> 165:3
82:4 95:24 96:5,7	123:10,11 135:13	11c 124:11 126:11	<b>19</b> 32:14 35:5
100:24 105:13,19	135:15,17,18,19	126:16,17	86:11 219:21
106:20 107:2,13	135:19 136:1,3,16	120.10,17 11th 203:15	225:16
109:11 110:11	136:22 137:7	<b>12</b> 99:8 103:6	<b>19-234649</b> 225:10
112:1 113:8 115:5	142:25 143:10,13	<b>12</b> 99.8 103.0 <b>12-16</b> 28:20	<b>19-23649</b> 1:3
116:1 117:4,4	142.23 143.10,13	<b>12-10</b> 28.20 <b>120</b> 214:5	<b>19-23049</b> 1.3 <b>191</b> 101:22
137:7 150:7 185:9	<b>10601</b> 1:14	<b>120</b> 214.3 <b>1201</b> 5:19	<b>191</b> 101.22 <b>1939</b> 165:3
241:9,10 258:7,10			<b>1939</b> 103:3 <b>1962</b> 223:1
258:22	<b>10:00</b> 273:10	<b>1221</b> 7:11 148:18	
<b>1.16</b> 101:2	275:12	<b>125</b> 102:11	<b>197</b> 101:22
<b>1.2</b> 32:15 160:16	<b>10:03</b> 1:17	<b>12th</b> 160:2	<b>1990</b> 222:21
1.3490069542	<b>11</b> 16:5,14 33:19	<b>13</b> 50:21	<b>1993</b> 223:9
72:17	33:25 43:12,12,22	<b>1334</b> 143:7	<b>19th</b> 148:25
<b>1.5</b> 34:14 156:14	52:5 62:25 65:15	<b>134</b> 32:17	<b>1:30</b> 144:13
1.6579015983	72:11 74:8 76:24	<b>135,000</b> 156:13	<b>1st</b> 221:12
70:20	77:10,11 82:5,12	<b>137</b> 66:11	2
<b>1.775</b> 35:21	126:4,5,7 130:13		<b>2</b> 35:11 97:19
<b>1/500th</b> 77:3	137:14,18 171:18	<b>13th</b> 71:4 220:22	102:1 109:12
<b>10</b> 40:5 47:4 83:1	185:11 203:3	225:5	110:11
97:18 116:2 160:2	224:19 225:10	<b>14</b> 102:23	<b>2.156</b> 40:3 73:2
209:7	240:13 251:1	<b>1411</b> 45:11	<b>20</b> 28:4 40:4 83:11
<b>10.4</b> 46:21	262:8 271:2	<b>146</b> 32:17	86:8 160:17 210:9
<b>10.6a</b> 234:22	<b>11.06</b> 258:15	<b>15</b> 100:23 105:18	<b>200</b> 6:3 101:22
<b>10.6b</b> 231:24	<b>11.1</b> 267:15 269:2	105:20 106:13	<b>20003</b> 7:20
232:2,4 234:9,21	<b>11.4</b> 224:15	109:13 128:23	<b>20005</b> 3:18
<b>10.6d</b> 234:17	1106 257:22	133:21 208:16	<b>2000s</b> 166:1
<b>10.7</b> 26:15	<b>1122</b> 80:20 90:14	<b>15222</b> 8:12	<b>2007</b> 57:14 79:9
<b>10.7b</b> 240:9	<b>1123</b> 99:13 100:5	<b>155</b> 31:19	<b>2008</b> 46:22
<b>100</b> 116:3 208:22	112:10 113:3,5	<b>158</b> 31:20	<b>2011</b> 221:3,10
214:4	119:2 170:19	<b>15th</b> 176:25	<b>2012</b> 128:11
	171:21 180:17	220:25 222:6	
		ral Calutions	

[**2015 - 63**] Page 2

<b>2015</b> 220:1,4	<b>25</b> 1:16	<b>3506</b> 228:12	5
<b>2017</b> 143:12	<b>252</b> 56:14	<b>35213</b> 7:4	<b>5</b> 39:6,7 56:14,15
<b>2018</b> 68:24 224:16	<b>25305</b> 5:5	<b>36</b> 34:15	83:6 124:5,11
224:16	<b>26</b> 5:4 276:25	<b>3612</b> 228:15	128:10 138:18
<b>2019</b> 29:3 46:22	<b>265</b> 57:7	<b>362</b> 261:19 262:15	170:19 171:21
62:25 221:3,10,12	<b>26th</b> 220:4	262:25 264:9,12	185:25 189:7
222:7 223:14	<b>27</b> 93:22	<b>363</b> 56:18 165:22	201:14
224:5,16 265:19	<b>28</b> 100:12	<b>38</b> 41:17 44:12	<b>5.5</b> 30:25 40:16
<b>2020</b> 146:23,24	<b>285</b> 47:1	70:2 82:25 94:21	45:16,21 46:8,14
148:16,18 149:4	<b>288</b> 128:11	<b>380</b> 100:17	<b>5.6</b> 170:22 184:10
178:5 183:9,9	<b>2988</b> 148:22	<b>388</b> 100:17 102:23	
220:7,22,23,25	<b>2:30</b> 144:24	<b>389</b> 99:8	<b>50</b> 70:2 223:5
221:24 222:1,2,2	145:21	<b>39</b> 40:4	265:24
222:4,6 225:5	3	<b>392</b> 103:6	<b>50.1</b> 79:1
<b>2021</b> 1:16 2:2	_	3rd 6:9 148:18,22	<b>500</b> 70:14
44:10 86:17 149:4	<b>3</b> 17:6,23 34:21	221:24	<b>501</b> 7:3
160:2 177:25	70:24 97:9,9 98:5	4	<b>510</b> 163:5 164:4
218:7 224:25	109:12 135:10	_	166:22 186:25
225:2,16 276:25	<b>3,500</b> 153:16	<b>4</b> 36:2,8,11 39:6	194:5
<b>203</b> 45:11	<b>3,900</b> 57:6	46:20 53:11 72:16	
<b>206</b> 227:19	<b>30</b> 18:25 124:17	82:1 84:20 87:22	243:17
<b>20852</b> 6:4	<b>300</b> 1:13 276:22	93:1 99:13 100:5	<b>526</b> 163:11
<b>21</b> 86:11	<b>3008-1</b> 225:19	112:10 113:3,5	<b>52nd</b> 6:16
<b>216</b> 101:21	<b>3018</b> 93:3,3	119:2 124:5,10	<b>533</b> 97:11 98:22
<b>210</b> 101.21 <b>217</b> 7:3	<b>30th</b> 220:23	138:18 186:1	<b>536</b> 102:11
<b>21</b> 7 7.3 <b>22</b> 33:24 35:8	224:25,25 225:2	223:3 237:23	<b>544</b> 33:3
<b>22</b> 33.24 33.8 <b>225</b> 8:11	<b>31</b> 6:16 100:21	243:17 261:19	<b>55</b> 4:10
<b>228</b> 66:11	105:9 108:7	262:15 264:12	<b>55,000</b> 155:16
	<b>3232</b> 70:24	<b>4.375</b> 40:14	<b>550</b> 67:5
<b>22nd</b> 86:17	<b>327</b> 99:20	<b>4.5</b> 117:5	<b>569</b> 143:11
<b>23</b> 2:2 32:16	<b>3277</b> 149:15	<b>4.8</b> 61:13	<b>57</b> 55:11
<b>230</b> 98:17	<b>33</b> 34:25	<b>40</b> 117:4 127:19	<b>57-259</b> 28:12
<b>233</b> 102:25	<b>330</b> 276:21	<b>400</b> 7:19 73:1	<b>570</b> 5:19
<b>234</b> 102:25	<b>3306</b> 227:15	<b>42</b> 79:2	<b>58</b> 43:16 55:7
<b>23649</b> 219:22	<b>3372</b> 82:24	<b>437</b> 32:17	<b>5th</b> 176:22
<b>239</b> 42:5	<b>3461</b> 227:18	<b>45</b> 117:5,5	6
<b>24</b> 86:11	228:12	<b>450</b> 3:5	
<b>241</b> 99:10	<b>3465</b> 228:13	<b>450,000</b> 117:12	<b>6</b> 100:17 157:21
<b>242</b> 99:10 100:3	<b>347</b> 101:23	<b>47</b> 37:9 79:2 96:5	<b>60</b> 222:8,10,15,17
<b>243</b> 100:3	<b>3479</b> 81:23	97:18 115:1,3	<b>606</b> 33:3
<b>248</b> 1:13	<b>3480</b> 81:23	<b>48</b> 70:2 79:2 82:25	61 55:4
<b>24:16</b> 30:19	<b>35</b> 28:2 86:16	113:14 214:5	<b>614,000</b> 45:4
<b>24th</b> 222:7	<b>350</b> 101:23	<b>49</b> 95:24 96:2,4,7	<b>620-621</b> 33:3
	<u> </u>		<b>63</b> 83:10

[636 - act] Page 3

		1	
<b>636</b> 147:11	8th 220:2 222:2	<b>able</b> 35:9 40:10	accepted 47:17
<b>64</b> 97:11	9	60:14 71:20 79:19	49:8 52:7
<b>642</b> 128:11 147:11	9 33:15,24 35:7	92:13 106:13	accepting 82:22
<b>645</b> 148:5	71:5 223:3	108:22 117:16	171:16
<b>648</b> 128:11	<b>9.1</b> 184:10	118:10 126:13	access 79:11
<b>67</b> 83:9	<b>9.10</b> 170:6	127:24 136:23	158:12,14 169:17
<b>699</b> 72:20,24	<b>9.9</b> 102:8	144:22 154:16	201:12
<b>699.1</b> 36:9	<b>90</b> 40:6 52:7	158:11,14 166:17	accessibility
<b>6:03</b> 275:14	101:11	192:12 197:6	271:10
<b>6:09</b> 224:5	<b>9006</b> 157:18	206:19 219:6	accident 247:9,15
<b>6:30</b> 224:24	<b>9019</b> 30:14 51:20	236:18 254:21	247:24 272:4
<b>6th</b> 128:11	99:21 100:4	255:10 258:12	accommodate
7		268:24 269:14	256:6
	<b>91</b> 101:11,14,19 <b>911</b> 84:24	abrams 9:4	accomplish 21:22
<b>7</b> 8:3 28:20,22		abrogate 135:15	accord 32:1 41:8
29:23 30:17,20,23	<b>95</b> 97:19 148:8	abrogated 143:10	accorded 92:2
38:5 42:10 49:4,6	<b>99</b> 188:23 190:12	abrogates 143:1	account 31:1
49:14,18 50:15,23	9th 202:22 222:2	143:16	45:23 46:19 49:10
51:9,16 52:4	a	absence 65:24	49:17 50:16 56:23
54:22 55:16 56:20	<b>a.h.</b> 93:25 94:14	117:19 180:4,9	71:8 83:11 96:18
<b>7.48.</b> 81:17	<b>aaron</b> 9:18	absent 85:14	96:20 100:9
<b>700</b> 7:19	abate 48:4	151:1 228:9	112:17
<b>718</b> 85:6	abatement 37:4,6	absolute 155:3	accurate 159:16
<b>72</b> 71:5	37:9,16,22 38:3	absolutely 17:8	168:21 276:4
<b>729</b> 99:19	46:3 73:25 84:17	70:1 135:8 204:7	accurately 71:20
<b>74</b> 97:11 98:22	86:25 87:1 104:5	265:18	accutane 213:23
<b>75</b> 57:17 69:5	105:3 109:14	<b>absorb</b> 35:17	achieve 103:5
<b>75,000</b> 57:16 69:1	125:22 128:21,24	abundance 225:9	140:2
<b>76</b> 160:2	136:19 137:16,20	<b>abuse</b> 106:6	achieved 118:5
<b>79.17</b> 83:1	138:6,9,19 139:2	abused 215:4	achievement
<b>79.25</b> 83:4	142:8,16 172:13	221:16	103:22
<b>7th</b> 221:25 222:4	206:21 212:24	<b>abusing</b> 209:14	achieves 98:20
8	215:24 217:10,12	academic 51:18	acknowledge
<b>8</b> 39:7 150:7 158:8	217:14,18 218:7	accept 41:22 49:3	54:15 55:11 62:3
<b>8/13</b> 55:4	228:3	70:6 83:2,5	65:4 107:25
<b>80</b> 44:12 45:14	<b>abby</b> 9:23	133:14 134:10	acknowledged
47:13 52:6 100:21	<b>abide</b> 265:10	193:10	59:3 125:25
<b>80s</b> 216:19	ability 42:1 65:8	acceptable 56:4	182:23
<b>825</b> 143:11	109:21 140:9	151:5	acknowledges
<b>843</b> 147:11 148:5	157:24 166:3	acceptance 130:4	125:16
<b>85</b> 100:21	169:6 192:13	130:13	acronym 106:1
<b>850</b> 4:3	201:11,15 209:5	acceptances 178:9	act 57:2,2,2,3
<b>86</b> 6:9	217:22	acceptances 170.7	81:19 94:3 136:7
			01.17 /7.3 130./

[act - advisory] Page 4

	T	I	I
136:14,22 152:12	acute 209:2,4	186:14 187:4	administratively
154:23,24 208:17	<b>ad</b> 4:16 6:15 7:9	188:22 200:25	262:9
acted 112:18	7:17 50:11 95:9	201:16 202:18	administrator
251:24	95:15 137:12	203:20 204:24	157:19 158:7
acting 208:12,17	148:11 155:15	210:5 240:4	161:16
208:18 209:1,4,13	162:20 167:12	242:25 245:8,10	admiral 175:9
209:15 211:14	169:15 202:22	246:10 254:14	178:25
216:23 237:15	<b>ada</b> 241:2	256:6,20 261:8	admiration
250:5 255:2	<b>adam</b> 11:15 15:1	268:23	272:16
action 71:9,15,18	<b>add</b> 23:18 26:2	addressed 38:19	admission 98:16
71:19 74:6 123:17	36:3 42:11 48:9	132:7,8 149:11	100:2
165:11 179:18	92:17 176:17	155:5 162:8 173:7	admissions 97:4,4
183:12 232:9	181:19 192:25	202:9 203:19	99:25
237:12 240:11,14	271:23	227:17 244:11	admits 124:7
241:10 242:9	<b>added</b> 25:16	260:5	admitted 99:9
248:1 252:1	101:15 130:12	addresses 154:6	101:24 102:16,19
260:16 261:21	138:2 181:17	174:9 189:7 232:5	′
267:21	190:4 194:16	267:5	266:3
<b>actions</b> 60:11 87:9	198:25 232:2	addressing 25:10	admittedly 23:10
87:10 124:16	addicted 212:18	30:2	249:24
135:21,22 140:10	addiction 151:21	adequate 146:19	admonition 20:6
168:5 169:3 195:2	151:21,23 214:15	147:21 153:22	240:7
221:23 256:12,13	addictive 226:1	196:21	<b>ads</b> 159:19
260:19 261:18	addicts 153:9	adequately 71:12	<b>adult</b> 41:18
262:6,11	adding 258:7	110:15	adulterate 208:22
<b>active</b> 153:10	addition 28:19	adhansia 250:16	advance 102:13
activities 268:7	82:1 174:11	250:18,19,19,22	advancing 48:20
activity 115:7	233:14 257:5	250:22,24,25	adversaries 178:5
244:24 259:14	261:12 271:22	251:1,6,9,13	adversary 147:1
actors 235:16	additional 18:1	252:4	164:14 165:12
239:1	104:4 148:20	adjudicate 64:8	168:20 176:19
acts 76:18	164:2 169:22	adjudicated	177:25 183:10
actual 22:9 26:5	225:8 227:13	261:17	184:5 185:18
26:11 33:17 39:1	260:24	adjusted 107:15	186:18 192:8
75:19 91:16	<b>address</b> 23:9,21	adjustments	196:11,24
157:25 158:16	25:12 61:8 66:16	112:16	adverse 64:2
159:20,23 225:1	75:19 80:7 84:7	administering	advertise 182:16
240:15,16,17	96:11 115:24	122:17 123:6	advise 17:7
241:8,14,15 247:7	131:6,10 142:22	administration	advised 124:9
248:24 249:15	154:6 155:20,23	106:6 156:15	advisors 25:7,9
267:8,16 268:8	158:2 159:3 163:8	administrative	advisory 173:22
269:3	171:22 173:9	262:16	174:3
	174:17 176:9		

advocate 16:24	<b>ago</b> 68:18 79:19	<b>aimed</b> 85:24	allotted 80:1
advocated 96:19	124:17 177:21	<b>airways</b> 131:16	<b>allow</b> 74:4 94:24
266:6	208:8 212:11	aisling 13:9	108:2 109:15
advocates 225:6	<b>agree</b> 22:2 30:15	<b>akin</b> 77:11 220:18	153:21 154:11
afanador 5:16	31:18 58:9 75:22	224:24	157:17,20 210:19
120:23	95:25 96:2 105:5	<b>al</b> 7:4 16:3,12	258:4 261:21
<b>affairs</b> 221:8,11	111:23 114:5	219:21 240:10	allowance 156:12
<b>affect</b> 134:13	116:6 119:8	alabama 70:19	allowed 130:25
155:22 156:14	127:24 132:13,15	<b>albeit</b> 58:17 59:10	162:3 206:16
177:4 191:11	135:12 169:22	aleali 9:5	262:10,17
<b>affirm</b> 253:23	176:13 199:22	<b>alert</b> 152:7	allowing 153:10
254:1	201:9 207:15	alex 55:13 57:5,11	<b>allows</b> 103:18
affirmative	223:2 239:12	alexander 12:11	alongside 35:7
123:14	247:12	<b>alfano</b> 9:6	<b>alter</b> 50:20 149:1
affirmatively	agreed 16:16	aliquot 138:6	194:12 200:9
122:25	35:11 38:2 40:15	allegation 123:16	237:14 242:3
affirmed 93:25	72:11 92:25 93:2	248:6	243:8,23 244:4
254:2 262:23	93:8 152:13	<b>allege</b> 43:17 81:13	250:6
affixing 58:25	169:19 227:14	<b>alleged</b> 147:15,23	alternative 30:17
afforded 107:7	234:2 236:12	207:8	31:25 41:4 45:18
affront 109:2	261:8 269:24	<b>allen</b> 5:22 120:8	46:12 68:12 78:7
<b>afield</b> 121:19	agreement 109:20	120:21,22	265:18
afternoon 144:23	117:20 127:25	<b>allies</b> 137:11	alternatively
145:23 162:25	229:17 236:24	167:4	51:23
163:2 167:11	237:10 253:6	allison 15:17	alternatives 44:14
229:23 233:7	257:10,12,18,22	allocate 16:16	210:8 212:9
235:15 236:16	257:23 258:4	102:21	amazing 89:17
240:1 256:25	271:22 273:21	allocated 20:24	<b>amended</b> 16:5,14
257:2 272:24	274:7	144:20 262:4	18:14 20:8 94:25
<b>age</b> 219:25 226:4	agreements 55:17	allocating 199:6	124:8 176:15,24
agencies 213:2	56:19,21 179:3	allocation 27:14	229:4 233:18
<b>agency</b> 105:16	<b>agrees</b> 112:12	34:3 53:20 70:17	257:23
242:3	201:6	91:2 92:23,25	amendment 94:24
agenda 16:22	<b>ahc</b> 31:19 41:18	95:7,21 97:21	amendments
19:14 28:1 79:21	49:16 50:9 74:20	103:19,20 110:23	258:15
79:25 80:6	77:24 93:7 163:8	111:8 114:23,24	america 37:4
<b>agents</b> 232:23	166:25 227:9	127:20,24 128:21	109:24 220:19
aggravates	228:12	129:15 132:24	221:17
152:25	<b>ahead</b> 52:1 120:10	138:14 142:8	american 125:21
aggregate 40:11	120:20 162:11	262:2 264:6	130:6,12 138:1
61:12 62:13	170:2 179:22	allocations 33:7	151:24
106:13,21 182:25	201:1 205:8 211:5	83:17 142:20	americans 37:4
191:2 192:14	232:20		

[americas - areas] Page 6

americas 4:17	199:18 200:6,14	apologize 16:8	130:21 131:5
7:11	200:21 201:6,9	25:20 43:2 141:17	140:13 144:10
<b>amount</b> 49:12	202:8 203:23,23	146:6 175:4	156:19 207:22
53:15 62:13 75:3	204:8,17 274:18	182:22 192:22	218:9,11 256:15
93:24 94:10 99:18	anker's 200:25	193:12	appreciative
106:25 107:1	201:2,16	apology 37:19	104:25 140:1
112:4 115:6 127:3	<b>ann</b> 12:9	apparently 78:6	approach 92:4
160:15 206:8	announce 19:11	140:24 208:4	approached
218:5 250:17	announcement	<b>appeal</b> 147:19,22	246:19
274:6,21	145:17	253:24 262:23,23	appropriate
amounts 92:5	anoints 208:1	<b>appear</b> 104:15	24:17 70:1 93:24
94:21 153:16	anomalous 113:24	151:10	156:22 159:12
<b>ample</b> 36:13	<b>answer</b> 18:6,7	appeared 166:15	162:10 163:6
amplify 111:1	26:25 28:21 77:2	174:15	166:22 169:14
analogous 42:8	92:23 95:21	appears 120:14	171:4 178:10
74:6	102:20 129:10,11	272:5	271:12 272:20,21
analysis 30:9	129:12 207:4	appendix 33:24	appropriately
31:17 36:7,17,19	227:4 231:3,23	appliable 163:7	87:22
47:12 50:20 51:20	233:13	195:2	appropriates
53:13 55:4 57:5,8	answers 92:24	applicability	106:14
57:12 61:21 63:7	<b>ant</b> 55:6	194:19 228:7	approval 267:18
63:12 65:11,22	antagonists	applicable 130:18	<b>approve</b> 198:19
71:22 89:21 93:25	206:20	164:5 262:7	211:10
94:8 135:18 137:5	<b>anti</b> 190:15,16	269:20	approved 35:22
241:23 242:1	antipathy 44:25	applied 238:10	100:8 122:14
analytic 28:14	antitrust 101:22	255:13	148:15,22 211:8
analyzing 77:6	108:17	<b>applies</b> 26:9 51:21	211:10 227:21
anatomy 214:13	anybody 17:1	94:9 113:3 154:24	250:22
<b>andrew</b> 6:19 8:23	35:18 78:9 93:4	188:17 198:17	approving 156:4
9:6 13:8 272:9	129:2 156:5	264:7 269:2	166:20 258:18
angela 11:17	157:24 162:1	<b>apply</b> 24:21 30:13	approximately
angers 69:10	232:12	36:15 68:16 100:5	83:8,18
<b>anker</b> 8:6 9:7	anymore 24:21	119:1 128:24	<b>aptly</b> 86:23
162:22 174:21,25	264:25	136:7 138:8	arbitration
174:25 175:4	<b>anyway</b> 120:11	183:21 239:6	169:11 174:14
178:22 179:8,23	211:7 216:2 219:3	262:25 263:20	179:3,13,16,21
180:3 187:14,21	219:19,20 265:5,9	264:9 269:15	181:10,13 186:19
188:2,6,22 191:17	anyways 201:19	applying 30:12	archetype 43:25
192:3,8,21 193:5	apart 35:14	106:12	43:25
193:17,19 194:9	106:18 259:13	appointed 74:18	ardavan 10:13
195:11,13 196:2	apologies 16:6	251:3	area 104:18
196:20 197:16	72:6 188:24	appreciate 27:3,4	areas 88:25
198:3,11,23 199:5		50:2 69:13 112:5	107:24 213:9,12

[arenas - attached] Page 7

	I		
arenas 221:10	149:19 150:17	<b>asked</b> 25:19 28:2	assertions 160:6
arguably 49:15	155:19 170:18,19	60:13 63:3 68:18	160:11 164:14
73:7 235:18	171:16 193:6	111:20 116:15	assessing 45:3
241:18	198:1 204:19	129:19 138:4	<b>asset</b> 45:25 169:23
<b>argue</b> 38:8 44:21	226:23,25 229:5	141:2,25 176:13	assets 40:9,21
50:19 60:15 70:3	235:23 256:16	176:16 178:25	42:2 64:5,22
73:17 87:13 95:10	261:8,15 263:22	179:11 204:20	65:21 77:1 90:16
99:21 107:8	274:22 275:9	221:18	90:20 121:14
114:22 121:21	arguments 95:3	asking 58:23	122:17 123:3,6,21
146:18 153:1	106:17 107:9	105:7 109:8 110:9	136:11 139:8
164:9 168:11,17	115:22 121:4	114:19 160:23	140:5,5 142:12
168:20 169:5	139:4 164:13	161:8 162:5 182:4	168:7 169:7 171:8
178:12 179:11	202:18 228:10	182:6 184:2	173:16 182:25
184:21 191:1	229:14 240:3	189:13 190:2	226:16 259:1
192:13 268:10	257:7	195:17 198:16	assign 32:4
<b>argued</b> 18:2 19:7	arik 8:25 220:21	225:19 230:14	180:16
31:19 50:8 89:13	224:23	254:13 256:9	assignment
89:13 115:9 119:6	<b>arises</b> 190:23	aspect 65:11	163:20 173:13
137:11 168:8	arising 82:5	90:21 128:21	179:9 184:12
186:10	194:24 230:15	135:11 143:8	190:15,16
<b>argues</b> 114:12	231:15	199:25 201:7	assisting 17:21
arguing 73:8	<b>arm's</b> 181:22	267:12	associated 77:18
80:17 88:18,19,22	arose 82:4	aspects 27:9 93:20	105:7
180:22 186:5,6,8	arranged 89:22	133:23 138:19	association
190:6,24 236:19	arrangement	162:17,18 164:12	220:14
<b>argument</b> 16:4,13	163:19	201:13 203:2	associations
19:13 27:7,15	arranging 92:10	assert 35:14 38:22	217:23
29:10,21 38:5,20	arrived 68:23	56:20 61:17 81:18	assume 40:10
41:9 43:4,14	arrives 160:24	81:22,24 91:11	47:13 63:3 203:24
46:19 49:1,24	<b>artem</b> 14:20	125:6 135:1	204:2 272:4
50:5 52:6,17 54:7	<b>article</b> 135:10	143:14 147:8,23	assuming 61:17
55:19,21 61:8	150:2,7 223:3	148:3,13 164:11	90:11 229:6
67:18 69:25 76:12	articulated 50:20	232:12	257:25
79:6,22 84:11	asbestos 32:12	asserted 26:17	assumption 31:21
87:5,20 88:7,15	147:18,20 172:14	32:16 55:16 61:24	61:20 62:19 66:5
90:12,21 91:11,13	254:4	63:22 74:24 77:14	74:2
91:17,19,23 99:24	ascertain 55:9	89:7 136:1 173:19	assure 205:8
104:12 105:9	61:15	232:12 252:9	astray 161:7
106:20 113:9	ascertainable	asserting 55:10	atinson 9:8
120:15 124:3	150:25	61:16,22 62:20	atkinson 47:2
130:10,14,14,16	<b>aside</b> 96:11	147:13 244:1	77:8
132:2 140:20,23	129:25 133:16	assertion 143:5	attached 127:13
145:15 146:2,2	187:23		135:1 257:25

attaches 77:9	authorities 87:11	babcock 172:4	<b>bank</b> 220:19
attack 64:12	218:1	back 17:8 25:21	bankruptcies
attempt 55:1,8,18	authority 23:1	26:19 34:20 47:7	189:18
61:15 91:8 94:1	66:19 86:1,3	47:10 50:8 78:23	bankruptcy 1:1
95:4 109:2 142:18	135:10 157:19	89:14 97:18	1:11,23 28:10
147:9 148:4	authorization	106:16 109:8	45:9 59:25 63:9
175:25 178:3	173:23	110:10,13 112:3	63:12 64:5,18,20
232:13	authorized 180:6	127:10 131:15	64:21 65:11,12,16
attempted 55:14	180:7,21 232:22	135:11 144:24	65:20 66:3,10
147:19	authorizes 173:15	145:9,21,24 167:7	76:22 78:2 90:14
attempting 17:3	180:17	178:7,8 193:21	98:7,21 99:4
23:4 233:17	automatic 261:22	196:7,14 197:1	100:2 107:2
attend 271:21	262:19 265:19,21	198:21 201:21	111:17 113:16
attention 220:21	265:22	202:22 203:14	123:13 130:3,18
257:8	available 33:23	208:11 210:13	133:17 135:7
attenuated 56:22	56:20 60:9 160:7	217:3 226:3	142:15 143:3,15
57:13	212:11 227:4	232:15 237:17	143:19 147:19
<b>attorney</b> 3:4 5:1,2	<b>ave</b> 7:19	238:8,18 251:14	148:2 150:7
6:1,2 7:1 96:23	avenue 3:5 4:17	251:15 255:4	164:20,23 165:1,2
97:1 101:18 102:3	7:11 8:11	264:23 265:9,18	166:18 168:1
104:13 215:15	average 32:16	267:18 268:18,22	169:4,9 170:12
220:21,21 221:1,2	avoid 93:2 153:3	backdoor 26:19	171:5,10,20
221:9,11,11,21,25	avoidance 123:17	270:9	173:15,18 175:20
222:1,3 225:8,16	135:21	backdrop 23:14	177:9,23 178:1
225:16	avoiding 46:6	backing 259:15	182:2 183:5 186:6
attorney's 6:8	<b>award</b> 172:19	backs 157:13	186:23 188:14,20
<b>attorneys</b> 3:16 4:2	aware 61:23 90:4	198:8 225:14	188:22,24,25
4:9,16 5:2,10,17	92:14 98:7 147:5	<b>bad</b> 97:23 99:11	189:3,12,17
6:15 7:2,9,17 8:2	147:7 201:22,25	110:8 156:24	190:25 191:1
8:9 41:17 88:8	227:22 270:23	175:6 210:13	195:1,6 196:8,15
92:8 97:22 220:10	271:17	241:13 249:16,20	198:5 211:25
221:22 224:21	awoken 220:4	249:23	224:13,17 225:17
attribute 126:19	b	<b>bag</b> 110:16	237:17 255:12
attributed 245:1	<b>b</b> 1:21 33:25 34:2	<b>bailiwick</b> 64:25	260:16 262:13
audio 16:7	39:6 82:24 109:10	balance 98:2	<b>banks</b> 151:17
<b>audit</b> 224:17	130:15 137:7	100:22 103:17	<b>bar</b> 146:23 148:17
august 1:16 2:1	184:17 223:7	207:13 256:8,11	153:23 157:15
35:7 44:10 71:4	234:19 261:19	balancing 157:5	161:14
160:2 203:15	262:15 264:12,21	<b>ball</b> 9:10	baranpuria 9:11
276:25	<b>b.r.</b> 32:17 33:3	<b>ballot</b> 206:7,14	bargain 253:7
augustus 161:10	66:11 97:11 98:22	ballots 124:10	bargained 252:17
auslander 9:9	102:11 143:11	<b>baltimore</b> 6:4	253:2
		1014	

h	h 104 16	100.10 202 2	h-44 20 12 16
bargaining 22:4	bear 124:16	199:18 202:2	<b>better</b> 29:13,16
<b>barker</b> 9:12	261:11 hazara 52:22 221:8	203:14 217:12	31:24 38:23 40:23
barred 147:12	bears 52:22 231:8	232:5 247:13,13	41:4 44:7 45:8,12
barrel 214:20	beat 131:22 203:7	247:14,19 250:10	48:1 61:10 70:10
<b>barrier</b> 155:3	beaucoups 211:2	259:2,2 260:24	70:11,12 76:10,23
bars 169:21	becoming 63:11	273:11 274:24	78:7,11 89:19
base 66:13	began 47:25	believed 94:25	102:8 103:2
based 21:3 29:25	219:23	198:7	142:25 174:20
32:14 42:7 53:20	begged 221:1	believes 78:7	246:9
56:21 57:5 58:23	beginning 71:5	belong 87:7	bevy 72:23
60:3 71:13 88:7	222:13 229:5	bench 273:11,15	beyond 20:23
89:8 90:17,18	241:10	beneficiaries	32:3 38:25 51:20
96:22 100:11	<b>begins</b> 20:14	123:25 223:17,25	64:18 65:14 74:1
103:21 105:9,11	behalf 16:21	<b>benefit</b> 47:6 56:8	121:8 229:17
105:11 108:6,23	21:20 42:17 43:3	56:13 75:10	<b>bfp</b> 79:14
109:9 110:5	43:5 48:7 74:17	103:22 220:16	<b>big</b> 18:4 39:13
116:17 132:22	77:12,15 80:3	223:6,7,16,21	113:7 114:5
168:18 169:3	95:15 120:22,23	benefiting 211:21	213:12 215:13
172:13 180:8	147:4 153:8	benjamin 3:9	224:6
181:22 201:5	155:15 162:23	264:16	<b>bigger</b> 46:14
203:2 212:25	163:1,8 166:25	bereaved 221:7	213:15
237:24 240:12,15	179:11 224:7,11	beretta 85:21	<b>biggest</b> 215:12
241:23 249:15	234:5 240:1 246:5	<b>bermuda</b> 169:11	216:23
262:2 264:5 268:5	249:13 261:14	174:14	<b>bill</b> 222:11
268:20 275:7	behavior 254:6	bernard 10:13	billion 30:25
<b>basic</b> 80:15	beiderman 11:16	bernstein 30:9	32:15 34:14,14
176:10 178:11	belabor 134:7	32:12 50:3	35:12,21 36:1
188:9	271:11	bernstein's 50:3	40:13,14,16 45:16
basically 18:20	<b>belatedly</b> 149:2	<b>best</b> 18:11 19:1	45:21 46:8,15,20
29:11 65:21 72:11	<b>believe</b> 17:4 21:11	28:2,6,24 29:9,13	46:21 61:13 72:12
83:2 93:2 152:13	23:16 24:11,20	29:22 30:3,12	72:21 76:9 79:1
173:24 198:13	27:25 37:11 40:1	31:16 38:19,22	116:2 117:5
200:17 264:24	43:24 46:4 47:1	39:16 42:16 43:13	billions 31:2
<b>basis</b> 27:8 57:11	47:19 54:2,2 64:7	43:24 45:6 46:11	33:25 35:13 38:5
67:14 87:13 95:7	64:9 69:10,12	47:3,9,14,22 48:5	38:6,10 40:15
107:5,15 127:25	78:8 80:10 83:24	48:24 52:8,11	41:14 45:25 46:5
128:6,9,16,17	88:16 93:9 107:6	53:2,7 62:1 66:7	47:22 86:21
132:21 143:6,8	112:2 119:3,4,7	66:14,21 68:9,14	<b>binding</b> 164:6,15
156:18 164:19	133:22 140:8	69:23 73:24 74:19	165:7 173:5
182:25 192:14	146:2 149:11	77:5 103:6 110:19	birmingham 7:4
244:8 270:4,4,5	163:6 165:12	175:7 212:17	161:15
<b>beacon</b> 223:4,9,12	166:21 181:4	217:19 226:18	<b>birth</b> 214:1
223:13,15,17,18	192:3 195:21	256:5 273:14	

[birthday - called] Page 10

<b>birthday</b> 220:2,3	<b>brave</b> 225:6	<b>briefs</b> 228:10	66:24 70:7,16
<b>bit</b> 28:3 100:20	breach 90:17	<b>bring</b> 48:3,3 70:8	73:10 89:12
122:20 123:7	<b>breadth</b> 27:8,9,18	86:10 87:9 97:7	266:20
144:21 145:2	229:9,12 258:24	107:9,12 110:9	<b>burdens</b> 262:14
188:7 203:5	260:9	118:22 122:19	bureaucracies
230:18	<b>break</b> 27:22	133:11 188:11	213:2
blabey 9:13	144:14 145:1,17	226:3 251:14	buried 158:4
blackline 26:15	breakthrough	257:8 267:20	business 69:8
180:4 197:6	209:12,16	bringing 85:24	142:5
blankie 223:8	<b>brian</b> 6:6 12:22	150:4 242:15	businesses 259:1
<b>bldg</b> 5:4	233:8	<b>brings</b> 20:1 28:1	butcher 182:22
<b>blight</b> 116:16	bridge 38:4	44:3 183:2 272:7	<b>buyer</b> 55:17 56:20
<b>blites</b> 108:1	bridgeport 4:4	<b>broad</b> 5:19 27:12	56:20
<b>block</b> 148:4	bridges 7:2	165:4 206:17	c
blocking 74:13	144:17 146:4,15	232:8 234:9	<b>c</b> 3:1 10:1,9 12:7
bloomberg 224:4	149:12,25 150:10	235:12,13 249:25	12:23 16:1 39:7
<b>bloyd</b> 7:2 146:3,4	153:7 155:4	259:2,5	52:15 70:24 276:1
146:14,23 149:12	<b>bridges'</b> 146:21	broader 25:23	276:1
149:13,14,25	<b>brief</b> 31:19 42:5	244:6 246:14	cabin 259:9
153:7 155:4	42:20 50:8 54:6	249:14	<b>cabined</b> 249:10
<b>bloyd's</b> 152:10	54:19 61:9 64:13	broadest 118:22	cahn 9:18
154:14	66:23 68:5,15	broadly 256:11	calculate 152:15
<b>blue</b> 220:13,13	70:9 84:11 85:8	broadway 5:11	calendar 273:14
<b>board</b> 248:17	85:20 87:8 88:13	brooks 9:12	california 53:4
250:23 251:2,20	91:6,24 93:12,14	brother 73:22	80:10 81:21,23
255:2 269:16,17	93:21 94:15 120:4	brothers 225:22	86:18 102:2,8
269:23 270:1,2,6	120:13,16 189:24	brought 20:3	106:24 107:13,25
<b>board's</b> 41:21	196:24 227:3,16	76:24 85:4 88:20	109:8,22 111:25
<b>boat</b> 274:19	227:17,18 233:23	88:23,25 89:4	112:2,19,21 113:8
<b>boca</b> 220:17	261:15	123:13 125:11	113:25 114:5,21
bograd 9:14	<b>brief's</b> 91:11	246:17 255:8	113.23 114.3,21
<b>border</b> 129:3	briefed 188:20	268:14	116:12,23 118:6
132:10 137:23	189:14	<b>brown</b> 9:16	118:16 183:22
141:25	briefing 182:9	brunswick 9:17	220:12
<b>bore</b> 220:2	183:23,25 184:6	<b>bryant</b> 220:19	california's 113:7
<b>born</b> 221:17	184:18 185:22	<b>bryce</b> 10:22	114:6 118:17
<b>bottle</b> 214:20	186:20 190:2,10	building 209:18	call 23:22 24:23
<b>bottom</b> 127:12	briefly 48:25	209:18	26:18 27:13 84:24
242:2	66:16 79:25 84:7	<b>builds</b> 160:4	106:24 166:1
<b>bowing</b> 121:15	140:18 148:14	<b>built</b> 158:9	173:22 234:3
<b>box</b> 7:3	159:3,7 171:22	<b>bunch</b> 92:24	called 84:1 141:23
brauner 9:15	261:4,8 264:15	<b>burden</b> 52:23,24	153:24 221:25
		53:2 66:7,20,21	
		35:2 00:7,20,21	224:24

[calls - center] Page 11

<b>calls</b> 219:1	<b>capable</b> 32:10,19	46:11 51:4 52:4	caselaw 90:13
<b>camera</b> 219:13	37:1 44:2 55:20	55:13,16 57:8	170:19 197:9,15
<b>canada</b> 122:17,18	66:6 69:23 150:13	58:17,20 61:17,24	cases 32:4,7,11
123:18,21 127:1	capacities 230:23	64:1,13 70:13	47:25 50:1,15,21
127:14,17 129:4	capacity 110:1	73:20 78:15,19	51:5 58:1 64:12
136:18 138:15,25	230:20 231:5,14	82:8,11 83:4 85:6	65:15 69:15 77:11
139:4 140:10	247:21,22 248:1	85:12,23 92:5,16	82:5,12 85:7,12
141:19,23,23,24	capital 223:20	93:5,23 96:24	86:9,12 89:23
142:4,6,11 267:6	268:12	97:11 98:22 99:17	92:4 93:22 94:14
268:10 269:17,18	capitol 5:4	104:2 105:8 122:5	100:12 105:2
269:19,20,21	caplin 3:15	122:8 123:9,16	143:18 163:20
270:1	capture 245:5	124:14 128:10,12	166:2,5 171:23
<b>canada's</b> 123:18	car 247:9,15,18	131:15 132:19	172:8,11 176:2
canadian 5:17	247:24,24	134:12,21 135:14	178:6 185:11
119:23 120:12,24	<b>card</b> 213:22,24	135:16,17 136:9	188:14,23 190:12
120:24 121:5	care 85:10 220:18	140:2,3,12,14	191:6 197:8
122:18 123:7,20	carefully 105:15	143:9,10,11 144:5	201:18 240:13
123:23 124:4,12	117:2 238:7	144:8 148:7 150:2	273:12
124:23,23 125:3,4	caremark 220:14	150:3,4,5 151:14	<b>cash</b> 31:1 46:8,21
126:3,13,20 127:1	caroline 10:24	151:16,20,20	106:24 109:23
127:7 129:5 133:6	carrie 8:18 205:18	152:9 154:9	128:23 133:21
133:8,13,18,25	carrier 185:19	155:15 163:22	138:7
134:10 136:10	190:22	166:6,13 172:4,9	cast 89:18 122:11
137:19 139:1,6,11	carriers 179:11	175:19 180:12,13	categorically
139:15,16,18	179:12 183:16,16	180:14,19 184:25	239:6
140:5,8,10 141:3	183:17 185:10	186:17,21 189:6	category 24:13
142:7,11,12 267:5	carriers' 183:17	195:21 196:11,15	245:11,13
267:6,21,25 268:2	carter 256:19,22	196:17 198:15	catherine 8:22
268:9,11,21 269:5	carve 23:23 24:4	206:25 215:20	11:16
269:10	27:6 107:13 109:8	217:17 219:21	<b>caught</b> 32:21
canadians 124:9	109:23 110:11	225:10 226:17	<b>cause</b> 101:14
124:18 125:10	145:7 238:13	231:11 238:9,17	251:10 252:1
139:12	240:14 250:4	239:14 244:8,19	caused 215:6
<b>canard</b> 74:13	<b>carved</b> 22:24 24:5	245:20 248:12	226:14
candidate 175:11	24:6,18 25:6	249:4,6,8,9,9	causes 71:8,15,18
<b>can't</b> 146:20	112:19 251:10	251:23 252:9	71:19 74:6 237:12
158:23 165:10	carveout 106:24	253:20 256:9,10	240:11 260:16,19
168:10 172:10	165:25 255:24	256:19 258:14	causing 260:12
184:20 188:11	carving 26:17	260:14,17,21,22	cavil 38:25
196:14 197:2	case 1:3 7:8 19:21	262:11 264:24	<b>cede</b> 228:19
200:12,13,18,20	20:3,21 29:2,11	266:10,21 271:2	<b>center</b> 8:3 220:17
208:15	30:5,6 32:12 36:9	272:14 273:6	224:10
	38:2 40:25 42:14		

[central - claim] Page 12

central 46:11	119:14 156:17	charleston 5:5	249:8 256:11
150:19 156:17	171:2 177:6,7,7,9	<b>chart</b> 53:21,25	circuit's 249:24
157:11	194:12 197:4,5	70:17 216:11	circuit's 147:10
centre 8:10	222:10 273:16	<b>chase</b> 90:12	147:17
cercla 253:2	<b>changed</b> 19:3 26:4	<b>chases</b> 73:14	circulate 273:24
255:18	106:8,9,10 108:2	chasing 40:8	circulated 16:17
<b>certain</b> 25:3 74:25	117:23 149:5	<b>chasm</b> 38:4	circumstance
81:16 83:25 88:20	240:11	chassix 97:11	136:15
91:12 120:23	<b>changes</b> 19:16,17	98:21	circumstances
136:18 162:17,20	21:22,23 22:9	<b>check</b> 21:9 197:14	44:1 82:18 87:8
164:8 168:8	26:22 27:4 102:13	checked 145:9	102:24 151:1
174:12 202:1,4	229:3,7,21 240:3	chemistry 275:6	156:1 199:10
227:12 237:12	257:5 274:17	<b>cheryl</b> 220:15	246:17,18 250:1
certainly 17:15	changing 153:17	<b>child</b> 153:18	263:19
19:16 20:1,5 41:8	178:16	children 215:6	<b>cite</b> 26:14 41:7
44:5 46:12 50:3,4	channeled 172:15	219:1 221:4	50:2 89:23 107:18
78:9 89:23,25	255:9	<b>chip</b> 22:4	123:9 135:17
94:12 104:1	channeling	<b>choice</b> 45:13 70:4	170:23
117:21 128:24	261:24	122:25 134:1,5	<b>cited</b> 28:15,19
137:1 150:11	chaotic 43:15	choose 45:13	47:1 64:12 85:8
152:5 156:11	chapman 17:5,7	chosen 45:8	87:11 94:14
175:24 250:17	17:21 18:5 19:20	<b>chris</b> 155:14	101:19 150:4
271:7,9	21:1 273:22	christina 13:23	172:4,8 189:6
certified 276:3	<b>chapter</b> 16:5,14	151:7	cites 72:7 108:7
<b>cet</b> 35:16	30:23 49:4,14,18	christine 82:23	143:17 170:5
cetera 85:3 191:6	50:15,21,23 51:16	christopher 7:14	<b>cities</b> 80:13 85:8
207:21 250:7	52:5 54:22 55:16	8:21 14:1	86:15,25 127:8
chadbourne	56:20 62:24 65:15	<b>chronic</b> 209:2,23	140:24
24:14	74:8 76:24 77:11	210:4	<b>citing</b> 100:12
<b>chain</b> 238:15	81:17 82:5,12	chronology 183:8	citizens 44:15
challenge 64:17	171:18 185:11	<b>chubb</b> 174:3,4	45:17 46:6 73:24
84:18	203:3 224:19	181:3	city 85:12,20,24
challenged 173:25	225:9 240:13	<b>chuck</b> 108:11	86:19 124:25
chalos 9:19	251:1 271:1	cicero 9:20	213:12
chambers 6:9	characterize	<b>cir</b> 128:11	<b>civil</b> 81:23 89:3
270:21	23:11	circle 3:17	241:1 246:23
<b>chance</b> 27:2,10,21	characterized	circling 217:2	252:18
110:21 121:21	100:6	<b>circuit</b> 28:17,25	<b>claim</b> 24:20 26:5
131:4,10 229:3	charged 105:17	29:1,15 31:15	26:12 30:5,6
258:1	charitable 223:17	68:13 94:1 128:9	35:12 37:8 39:2
<b>change</b> 20:8 24:2	223:22	137:4 143:18	39:25 40:3,6
26:21 50:14	charles 146:4	147:21 163:22	42:11 49:8,11,17
103:14 109:9,22	150:1	166:6 180:18	50:17 51:11,12

[claim - classified] Page 13

57 67 61 00 00	147 20 155 12	01 10 12 00 1 5 6	1- '6'-1 02 6
57:6,7 61:20,23	147:20 155:13	91:12,13 92:1,5,6	<b>clarified</b> 23:6
67:5 69:17 76:3	159:16,19 167:13	92:15 94:11,21,23	26:20 195:25
79:1 83:14 91:7,9	172:16 181:20	99:19 122:5,19	clarify 23:7
92:3 93:20 94:2	191:8,11 192:20	123:13 124:21,23	162:12 202:10
106:13 112:11,12	207:3 228:4 254:4	124:24,24,25	230:11 233:11
113:13 122:25	<b>claiming</b> 191:14	125:2 126:20,22	235:15 236:1
123:1,14,17,18	claims 20:11	126:25 127:14	clarifying 230:3
124:14,19,19,24	25:14 26:16 29:14	128:10,25 131:10	clarity 22:10 45:8
126:14,24 127:13	31:1,3,7,10,16	134:23,25,25	class 20:21 36:2,8
131:14 136:8	32:6,8,9,13,16,18	135:25 138:3,15	36:11 49:2,2,7,8
137:6 143:5 145:8	32:23 33:2,10,17	139:15,18,21	53:11 69:16,18
146:22,24 147:1	34:6,8,21,23	145:13 150:21	72:16 82:1,21,22
153:8,11,20,22	35:11,13,15,15,15	152:8 153:10	83:24 84:20 87:22
155:20 156:6,10	35:17 36:24 37:1	154:12 155:22,23	89:16 90:18 91:9
156:12 157:13,20	38:9,21 39:9,17	156:20 157:17,19	92:11 93:1 94:17
157:24,25 158:21	39:18,20,21 40:1	157:25 158:6,7	94:18,25 95:1
158:22 161:16,24	40:4,6 41:7 42:1,6	160:15,21 161:22	100:8 112:11,22
162:3 185:11	42:7,8,9,21 43:23	162:10 163:14,25	112:23 113:3
192:5,6,15 206:8	44:1,8 45:15 49:7	164:22 165:20	124:11 125:19,20
206:16 215:8,14	49:18 51:22 53:1	169:21 172:15,18	126:4,5,7,11,21
220:7,24 222:6	55:3,5,10,15,19	172:23,25 187:9	128:10 130:8,12
231:11 232:11,11	56:5,14,17,17,22	187:24 188:5	130:13 131:17,20
232:12 238:20	56:23,24 57:1,3	191:15 192:2	131:21 132:1
242:10 243:23	57:11 58:12,13,21	197:21 198:17	133:13 137:14,18
244:1,6,16,20	58:25 59:2,9,13	225:20 230:14,17	138:18 148:9
249:12,25 250:11	59:16,22 60:15,24	230:17,17,22	155:20,22 156:8
250:12 254:23	61:1,4,10,11,12	231:3,4,4,9,13,15	156:12,13,20
255:3,18 263:19	61:16,18,18,22	232:1 235:8,22	classes 47:19
263:21,21 267:17	62:3,4,7,8,11,15	236:23 237:24	80:23 90:1 124:5
267:17 268:2,5,8	62:20,21,24 63:4	238:3 240:23	124:10 125:9
268:13,13 270:6	63:6,14,21,23	241:1 242:17,17	126:2 130:7
claimant 38:25	66:5,19 67:15	243:6,7,9,10	classification
90:16 147:18	69:20,22 70:9	244:12,13 245:15	79:22 80:8,16,19
205:11	71:10,12,24 73:1	248:23 249:19	83:21 84:3 89:5
claimant's 76:3	73:2 74:23 75:2,3	250:11 254:7,25	89:14,19,20,22,24
claimants 7:18	77:13,17,18,20	255:2 259:12	91:12 128:7 130:3
34:19 39:23 40:8	80:20,23 81:2,4,8	260:4,15,18,18	132:21
40:10,13 41:4,5	81:12,16,18,22,24	261:17,25 262:18	classifications
43:13 45:14 67:10	82:1,5,6,12 83:24	263:2,13 264:4	84:19 89:12
94:5,11 95:16	84:13,20 85:5,9	267:4,6,6,8,24	132:12
99:17 122:18	86:10 88:19,19,20	269:3,4,4,6,7,16	classified 69:18
128:8,8 131:17	88:23 90:1,15,17	270:7	80:21 81:3 82:6
132:19 146:16	90:18,20,24,25		82:10,16,21 87:13

-	-		
87:22 89:1 130:9	133:5 184:19	133:17 135:7	88:3
133:14 134:2	217:5 226:12	136:3 143:3,4,15	combinations
classifies 80:13	240:18 245:13	157:6,12 158:1,19	233:24
classify 81:7	250:7,16 269:15	158:20 164:20	<b>combine</b> 214:18
82:14 90:17	clerk 82:23	165:1,2 166:19	combustion 166:2
140:21,24	clerk's 271:8	170:12 171:5,6,19	190:12
claudia 14:23	clerks 204:23	173:15 186:6	come 23:17 40:13
clause 187:16,17	<b>client</b> 138:12	189:12 190:25	47:10 65:20
192:23 241:9,10	178:2,3 182:13,13	191:1 195:1,6	106:23 107:17
<b>clean</b> 173:11	client's 138:2	260:16 262:14	110:25 127:6
246:22	clients 44:22 69:7	<b>code's</b> 173:23	136:19 138:6
<b>clear</b> 17:16 26:3	69:24 78:10 91:8	cogently 85:19	143:22 144:24
29:22 32:3,8	122:3,4 124:6	cognizant 84:10	145:21 157:17
72:12 73:8 78:20	126:1 129:22	232:24	158:23 167:7
79:7 85:7 86:2,14	130:9 136:8	cohen 88:2	189:19 191:16
96:12 108:10	137:15 139:14	colander 206:6	200:16,18 217:16
110:5 111:9	140:12 147:7,15	209:25	218:5 238:8
116:11 118:23,25	148:7,7,12,23	coleman 9:21	243:25 244:16
119:1 125:24	179:7 180:13	collaboratively	255:12 266:13
127:20 128:18	195:23 251:20	109:18	267:18,20 268:18
131:10 133:8,25	253:1 266:16	collateral 196:16	268:22 269:12,23
152:6 156:23	clients' 160:6	colleagues 26:7	270:3,16 272:3
163:23 165:21	<b>clint</b> 10:8	95:19 109:5	comes 67:12 85:1
174:6 176:17,22	<b>clock</b> 17:20 18:24	111:18	105:17 106:8
180:20 190:3	<b>clone</b> 226:3	collect 140:9	137:4 183:11
193:5,7 198:25	<b>close</b> 32:11 36:3	collectability	226:12 255:4
200:9,19 201:4,5	45:15 95:23 138:7	77:21	comfort 18:8
202:5,23 204:1,12	239:3	collecting 65:9	246:6
206:14 207:5,7	<b>closed</b> 183:25	77:19	comfortable
217:20 231:24	closely 108:8	collection 41:10	30:18 31:23 59:1
233:18 236:2,10	234:11	43:19 56:25 57:3	78:16 181:7 187:2
237:1,1,9 238:17	<b>closing</b> 150:17	collective 198:5,7	204:13
239:13 242:11	270:25	collectively 44:5	<b>coming</b> 26:19
243:15 245:14	clouding 22:17	181:17,20 182:12	128:23 150:8
246:3 251:4 253:7	<b>club</b> 7:3	183:1 192:23,25	198:20 267:23
258:15 260:23	clue 183:10,13	193:7 198:25	<b>comley</b> 4:1 261:6
262:17 263:17	coalition 35:25	colloquial 190:8	<b>comm</b> 7:17
268:15,24 271:20	125:7	colloquies 28:9	command 52:4
clearer 90:13	<b>coast</b> 175:5	colloquy 18:17	commenced 77:12
236:13	<b>code</b> 51:13 81:17	25:15 78:1 231:22	232:9 261:18
clearly 25:25	81:23 90:14 96:10	colorable 67:5	comment 144:4
45:14 80:4 94:9	96:12 98:21 99:14	columbia 48:20	145:1 229:10
99:22 124:22	123:13 130:3,19	53:5 80:9 83:3	266:24 267:1
		ral Calutions	

231:19       254:3 256:23       98:7,8 103:17       1         commenting 20:9       268:21 269:11       115:11       compromises         comments 22:6,7       company's 224:13       compromises       3	nclusion 58:23 84:15 nclusions 29:5
commenting         20:9         268:21 269:11         115:11         components           comments         22:6,7         company's         224:13         compromises         3	
comments 22:6,7   company's 224:13   compromises 3	nclusions 29:5
23:9 84:11 88:14   226:14   97:17   1	86:13 163:9
	67:15 173:8
204:6 233:4,6 <b>compare</b> 81:14,20 <b>computer</b> 218:20 1	76:7 178:19,24
250:10 257:5 <b>compared</b> 72:20 <b>concede</b> 83:16	79:6 195:19
260:25 272:12 110:8,20 104:24 <b>con</b>	ncrete 36:25
275:1   comparing 182:24   conceded 93:14   con	ndition 59:12
commercial comparison 53:8 concededly 91:13 1	38:25 174:10
175:20 54:7,20 140:5 <b>concedes</b> 83:8,9 <b>con</b>	nditions 35:20
commitment compensation concentrated 1	94:19
174:13 17:10 154:2 <b>con</b>	ndone 222:24
committed 65:25 competing 36:16 concentration com	nduct 23:5
<b>committee</b> 4:16   36:17 45:19 63:6   154:7   2	25:17,17 26:2
41:21 74:16 77:13 <b>competitors</b> 45:4 <b>concept</b> 244:23 6	58:23 142:22
	230:14,15 231:15
131:12 137:11 62:22 74:7 81:14 <b>conceptual</b> 21:25 2	231:16 234:13,13
162:20 167:12 81:20 98:4 127:13 <b>concern</b> 118:18 2	235:24 237:16,20
169:15 181:9 135:1 243:9 139:5 193:23 2	237:21 239:18
182:23 202:22 <b>complete</b> 67:2 194:2 200:1 2	242:12,19 243:18
220:18 225:4 177:1 246:22 216:23 237:5 2	248:8,25 249:1,1
259:25 252:18 240:8 248:6 2	249:2,17 250:4,5
<b>common</b> 104:19 <b>completely</b> 24:7 259:17 260:9	251:6 254:7,8,15
151:25 30:15 60:4 61:19 <b>concerned</b> 90:14 2	254:25 268:6,20
<b>commons</b> 78:23 208:17 127:21 155:2 <b>com</b>	<b>nfer</b> 37:7
<b>communities</b>   <b>complex</b> 5:4 44:1   195:17 196:4   <b>com</b>	nfers 98:24
100:16,17 108:21   69:6 94:10 232:25   204:10 257:24   1	03:22 203:13
109:15 142:17,19   273:6   274:3   2	224:1
community 84:23 complexity 40:24 concerning 77:16 com	nfess 177:23
110:3 153:18 <b>compliance</b> 96:10 101:7,12 208:20 2	241:7
217:23 <b>complicate</b> 233:12 240:5,19 <b>com</b>	nfidentiality
companies 142:22 complicated concerns 25:11 2	21:12
177:5 187:12 18:23 102:25 152:5 158:4 202:2 con	<b>nfine</b> 62:12
194:22 129:24 175:17 202:9 218:10 <b>con</b>	<b>nfining</b> 187:12
<b>company</b> 8:2 217:21 232:6 245:10 <b>com</b>	<b>nfirm</b> 74:3
73:20 76:18 <b>complicates</b> 244:3 260:7	42:10 181:5,7
	218:6
	nfirmation 2:1
207:13 214:11 <b>component</b> 174:9 <b>concluded</b> 44:16 1	6:5,13 21:6
	35:24 77:4 86:9
	87:2 93:21 134:11
239:3 240:22	45:25 147:9

	I	I	I
148:4,21 149:3	congress 106:14	considerably 27:6	59:16 81:18,19,24
154:10 162:18	110:20 150:6	consideration	108:17 221:8,11
164:9,12 165:1,10	152:22 171:20	107:7,16 116:18	240:23 261:22
165:18 166:4,7,9	263:17	137:18 156:1	consumers 56:13
166:12,20 167:5	conjunction	157:1	consuming 94:4
167:15,20 168:9	259:13	considerations	262:10
169:10,12,14	connected 234:12	100:11 103:21	consummated
170:7,24 171:23	connecticut 4:2	107:17 110:11	227:21 228:8
171:25 172:4,6,17	41:24 42:17,23,25	116:17 166:13	consumption
172:21,22 173:4	43:4 47:2 48:8	172:10	216:10
173:14 174:1,10	53:4 64:13 66:25	considered 31:16	contact 147:2
174:11,15 178:13	72:24 73:6 78:2	32:9 41:21 51:5	contacted 221:5
178:14 184:1	79:1 80:9 83:9,16	199:14	221:23
185:1 186:2,18	88:9 221:2,3,4,5,9	considering	contain 88:24
194:11 195:4	221:12,17 261:7	169:11 229:15	107:10 164:22
196:3 200:11	265:12	256:16	170:7,24
201:10,17 203:10	connecticut's	consistent 51:4	contained 92:10
203:14 204:4	72:17	90:21 98:11,21	166:19
227:19 258:1,16	connection	108:15 158:19	contains 227:20
258:17 263:1,12	117:17 148:21	163:7 164:5 171:5	228:16
264:4,8 266:7	165:9 175:6	consistently 33:9	contemplate
270:22 271:1,18	183:15 227:4,9	consisting 225:3,6	28:13
274:9,14,16	connolly 9:22	225:13	contemplated
confirmed 30:11	conroy 35:4	conspiracy 97:24	23:5 228:4
38:12 61:14 65:24	246:25 253:7,9	constant 209:17	contemplates
66:12 123:22	conscious 134:1,4	210:3 211:13	21:10 30:2 171:19
139:5 143:8	consensus 118:5	constantly 209:17	<b>contend</b> 207:15
165:11 166:18	118:22	constitutional	262:5
confirming 51:17	consent 69:4	147:13	contended 80:12
confirms 155:22	168:17 172:6	construction	contention 54:23
164:5	182:1 183:17	256:22	91:15 242:7
conflating 191:18	187:22 189:11,21	constructive 27:5	contents 169:4
conformity	190:17 191:6,12	159:14,17 242:3	contested 196:23
166:18	197:15,20 223:19	266:19	contesting 265:6
confounding	consenting 6:15	consult 189:16	265:10,14 266:3
265:15	consequence 36:3	consultant 24:9	context 79:8
confused 192:21	64:2	consultants 24:4,5	95:23 104:2,2
193:13 206:1	consequences	consultation	113:13 114:7
confusing 26:8	176:20	190:18	142:1 197:22,23
208:2	conservative	consulted 183:16	198:6 246:16
confusion 26:9	45:22	consumer 55:15	contingent 31:1
214:18 232:6	consider 70:7	55:17 56:5,17,19	39:22 95:16
268:24	117:2	56:21 57:6 59:13	167:12

continuance 2:1	contribution 69:5	corporate 79:9	162:21 163:4,4
continuation	113:8 114:5,10	239:1	167:11 179:14
19:20	contributions	corporation 86:17	203:16 218:16
continue 19:9	262:1	220:16,16 225:25	228:24 229:20
206:19,23 213:20	control 98:10	256:19	267:14
266:20 273:4	171:9 214:1 252:5	correct 48:15	counsel's 55:21
274:2	253:10 274:7	59:18 69:15 75:17	105:9 106:16
continued 20:10	controlled 242:4,5	88:1 105:6 109:7	<b>count</b> 46:4 83:7
20:16,23	controls 51:19	119:5 122:7,9	83:17 89:15
continues 22:16	controversial	126:23 136:5	108:11 127:2
continuing 60:11	265:21,23	146:11 149:14,22	216:11
207:5	controversy	170:20 179:14	<b>counted</b> 90:7,8,9
continuously	107:11 150:3,5,5	187:21 195:13	90:11
18:10	controverted	199:5 201:9	<b>counter</b> 123:12
contract 90:18	53:23	202:20 203:16,17	143:5
189:1	convenience	239:15 260:1	counterclaim
contracting 241:2	262:17	correction 161:1	123:17
contracts 228:17	conversation 68:9	corrections	counterclaims
contradicted	225:2	153:18	123:15
146:20	conversations	correctly 198:24	counterparties
contradictions	21:11,13 202:21	239:11	246:19
97:4	230:1	correspondent	countervailing
contrary 32:7	conveyance	222:11	56:8
37:24 73:8 80:17	267:21	corroborated	counties 85:8
82:11 97:13 99:24	conveyed 139:11	113:19	86:15,25 140:22
105:9 159:19	convince 109:22	<b>cost</b> 43:15,18	countries 128:13
164:20 168:3	130:22 138:25	62:17 210:24	136:17
170:9 194:18	189:25	costs 37:8 85:10	<b>country</b> 7:3 44:22
203:4	cooperation 88:8	85:10,11 232:13	90:5 95:25 105:3
<b>contrast</b> 33:4 45:2	coordinating	<b>couched</b> 205:12	105:16 106:23
55:12	48:10	could've 210:8	140:25 141:1,20
contravention	coordination 88:8	couldn't 169:8	142:17,19 143:19
37:5 108:12	<b>copper</b> 181:4	195:23	185:14 207:9
contribute 102:4	<b>copy</b> 204:3	councilmen	212:18 214:15
107:4 108:3	core 24:23 47:12	217:25	215:13 221:17
contributed	168:18 169:9	counsel 24:15	255:9 266:2
236:23	186:18	86:23 95:8,11	276:21
contributing	<b>corning</b> 128:10,10	104:10,23 105:20	country's 97:22
111:25 113:25	132:19 166:2,6	106:19 107:17	142:4
115:5 121:14	<b>corona</b> 220:11	108:7,11,14	<b>county</b> 85:2 86:19
182:19 192:16	<b>corp</b> 85:21 128:11	118:15 119:21	<b>couple</b> 101:19,20
237:18	131:15	131:7 144:8 146:3	112:22 115:19
The state of the s	1	146.0 147.2	205.22 220.11 25
		146:8 147:3	205:23 230:11,25

[courage - cover] Page 18

00111000 226.0	02.16 17 04.16	160.0 22 24 160.1	252.12.14.10.21
courage 226:8	93:16,17 94:16	168:9,22,24 169:1	252:12,14,19,21
270:15	95:17 96:5 101:10	169:10,25 170:2	252:24 253:1,4,9
course 17:10,25	104:8,10 105:2,7	170:10,18,21	253:14,23,23
22:13 23:18 26:19	105:21,23,25	171:17 173:21	254:1,18,20 255:4
29:1 30:20 37:20	106:4,7,15 109:6	174:20,24 175:3	255:4,7,10,11,13
45:9 49:21 86:23	110:9,18 111:2,10	178:21,23 179:17	255:21 256:1,4,7
86:24 87:4 109:3	111:22 112:25	179:21 180:2,25	256:18 257:2,14
120:15 127:17	113:2,11 114:3,9	187:6,16,22 188:5	257:25 258:5,9,12
152:2 170:1,3	114:11,17 115:15	188:13 191:4,23	258:17,21 259:6,9
184:21,21 206:25	115:17 116:4,6,19	192:1,7,19 193:3	259:19,22,24
233:3 251:10	117:7,13,19,20	193:14,18,21	260:2 261:1,5
263:19 274:11	118:1,8,14,23,25	194:8 195:8,12,14	262:13,20,22
<b>court</b> 1:1,11 16:2	119:8,12,16,19,21	195:22 196:8,12	263:5,10,14,16
16:7,9 17:7,13	120:18,20 121:2,5	197:5,18 198:4,12	264:7,14,18 266:9
18:8 19:4,6,18	121:8,10,15,17,19	199:3,6,22 200:7	266:23 267:10,24
20:18,20 21:18	122:3,4,8,17	200:15,22 201:1	268:15,25 269:8
22:1 27:2,21,24	123:4,14 124:15	201:19 202:14,16	269:12,23,25
28:7,9 29:20 30:8	125:13,16,19	203:15,21 204:7,9	270:3,16,21,24
31:23 34:17 35:22	126:7,9,22 127:10	204:18 205:19,21	271:7 272:13
37:21 42:22,25	128:5 129:6,8,10	205:25 206:10,13	273:4,9 275:4
43:8,11 45:10	130:24 131:1,3,20	206:22 210:21,25	<b>court's</b> 19:15 22:6
48:6,13,18,22	131:24 132:13,15	211:4 213:17	117:17 121:24
49:5,17,23 50:9	132:18,20 133:6	216:24 217:1,5,8	127:5 134:11
50:11,25 51:2,7	133:18 134:8,16	218:10,12,21,23	137:4,5 257:8
52:1,2,16,18,20	135:5,8,23 136:11	219:4,10,12,17,19	258:18
53:3,19,21 54:2	136:23,25 137:3	224:17 226:6,22	courthouse 38:16
54:10,16 55:24	138:21,25 139:14	227:6 228:17,20	139:20
56:1,4,7,12 57:9	139:23 140:6,15	228:25 229:2	courthouses 39:4
58:1,4,6 59:5,6,10	140:17 141:5,9,12	230:7 232:20	courtroom 22:18
59:12,15,20,22,25	141:16,18 143:22	233:2,4,19 234:16	219:13
60:5,19,21 61:3,6	144:2,6,12,24	234:23,25 235:4,7	<b>courts</b> 29:24
62:6 63:17,19	145:10,18,21,23	235:10 236:9,20	31:17 49:21 51:14
64:19 65:3,7	146:22 147:7,12	237:4,7,9 239:9	86:18 100:7 128:5
66:10 67:8,18,22	149:8,13,16,18,20	239:16,21,24	132:4 135:19
68:2 70:7 71:7,23	149:23 150:19	240:4 241:4,6,13	143:19 151:2
71:25 72:2 74:21	152:21 153:21	241:17,22,25	161:5 171:20
75:7,11,14,18,21	154:17,22 155:10	242:24 243:2,13	222:15 261:18
78:16 79:17,18,20	155:21 156:4	243:15,20,25	<b>court's</b> 164:5
80:5,18 84:8	157:18 159:2,5,13	244:14,17 245:3,6	173:5 176:3
85:21,23 87:24	160:13 162:1,14	245:9,17 246:17	covenants 17:23
88:5,12 89:7,10	163:2 164:15	247:1,5,17 248:14	<b>cover</b> 22:12,16,20
90:8,10 91:1,4,21	165:15,22 166:18	249:6,8,10,22	30:17 119:25
91:25 92:18,20	166:19,24 167:1,9	251:3,3,18 252:9	163:25 178:6
	Veriteyt Leg		

[cover - dana] Page 19

193:15 198:13	creative 58:19	126:13,15 128:1	203:12 220:13
200:16 238:14	245:16,18 251:12	128:15,20 131:8	crosstalk 72:1
247:10 249:18	266:12	131:13,13 132:5	253:3
254:6,21,24 255:5	credentialed	132:25 133:9,9,14	crucial 174:9
coverage 163:14	214:12	133:25 134:2	crucified 175:13
164:7,9,10,16,19	credibility 102:15	137:19 138:5	crystal 32:8
165:11 168:2,11	<b>credible</b> 97:1,15	139:1,7 140:8	ct 4:4
168:18,23,25	credibly 39:1	148:9,10 151:17	culpability 41:10
169:1,3,12,18,20	credit 35:21 55:17	151:18 163:18	cumbersome
169:21 171:14,24	56:19,21 57:2	169:7,15 178:14	262:10
172:3,21 175:21	73:5	186:23 194:15	cunningham 9:23
176:1,20 177:17	creditor 33:25	197:3 220:18	curious 58:18
178:4 179:13,18	36:5 39:11 40:17	225:4 246:19	73:13
180:23 183:4,12	43:17 44:18 45:4	260:13,17,21,22	current 104:7
183:14 184:4,21	47:19 52:25 61:17	270:7	194:6 232:22
185:1,3,20,23	73:16 76:4 98:24	creditors' 172:23	currently 86:20
186:18,22 188:8	122:24 126:3,3	creditor's 150:21	110:4
191:18,21,23	134:5 150:21,25	credos 20:15	cushing 65:8
192:1,9,15 194:1	151:3,3,4,6 268:9	creighton 146:3,4	cushing's 41:25
194:1 197:11	creditor's 33:10	149:10,13,25	<b>custody</b> 160:16,18
198:17 201:5,13	creditors 5:18	154:14 155:4	<b>cut</b> 90:11 141:5
202:6 203:2	28:13,15 29:13	<b>crime</b> 85:11	141:10,12 248:14
covered 22:13	30:22 31:2,6,24	151:21 238:12	263:12
73:12 127:18	32:5 33:24 34:4,9	crimes 79:9	<b>cutler</b> 8:1 175:1
179:3 185:25	36:2,8,10,10	<b>criminal</b> 22:14,16	cvs 220:14
187:11 219:14	37:10,15,25 38:14	22:20 84:19,25	cyganowski 9:24
245:13 274:20	39:3,19 40:21,22	102:6 112:4	d
covering 242:18	40:23 42:15 43:13	230:17,17	
<b>covers</b> 111:15	43:20,23 44:6	crisis 48:4 84:23	<b>d</b> 1:22 8:6 9:7 11:24 14:21 16:1
240:9,13 242:12	45:19 46:2,2,13	216:3 221:4	
248:22	47:8,18 49:2	222:14 224:10	39:7 182:15
<b>cowan</b> 97:2 98:16	50:16 51:21 52:5	271:4	220:14 223:9,14
99:6 101:23 102:7	52:10,12 53:4,7,8	criteria 99:16	223:16,21 224:1
102:14 108:11	53:11,13,15 55:6	101:5,6	<b>d&amp;o</b> 187:10
111:20 113:10	55:9 61:15,22	critical 38:15	<b>d.c.</b> 47:16 48:8
114:23	62:2 64:15 66:8,9	84:16	damage 46:6
cowan's 97:13	66:14,21 70:12	critically 172:12	damaged 206:4
99:25 100:15	72:16 74:17,19	criticism 103:25	damages 38:19,21
102:10 113:19	76:5,6,7,10,16	critiquing 36:18	58:25 77:18 86:22
<b>cram</b> 130:14	77:4,10 79:3	cross 35:2 36:20	99:8 261:17,23
create 46:13	82:10,15,17 98:25	65:8 68:18 97:16	262:6,11,18
109:14 164:2	120:24,25 121:4	102:5,16 113:9	damian 13:12
182:7 245:11,13	123:8,20,24 124:5	151:8 182:24	dana 131:15
, , ,	, -,		
Veritext Legal Solutions			

[dancing - debtors] Page 20

dancing 71:3	204:1 209:7,8	49:13 50:8 51:12	58:19 59:4 60:10
dangerous 207:14	220:1,2 274:21,22	58:18 61:25 64:12	60:13,22 61:14,16
<b>daniel</b> 9:22 12:12	<b>dc</b> 3:18 7:20 42:17	72:13 80:22	62:4,9 69:18
14:10 15:20	43:1,3,4,9 220:12	122:17 123:6,17	70:20 73:20 77:15
danielle 12:15	<b>de</b> 98:7	124:2,3,7,22	80:3 81:6,8 82:14
daresay 79:17	<b>dead</b> 29:8 131:23	127:6 130:2	85:5,6 87:19
dark 122:11	203:7	134:24 135:22	89:12,13,18,22
darren 12:6	deadline 21:1,5	143:5 150:20	91:19,23 92:12,20
<b>darts</b> 101:6	205:13	151:4 152:13	93:14 94:2 117:16
dasaro 10:2	deadlines 21:2	176:14 180:16	120:4,12,12,16
data 47:8 60:3,9	158:8	182:15 186:7	123:9,9 126:23,25
60:16,18	<b>deaf</b> 220:3	189:4 190:14	127:14,15 131:8,9
date 49:11 71:19	<b>deal</b> 17:3 18:11	199:7 200:3	132:6 134:1
146:23 148:17	34:20 35:8,14,20	203:16 230:24	135:17 137:11
153:23,23 157:15	51:24 77:5 80:22	231:2,6,10,10,12	140:20,21,24
195:1 232:10	101:15 108:1,25	231:15 234:8,17	146:12 147:2
250:24 276:25	116:16 132:5	234:20,21 235:5,9	148:19 150:22
<b>dated</b> 220:22,24	133:19 142:2	237:12,14,21,22	151:9 152:7,19
222:1,5 225:2,5	149:9 157:4 176:6	237:24,25 238:1	154:1,11 159:6
<b>david</b> 9:13,16	246:6 274:4,13	240:6,7 241:22	162:18,24 163:4
13:6 15:23 247:1	dealing 57:10	242:6,12,17 244:2	164:3 167:4,14
247:7	112:9 113:12	245:13 248:22	169:18 171:7
davis 3:3 10:3,4	188:9 200:2	249:13,13,20,22	172:12 173:20
16:20 80:3 120:11	209:24 250:3	249:23 250:12	174:16 176:22,23
136:5 140:19	<b>deals</b> 72:25	251:2 254:8,9,24	177:5 178:8 181:9
146:12 152:18	108:19 110:21	254:25 261:2	181:19 183:1,6,12
175:24 220:10	186:1 189:1	266:2 267:23	183:13,15,24
221:21,24 226:2	<b>dealt</b> 195:16	268:17 269:5,9	184:3,20 186:2
226:10 227:17	238:16 262:12	270:9,13	187:1 188:4
228:11,11 229:24	dear 219:23 226:3	debtor's 80:15	189:19 191:17,21
264:16	dearest 220:1	86:23 90:20	192:11 193:4,9,9
day 16:4,12 19:13	dearman 10:5	117:21,23 218:16	193:24 194:23
24:1 33:11 47:7	<b>death</b> 101:14	227:25 229:19	195:3 199:3,4
79:18 97:19 98:17	223:14	241:23 242:10	200:3,9 202:23,25
100:3 101:11	deaths 110:3	<b>debtors</b> 3:4 16:4	204:3,12,13,14
140:12 157:10	debate 22:21	16:13,21 17:19	205:2 207:6 227:8
176:21 181:12	175:11 272:22	18:10 24:14 27:17	228:14,21 232:1
182:8 190:20	debevoise 224:8	30:21,24 31:3,4	232:13,23 234:12
200:18 264:23	224:13	33:8,13,22 36:25	239:11,12 240:10
265:20 266:3	deborah 11:12	38:18 40:2 41:16	240:12,20 246:20
days 36:13 68:18	<b>debt</b> 57:3	42:5 51:21 53:2	246:23 248:2
115:19 124:17	<b>debtor</b> 1:9 8:9	53:14 54:19 55:8	259:25 260:10,11
146:22 197:25,25	31:6 32:20 39:24	55:18,21,22 58:15	262:12 264:17,24

265.5 12 267.14	dooling 212.10	definitions 225.20	donwing 126.10
265:5,13 267:14	decline 213:10	definitions 235:20	denying 136:12
268:6,7 270:8	decrease 194:12	defy 107:17	<b>depalma</b> 5:16
272:25 273:5	decreasing 209:10	<b>degree</b> 139:6	120:23
<b>debtors'</b> 163:16	dedicate 38:2	198:16	department 74:18
<b>debtor's</b> 146:8	dedicated 19:25	<b>del</b> 220:11	221:5
148:15 157:14	deed 103:24	delaconte 10:6	depending 126:2
163:12 166:3	defendant 86:17	delaware 48:11	214:23 250:13
168:1,5,8 169:3,6	232:7,9,11,11	53:4 80:11 88:9	depends 113:20
171:9,17 201:15	235:22 238:13	261:15	206:22 207:4
<b>decade</b> 32:17 33:6	defendants 40:12	<b>delay</b> 43:15,19	deposed 36:19
166:7	41:12 84:14 86:4	62:17 94:5 166:4	depression 225:23
decades 24:15	86:5 87:17 223:22	171:13 268:5	deprivation
32:17	232:3,16 235:20	delays 211:6	152:23
<b>december</b> 220:1,2	235:21 236:2	<b>delconte</b> 33:14,24	deprive 51:23
220:4,22,25	239:19	34:14,23,25 35:2	deprived 166:11
221:24,25 222:2,2	defended 68:23	36:19 53:17 54:18	166:14 203:9
222:3,6 224:5	defending 221:22	55:1,11 58:24	227:12
225:5	defenses 41:10	61:14 71:6	<b>depth</b> 38:20
decide 96:22	71:17 164:6	<b>delconte's</b> 36:7,19	derail 29:21
133:7 212:2	168:14,19 169:20	71:1	derivative 249:11
255:13	182:7 183:6	deletion 197:23	249:12,25 250:8
decided 24:1	defensive 123:11	deliberate 248:24	255:1 256:12
70:22 109:5	135:20	249:16 251:9	derivatives
111:11 165:9	<b>defer</b> 60:1,1	deliberately	219:24
168:19 169:10	111:17 155:12	241:13 251:24	derived 121:9
182:9 184:5	define 207:5	deliver 110:2	describe 19:2,2
269:19	254:5 255:15	delivers 98:25	213:19
decides 111:3	<b>defined</b> 23:23,24	demanding 68:13	described 19:21
179:17 245:18	24:19 51:12	265:2	21:3 27:5 30:7
deciding 41:22	177:13 257:10	demonstrate	34:25 230:14
decimal 70:19	<b>defines</b> 256:11	30:21 33:16 38:14	descriptive 26:6
decision 28:17	260:17	44:5 83:24 165:23	deserving 94:5
29:2 60:20 105:1	definition 25:16	demonstrated	designate 91:8
147:17	25:19,21 26:3,4	52:23	designated 36:16
decisions 211:11	33:11 145:8	demonstrating	36:18 257:11
declaration 34:15	191:15 202:3,5	86:9,12	desire 142:8
34:25 37:9 47:2	234:7 235:20,21	<b>denied</b> 154:10	<b>despite</b> 84:12,15
72:16 77:8 82:24	240:17 241:7	denominator	84:16 124:10
83:6 97:12,19	242:2,16 249:25	138:2	destroy 48:2
149:9 151:8 223:3	257:9 274:8	denounces 222:9	169:23
declarations	definitionally	densely 154:2	destroyed 73:21
158:15 159:20	28:23	deny 166:17 186:5	destruction 33:20
			36:4

<b>detail</b> 26:25 70:3	different 24:13	175:24	discretion 82:14
determination	71:15 74:6 78:22	directing 37:21	103:18 157:20
64:20 66:13 169:2	78:22 79:12 80:23	directing 37:21	158:7 161:14
184:3	83:24 89:7,22	60:19 109:6	223:19
determinative	92:7,8 98:2,24	117:18 125:9	discretionary
186:22	100:9,10 109:5,13	directly 46:22,22	223:24
determine 105:2	109:14 112:17	68:21 107:21	discriminate
169:1 170:17	113:10,20 115:1,3	137:22 225:12	128:15
determined 31:15	125:2,4,4 127:8	director 223:11	discriminatory
71:11,21 184:24	128:13,13 129:4,5	238:2 243:21	157:22,25
185:2 226:18	130:7 131:21	245:2 248:1 250:6	discuss 74:8,10
determining 90:2	132:1,2,22 140:25	252:16 254:8	115:20 120:2
detriment 94:6,6	142:19,19,20,20	270:10	167:6 186:3
detrimental	142:22,22,23	directors 232:22	266:20
164:13	172:9 180:12	238:17 243:11	discussed 17:18
detroit 129:4	188:13 191:5	268:10	78:24 88:11
<b>develop</b> 142:15,16	192:24 198:15	<b>dirty</b> 98:8	105:13 112:6
developed 111:24	208:17 212:23	disabled 226:4	185:7 204:16
166:1 210:8	269:8	disagree 29:25	217:3,5 231:7,17
development 20:4	differently 69:16	41:23 179:24	232:5 259:10
210:7	difficult 47:20	226:9	discussing 195:20
devil's 122:25	95:20 103:16	disagreed 96:4	236:15
<b>devon</b> 10:7	119:14 129:16	disagreement	discussion 49:25
dictates 39:15	140:1 161:12	181:15	226:24 229:5,17
151:25	236:7 271:1	disbursement	233:25
didn't 153:25	difficulty 129:1	163:12 228:1	discussions 21:3
176:9 183:24,24	<b>dilaudid</b> 214:5,7	<b>disc</b> 101:21	22:5 109:4 230:19
186:12,13,14	dillion's 85:16	discharge 165:19	disease 108:19
195:15 198:13	dillon 84:1	186:7,8 237:14,17	disguise 244:13
208:11	<b>dilute</b> 62:16	270:8,8	244:16,17
<b>die</b> 215:6	<b>dilutive</b> 62:6,14	disclaim 169:3	dismiss 57:19
<b>died</b> 220:1	diminishes 168:6	disclose 89:25	86:12
dietech 49:22	diplomatically	disclosure 33:15	disorder 154:3
50:15 52:2 55:13	266:10	33:24 35:1 66:5	161:3 217:24
55:16,22 57:9,9	<b>direct</b> 33:10,17	71:14 89:24 93:7	disorderly 39:3
58:10 59:12	36:24 40:10 41:7	182:15	disparate 130:15
<b>differ</b> 98:17	42:1,9,11 43:23	discount 160:9	dispatch 85:20
difference 59:8	44:8 45:15 46:16	discouragement	dispenses 24:8
105:19 125:6	53:1 55:5 62:2	108:18	disposes 80:25
180:8	71:10 93:21	discovered 248:7	159:10
differences 19:24	117:20 121:16	discovery 24:16	disproportionally
92:15	directed 123:22	233:12,16 250:20	155:24
	159:24 175:23,23	250:21 259:24	

<b>Te</b>	220.2.2	104 11 107 10	107.04.100.10
disproportionate	228:3,3	194:11 195:4,9	187:24 188:19
115:6	distributors	196:5 200:11	190:5 191:8,9,10
disproportionat	231:21	204:4 224:9,13	191:13 192:4,4,20
151:22	<b>district</b> 1:2 48:20	260:23 271:15	193:1,3,14,23
dispute 31:2,5	52:3 53:5 59:25	doesn't 157:1	194:2 195:21,25
58:9 63:25 76:2	80:9 83:3 85:21	160:19 164:2	196:5,17 197:12
172:20 173:4	85:22 88:3 131:16	167:7 170:13,15	197:18,19 199:7
177:17 180:24,24	143:12 154:17	174:8,12,15 180:6	199:22 200:1,15
185:21	179:17 224:18	184:17,18 188:17	202:19 203:21
disputed 59:10	districts 133:4	189:22 196:15	205:2 206:3,11
64:1,3	<b>ditech</b> 28:2 31:18	198:2,14 207:10	207:24 273:7
disputes 168:23	32:2,20 33:8	<b>dogs</b> 219:1	<b>door</b> 133:2 237:17
169:12	61:22 68:15	<b>doing</b> 19:12 29:18	238:18 251:15
disputing 90:23	diversion 208:20	42:18 60:10 68:12	dorr 8:1 175:1
disrespect 42:18	208:21 215:11,19	75:12,15 77:22,23	<b>dose</b> 213:19
disrespecting	216:1	121:10 139:17	222:22,25
88:16	<b>divert</b> 272:11	189:20 192:16	double 21:9
dissenting 52:12	diverted 215:4	212:23	197:14
52:25 53:3,8,13	<b>divide</b> 191:19	<b>doj</b> 35:11	<b>doubt</b> 139:23
53:15 54:23 55:2	<b>dmp</b> 227:1	doj's 35:11	148:6 151:7 160:8
62:2 66:9	<b>dmps</b> 227:9,10,12	<b>dollar</b> 32:4 35:17	242:14
dissolve 173:2	227:14 228:7,15	37:12 86:16 92:2	doubts 181:5
distancing 152:2	228:23,25 231:21	92:3,6,11,21 93:2	dougherty 10:9
distinct 156:21	<b>dmvt</b> 227:13	93:10,20,23,23	douglass 13:17
231:25	docken 10:8	94:9 126:14,18,20	<b>dow</b> 128:10,10
distinction 124:22	<b>docket</b> 70:24	127:3	132:19
125:1 128:7	82:24 148:18,22	<b>dollars</b> 35:13 36:1	<b>dozen</b> 224:12
distinguish 129:3	149:15 227:15,18	38:5 41:14 72:13	<b>dr</b> 37:4 97:2,12
distinguished	228:12,15 270:14	72:21 76:9 86:21	98:16 99:6,24
50:21	271:25	106:13 116:9	100:15 101:23
distinguishing	docketed 85:6	domestic 84:19	102:7,10,14
241:20	<b>doctor</b> 212:6,16	128:15	111:20 113:9
distraction 25:8	214:23 219:25	<b>don't</b> 35:20 148:6	223:16,21 224:1
distribute 30:25	<b>doctors</b> 208:14	150:8,16 153:23	<b>draft</b> 243:5
157:10 163:17	209:12 211:21	154:5,17,23,25	244:10 253:16
169:7	212:16,21 214:9	155:6 156:23	<b>drafted</b> 23:13,20
distributed 37:12	214:10	160:5,8 167:1	121:11 156:24,24
distributing 262:1	<b>doctrine</b> 85:16,18	168:22,23,25	253:17,18 269:14
distribution 67:1	doctrines 83:23	171:18 173:20	drafting 23:16
93:1 160:23	84:2	175:15 178:5	229:25 260:6
194:23 265:3	document 177:13	179:2 180:1 183:3	<b>drag</b> 202:19
distributions	documents 70:23	183:5 185:18	<b>drain</b> 1:22 16:2
125:22 156:16	177:3,7,11,15	186:4 187:12,17	16:11 145:24
	77 ' T		

218:19 219:23	<b>dumped</b> 270:23	eckstein 10:12	efficacy 103:4
220:23 222:5	duration 222:22	74:3 118:2,3,9,20	efficient 179:22
225:19	<b>duty</b> 86:3 250:6	118:24 119:3,9,13	273:3
dramatically	duvani 227:8	119:17,20	efficiently 171:8
102:14	dwarfed 40:3	economic 37:7	274:24
draw 33:7 237:19	<b>dwell</b> 111:13	108:23	<b>effort</b> 17:5 62:21
256:14	d'angelo 9:25	economics 17:24	147:14 151:9
drawing 197:17	<b>d'apice</b> 10:1	ecro 1:25	152:23 157:5
238:4	e	ed 161:15 222:11	180:15 185:20
<b>drive</b> 207:21	e 1:21,21 3:1,1 5:4	222:20,22,24	189:16 218:11
212:4,6	9:13 13:5,10	edan 12:18 220:21	251:4
<b>driven</b> 125:3	14:13 15:5 16:1,1	edit 273:16	efforts 19:25
<b>drives</b> 151:21	182:15 185:6	edmunds 6:6	84:14,17 87:1,1
<b>driving</b> 131:19	186:5 221:23	230:2,10,19,25	151:12 233:12
247:17	267:15 269:2	231:18 232:5	273:22
<b>drug</b> 161:4,5	276:1	233:11,14,21,22	<b>ego</b> 237:14 242:3
209:14,19 213:10	<b>e.g.</b> 45:11	234:19,24 235:2,5	243:8,23 244:4
213:24 215:2	e.g. 43.11 earl 185:6	235:8,11 236:5,12	250:6
220:5 222:9,12,17	earlier 20:2 30:8	237:5,8 238:22	<b>eight</b> 38:13 72:21
222:19,21 225:24	52:3 85:6 135:25	239:14,23	76:9
248:20	140:20 145:5	<b>edward</b> 13:10	eighteen 86:15
<b>drugs</b> 206:20	148:19 149:3	<b>effect</b> 23:13 62:7	eighties 208:11
208:8,16 209:1,1	161:10 162:6	62:14,15 63:12	<b>either</b> 19:10,21
209:3,4,15,22	173:13 175:18	121:12,13 137:24	49:3 50:1 60:19
210:3,6 211:14,20	180:11 205:1	158:15 164:24	67:13 78:8 86:20
212:13 213:16	225:25	165:19 177:14	93:9 109:9 111:19
214:8 215:1,4,4	early 166:1	186:9 255:22	112:3 136:4
215:22 216:5,8,8	219:25 220:7	effective 49:11	155:24 157:17
216:10,19 222:25	224:16	99:7,9 170:8	162:17 197:20
<b>dry</b> 161:14	ease 212:13	171:14 177:14	198:24 204:23
drysdale 3:15	easier 109:10	195:1 232:10	209:13 214:7
<b>dual</b> 16:23	easily 107:14	effectively 66:20	249:4 251:17
<b>duane</b> 181:4	eastern 85:22	105:10 108:10	261:13 273:21
<b>dubel</b> 10:10	easy 196:1,2	122:11,16 123:12	election 90:4
131:12	eberhardt 10:11	124:4 134:23	elections 90:5
<b>due</b> 20:16 38:6	echo 175:18	136:20 203:8	element 18:1
61:12 72:10 77:2	270:15	232:12,15 267:8	<b>elements</b> 17:18,22
107:7 124:9	eck 15:8 218:18	268:7	<b>eli</b> 3:11 229:24
150:20 157:5	219:4	effectiveness	eliminate 107:13
184:8,16 186:12	ecke 8:16 218:19	217:17,18	110:11
200:12 202:18	218:22 219:3,8,11	effects 37:10	eliminates 262:5
203:13 221:4	219:15,18,20	214:17 216:8,15	eliminating 109:7
	226:6		
	· .	1014	

[elisa - estimated] Page 25

	37:7 50:12 62:10	256:1	32:22
274:1	<b>entities</b> 3:16 23:14	equivalent 244:18	estimated 32:12
255:14 273:20	142:3,17 225:21	equity 223:8	127:2
encouraged 20:24	82:17 140:25	equitable 131:11	59:2 71:12,20
274:1	entirely 80:16	54:9,21 225:3	43:14 54:13 55:2
encourage 19:24	122:12 136:19	equation 39:5	<b>estimate</b> 33:3 41:5
195:23	<b>entire</b> 40:25 92:9	equates 83:3	59:5 71:24
encompassed	entertain 147:21	equals 39:7	estimable 36:25
enabling 137:13	enterprise 121:9	108:5	66:1 77:15 240:12
171:7	258:2,4,5	equally 99:20	63:11,14 65:16,20
enable 163:15	195:6 196:8,10	equality 103:5	47:23 55:9 63:6
241:1	177:8,22 181:21	119:4,5 132:11	estates 34:4,5
employment	69:11 146:22	equal 99:13,18	244:6,20
238:17 239:3	enter 133.0 entered 20:17	222:8	243:8,23,24 244:2
employees 232:23	enter 135:6	104:21 109:1	171:12 189:4
248:1.21 268:17	ensures 199:16	epidemic 104:16	94:7 156:15
237:22 238:2	enormous 62:13 ensure 168:4	82:13 240:25	79:12 81:6 90:16
employee 237:21	enormous 62:13	environmental	64:5,6,6 77:17
empirical 44:9	<b>enjoined</b> 30:10 139:17,19 256:12	253:10	57:1 63:16,21
emphatically 88:15		environment	42:7 47:10 51:21
174:7 231:18	<b>enjoin</b> 137:6 263:18	<b>entry</b> 85:18 271:18	<b>estate</b> 33:21 34:21 34:22 35:18 41:12
152:17 163:14	190:12	268:11 269:5	established 102:5
emphasize 49:14	engineering 166:2	267:21,25 268:2	173:1
172:2 231:8	engaging 259:14	187:9 223:7	<b>establish</b> 125:9
emphasis 100:14	235:17 239:2,10	141:24 143:2	117:20 134:17
163:7 167:11	161:18 234:13	137:8,8 139:11	82:20 94:12
emily 7:22 11:13	engaged 148:19	entity 39:10 84:6	essentially 52:11
84:25	engage 161:12	entitlement 34:9	228:5
emergency 84:25	115:7	250:1	essential 227:23
embrace 68:13	107:19,24 114:22	191:22 222:8	essence 121:18
167:22 181:20	enforcement	169:17 171:9	211:7 213:21
embodied 166:20	194:18	164:9 168:11	161:13 210:4
embattled 224:9	enforceability	entitled 119:7	46:5 153:12
109:1	enforce 64:21	259:1,13,18	especially 37:11
embarrassment	274:3,4	238:24,24 258:25	eskandari 10:13
<b>emails</b> 271:16	247:21 270:22	159:25 162:21	escape 203:2
<b>email</b> 236:15	ends 100:1 154:13	139:15,16,18	<b>errors</b> 121:5
else's 241:25	endorse 41:8	127:22,23 129:23	121:3
eloquently 111:14	<b>endo</b> 86:16	125:1,20,23 127:1	<b>error</b> 89:14,20
elongate 158:7	134:3	91:14 93:1 95:10	eric 14:25
elisa 11:21 elizabeth 14:12	ended 110:15	84:10 85:9 86:13	erased 34:10
	endeavor 33:20	62:10 77:14,18	equivalents 108:9

estimating 58:24	evoke 83:23	excess 30:25	exists 24:10
estimation 32:10	evolved 120:16	47:23	<b>expand</b> 260:20
32:19 37:1 44:2	ex 89:24 220:3	exchanged 271:17	<b>expanded</b> 69:6
55:20 58:22 66:6	<b>exact</b> 147:18	exclude 190:22	148:17 222:10
69:23	<b>exactly</b> 37:24 75:5	excluded 23:19	249:11 257:20
estoppel 196:16	124:6 144:15	145:8,13 230:16	expanding 236:3
196:17	203:8 234:1	232:17 238:25	expansive 255:1
et 16:3,12 33:15	239:18	245:12 267:4,17	<b>expect</b> 151:17
35:16 85:3 191:6	examination	269:4,6	261:10 274:12
207:21 219:21	36:20 68:19 97:16	exclusion 133:8	expected 30:25
240:10 250:7	102:5 182:21	exclusions 177:18	expecting 216:9
ethan 12:2	examine 65:8	178:2 190:22	expects 110:18
evaluate 59:11	126:12 203:12	194:20 197:11	expedient 148:3
94:1	examined 23:15	232:18	<b>expended</b> 84:13
evaluated 225:24	35:2	exclusive 199:13	expenditures
evaluating 51:8	example 40:20	exclusively 38:8	102:6
evaluation 55:12	70:19 85:23 86:7	46:1	expense 112:5
182:24	87:20 89:2 103:15	excuse 55:18	246:1
<b>evan</b> 8:24	133:4 161:5	125:4 168:2	expensive 132:23
<b>evans</b> 161:10	169:11,20 172:24	181:24 187:19	experience 104:22
evaporates 76:10	177:16 194:1	228:25 232:21	208:1,6,24 275:7
evening 267:14	197:7 238:23	246:13	experienced
<b>event</b> 100:18	243:14 250:14	executives 214:10	213:10 218:25
122:14 141:19	251:13 253:2,19	exemption 164:25	<b>expert</b> 19:25
eventually 210:20	255:2,18 268:20	exemptions 165:7	33:14 36:16,17,18
everybody 24:18	272:23	exercise 51:16	38:19 58:20,24
29:11 38:11 68:7	examples 86:6	53:18 103:13	59:2,4 63:23
74:15,17 78:23,25	241:3 250:15	exhaustive 148:16	66:23 73:13,13
93:2 151:22 230:5	254:21	<b>exhibit</b> 24:10,17	102:13 104:3,6
everyone's 221:19	exceed 37:12	24:25 70:24 82:24	108:11 182:23
evidence 33:14	exceeded 46:16	99:8 100:17	215:2
36:23,25 41:9	exceedingly 45:22	102:23 103:2,6	<b>experts</b> 58:16,19
44:9 45:23 46:8	exceeds 31:8	167:19 257:9,11	186:15 211:9,10
52:23 53:15,25	61:13	257:19,20 258:24	explain 19:16
63:5 66:12 72:14	excellent 50:4	258:25	21:16,22 182:3
75:4 77:7 128:12	exception 24:6	exist 82:11 158:20	236:20 240:8
133:15,19 160:5	111:24 119:6	169:9 184:4	explained 18:22
160:11 183:11,14	136:6 151:11	207:11	explaining 48:24
183:18,20 184:18	194:1 227:11	existed 101:16	73:11
185:18,21 199:12	242:5 243:10	207:19	<b>explains</b> 222:9,22
222:23 273:13	exceptions 232:21	existence 166:17	explanation
evidently 193:12	excerpts 228:16	existing 171:7	113:24 130:22

[explicitly - fatal] Page 27

		I	
explicitly 29:12	f	<b>factor</b> 28:12	108:2 109:2
exposure 47:5	<b>f</b> 1:21 14:19 276:1	101:21 102:7	110:10 116:14,21
148:23	<b>f.2d</b> 148:5	114:23,24	156:24 167:23
express 190:5	<b>f.3d</b> 128:11	<b>factors</b> 100:10	181:21 241:14
expressed 17:2	<b>f.3rd</b> 99:19	108:9 110:5	249:16
50:14 175:18	<b>f.r.d.</b> 101:22,23	111:16 113:10,20	<b>fall</b> 202:4 242:15
193:23 203:3	<b>f2.d</b> 147:11	156:10	249:24
expression 190:8	<b>fabulous</b> 117:18	<b>facts</b> 33:4 36:15	<b>falls</b> 35:14 99:22
expressive 275:5	face 21:4 47:5	68:25 69:9 70:17	274:19
expressly 21:10	75:2 92:3 132:8	73:7 79:17 81:10	<b>false</b> 72:15
22:24 205:12	192:17 237:2	146:20 157:1	familiar 80:18
246:21 261:13	faced 45:13	238:7 246:16,18	134:21 150:3
<b>extend</b> 244:24	158:12 164:3	248:6	213:23
extended 148:17	facilitate 17:20	<b>factual</b> 29:5 42:20	families 40:14
158:11	facilitated 18:9	64:19 136:15	<b>family</b> 4:9 21:20
extends 244:23	facilities 160:1	184:6 190:1,10	24:13 40:12 145:3
extensive 33:13	161:1	factually 68:7	214:10 215:2
148:20 230:19	<b>facing</b> 111:1	124:6 125:3	224:7,12,20
<b>extent</b> 22:7 29:25	fact 25:5 32:22	<b>fail</b> 104:1	225:13,18 246:5
64:10 96:21	35:22 44:9 59:3	<b>failed</b> 33:11	<b>far</b> 23:9 46:14
113:17 127:15	60:8,8 63:25 70:3	237:13	74:1 76:1 90:13
137:22 139:15,17	70:5 71:13,14,18	<b>fails</b> 31:13 100:5	102:8 121:19
150:12 151:10	74:10 75:18 84:12	failure 55:12	122:3 127:20
155:21 157:8	84:15 85:7 87:22	67:13 242:4	137:16 147:5,6
158:10 161:2	94:17 96:4 98:8	250:11	155:2 156:9
163:24 182:19	98:14 105:12	<b>fair</b> 17:15 18:16	195:16 197:12
190:10,23 240:14	108:12 109:25	28:23 41:23 51:1	200:7 204:9
extinguished 56:6	113:19 123:5,19	51:24 57:2,3 59:6	224:23 243:16
56:18 150:22	124:5,10 128:7	62:9 96:14 99:1	248:13 253:6
<b>extra</b> 246:1	132:9 163:8	101:24 102:24	259:11 274:3
extraordinarily	169:24 176:2	103:14 118:14	farfetched 98:1
17:9 30:18 38:1	177:19 179:2,6	119:16 150:9	farrell 10:14
77:8,10	182:7 189:6	250:17 273:9	farther 75:13
extraordinary	195:19 196:23	274:6	fashion 88:10
45:7 68:14 148:15	193:19 190:23	fairest 68:14	124:20 131:11
151:1 240:5	203:13 215:13	<b>fairly</b> 51:14	133:2 136:24
270:14,17 271:5	217:11 235:24	106:18 124:20	157:8
274:21	251:7 252:15	<b>fairness</b> 28:4,16	fashionably
<b>extreme</b> 220:9,9	257:21 259:2	29:4,16 30:7,13	100:11
extremely 97:15	262:3 263:11	31:22 68:20 79:13	<b>fast</b> 179:21 272:1
	264:7 274:1	97:5 113:17	faster 71:3
	facto 89:24	<b>faith</b> 67:4,6 97:6,8	<b>fatal</b> 109:20
	1 <b>4CtO</b> 07.24	97:23 98:19 99:11	

[fathers - first] Page 28

-			
<b>fathers</b> 225:22	<b>femino</b> 10:16	<b>filing</b> 62:25 63:13	193:25 195:4,19
<b>favor</b> 52:10 68:11	<b>fentanyl</b> 214:4,5,7	85:6 120:16	196:22 200:10
77:20 83:1 94:19	festers 104:4	122:25 123:1	201:7,17 202:13
126:9,17 169:16	<b>fewer</b> 19:11	124:13,19 136:8	203:14,19 204:10
178:14	fiduciaries 246:20	148:24 161:24	<b>finds</b> 255:4
favorable 112:13	fiduciary 39:25	185:11 205:15	fine 28:3 32:2
favored 98:8	41:15 74:18	<b>filings</b> 270:14	52:22 68:16 84:8
<b>fda</b> 211:9 222:8	148:10 171:12	<b>final</b> 17:3 18:4	141:18 144:2
222:10,13,18,21	fielding 232:25	44:3 78:19 87:4	161:15 167:9
250:23	<b>fifth</b> 8:11 176:15	102:10 133:6	175:3 199:24
<b>fear</b> 213:1	<b>fifty</b> 98:2	185:24	201:20 204:7
fearsome 44:21	<b>fight</b> 94:20 117:21	finalized 257:19	210:25 218:23
feasibility 185:2	181:11	271:15	219:7 227:6
186:23	fighting 44:14	<b>finally</b> 42:24 79:5	228:20 230:7
feasible 185:3	45:19	161:24 225:13	257:14 264:18
<b>feature</b> 45:18 92:1	<b>figure</b> 42:9 47:1	246:2	fineburg 129:14
156:17	152:15 188:14	financial 94:6	<b>fines</b> 153:17
february 146:23	260:10	<b>find</b> 58:18 79:18	<b>finigan</b> 148:19
148:16 222:7	figuring 77:5	89:17 104:18	<b>finigan's</b> 159:20
<b>federal</b> 35:16 36:1	<b>file</b> 62:21 70:23	136:4 143:4 148:3	<b>finzi</b> 10:17
46:23 47:4 57:21	133:1 152:8	151:17 154:5	firefighter 85:2
67:11 71:23 82:17	154:12,15 156:6	182:6 189:15	<b>firm</b> 24:10,15
147:12 151:18	157:12,24 158:15	192:6 195:17	25:4,5 120:22
163:22 189:5,25	158:21 162:3,10	198:19 228:17	176:1 181:4
190:11 255:11,24	178:17 271:18	<b>finding</b> 58:2 170:7	
267:20	<b>filed</b> 18:13 20:2	173:12,15,24	228:11
feeble 226:4	21:17 34:6 39:25	174:8,9 181:16,18	
<b>feed</b> 204:24	40:4 43:3 62:8,22	182:5,5 184:14	<b>firms</b> 44:21,22
feel 59:1 154:19	62:23 85:15 93:4	185:5,9 186:3	224:6,12
181:7 207:24	93:5 122:5 124:25	191:24 193:1	<b>first</b> 5:17 19:19
208:5 211:8,23	131:13 142:15	198:16 199:1	20:16 21:25 23:10
213:20,21 221:15	146:2,22,23,25	<b>findings</b> 29:5	25:15 28:1 31:14
<b>feeling</b> 210:16	153:7,11,21	163:8,24 164:1,6	50:7 53:14 69:13
feeney 10:15	154:15 156:4,11	164:15 166:19	75:8 80:15,19,25
fees 34:2,13 40:20	157:17 161:22	167:15,19 168:4	87:6 88:7,14,17
70:14 153:17	176:23,24 177:12	168:22 169:13	89:6,11 90:7 97:7
224:11	177:16,25 180:10	170:24 171:2,4	98:5 100:21 105:1
feinberg 220:12	185:18 204:20,22	172:5,11 173:8,10	112:22,22 116:10
<b>feld</b> 220:19	205:5 215:8,14	176:6,19,20	119:23 120:24
<b>fellow</b> 161:14,15	217:17 218:14	178:19,23 179:6	121:6 122:20
<b>felt</b> 117:19 154:15	224:13,17 225:17	181:14 183:24	123:24 124:4,13
210:16 215:17,17	228:15 229:21	184:9 185:4,7	124:23 126:3,20
271:12	257:6 272:25	186:13,24 193:22	127:7 130:6 131:9

[first - frankly] Page 29

. , ,			
133:9 137:5	<b>flatly</b> 87:18	<b>followed</b> 162:19	<b>forth</b> 34:24 80:20
138:17 140:12,18	<b>flaw</b> 109:20	177:23	85:5 87:2 97:18
141:3 143:22	<b>flawed</b> 105:6	<b>following</b> 144:16	120:13 159:19
146:9 155:6 156:2	fletcher 10:19	183:8 194:16	160:1 161:25
159:14 160:14	flexibility 80:22	220:8	200:10 228:10
162:19 164:9	158:9	<b>follows</b> 100:6	240:3 262:15
168:22 172:2	<b>flies</b> 130:14	footnote 83:6	fortunate 20:21
174:21 175:9	flipping 187:5	157:21 158:8	<b>fortune</b> 225:14
176:25 178:19,24	flooded 207:8	232:2 235:13,25	forward 54:24
178:25 179:10	<b>flooding</b> 160:20	236:2,3	60:18 65:17,25
181:17 182:1,12	<b>floor</b> 6:9 18:4	<b>forced</b> 79:12	107:10,14 111:4
187:23 191:6,12	68:1	<b>forces</b> 212:20	156:15 158:23
191:21 192:23	florida 96:25	foreclosure 56:24	<b>foster</b> 85:10
193:22 196:4	143:12 244:18	foregoing 82:1	<b>found</b> 111:5
197:15 205:3	245:25 255:11	194:18 276:3	163:19 215:7
207:1 217:9 220:6	<b>flow</b> 46:1 72:8	foreign 120:3	227:15 238:9
221:23 224:16	74:14 109:15	128:1,8,15 132:7	275:4
229:18 230:13,16	137:18,20,22	134:23 135:22	foundational
233:5,8,9,21	<b>focus</b> 49:17 90:13	136:2,6,14,22	230:12
240:9 241:9	109:2 110:22	143:2,13 144:9	foundations
242:10,15 255:13	111:7 187:6 194:5	forfeiture 35:12	223:22
257:17 264:23	244:8 266:18	35:21	<b>four</b> 35:11 36:1
266:3 267:24	focused 53:13	<b>forget</b> 34:17 66:17	48:20 76:8 103:10
firstborn 220:1	60:23 61:2,3	<b>forgive</b> 218:20	130:5,7 225:2
<b>fit</b> 24:12 130:18	108:18 151:12	<b>forgot</b> 233:10	<b>fourth</b> 18:1 94:1
130:20 255:3	176:8	<b>form</b> 123:17	98:17 100:3 103:8
<b>fitch</b> 7:2 146:4,15	focusing 188:15	206:24 273:21	103:9 225:13
146:25 150:1	191:7	formally 20:17	fraidin 10:20
155:5	fogelman 6:12	154:11 174:4	<b>frame</b> 136:23
fitzsimmons	239:24,25 240:1	204:5 274:15	framework 48:25
10:18	241:5,12,16	<b>former</b> 153:9	80:16 164:18
<b>five</b> 35:25 36:1	242:22,25 249:5,7	243:11 266:20	francisco 81:21
48:19 72:12,21	249:21 250:9	270:10	<b>frank</b> 7:1 136:4
76:8 176:13	252:7,11,13,17,20	<b>forms</b> 135:2,3	146:7 149:24
261:10	252:23,25 253:3,5	159:18 272:1	frankel 4:15
<b>fix</b> 18:7 93:15	253:13,22,25	<b>formula</b> 105:6,11	<b>franklin</b> 7:6 13:13
111:2 196:1,2	254:12,19 255:6	105:19 106:11	frankly 28:10
261:23 262:6,18	255:19,23 256:2,5	108:6,8,23 110:23	59:24 79:23 89:17
<b>fixed</b> 89:14,20	256:7,15 258:10	111:8 112:16	90:12 91:5 114:12
92:6 196:21	folding 128:1	248:20 264:6	123:21 128:21
261:17	folks 28:11 161:18	formulas 213:6	129:16 136:10
<b>fixing</b> 262:10	<b>follow</b> 16:17	formulated	138:23 154:18
	29:24 212:17	208:20	171:12 175:19,22

[frankly - give] Page 30

[ITAIIMIY - give]			1 age 30
178:1,11 190:20	<b>fun</b> 265:6	g	generals 225:8
197:19 199:16	<b>function</b> 208:15	<b>g</b> 9:23 10:3 16:1	general's 5:1
201:18 244:22	230:3 269:1,7	237:23 243:17	generated 224:3
245:22 263:22	<b>fund</b> 100:24 102:5	gabe 9:17	generative 219:24
<b>fraud</b> 25:20,22,23	105:13 106:12	gain 94:13 158:11	generics 182:17
25:23,25 26:1,2	107:5 108:3	158:14	<b>gentle</b> 161:15
135:1 240:8 241:1	109:12,24 110:12	galle 10:23	162:1
241:1 254:3,5	112:1 114:1 115:6	gamble 94:13	genuinely 138:19
fraudulent 26:2	116:9,16 117:4	gamble 94.13 game 157:8	geoffrey 11:7
42:8 63:23 267:25	206:21	game 157.8 gange 10:24	<b>george</b> 221:2,9,11
268:1 269:10,21	fundamental	ganged 98:3	<b>gerard</b> 3:12 4:13
269:22 270:2	139:25 143:21	gangeu 98.3 gap 45:16	9:20 21:19 145:3
frazier 10:21	146:17 200:17	• -	246:4
frederick 14:13	244:12	<b>garden</b> 168:23	gerry 80:2
<b>free</b> 47:24 151:12	fundamentally	garrity 50:2	getting 28:22
151:15 152:6	135:7 136:21	garrity 50.2 gartrell 10:25	29:17 35:9,21
153:15 165:21	141:20 142:9	gary 11:9	36:2 45:17 60:14
frenetic 38:16	175:25	gate 246:3,8	64:18 70:18,22
frequently 108:16	<b>funded</b> 199:11		96:17 101:2,2
243:9	261:25	gatekeeping	114:25 119:9
<b>friday</b> 21:5 225:2	<b>funding</b> 212:23	245:24 246:3,7	130:9,10,11
273:10,19 275:12	<b>funds</b> 37:14 101:2	269:1,6,12,15	133:19,21 138:8
friedman 10:22	106:21 223:19	gates 246:7	138:23 156:9
<b>front</b> 84:22 111:6	225:11 262:2	gaurisankaran 37:5	162:11 209:13
180:1 185:13,21	<b>funnel</b> 213:3	gears 95:4 263:23	225:10 236:7
185:22 193:8	<b>funny</b> 138:11	geldreich 11:1	251:21 256:14
fruition 48:4	furnish 204:3	general 5:2 6:1	gibson 11:2
frustrate 166:4	further 17:13	41:17 82:10 88:8	giddens 11:3,4
171:11	18:15 22:5 24:25	90:20,24 91:13	<b>gift</b> 269:17,20
frustrated 119:17	25:13 46:6 79:19	92:8 96:24 97:23	<b>gilbert</b> 7:16 11:5
170:14	92:17 94:5 134:7	101:18 102:3	167:11 176:1
frustrating	143:25 191:6	104:14 114:7	201:17
171:18	193:15 226:24	148:1 215:15	<b>gill</b> 11:1
<b>full</b> 28:13,15 97:3	229:7,16,21,25	221:1,2,11 223:4	gillian 13:22
120:13 135:24	254:13 256:16	223:24 224:1	<b>give</b> 18:8 20:15
155:18 182:9,9	258:18 261:2	225:17	21:25 26:14 27:21
184:6,6 186:20,20	262:23 268:5	general's 97:1	67:25 116:13
189:24 190:9	271:23	generally 49:19	118:12 150:20
220:23 226:19	furthers 47:22	114:20 123:7	170:5,22 171:11
230:18 239:19	futility 94:4	134:10 147:12	202:8 204:6
<b>fully</b> 70:6 190:19	<b>future</b> 23:4 107:2	151:4 152:15	209:12,15 214:23
210:20 226:20	195:10 196:24	167:21 237:11	218:2 225:1 229:8
228:10		107.21 237.11	241:22 242:9

249:5 250:14	170:2 177:14	180:21 182:3	73:17 75:11 76:13	
260:20 265:20	178:7,8 179:22	183:20 185:11,20	76:20,21 77:3,22	
269:19 273:11,23	180:25 185:4	188:7,10 189:22	78:10,14 79:17	
274:5,6	193:21 197:1,24	190:19 191:4	261:4,6,6 262:21	
<b>given</b> 33:13 51:7	201:1,21 202:23	192:24 193:6,8	263:4,7,11,15,25	
51:18 58:19 64:15	205:7 211:5 212:6	196:5,6,7 203:7	264:11 266:16,22	
66:8 79:24 91:15	213:6,11 216:10	203:24 206:19	goldman's 69:24	
109:25 112:7	217:15 232:20	207:18,25 209:24	72:2 74:22 79:13	
122:25 130:4,13	233:8,8 235:19	210:3,20,23	goldstein 11:6	
158:8 159:10	237:20 238:18	211:14 212:6	<b>good</b> 16:2,11,19	
177:18 178:2	245:25 246:8	213:1,2,3,5,20	23:24 37:4 48:24	
197:12 204:25	254:13 264:23	214:24 215:20	67:3,6 96:14 97:5	
253:16 264:25	265:8 273:15	216:3 217:6,16	97:8,10 98:19	
271:12 273:13	<b>god</b> 215:18	218:6,6 219:3	103:24 106:17	
<b>gives</b> 45:8	<b>goes</b> 25:10 47:9	228:22 235:15	107:3,18 108:2	
<b>giving</b> 56:13	60:21 70:18 90:15	236:7,13 238:4	109:2 110:9	
207:23 241:23	103:24 144:23	243:25 247:6	113:23 114:19	
253:11	152:10 167:2	248:14 249:18	116:12,14,21,25	
<b>glad</b> 123:20	177:13 178:23	253:12,14,15	131:3 134:9	
154:20	180:10 189:6	254:10,11,20,21	145:18,23 152:4	
<b>gleit</b> 5:14 227:2,2	191:24 192:19	255:16 258:7,13	162:25 167:10,23	
227:7 228:23	199:16 209:19	259:11,19 260:20	181:21 212:6,6	
<b>global</b> 35:9 123:8	229:15 265:25	265:18 266:17	215:3 229:23	
132:4 246:22	<b>going</b> 17:12 21:8	273:18	233:7 239:25	
247:5	30:16 41:7,8	<b>gold</b> 9:2 46:20	256:25 266:12,17	
<b>gloria</b> 221:8	65:17 72:7 73:19	76:20 87:24 88:1	goodman 11:7	
<b>glove</b> 211:19	74:4 89:14 96:24	88:2,6,13 89:9,11	gostin 11:8	
<b>go</b> 21:23 26:13,24	102:3 104:11	90:9,23 91:3,5,18	gotten 75:1	
33:23 37:16,22	105:3 106:21	91:22 92:1,19	225:14 230:9	
48:25 50:23 52:1	108:24,25 109:15	94:22 216:13	<b>gotto</b> 11:9	
52:9 54:24 60:17	110:13 111:3,17	<b>gold's</b> 42:17	<b>gov't</b> 7:17	
64:23 65:25 73:22	116:13 117:20	<b>goldman</b> 4:6 28:2	governance 207:3	
75:6 76:23 79:12	118:10 121:23	48:7,9,15,19,23	governed 21:12	
83:14 90:2 93:22	122:10 124:11,14	49:21 50:7,10,13	125:23	
100:20 108:24	130:22 131:1,22	51:1,25 52:2,17	governing 80:19	
109:8 110:13	138:1 144:16	52:19,22 53:20,24	government 35:16	
111:22 112:3	146:8,9 149:9	54:5,14,17 55:25	47:4 67:11 82:17	
120:10,20 122:22	154:11 155:22	56:3,10,16 57:24	87:14 204:24	
128:22 131:15	156:15,17,21	58:5,8 59:7,18,21	261:21	
139:16 141:16	161:17,22,23	60:1,6 61:2,5,7	governmental	
146:8 152:1	162:13,23 167:6	62:18 63:18 64:10	3:16 36:2 46:2	
156:10 157:18	172:24 177:12	65:1,4,10 67:16	50:11 62:10,10	
162:19 167:3	178:16 179:24	67:20,25 68:2,3	84:10,19 85:9	

86:13 91:14 95:9	170:3,16,20,22	233:24 246:8	hanover 150:19
95:15 125:20,23	174:23 175:24	251:19 259:24	happen 78:1
127:22 137:8	179:1 180:15	267:9 268:17	127:23 133:22
143:2,17 162:20	181:2,7 182:5	274:4,13	214:16 238:11
167:12	184:11 185:21	guidance 45:10	253:12,14,15
governments	190:25 197:7	238:20 271:20	happened 76:23
37:11 46:23 80:14	200:24 201:2	guidelines 206:24	125:12 141:6
82:3 83:25 84:13	202:1,15,17	guilty 79:8	178:5 247:8
84:16,22 85:4	grossly 96:8	<b>gulf</b> 19:6	happening 108:20
86:3,10 87:9,15	<b>ground</b> 18:4 47:3	<b>gump</b> 220:18	155:21
87:21 88:17 94:23	104:20 147:20	224:24	happens 132:3
217:13	181:3 213:4	gun 85:25	189:17 196:14
governor 215:15	274:21	<b>guys</b> 211:2	209:22 210:18
218:1	<b>grounds</b> 57:20,21	h	213:8
<b>grab</b> 106:25	57:22	<b>h</b> 10:12 15:17	happier 224:22
109:23 110:16	<b>group</b> 3:16 6:15	24:10 52:15 106:1	<b>happy</b> 16:17
<b>grace</b> 99:17,19	7:9 34:18 50:11	182:15 185:6	20:12 26:24,25
<b>grant</b> 274:16	84:6,10 86:8	haberkorn 11:15	67:20 136:18
granted 129:22	88:18 93:20	habit 175:8	187:3,5 203:20
granting 247:23	112:18 148:11	hadley 4:8	205:4,16 228:18
granular 81:11	155:15 221:7	hale 8:1 175:1	230:4 233:4 246:2
<b>graph</b> 142:18	253:10	half 34:13 42:15	264:19
grateful 19:22	<b>groups</b> 39:24	44:24 58:11 96:16	<b>hard</b> 17:9 58:8
20:5 104:14	44:18 47:19 98:25	101:1 195:18	116:22 118:21
110:24	112:17 137:12	224:16	126:24 154:5
gravamen 254:23	217:23	hallmarks 29:3	274:23
<b>grave</b> 105:7	<b>growing</b> 103:10	hampshire 53:5	<b>harder</b> 230:18
great 41:21,21	grows 213:13	hampton 220:13	<b>harm</b> 84:15 159:1
80:22 142:2 157:4	<b>gruff</b> 275:1	hand 17:17 51:13	214:24 226:15,18
216:6 221:17	guarantee 37:13	132:15,18 133:13	226:19 251:10
246:6 265:16	44:23	157:6 160:5,10	harold 11:24
greater 33:5	guaranty 220:16	211:19 217:14	185:6
greatly 33:23	<b>guard</b> 11:14 96:25	226:12 237:11	hasn't 146:25
131:5 140:1	97:15 101:7	259:15 262:12	156:8
green 11:10,11	111:14 112:5	269:25	hate 115:15,17,18
greenberg 5:16	116:12 203:6	handcuffed 140:9	217:1
120:23	<b>guard's</b> 97:12	handcuffing	hauer 220:19
greenspan 11:12	101:10	139:6	<b>haven't</b> 199:15
greenwich 64:13	guess 27:3 60:21	handed 70:22	hayden 9:21
<b>greville</b> 223:3,23	67:12 94:16 95:2	handle 104:11	<b>hazard</b> 188:10
<b>grim</b> 7:22 11:13	122:22 123:2	handled 90:5	<b>head</b> 28:6 221:8
163:7 166:25	139:4 187:6	handling 87:25	221:10
167:5,10,11 170:1	193:21 218:16	225:9 275:8	
		223.7 213.0	

[headings - honor]

headings 184:12	159:23 161:9	191:20 228:17	<b>hoc</b> 4:16 6:15 7:9
heads 185:12	227:19 231:20	230:2,6 250:9	7:17 50:11 95:9
heal 209:9 210:19	236:11,16 240:5	255:6 258:20	95:15 137:12
210:20	265:17 266:8	<b>helping</b> 37:4 46:6	148:11 155:15
healing 211:6	270:22 271:1,5	161:18 219:18	162:20 167:12
<b>health</b> 105:16	272:24	<b>helps</b> 145:16	169:15 202:22
106:6 158:5 207:1	hearings 275:8	232:24	<b>hold</b> 46:12 58:1
218:1 220:14	<b>heart</b> 18:17 68:10	herculean 151:9	82:12 118:9 123:7
221:5 271:3	150:16 162:9	here's 189:19	208:14 274:9
healthcare 85:10	212:17 220:8	heroic 17:5	<b>holder</b> 49:7,12
110:1,2 211:18	250:10	<b>heroin</b> 216:1,4	112:12 232:10,11
215:2	heartache 225:23	herring 11:17	<b>holders</b> 61:9 62:4
hear 17:13 19:18	heartbroken	67:2	235:22 260:15,17
20:12 22:19 78:10	225:15	hesitate 67:23	260:18
79:25 80:4 88:4	heartburn 202:8	hey 248:7	<b>holding</b> 143:9
93:17 95:11,14	heartfelt 272:12	<b>he's</b> 156:19 202:8	222:18
115:23 118:4	heather 10:21	<b>hidden</b> 225:25	holdings 32:3
120:5 131:3 141:8	heathridge	<b>high</b> 36:9 154:7	102:11
141:9 146:9 159:7	223:11	222:22,25,25	holds 82:9 223:6
162:21 174:21	heaviest 26:15	266:11	223:18
175:2 176:9,23	heavily 60:25	<b>higher</b> 132:2	<b>hole</b> 38:6
178:4 179:5 205:4	113:14	highest 29:12	home 67:11 73:23
205:16 218:16	<b>heavy</b> 87:10	112:2,4	85:16,18 272:7
229:19 233:5	heitzenrater	highlights 38:20	homogenous
257:13,14 263:22	11:16	<b>highly</b> 115:6	61:19
263:25 266:22	<b>held</b> 42:2 56:4	142:1 208:14	<b>hon</b> 1:22
<b>heard</b> 16:8 17:8	59:12 66:7 91:10	226:1	honestly 97:10
25:3 68:22 76:2	91:14 93:23	highway 115:2	hong 225:17
78:9 79:7 93:4	147:22 232:1	hippocratic	<b>honor</b> 16:6,19,22
96:15 155:19	262:19	212:18	17:1,2 19:7 20:14
165:13,14 166:15	hell 44:14 209:21	hire 59:4	21:7,15,19,21
204:1 206:2	<b>help</b> 19:16 45:17	<b>hired</b> 38:19 58:17	22:2,9,15 23:14
227:19 229:15	48:4 109:21 110:9	59:3	24:12,25 25:12,14
237:10 239:11	117:13,14 161:11	hirshman 11:18	25:19,24 26:4,9
250:16 261:4	161:12 187:5	<b>history</b> 33:6 57:10	26:14,21,24 27:23
273:13	191:19 200:1	58:2,7,10,13 59:8	27:25 28:8,15,19
hearing 2:1,1 16:7	209:3,15 221:3,6	59:10 151:24	29:19 30:15,20,24
16:18 18:18 58:16	221:18 225:11	175:14 214:14	31:14 32:1 33:13
74:12 95:21 98:18	226:4	261:20 263:17	37:18 38:25 42:4
100:3 101:11	<b>helped</b> 209:23	271:2	42:13,24 43:2,10
104:18 120:15	213:20	hit 92:22	43:12,22 44:3
144:17 145:25	<b>helpful</b> 22:11,19	<b>hitting</b> 271:25	45:9,21 46:10,18
148:21 153:23	23:7 76:1 145:1		46:20 47:1,13

Page 33

[honor - hundreds] Page 34

48:1,9,16 51:25	165:11,14 167:8	252:11,13,18,25	hospital 85:3
53:25 56:11,16	167:11,14,18	253:5,13,22,25	216:11
58:9 60:1,6 61:7	170:16,20 171:7	254:13,16 255:19	hospitals 41:20
63:3 65:4 67:7,16	173:7 174:18,23	255:23 256:2,5,25	217:13
67:21,25 68:3,4	174:25 175:2,4,8	257:3,4,13,16,21	<b>hotel</b> 175:6
68:21 69:13 70:6	175:10 176:7,18	258:3,7,19,22,23	<b>hour</b> 195:18 211:4
70:16 72:6,6,9	176:19 177:8,10	259:7,17,21 260:1	212:5 234:2
73:11,12 75:5,23	177:22 178:10,18	260:3,8,23,25	271:21
76:20 78:19 80:2	179:8,15,16,23,25	261:3,4,11 262:21	hours 78:4 144:13
80:4,7 82:19	180:19 181:5,11	263:7,25 264:13	144:21 212:7
83:20 84:5,9,11	182:6,9,13,22	264:15 265:19	214:5
84:12,21,24 85:1	183:3,4,8,18,23	266:22 267:2,13	house 151:23
85:13,14,20 86:2	184:2,7,17,24	267:20 268:23	howard 14:24
86:7,14,18,24	185:2,6,9,24	269:24 270:12,13	hudson 4:10
87:4,12,19,21	186:1,11,11,16,19	271:14,19 272:9	11:19
88:1,3,11,13 89:9	187:3,4,14,21	272:11,24,25	<b>huebner</b> 3:8 16:6
89:17 90:3,23	188:3,6,23,24	honor's 114:14	16:19,20 20:14,19
91:18,24 92:17,19	189:6,12,22	115:13 118:4	21:7 22:3 27:25
92:22 93:6,18,19	190:11 191:17	140:13 141:22	28:8 30:15 42:24
93:21,25 94:8,13	192:3,21 193:6,8	227:22 231:19	43:2,10,12 48:24
95:13,20 96:22	193:8,12,19,20	240:7 256:15	51:3 52:25 58:15
97:15 98:6,13,20	194:5 195:13	264:25	66:17 68:4 72:1,6
101:3 103:12,18	196:2,20,22 197:1	honorable 225:19	75:5,8,13,17,19
103:20 104:8,13	197:16 198:3,11	honor's 159:9	75:22 92:22 93:18
107:9 109:21	198:25 199:18,20	198:23	96:13 117:15
110:24 111:12,18	200:6,14,21,24	hope 22:11 24:8	220:10 233:24
114:16 115:16,24	202:1 203:8,18,23	25:9 44:4 45:24	234:3 235:14
117:15 118:2,13	203:25 204:8,17	136:23 142:9	270:12 271:9
118:20 119:3,13	205:17 218:9	145:1 157:3 176:5	272:9,13,19
119:17 120:7,8,21	226:5 227:2,7	205:6 212:1	huebner's 52:6
122:9 124:17	228:9,13,18 229:1	217:12,12 238:20	huebner's 199:12
126:10 129:2,7	229:23 230:4	261:11 266:19	huge 77:23 213:2
130:21 131:14	232:24 233:7,7,22	275:8	<b>hugh</b> 12:25
133:24 138:10	234:19,22 238:22	hopeful 232:23	<b>human</b> 207:2
140:18 141:8,17	239:15,23,25	hopefully 19:3	214:13 275:6
142:9 143:6,25	240:2 241:5	21:9 22:21 30:16	humanly 272:1
144:4,15,25 145:4	242:21,22 243:3	144:22 161:2	<b>hundred</b> 180:20
145:11 146:11,17	244:10,22 246:4	230:5	190:3
148:15 149:24	246:11,15,24	horewitz 182:23	hundreds 34:5
152:10 154:13	247:12,19 248:3,4	horrible 47:20	39:3,6,22 40:19
155:8,14 157:3	248:11 249:5	horrific 104:22	43:23 214:15
159:3 160:14	250:9,12,15	horse 131:23	271:10
162:25 163:3,11	251:11,17 252:7	203:7	

[hurley - income] Page 35

1 1 11 20	•11 4 4 04 4 4	107 6 111 2	
hurley 11:20	illustrative 81:14	107:6 111:2	inception 171:1
hurt 221:19	imagine 40:19	117:10 136:10	incidents 86:4
husband's 220:3	200:16	141:20,21 142:1	include 43:9
<b>hyde</b> 2:25 276:3,8	imes 11:22	150:15 172:12	46:19 50:22 55:5
<b>hyder</b> 11:21	immediate 67:3	174:7 199:25	58:11 71:22 83:12
hypothetical	immediately	202:17,20 218:2,8	128:1 177:13
30:23 33:2 42:10	220:4	231:8,17,18 232:4	196:10 240:8
53:10 62:5 78:1	immunities 136:7	234:25 273:12,17	244:3 260:15
89:21 249:3	136:14,22	274:9	included 77:15
hypothetically	<b>immunity</b> 120:3,3	importantly	133:20 138:5
116:2	136:2 137:9 143:2	80:15 186:15	167:14 172:5
hypotheticals	143:10,14,17,21	241:19	229:4 231:23
102:7	143:24	<b>impose</b> 51:6 94:4	includes 119:5
i	<b>impact</b> 166:10	imposed 31:11	155:16 164:4
<b>i.e.</b> 204:21	172:20 271:4	imposes 245:17	204:14 217:21
iac 141:23	impacted 132:10	impossible 38:13	232:8,10 240:11
iacs 65:19 122:18	132:11	94:12 133:11	251:21 258:25
idea 50:14 66:4	impaired 30:22	134:3 152:3	including 18:9
239:5 243:5 266:6	49:7 184:3	impression	19:25 31:9,22
ideas 158:3	<b>impede</b> 201:15	118:12	33:14 70:8 82:13
266:13	imperative 28:18	improper 92:16	84:14,17 85:9
identical 74:5	implement 201:15	126:4 206:21	86:5 98:12 101:25
81:5 99:16 100:7	implementation	improperly 80:12	115:12 121:25
	134:13	198:9 227:12	128:9 133:3
<b>identically</b> 45:6 45:14 70:4	implemented	255:2	137:14 142:14
identified 57:6	171:21	improved 119:10	143:2 155:17
62:5 63:3 238:24	implementing	inability 119:18	174:10,13 179:12
238:25 248:9	237:3	inadequate	180:17 182:1
	implication 134:8	109:25	185:10 187:10,22
273:2	implications	inappropriate	190:24 192:10
<b>identify</b> 23:18 55:14 62:22 259:4	183:19	17:25 93:11,13	194:13,19,21,23
	implicitly 29:12	109:23 142:18	194:25 195:2,4,10
259:8	190:7	186:21 234:10	219:1 220:10,13
identity 150:22,24	implying 75:9	incapable 58:22	224:7 226:24
ignite 222:8	importance 66:8	incarcerated	234:13 240:6,20
ignore 51:11	100:18 109:6	146:16 150:11	240:22 249:9
107:16 152:23	141:25 159:10	151:15 154:4	255:1 260:11
265:12	160:9	155:17,25 157:2	268:6 271:9
ignored 72:10	important 19:3,4	157:23 158:4,13	274:18
ignores 63:7	21:2 29:10 37:16	159:17 160:10	inclusion 165:3
ii 52:4	65:23 68:9 77:9	208:25	inclusive 44:8
illegal 140:21,24	77:10 78:17 84:21	incentive 171:13	income 46:24
208:10,24 212:13	87:1,16 95:23		65:16 145:13,14
238:12	07.1,10 73.23		05.10 175.15,17
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	ral Solutions	1

	I		
223:20 224:2	indicative 107:3	76:7 94:2 112:8	227:12,23 228:5
inconsistencies	indifference	148:11 156:6	229:9 237:18,24
101:13	221:19	158:8,14,23	238:9 258:6 263:8
inconsistent 92:14	indirect 137:24	172:16,25 209:5	263:9 264:1,7
145:6 184:16	indiscernible 18:7	242:8 247:25	273:1
incorporated	19:8 20:17 22:4	249:2 272:15	injunctive 121:25
235:13,19	23:20 32:24 35:6	individualized	injured 225:12
incorporates	40:9 41:18,19	156:18	<b>injury</b> 67:9,22
235:22 237:1	42:3 43:20 98:19	individually 44:4	79:4 132:19 153:1
incorporation	99:5 101:4 102:1	183:1	153:3 155:5,13,16
261:14	102:12 103:2,3,18	individuals	156:13 209:8
incorrect 80:17	111:15 112:6	108:20 155:16,17	210:12 215:21
incorrectly 25:20	114:11 115:9,10	155:25 156:14,14	216:21 228:4
increase 110:11	115:13 117:8	157:2,7,17,23	innuendo 22:17
116:15	118:6,13 121:1,1	158:4,13,25 205:4	<b>input</b> 217:25
increased 85:10	121:7,13 126:12	220:8 221:14	218:2
85:10,11 103:4	126:14 131:1,2	238:25 272:13	insanity 266:5
incredible 157:14	132:12 134:10,20	<b>induced</b> 213:10	inside 22:18
incredibly 42:14	134:22 139:13	industry 211:19	insoluble 140:3
87:17 129:16	141:4,7,11,14	222:9 231:2	insolvent 269:20
incumbent 51:7	144:17 150:14	inestimable 32:6	instance 122:20
<b>incur</b> 37:8	151:3 152:5,25	inevitable 216:2	220:9 230:24
indelicato 11:23	153:2,12,25	inevitably 238:5	instances 101:20
indemnification	154:20 160:15	inextricably	instant 33:4
26:16	162:5,13 163:5,18	169:6	instrument
independent	164:25 166:3,12	infirmity 93:11	223:18
66:13 141:22	166:23 171:25	<b>info</b> 85:11	instrumentalities
231:15,16 237:20	172:18 174:16	information 74:13	266:1
238:11 239:18	180:5 182:5,6,8	74:23 79:11	insulate 164:11
249:17 250:5	183:19 184:8,25	204:25 206:5	insurance 8:2
252:1 256:13	185:23 189:4	222:16 251:21	45:24 163:4,13,20
268:20 269:15	193:7 195:5	informer 232:22	163:24 165:11
independently	210:14 216:25	infringes 261:16	168:7,20 169:23
234:11,12	221:8 228:24	inhabitants 86:2	170:7,25 173:13
indicate 166:9	232:19 240:18,20	inherently 207:14	173:17,21 175:21
174:12	241:21,24 270:20	<b>initial</b> 28:4 81:4	176:14 177:4,16
indicated 105:18	271:11 272:3,12	initiate 225:21	179:18 180:6,13
105:22 208:7	272:15,17 273:2	initiation 189:3	180:16 181:25
259:3	individual 7:9	injunction 20:11	183:11 184:25
indicates 106:19	33:9 39:10,11	51:6,22 60:12	186:17 187:20
107:20	40:11 45:4 62:8	63:1 74:16 75:2,9	188:6,8 189:1
indication 259:12	64:17,20 65:12	75:25 127:18	191:14 194:13,13
	69:15 73:16 76:3	137:10 206:24	194:20,21,22,24

[insurance - issue] Page 37

			I
194:25 198:17	201:24	interested 22:3	investigated
199:13 200:2	<b>insurer's</b> 167:19	138:19 226:17	23:15 24:16
201:8,11 202:3	172:5 191:12	interesting 28:9	investigation
227:13,22,25	integral 137:13	interestingly	77:12,16 248:13
228:16 254:3	228:6	126:10 153:4	250:22
270:10	integrated 227:23	interests 28:2,6	investment 34:6
<b>insure</b> 164:1	intellectual 77:25	28:24 29:9,22	investments 259:4
<b>insured</b> 164:24,25	intend 21:5	30:3,12 31:16	invoked 262:12
182:14 188:17	273:10,11	38:22 39:16 42:16	involuntary 63:9
190:23 191:13	intended 42:18	43:13,24 47:22	134:22
227:11 228:5	62:23 135:14	63:13,15 68:10	involved 45:3
insureds 163:9	164:1 170:4	80:20 98:2 99:2	108:16 116:1
165:4,5 166:14	246:12 251:10,14	112:18 138:17	128:20 129:18,19
191:8 227:13	intensity 96:18	212:17	involvement
<b>insured's</b> 165:12	100:22,23,24	interfere 86:1	70:20 237:25
167:16	101:8,13 102:4	166:11	250:18
<b>insurer</b> 166:17	104:23 105:18	international	involves 200:2
168:2 174:3	106:12 107:5,17	122:24 129:3	234:13
177:25 181:24	109:10,11,24	internecine 39:2	involving 161:9
187:9,10,20,23	110:12 111:7	interpretation	ironic 60:8
188:1,2,3,3,11	116:8,16 117:4	30:3,4,17 254:2	ironically 35:23
227:22	intensity's 107:6	interpretive 237:2	42:4 47:3 78:17
insurers 144:18	intent 202:21,24	interrelated 94:11	irregardless
162:17 164:6,7,8	236:9	interrupt 74:21	121:3
164:17 165:6,25	intention 106:17	105:23 114:18	irrelevant 83:23
166:8 167:24	intentional 23:25	169:25 170:10	102:11 133:16
168:8 169:2,19	intentions 97:10	234:16 241:4,6	172:9
171:9,11,17 172:8	107:3 170:14	interrupting 16:8	irrevocable 42:7
172:17 173:1,6,14	interacts 214:13	intertwined 169:6	223:15,24
173:19,24 174:12	intercreditor	intervention	<b>irve</b> 4:6 261:6
174:13,14 176:13	34:10 40:24 72:25	176:4	<b>island</b> 48:12 53:6
177:20 179:2,3	interest 38:20	intolerable 94:5	80:11 88:9 261:14
181:11 187:12	45:6 46:11 47:3,9	<b>intro</b> 207:23	isley 11:8
189:16 195:15	47:14 48:5,24	introduce 212:2	isn't 160:7,11
196:14,18 197:24	49:8 52:8,11 53:2	introduced	186:22 199:10
198:20,20 199:8	53:7 62:1 63:10	208:13	israel 11:24
199:11,14 201:4	65:19,21 66:8,14	introducing 216:4	issacharoff 11:25
202:2,10,25 203:1	66:21 99:11	introduction	issue 23:12,12,23
203:3,9	112:11,12 150:17	210:6	24:8 25:12 32:18
<b>insurers'</b> 164:22	165:8 166:16	inuendo 250:18	48:14 51:10 58:19
171:16,22 173:8	173:9 175:19	invariably 82:12	58:21 59:13 66:25
174:1 190:18	224:2	82:14	72:9 95:7 96:22
198:6 200:9			98:19 102:3

[issue - judgments]

104:16 106:20	169:9 171:25	196:4 201:1,24	<b>john</b> 10:9,10
107:18 108:19	172:3 173:5	203:7,19,23 206:3	11:14 12:19,20
110:7 111:1,11,24	175:17,22 176:3	207:25	96:25 97:12
113:8 115:25	187:4 191:19	i've 200:8 206:1	116:11
116:21,22 118:10	195:15 197:8,9,17	208:8	<b>johns</b> 147:11,19
118:19 119:22	198:12 227:1	j	<b>join</b> 43:4 48:16
122:23 125:25,25	230:5,12 240:4	j 3:11,13 5:22	joinders 80:10
127:11,20 128:3	271:3,20 272:21	7:14 8:21 9:2	joined 43:1
131:7 133:7 134:8	it'd 67:23	12:15 13:8 14:2	118:16,17 146:5
134:18 135:12	item 19:5 28:1	15:4,9	155:11 261:13
136:23 150:3,13	80:6	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	<b>joint</b> 167:19 174:1
152:20 153:20	iteration 165:3	jacquelyn 221:23 jail 160:25	228:14
154:1 155:20	<b>it's</b> 146:7,12	james 3:10 5:7 7:6	jonathan 4:20
158:12 159:10	149:15 150:13	11:11 13:13 14:9	13:5 95:14 223:3
160:15,22 162:12	154:5 155:14,18	15:16 175:9	223:23
168:10 169:5	156:18 158:10	221:21 222:1	<b>jones</b> 8:24
172:10 173:11	159:16 161:11,21		jordan 14:3 15:11
174:2 178:11	161:22 162:10,25	<b>jamie</b> 15:22	<b>joseph</b> 10:3 13:24
179:20 180:24,25	174:7,20 175:22	<b>january</b> 147:3	14:10,22 15:7
181:12,15 182:13	175:23,24 177:12	221:12	josephine 10:25
184:5 188:20,23	178:10 180:7,8,12	<b>jared</b> 11:3,10	<b>jr</b> 9:13 11:11
189:5,13,14,24	182:19 184:16	jasmine 9:10	15:18
191:15 192:12,18	185:17 187:16	<b>jason</b> 14:5	<b>juaire</b> 220:15
193:12 196:24	195:19 196:3	<b>jay</b> 9:9	judge 1:23 16:2
197:25 222:16	197:5 198:5 199:3	jeff 227:2	16:11 17:5,7,10
223:16 224:1	199:9,15 200:17	<b>jeffrey</b> 5:14 12:17	17:16,21 18:5
229:11 231:17	202:17,19 203:5	14:2	19:20 21:1 30:9
233:25 234:4	207:5,18	<b>jenna</b> 11:19	32:12,25 50:2,2,3
235:11 236:1,14	iv 249:9	<b>jennifer</b> 10:15	135:10 145:23
236:20,21 238:23	ives 12:1	13:14	147:25 150:17
238:23 245:19	i'd 155:19 189:23	<b>jepsen</b> 221:2,9	152:25 218:19
254:14 273:1	<b>i'll</b> 153:5 154:20	jeremey 14:8	219:23 220:23
274:8,10 275:3	170:5 173:9	<b>jeremy</b> 12:7	222:5 225:19
<b>issued</b> 22:17	174:18,21 184:23	<b>jerome</b> 15:2	254:2 256:19
165:22 264:2	185:4 190:11	<b>jersey</b> 41:24 64:9	273:22
270:22	203:20	64:23,24,24,25	judgement 59:13
issues 27:17 36:21	<b>i'm</b> 146:6 149:13	78:2 183:22	judges 43:10 50:4
41:25 81:1 101:7	150:3 151:19	jesse 10:6	judgment 39:13
101:12,15 102:22	158:18 175:6	jill 9:4	59:19,23 60:4
104:17 105:7,17	179:14,23 183:4	<b>jja</b> 181:16 187:7	64:22 69:4 71:19
107:12 111:7	185:25 188:7,8,14	187:15 199:19	75:1 77:19 265:13
115:18 148:24	189:13 190:2	<b>jjb</b> 186:2	judgments 33:6
157:6 161:19	191:6 195:16,17	<b>job</b> 41:17 42:19	60:19 63:8 65:13
10,.0101.17	1,2,0,10,11	48:24 215:3	
	Veritevt Leo	1	1

66 1 60 11	1 000 15	20.24.24.27.22.2	217.0.21.21.51.5
66:1 69:11	kara 220:17	20:24 21:25 22:3	215:8,21 216:1,6
judicata 196:23	karavolas 12:3	22:13,15,17 26:14	216:11,18 218:4
judicial 70:2	karen 12:4	28:10,21 29:2,9	218:13,14 219:4,8
78:18 107:19	katherine 10:23	29:16 31:25 34:13	226:25 229:7,16
196:16	13:16	43:6,8,14 45:12	233:19 237:13,15
<b>july</b> 44:10 86:17	kathleen 13:7	49:20 58:2 62:7,9	237:21,23 238:14
148:25 176:22	keep 21:11 24:17	64:18 65:5,17	238:15,17 239:7
220:23 224:24,25	47:8 73:11 75:9	68:7,8 69:8 70:11	243:10,20,22
225:2,16	84:11 144:22	70:12 71:13 72:9	246:1,9,10,22
<b>jump</b> 265:11	161:5 164:10	73:12,19 74:10,19	247:2,24 248:8,12
<b>june</b> 146:24	165:15 210:24	76:13,14,15 80:18	248:13,19 249:15
148:18,22	216:12 234:25	91:9 92:20 96:23	250:6 252:7,8
jurisdiction 43:16	259:19	102:2 106:10	255:12 256:20
57:22 121:8,24	kelly 15:6	113:21 114:12	257:20 259:18
122:4 134:15	kenan 9:1	116:25 117:7,9	260:16 264:19
135:5	kennedy 12:4	118:15 122:15	265:4,8 266:24
jurisdictional	kenneth 10:12	127:2 128:5	267:20 269:19
120:1 131:7 135:9	118:3 220:12	129:17 130:2,8	270:24 273:11,18
136:22 142:24	kentucky 103:9	133:18 135:22	273:23 274:18
143:6	<b>kept</b> 215:19 216:1	137:21 141:2,10	275:3
jurisdictionally	244:19	145:14,15 150:6,8	knowable 33:18
122:20	kesselman 12:5	150:12 154:18	39:4 76:8,8
jurisdictions	<b>kevin</b> 3:20 10:4	156:19 158:18	knowing 216:8
43:16	84:9 93:19	160:17 161:1,2,5	226:18
justice 68:19	<b>key</b> 49:9 168:11	161:6,10,13,17,20	knowledge 67:4
74:18 102:6 112:4	240:10	162:9,13 175:15	67:14 79:15
justifies 93:11	keyboard 141:15	178:5 180:1 183:3	237:16 241:14,15
94:9	kick 190:8	183:5,7,8 186:4	248:24 249:15
<b>justify</b> 96:10	kills 222:23	189:23 192:4,4	known 92:7
<b>jx79</b> 81:15	<b>kind</b> 28:24 36:23	195:15 196:5,16	159:19 161:4
<b>jx825</b> 81:21	123:8 140:2 206:2	197:9,9 199:6	214:14
<b>jx944</b> 81:15	206:5,8 208:10,25	200:15,19 202:1,7	knows 19:12 21:2
<b>jx947</b> 81:21	209:5,9,11 211:11	206:3,11 207:3	22:15 30:21 76:19
k	211:23,25 213:7	208:8,9,11,19,23	151:22 171:7
<b>k</b> 11:17	213:14 214:13	209:6,7,9 210:8	173:7 183:4
kami 13:20	215:16 216:2,13	210:10,15,20	knudson 221:24
kaminetzky 3:9	239:4	211:21,24 212:1,4	221:25 222:3
12:2 71:6 264:15	klein 12:6	212:5,11,15,17,20	kotler 12:8
264:16,19	kleinberg 88:2	212:21,22,24	<b>kramer</b> 4:15 12:9
kane 147:11,17	kleinman 12:7	213:3,5,11,12,14	95:14,19
148:8	<b>knew</b> 92:12 216:3	213:23,25 214:2	
<b>kaplan</b> 88:2	<b>know</b> 16:23 19:6	214:11,12,14,15	
11 00.2	19:10,17,22 20:20	214:17,23 215:2,7	

[l - levine] Page 40

	100 01 01 101 1		1 0 47 44 40 40 0	
l	102:21,21 104:1	lawrence 6:12	<b>left</b> 47:11 136:20	
<b>1</b> 8:18 9:24 10:22	106:22 151:10	12:8	140:10 213:5	
14:22 15:8 220:15	246:20 273:12	laws 142:4 240:24	268:11	
<b>l.p.</b> 1:7 5:10 16:3	274:24	240:25 241:1,2,2	legal 40:20 70:14	
16:12	<b>largely</b> 20:9 57:19	lawsuit 222:13	83:23 93:20 97:24	
<b>la</b> 132:19	57:20 85:17 121:9	270:4,5,5	125:25 142:20	
label 222:10	172:9	lawyer 42:19 72:2	176:20 184:6	
labeling 222:19	larger 31:22	72:3 73:4 79:16	190:1 224:6,11,14	
labor 241:2	51:19 104:2	117:5 183:4,5	224:15 225:18	
labovitz 12:10	134:14	188:8 206:3 253:9	251:12 276:20	
labs 28:16	<b>largest</b> 34:18,18	253:10 270:17	<b>legally</b> 102:11	
lack 41:10 55:18	34:19 106:22	275:10	133:17	
74:23 147:8	<b>larry</b> 240:1	lawyers 48:1	legislative 261:20	
148:12 153:4	lasalle 45:11	67:22 204:21	263:17	
181:12 200:5	late 154:12 157:17	225:9 226:2,11	legitimate 80:24	
laid 71:14 85:19	157:24 161:25	247:6 253:15	100:11 103:21	
land 212:22	162:3 176:24	266:11,12 274:25	107:16 116:18	
language 26:20	launch 29:9,19	275:2	245:11,19 251:19	
27:3,18 49:6,9	launched 223:10	lay 85:13	legitimately 101:3	
136:16 164:4	250:24	layers 236:8	248:25	
165:4 166:8,21	<b>laura</b> 10:16 12:24	<b>layn</b> 220:11	lending 57:2	
170:3 174:12	<b>lauren</b> 15:21	lays 36:7	length 181:22	
176:10,11,13	<b>law</b> 7:1 36:15	<b>le</b> 173:15	lengthy 43:15	
178:6,8,11,15	38:21 41:24 57:21	leaders 212:1	132:23 273:15	
179:5,9,19,25	69:24 78:2,3	leading 111:6	lennard 12:12	
180:20 186:25	107:23 110:18,19	121:2,4	leonard 12:13	
187:7,25 189:7	114:22 115:6	leads 275:6	lessen 209:10	
190:3,4,6 192:19	123:9 125:24	leak 151:15	<b>letter</b> 77:9 106:2	
193:24 195:23	135:17 136:4	learn 217:15	220:22,23 222:1,5	
196:9 197:2,10,23	158:19 159:14	218:7 220:4	224:25 225:5	
199:8,19 200:8,16	163:7,9 164:5,17	learning 217:16	<b>letters</b> 215:14	
200:19 202:10,24	165:9,20 168:18	leave 41:3 47:21	270:14	
203:25 204:14	173:18 182:2	62:7 67:19,20	letting 68:7	
226:24 229:16	183:20,21,21,22	129:25 178:10	271:23	
237:1,23 239:13	183:22 188:13,24	213:11,13 264:13	<b>let's</b> 181:14	
240:10 241:17	188:25,25 189:10	leaving 35:18	182:11 190:19	
242:2 243:4,16	189:11 195:2,20	<b>lectern</b> 141:15	level 104:22 132:3	
245:7 248:15	196:17,22 208:9	<b>led</b> 41:2 161:6	161:4 209:17	
250:2,4 252:3	224:4,6,12 238:17	ledanski 2:25	leventhal 12:14	
266:24 267:7	249:8 256:1,9,10	276:3,8	<b>levin</b> 4:15 95:14	
languages 178:13	256:19 261:22,23	<b>lee</b> 220:17	95:19	
large 40:3 51:14	269:21,22	lees 12:11	<b>levine</b> 12:15	
98:9,14 100:16				
70.7,14 100.10				
Veritext Legal Solutions				

_			
lexington 3:5	<b>light</b> 115:25 154:9	33:18,21,22 34:1	99:6 101:22
lexisnexis 224:4	229:11	34:4,23 35:18	102:15,17,18,19
<b>li</b> 153:24	lightly 60:23	36:7,17 37:13	102:19 111:4
liabilities 23:2	<b>lights</b> 219:16	42:12 44:7,17	164:9,16 167:13
168:1,16,25 169:8	likelihood 66:2	45:5 46:13,16	168:11 177:9
169:18 171:8,10	76:5 77:16,19	47:10 48:2 53:12	232:14,16 233:13
173:2 181:23	118:9	54:8,12 55:4	244:18 246:1
182:24 185:15	likewise 35:14	61:10 63:22 69:20	little 28:3 100:20
202:7 240:21,25	165:21	71:22 72:13,15	140:11 144:21
255:24	<b>limit</b> 166:3 203:1	73:6 139:10 140:4	145:2,5 151:4
<b>liability</b> 22:14,16	260:21	172:23	152:7 188:7
22:21,24,24,25	limitation 196:9	lisovicz 12:18	189:10 203:5
26:11 31:1 39:23	231:7	220:21	230:18 267:19
143:14 144:9	limitations 194:20	<b>list</b> 23:19 44:18	<b>live</b> 108:25 176:10
145:7 165:24	230:20	48:10 86:9 119:22	176:16 262:14
168:13 186:8	<b>limited</b> 25:23 26:1	167:18 205:6	lives 47:21 99:2
187:10,13,19	46:25 112:6 143:4	208:4 218:14	<b>living</b> 153:9 197:8
188:17,18 190:22	196:3 223:5,11,12	238:25	225:23
190:23 192:10,17	231:14	<b>listed</b> 119:24	<b>livy</b> 13:3
199:17 237:13	<b>limiter</b> 247:22	154:6 202:4 242:1	llc 5:16 7:1 220:14
242:3,4,6 243:8	limiters 247:21	<b>listen</b> 138:12	220:15
246:13,23 247:2	limits 191:2,2	248:11	<b>llp</b> 3:3 4:8,15 5:9
252:5,5,18 253:2	194:1 249:14	listening 20:9	6:14 7:8,16 8:8
253:11 265:6,10	linda 11:22	118:16 207:12	167:11 220:19
265:14 266:4	line 20:5 21:23,23	litany 42:13 86:9	local 80:13 82:3
liable 243:11,23	28:20 38:1 59:1	86:11 94:14	83:25 84:12,16,22
249:2	71:5 76:16 117:8	lite 5:16 120:23	84:23 85:2,2,2,4,9
lianna 14:17	181:4 237:19	literally 43:25	86:3,10 87:9,14
lichtenfeld 12:16	238:4 242:15	99:2 142:14	87:15,21 88:17
lie 18:17 lien 151:3	256:14 265:12	235:12 240:13	94:23 142:21
lienholder 152:23	lines 84:22 160:2	litig 7:17	215:15 217:13 218:1
lienholders	231:1 link 211:23	litigable 41:25 litigants 29:2	localities 87:7
152:11	liquidate 31:4	147:12	located 18:24
liens 153:2	94:10 128:25	litigate 172:20	228:12
liesenmer 12:17	263:2,19 264:4	265:24	locked 139:7
life 153:17 208:6	liquidated 40:6	litigated 262:22	153:12 217:10
221:15 224:2	49:13 62:11	litigating 44:13	logic 39:15 188:18
225:23	263:13	264:25	188:19
lifetime 208:8	liquidates 172:16	litigation 34:10	logical 28:17
216:18	liquidating 34:4,8	40:13 43:19 44:22	lohmann 220:15
lifland 254:2	liquidation 29:14	47:24 53:10 57:8	loneliness 225:24
	30:23 31:6 33:14	60:9 64:1 95:16	

[long - marketed] Page 42

238:6 246:6 247:6 249:6 254:10 256:18 260:19 263:16 266:9,16 267:24  lowest 99:22 lowne 12:20 loked 77:21 104:21 105:15 106:11 110:14 135:19 175:12 192:5 212:13 lowhing 62:1 105:17 108:8,9 1238:6 246:6 247:6  loved 225:15 low 153:16 lowest 99:22 239:13 man 144:15 155:11 159:8 232:19 233:7 234:21 236:1 241:21,24 258:7 258:10,22 man's 212:22 manage 209:5 215:1 216:9,14 273:2  march 68:24 margin 47:18 mario 9:25 marion 13:21 mark 9:19 10:5 11:23 120:11 140:19 market 45:5,10 182:16 208:13 210:7 216:5 222:21 marketed 188:4	Г			
128:8 129:13   152:14 177:20   208:12,17 209:14   209:13 210:4   209:23   10rda				
152:14 177:20   208:12,17 209:1,4   209:13 210:4   209:23   210:4 210:22   222:22,24   273:8   266:3   266:3   266:3   274:2 150:1   273:2   273:8   266:3   266:3   274:2 150:1   274:2 150:1   274:2 150:1   274:2 150:1   274:2 150:1   274:2 150:1   275:2 26:7   276:2 208:1   277:2 1 30:5,6   32:11 51:7,14,20   82:22 86:7 105:7   108:7 110:1,1,3,4   110:13 112:3   113:6 116:2 117:7   18:18,25 126:11   29:18 133:5   250:16 255:17   135:18 138:2   140:4 172:14   190:19 191:5,5   196:6 233:20   238:6 246:6 247:6 249:6 254:10   256:18 260:19   263:16 266:9,16   267:24   100:11 110:14   190:25 12:23   100:17 108:8, 9   145:24 219:21   104:21 105:15   106:11 110:14   175:22 13   129:13   130:18   136:16   110:14   140:20   175:17   190:18 273:6   100:11 110:14   190:25   120:15   100:15			lynchpin 133:10	
Loosing 103:11   Lord 209:23   Lordab 161:6   Lose 91:1 272:21   Lordab 163:5   Lordab 173:5   Lo			m	
208:12,17 209:1,4		,	m 6:19 8:14.23	_
209:13 210:4   214:3 216:22   221:22   222:22,24   273:8   273:2   273:8   273:8   273:2   273:8   273:8   273:8   273:2   273:8   273:8   273:2   273:8   273:8   273:8   273:8   273:8   273:8   273:2   273:8   273:2   273:8   2	208:12,17 209:1,4	_	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	152:12 154:22
214:3 216:22   22:22:22,4   lose 91:1 272:21   273:8   lose 91:1 272:21   273:8   lose 91:1 272:21   273:8   lose 91:1 272:21   273:8   lose 44:24 214:18   lost 17:1 73:21   177:24 209:25   221:4 225:15   245:21   lot 25:22 26:7   245:21   lot 25:22 26:7   273:3 101:24   magali 11:4   manufacture   160:19 182:17   222:22   221:23 222:2   mailings 159:24   manufacture   160:19 182:17   222:25 240:20   manufacture   222:9,12   manufacture   222:9,12   manufacture   222:9,12   manufacture   222:9,12   manufacture   222:29,12   manufactures   222:21   manufactures   222:11   manufactures   222:11   manufactures   222:12   manufactures   222:29,12   manufactures   222:12   manufactures   222:21   manufactures   222:21   manufactures   222:21   manufactures   222:21   manufactures   222:21   manufactures   222:21   manufactures   222:22   222:22   222:22   222:23	209:13 210:4	<b>lord</b> 209:23		manipulation
longer 28:3   273:8   loss 44:24 214:18   loss 44:24 214:18   loss 44:24 214:18   loss 17:173:21   177:24 209:25   221:4 225:15   longmire 12:19   lot 25:22 26:7   lot 25:22 26:7   37:3 101:24   maglit 11:4   magnitude 92:7   mail 159:21   221:23 222:2   mail 159:21   222:25 240:20   maunfacture 190:24   manufacture 190:	214:3 216:22	<b>lortab</b> 161:6		91:15
longer 28:5   111:13 143:13   loss 44:24 214:18   loss 17:173:21   madoff 244:19,20   maelstrom 34:11   manufacture 190:24   manufacture 190:25   18:10:25:3   22:13   22:13   22:13   22:13   22:13   22:13   22:13   22:13   22:13   22:13   22:13   22:13   22:13   22:13   22:13   2	222:22,24	lose 91:1 272:21		<b>manner</b> 110:22
111:13 143:13   16ss 44:24 214:18   17:24 209:25   17:724 209:25   17:724 209:25   16:19   16t 25:22 26:7   10:15:17 10:14, 17:14   19:19 11:15   10:14 11:25   12:24 215:25   10:14 114:25   12:24 215:25   10:15:17 10:15, 15   10:16 23:20   10:17:17 21:29 20:19 21:28   13:6 116:2 117:7   118:18, 25 126:11   12:24 215:25   12:24 215:25   12:24 215:25   12:24 215:25   12:24 215:25   10:10 12:18 133:5   10:12 4 215:25   12:24 215:25   10:10 12:18 133:5   10:16 69:6 175:17   100:19 191:5, 5   100:19 191:5, 5   100:19 191:5, 5   100:19 191:5, 5   100:19 191:5, 5   100:19 191:5, 5   100:19 191:5, 5   100:19 191:5, 5   100:19 191:5, 5   100:19 191:5, 5   100:19 191:5, 5   100:19 191:5, 5   100:19 18:5   10:19 12:20   10:19 12:20   10:19 12:21   10:19 17:12   10:19 17:		273:8	_	121:14 123:6
158:5 186:2 264:8   lost 17:1 7:3:21   lost 17:1 7:3:21   longmire 12:19   longstanding 165:19   lot 25:22 26:7   37:3 101:24   lost 25:22 26:7   37:3 101:24   lost 25:22 26:7   37:3 101:24   lost 151:7,14,20   lost 17:1 7:21 151:7,14,20   lost 17:1 15:12   lost 69:6 175:17   l	111:13 143:13	loss 44:24 214:18	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	124:1,20 132:4
Tritical 209:25   Longmire 12:19   Lot 25:22 26:7   Lot 25:22 26:13   Lot 25:22 208:19,24   Lot 27:22   Lot 25:25   Lot 25:17   Lot 26:15   Lot 25:15   Lot 26:11   Lot 26:15   Lot 26:15   Lot 26:15   Lot 26:15   Lot 25:15   Lot 25:15   Lot 25:15   Lot 25:15   Lot 22:26   Lot 27:22   Lot 20:25   Lot 26:10   Lot 26:15   Lot 27:22   Lot 27:23:2	158:5 186:2 264:8	<b>lost</b> 17:1 73:21		134:1
longmire   12:19   245:21   lot   245:21   lot   25:22 26:7   mail   159:21   221:23 222:2   mailings   159:24   manufactured   160:19 182:17   222:25 240:20   manufactured   160:19 182:17   222:25 240:20   manufactured   222:25 240:20   manufacturer   222:25 240:20   manufacturer   222:25 240:20   manufacturer   222:25 240:20   manufacturer   222:9,12   manufacturer   22:9,12   manufacturer   22:9,12   manufacturer   22:9,12   manufacturer   22:9,12   manufacturer   22:9,12   manufactures   22:11   14:15   25:9,9,13 95:25   105:10 126:15   224:14 225:10   marufactures   22:11   manufactures   22:12   manufactures   22:12   manufa	266:3	177:24 209:25		manufacture
lot   245:21   lot   25:22   26:7     37:3   101:24   105:14   114:25   105:14   114:25   105:14   114:25   108:7   109:15   17:7   118:18,25   126:11   129:18   133:5   129:18   133:19   191:5,5   106:6   233:20   18:5   109:6   233:20   18:5   109:6   233:20   18:5   100:6   233:20   18:5   100:6   233:20   18:5   100:6   233:20   18:5   100:6   233:20   18:5   100:6   233:20   104:21   105:15   106:11   110:14   129:5   22:13   104:21   105:15   106:11   110:14   133:19   175:12   104:21   105:15   106:11   110:14   133:19   175:12   119:5   120:15   100:10   120:10   100:10   120:10   100:10   100:10   100:10   100:10   100:10   100:10   100:10   100:10	longmire 12:19	221:4 225:15		190:24
lok   25:22 26:7   37:3 101:24   105:14 114:25   27:21 30:5,6   32:11 51:7,14,20   189:10 196:22   108:7 110:1,1,3,4   197:22 208:19,24   110:13 112:3   210:7 211:9 212:8   113:6 116:2 117:7   122:24 215:25   118:18,25 126:11   226:8 232:6 250:3   226:13   maintain   66:1   264:11   majority   31:12   52:9,9,13 95:25   105:10 126:15   105:10 126:15   105:10 126:15   105:10 126:15   105:10 126:15   105:10 126:15   105:10 128:7   110:10 128:7   110:10 128:7   110:10 128:7   110:10 128:7   156:25 176:19   118:5   10we   45:10 117:9   118:5   10we   45:10 117:9   123:19:222   104:21 105:15   106:11 110:14   10wis   19:20   10wis   19:20   104:21 105:15   106:11 110:14   123:19 175:12   105:17 108:8,9   122:5 127:12   105:17 108:8,9   122:5 127:12   123:25 12	longstanding	245:21		manufactured
look 25:24 26:13	165:19	lot 25:22 26:7		160:19 182:17
105:14 114:25   127:4 151:9   189:10 196:22   178:11 225:3   222:9,12   manufacturer	look 25:24 26:13	37:3 101:24		222:25 240:20
127:4 151:9	27:21 30:5,6	105:14 114:25		manufacturer
189:10 196:22   197:22 208:19,24   210:7 211:9 212:8   226:13   maintain 66:1   264:11   majority 31:12   222:18   231:21   manufacturers   231:21   manufactures   231:21   manufactures   231:21   manufactures   231:21   manufactures   222:12   manufactures   231:21   manufactures   222:12   manufactures   231:21   manufactures   222:12   manufactures   231:21   manufactures   231:21   manufactures   231:21   manufactures   222:12   manufactures   231:21   manufactures   231:21   manufactures   231:21   manufactures   231:21   manufactures   231:21   manufactures   222:12   manufactures   231:21   manufactures   222:12   manufactures   222:12   manufactures   231:21   manufactures   222:12   manufactures   231:21   manufactur	32:11 51:7,14,20	127:4 151:9		222:9,12
108:7 110:1,1,3,4	82:22 86:7 105:7	189:10 196:22		manufacturers
110:13 112:3	108:7 110:1,1,3,4	197:22 208:19,24		111:5 222:18
113:6 116:2 117:7	110:13 112:3	210:7 211:9 212:8		231:21
118:18,25 126:11   226:8 232:6 250:3   250:16 255:17   105:10 126:15   105:10 126:15   105:10 126:15   124:14 225:10   106:3,12 181:14   190:19 191:5,5   196:6 233:20   238:6 246:6 247:6   249:6 254:10   256:18 260:19   263:16 266:9,16 267:24   lowed 225:15   106:11 110:14   135:19 175:12   106:11 110:14   135:19 175:12   105:17 108:8,9   122:5 127:12   105:17 108:8,9   122:5 127:12   122:5 127:12   122:5 127:12   122:5 127:12   122:5 127:12   122:5 127:12   122:5 127:12   123:6   126:8 232:6   250:3   250:16 255:17   105:10 126:15   224:14 225:10   making 43:13   60:23 63:19 79:6   110:10 128:7   156:25 176:19   191:23 192:22   239:13   march 68:24   march 9:25   march 13:21   march 13:21   march 13:21   march 9:25   march 13:21   march	113:6 116:2 117:7	212:24 215:25		manufactures
129:18 133:5	118:18,25 126:11	226:8 232:6 250:3		222:12
135:18 138:2	129:18 133:5	250:16 255:17	i i	manville 147:11
140:4 172:14   190:18 273:6   loud 204:1   190:19 191:5,5   196:6 233:20   238:6 246:6 247:6   249:6 254:10   256:18 260:19   263:16 266:9,16 267:24   lowed 77:21   104:21 105:15   106:11 110:14   135:19 175:12   192:5 212:13   lowing 62:1   105:17 108:8,9   122:5 127:12   234:21   234:2   234:2   234:2   234:2   234:2   234:2   234:2   234:2   234:2   234:2   234:2   234:2   234:2   234:2   234:4   273:2   100000000000000000000000000000000000	135:18 138:2	<b>lots</b> 69:6 175:17		147:19 249:9
180:3,12 181:14   190:19 191:5,5   190:is 9:14   100is 9:14   100:19 191:5,5   196:6 233:20   238:6 246:6 247:6   249:6 254:10   256:18 260:19   263:16 266:9,16   267:24   lowest 99:22   lowne 12:20   loked 77:21   104:21 105:15   106:11 110:14   135:19 175:12   192:5 212:13   looking 62:1   105:17 108:8,9   122:5 127:12   123:5 127:12   123:5 127:12   123:6   123:6   123:6   123:5 123:2   123:6   123	140:4 172:14	190:18 273:6		mar 220:11
190:19 191:5,5   196:6 233:20   238:6 246:6 247:6   249:6 254:10   256:18 260:19   263:16 266:9,16   267:24   267:24   223:6   106:11 110:14   135:19 175:12   192:5 212:13   looking 62:1   105:17 108:8,9   122:5 127:12   234:21   234:2	180:3,12 181:14	<b>loud</b> 204:1		mara 12:14
196:6 233:20	190:19 191:5,5	<b>louis</b> 9:14		marc 3:13 12:5
118:5   191:23 192:22   239:13   march 68:24   margin 47:18   march 68:24   march 68:24   margin 47:18   march 68:24	196:6 233:20	<b>love</b> 45:10 117:9		14:19 15:4 146:12
loved   225:15     239:13     margin   47:18	238:6 246:6 247:6	118:5		march 68:24
256:18 260:19	249:6 254:10	loved 225:15		margin 47:18
155:11 159:8   232:19 233:7   234:21 236:1   241:21,24 258:7   258:10,22   258:10,22   258:10,22   273:2   273:2   273:2   273:2   273:2   273:2   273:2   273:2   273:2   273:2   273:2   273:2   273:4   273:2   273:4   273:2   273:4   2	256:18 260:19	low 153:16		_
lowne   12:20   lp   145:24   219:21   232:19   233:7   234:21   236:1   234:21   236:1   241:21,24   258:7   258:10,22   25	263:16 266:9,16	lowest 99:22		mario 9:25
looked 77:21 104:21 105:15 106:11 110:14 135:19 175:12 192:5 212:13 looking 62:1 105:17 108:8,9 122:5 127:12    lp	267:24	lowne 12:20		marion 13:21
104:21 105:15 106:11 110:14 135:19 175:12 192:5 212:13 looking 62:1 105:17 108:8,9 122:5 127:12  104:21 105:15 223:6 lp's 221:22 lts 220:15 lumped 92:6 lunch 27:22 144:14 145:15 234:21 236:1 241:21,24 258:7 258:10,22 man's 212:22 man's 212:22 manage 209:5 215:1 216:9,14 273:2  11:23 120:11 140:19 market 45:5,10 182:16 208:13 210:7 216:5 222:21 marketed 188:4		<b>lp</b> 145:24 219:21		mark 9:19 10:5
106:11 110:14     lp's 221:22     241:21,24 258:7     140:19       135:19 175:12     lts 220:15     man's 212:22     market 45:5,10       192:5 212:13     lumped 92:6     manage 209:5     215:1 216:9,14       105:17 108:8,9     144:14 145:15     273:2     215:1 216:9,14       122:5 127:12     234:2     234:2		_		
135:19 175:12 192:5 212:13 looking 62:1 105:17 108:8,9 122:5 127:12    Its   220:15   man's   212:22   manage   209:5   215:1 216:9,14   273:2     222:21   market   45:5,10   182:16 208:13   210:7 216:5   222:21   market   45:5,10   234:2   215:1 216:9,14   273:2   223:21   market   45:5,10   234:2   23			′	
192:5 212:13   lumped 92:6   lunch 27:22   manage 209:5   210:7 216:5   212:21   manage 209:5   210:7 216:5   222:21   273:2   marketed 188:4		_	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
looking 62:1   lunch 27:22   215:1 216:9,14   273:2   210:7 216:5   222:21   234:2   234:2   234:2   273:2   210:7 216:5   222:21   273:2   27				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
105:17 108:8,9 144:14 145:15 273:2 222:21 marketed 188:4		_	_	
122.5 127.12 234.2 213.2 marketed 188.4				
$\mathbf{managed}  58.20$				
1 120.2 127.75			managed 58:20	
216:20	100.0 102.20		216:20	

marketing 81:9	160:24 161:9	<b>md</b> 6:4	113:21 274:6
207:7,20 239:2	170:13 196:15,17	<b>mdp</b> 163:15	measures 96:19
251:1	196:23 239:12	<b>mdt</b> 167:4,17	100:22,23 101:8
markets 141:24	246:7 273:12	168:7 169:17	101:13
<b>marking</b> 234:14	matters 19:14	170:25 173:1,16	mechanics 93:8
markman 11:8	51:3 79:24 82:13	173:21 180:6	mechanism
marshal 169:7	99:17 107:19	194:13,21,25	242:13 243:25
marshall 3:8	108:15 144:19	200:9 201:8 202:3	245:25 246:3,7
16:20 220:10	165:9 190:10	<b>mdt's</b> 201:11	262:5 265:4
martin 15:15,16	197:19,20 226:23	mean 22:2 25:15	269:12,15
maryland 6:1,2	242:8	52:8 54:2 59:24	mediate 132:24
37:19 42:17 43:1	matthew 9:2	60:10 63:13 64:23	mediated 185:16
43:3 48:8,12 53:5	10:18 88:1	64:24,24 65:2	mediating 183:12
78:2 80:9 88:9	<b>maura</b> 13:7	67:8 73:7 74:1,2	mediation 17:6,23
230:2	maxcy 12:23	74:12 100:7 114:3	18:5,20 20:1,17
mass 44:21 86:4	<b>mayor</b> 218:1	114:3,17 125:24	20:17,25,25 21:11
93:23 163:19	ma'am 205:8,16	127:9 135:14	22:5 34:10 82:4
massive 33:18	mccarthy 3:12	137:22 153:14	128:3 129:13,14
34:2,6 36:6 43:15	80:2,3,6	160:19 171:16	129:19 134:3
<b>master</b> 163:12	mccarthy's 93:13	188:3,19,21	138:4 183:9,15
194:23 228:1	mcclammy 3:10	191:13 192:4	mediator 19:20
masumoto 12:22	221:21 222:1	194:2,2 195:25	273:22
matched 57:7	mccloud 12:24	196:13 197:7,20	mediators 20:2,16
243:6	mccloy 4:8	197:24 198:12	20:21
material 24:2	mcdermott 224:8	200:8 206:22	medical 84:25
25:10 36:20 41:3	mcdonald 12:25	211:11,14 212:14	158:14,17 215:21
42:2 73:5 114:8	mcgaha 8:18	212:20 214:20	220:17
116:10 132:3	205:6,17,18,19,20	228:23 244:7	medications 81:9
134:14 171:2	205:20,22 206:1	245:20 247:1,14	<b>meet</b> 30:18,19
materiality	206:11,17 207:22	248:12,15 249:6	116:14,17
115:25	210:23 211:1,6	249:22 252:4,7	meetings 222:18
materials 206:14	213:18 216:25	253:5 255:21	megan 14:6
<b>math</b> 46:7 100:20	217:1,4,7 218:9	256:8,18 263:23	meises 13:2
117:4,5	218:14	meaning 49:25	melanie 9:24
mathematical	mcgaha's 205:15	135:21	melissa 11:2 15:8
32:15	mckenzie 239:8	means 29:16	meltdown 47:23
<b>mathew</b> 10:14	mckinsey 23:12	56:11 159:18	<b>melted</b> 73:20
matter 1:5 23:1	23:12,22	204:13 264:3	<b>member</b> 69:15
81:4 82:10 85:17	mckinseys 26:18	meant 28:25	85:3 161:14
94:3 95:19 100:1	<b>mcmahon</b> 256:20	36:21 54:14,15	248:17 269:16,18
108:17 126:16	mcnulty 13:1	88:15 145:5,13	269:23 270:1,2,6
146:1 151:14	<b>mcorp</b> 66:10	measure 62:14	members 40:11
152:20 153:14		101:10 105:12	49:2 100:8 224:7

_			_
memory 21:9	<b>miles</b> 73:10	misconduct 23:24	<b>moment</b> 177:10
214:17	millenium 29:6	26:5,5,8,11	197:2 246:11
men 154:4	30:8	235:17 240:16,17	moments 72:8
mental 106:6	millennium 28:16	241:8 247:7	monaghan 13:7
mention 83:22	miller 13:4	249:16 255:16	242:21,22 243:3
85:16,16 104:15	<b>million</b> 36:9 42:15	260:4 267:8,17	243:14,19 244:10
104:20	47:2 56:14,14,15	268:8 269:3	244:22 245:4,7
mentioned 17:5	57:18 69:5 70:14	misfeasance	<b>monday</b> 17:2 20:6
49:1 82:19 84:7	72:20,24 86:16	245:12	23:21 25:14 36:14
mentioning 216:1	116:3 117:6	misleading 87:18	42:4 46:20 107:11
239:4	128:23 133:21	misnomer 165:6	224:17 227:8
merely 65:10	156:14 160:16	misrepresenting	234:7
124:13 150:25	224:11,15	93:15	<b>monday's</b> 231:20
153:3	millions 40:20	<b>missing</b> 112:20	monetized 45:25
merit 61:19 95:5	116:9	114:1,21 211:23	<b>money</b> 47:7,10
meritorious 39:17	<b>mind</b> 25:18	misstatements	67:3,6 103:1
39:18,20	124:17 206:4	56:23	106:25 109:15,17
merits 39:9 96:12	252:12,15	mistake 41:14	115:25 117:9
178:4 190:7 265:5	minds 19:17	93:14 139:14	122:8 130:10
266:17	mineola 276:23	mistakes 215:5	138:13,13,18,22
messrs 129:13	minimal 107:5	misunderstanding	156:5 157:7,9,9
<b>met</b> 73:10	minimize 171:14	38:21	158:24 199:16
meta 44:4	<b>minimum</b> 40:16	misunderstandi	211:1,2 213:13,14
metaphor 246:9	116:15	230:10	215:20 217:11
<b>metric</b> 101:17	<b>minor</b> 102:4	misunderstood	218:4 224:20
<b>metrics</b> 101:16	127:22 176:11,11	235:6	242:20 263:6
104:21	minority 52:20	<b>misuse</b> 37:6,9	money's 117:9
metromedia	<b>minus</b> 39:6	<b>mitchell</b> 9:9 11:20	212:3
28:12 29:6	<b>minute</b> 74:9 102:2	mitnick 13:5	moneys 110:14
<b>mezei</b> 13:3	266:7	mmes 212:25	<b>monies</b> 64:11
<b>michael</b> 9:8 11:6	minutes 28:2	<b>mo</b> 19:12	monitor 79:9
12:21 13:11 14:14	30:16 70:3 127:19	<b>mode</b> 20:9,9	207:1,1 251:4
15:9	130:25 202:18	<b>model</b> 105:9	monitoring 79:10
michele 11:18	222:8,10,15,17	138:22 142:10,16	monitors 207:6
13:2,19	261:10	142:18	<b>month</b> 184:1
microgram 214:4	miracle 127:23	<b>modest</b> 110:10	214:6
microphone 21:16	miracles 209:3	<b>modify</b> 49:16	months 129:13
<b>middle</b> 18:13	mirrored 243:6	173:14 194:12	265:3,3
143:12	mis 205:22 215:4	<b>mogul</b> 163:22	<b>moot</b> 82:20
milbank 4:8 21:20	miscellaneous	189:6,25 190:12	190:20
25:1,8 145:3	144:19 226:23	mohican 129:5,5	moral 188:10
246:5	261:9	molton 13:6	<b>morning</b> 16:2,11
			16:19 177:1 227:8
		ral Calutions	

			I
229:6,18,21 239:7	<b>mullane</b> 150:19	<b>named</b> 25:4,8	nebulous 125:1
267:15 273:10,19	<b>multi</b> 3:16 33:5	35:6 40:12 74:7	necessarily 21:23
275:12	34:6 84:6,10	narcotics 213:21	103:1 134:6 252:1
morphine 108:8	multiple 34:24	narrow 18:15	necessary 24:21
<b>morris</b> 102:3	79:9 82:11 191:18	198:13 227:11	59:11 153:18
181:4	197:8 216:18	240:18 248:16	158:6,16 167:16
morrisey 5:7	227:20 236:7	narrowed 27:5	170:24 177:13
96:24 104:11,13	multiplication	narrowing 17:13	211:1 213:7
104:14 105:22,24	53:18	145:2	216:22 228:7
105:25 106:3,5,10	multiplier 37:10	narrowly 234:4	necessity 29:4
106:16 114:16,18	37:16 46:3,7	nas 157:21 158:9	58:13
115:16,18,23,24	municipal 81:12	natasha 12:10	<b>need</b> 25:4,5 33:16
116:5,7	120:24 123:20,23	nathaniel 13:4	38:4 42:21 73:4
morrisey's 114:4	124:4,23 126:3	nation 5:17	81:11 93:17 95:21
mortimer 223:9	133:9	103:23 124:4,24	102:23 109:16
223:14,16,21	municipalities	130:6 154:3	111:13 120:14
224:1 259:3	39:21 80:13 81:2	<b>nation's</b> 96:16	152:8 157:7
mothers 221:3,7	88:25 89:4 92:10	138:17	158:16 161:11,19
225:22	119:23 121:6	national 97:24	174:8 186:3,17
<b>motion</b> 127:2	124:13 125:8	99:1,11 101:20,25	193:14 201:7,16
133:6 153:21	127:7 132:7,8	101:25 142:21	203:17 207:24
178:17 220:7,24	135:4 138:17,24	271:3	208:12 210:4
222:6	140:22 141:1,3	nations 120:24	211:13 213:4
motions 57:19,20	142:7,12 143:22	121:6 123:24	225:20 236:17,25
86:12 93:4	225:9	124:13 126:3,20	244:1 246:15
motivate 161:12	municipality 5:17	127:7 133:9 141:3	258:10 260:21
motivation 113:7	124:24 125:4,5	143:22	272:19 273:2,7
114:7	137:23	<b>native</b> 125:21	<b>needed</b> 26:21 95:1
<b>mouth</b> 114:4	murray 13:9	130:6,12 138:1	209:6
<b>move</b> 65:9 79:20	musicland 156:9	<b>nature</b> 97:5 112:8	needs 16:7 29:23
91:2 95:6 109:5,9	<b>mute</b> 16:10	132:22 161:19	107:23 108:1
109:11 134:15	141:13 155:10	271:6	142:23 162:8
141:13 176:6	165:15	navigating 161:11	190:4 195:24
178:19 259:20	mvra 152:14,24	navigators 8:2	236:14 246:8
270:25 273:12	mvt 227:22 228:5	175:1 179:10	249:19 274:10
<b>moved</b> 73:1	n	navigators'	275:4
movement 119:18	n 3:1 16:1 45:11	162:21	negate 201:5
<b>moving</b> 271:16	276:1	<b>nbt</b> 257:23	negligence 216:7
<b>msg</b> 41:18	naacp 129:19	ncaa 139:4	216:16 247:10,25
msge 86:8 92:21	133:3	ncsg 93:7	negligent 247:9
93:19	naftalis 4:15	nearly 85:18	247:15
<b>muha</b> 13:8	name 182:22	151:25	negligently
	205:18 241:3		248:19

negotiate 115:19	64:25 69:1 85:20	135:10 157:21	86:24 94:14 96:13
164:21 246:20	85:22,24 86:18	158:9 168:18	98:23 101:12
negotiated 82:3	103:9,10 129:5	173:18 180:16	104:3 113:9
97:22,23 113:14	178:13 183:21,21	182:2 200:3 210:5	141:22 142:9
116:25 167:23	206:18 220:20,20	240:6,7,8,16,17	143:6 147:25
170:3,11 185:16	221:10 222:21	241:8 242:8,19	174:2 200:4
negotiating 168:6	224:8,12,18	243:17 244:7,12	270:13
negotiation	225:21 235:13,14	244:24 246:12	<b>notes</b> 20:15
167:25 181:23	257:9 260:6	247:7 248:20	143:16 151:16
187:18	newark 5:20	249:19,22 250:4	181:2 182:15
negotiations 19:8	newco 45:25	254:25 260:4	210:1
97:17 98:1 112:7	273:1	267:8,16 268:8,13	<b>notice</b> 70:2 78:9
112:8 167:25	<b>newman</b> 147:25	269:3 270:16	78:18 79:15
181:22	newspaper	noncompliance	146:15,19 147:4
neiger 13:10	185:13	57:21	147:16,21,23
<b>neither</b> 57:25 70:5	nice 213:11	nonconsensual	149:2 150:20
165:2 190:1	nicholas 13:18	29:3 135:6	151:14 152:5
233:20	nickolas 12:3	nonconsenting	153:12 154:2
nervous 244:23	nicole 12:13	272:9	155:2 157:13,14
<b>net</b> 35:17 43:18	niece's 175:5	nondischargeable	159:9,11,11,15,15
139:10	<b>night</b> 18:13,13	35:15	159:17,21 160:7
<b>network</b> 134:20	176:25 229:22	nonmaterial	162:7 167:24
neutral 190:4	<b>nii</b> 102:11	94:24	184:8,14 185:10
neutrality 165:4,5	nimble 272:4	<b>normal</b> 151:20	185:15 186:10
166:1,8 176:14	<b>nine</b> 40:8 41:1	196:16	195:15,22,24
186:25	47:15 70:19 86:15	normally 30:13	196:9,13,15,19,21
<b>nevada</b> 128:10	220:1,2	150:16 151:13	196:21 198:20
never 22:12 23:5	<b>ninth</b> 18:14 20:8	249:12	200:12 204:2
23:6 43:10 68:22	143:18 229:4	<b>norton</b> 24:12	242:4
69:7 76:2 78:9,20	<b>nj</b> 5:20	224:8	noticed 151:24
93:4 108:24 125:2	<b>nn</b> 186:4	notable 151:11	notices 151:5
125:12 131:13	<b>noad</b> 139:9	<b>notably</b> 163:21	noticing 148:16
134:4 138:11,14	172:24	<b>note</b> 24:25 46:18	148:20
148:23 178:3	<b>noat</b> 82:2 83:18	51:10,11 66:4	notification 153:4
208:8,9 210:16	91:2 92:23,25	69:2 88:7 89:11	notified 173:20
215:3 226:19,20	95:7 138:1 261:25	100:1 109:12	<b>notify</b> 151:9
nevertheless	265:9,11	137:10 140:7,19	noting 75:8
19:22 119:1	<b>non</b> 6:15 25:13	142:13 148:14	<b>notion</b> 76:13
207:15	26:5,10,11 36:1	159:11 203:25	122:10 131:16,18
<b>new</b> 1:2 3:6 4:11	38:9 39:17 40:21	228:13 260:10	notions 83:25
4:18 5:12 6:10,17	40:22 62:10 73:2	270:25	notwithstanding
7:12 8:4 17:23	82:16 84:19	<b>noted</b> 31:14 37:23	113:3 137:25
53:5 57:15 64:24	122:17 123:6	42:4 80:7 85:7	164:14,23 170:8

173:17 181:25	179:12 181:2	82:20 85:15 87:15	obvious 73:14
194:17	198:9 199:15	96:11 146:2,5,14	obviously 19:9,23
november 220:7	objecting 38:14	148:24 155:23	21:24 56:1 105:20
<b>nth</b> 45:3	46:2 48:11 79:22	162:16 167:20	118:5,21 123:20
<b>nuisance</b> 81:16,22	80:12,16 83:20,22	168:9 172:5 173:8	137:21 190:18
135:1 240:24	84:18 85:15 87:5	174:2 180:5 184:1	196:13 218:3
<b>number</b> 17:3,15	87:25 88:24 94:17	184:9 199:24	226:7 229:13
22:23 31:10 34:18	95:3 96:9 118:11	200:5,5 204:12,20	239:9 271:14,17
34:21 43:12,12	173:19,24 179:11	205:10 225:17	271:19 274:18
45:22 47:4 54:11	202:10 205:14	227:10	occasion 184:22
57:18 62:9 68:21	229:8,19 234:5	objective 101:9	184:24
70:6 71:15,17	264:21	objector 29:12	occlusion 169:21
76:14 83:2,12,23	objection 18:18	36:15,16,18 47:3	occur 105:3 189:3
85:12 93:22	19:7 31:13 35:23	113:4 147:22	occurred 183:9
110:25 167:14	39:16 42:15,16,20	objector's 62:16	occurring 207:10
168:21 194:17	43:3,5 47:16 48:5	120:13	<b>odd</b> 103:7 271:4
202:8 219:21	48:16,17,21 49:16	objectors 19:4	<b>oddity</b> 140:20
225:10,19 227:18	70:9 78:6,8 80:14	22:7 33:16 35:24	<b>odds</b> 78:25
228:15 230:8,13	83:9,21 93:5,8	36:12 38:4,18,19	offended 273:25
<b>numbers</b> 96:9,11	95:8,12,22 97:6,7	45:1,7 47:15	offense 135:8
110:8 225:1	98:9 99:12 100:5	51:23 70:8 71:2	offer 35:10,22
228:12	100:6,12,13	93:9 205:9 229:14	<b>offered</b> 18:19 97:3
numerosity	102:13 104:8,12	obligated 233:16	98:13,15 212:12
126:15	117:22 118:17	<b>obligation</b> 164:19	257:4
numerous 85:9	119:23,24 120:13	191:12 233:17	offerings 103:4
202:20	121:20 124:8	obligations 38:1	<b>office</b> 5:1 6:1,8
<b>nurses</b> 216:11	125:16 130:17	158:20 168:2	97:1 221:9 257:1
<b>ny</b> 1:14 3:6 4:11	137:2,3 144:18	171:12,14 177:4,5	271:8
4:18 5:12 6:10,17	146:18 147:4	181:24 187:20	officer 78:15
7:12 8:4 276:23	148:14 149:10	194:22 195:2	238:1 243:21
0	152:10 154:14	200:3 202:25	248:18,21 249:1
o 1:21 16:1 52:15	155:6,19 156:23	203:2	250:6 251:21
79:2 182:15 276:1	156:25 164:11	obligatory 31:22	252:16 254:8
oath 71:1,6,23	174:5 180:9,10	observations	268:17 270:10
73:4 78:11 212:18	181:3 185:6,25	217:9 218:8	officers 97:24
object 96:3	190:5 200:4	observed 52:3	232:22 238:16
117:25 166:11	204:11,22,25	obstacle 149:3	268:10
173:20 180:7	205:5,12,16 217:2	obtain 66:1	offices 88:9
198:6 201:6	218:15 219:20	147:14 233:12	official 74:16
203:10 225:1,20	226:13 227:11,14	<b>obtained</b> 147:20	77:13 220:18
<b>objected</b> 27:7	257:6 261:13	obviate 158:16	225:4
77:4 109:19	objections 17:15	174:8	offshore 63:10
163:10 174:3	19:11 31:12 80:8		

[oh - oregon] Page 48

<b>oh</b> 43:2 54:10	257:15 258:21	221:15 223:2	189:24,24 196:6
58:8 73:17 120:9	259:22 260:2	opioid 25:13 26:5	200:24 203:10,11
141:14 218:17,21	261:1 264:14,18	26:10,11 37:6,9	218:10 229:10
219:10,15,15,15	266:23 267:12	48:4 81:9 84:14	257:4
219:15 233:10	268:3,25 270:11	84:23 86:5,17	<b>oppose</b> 110:17
244:19	271:7 273:9	87:17 102:21	138:24
okay 19:18 21:18	oklahoma 57:17	104:4,16,20 109:1	opposed 43:5
27:24,25 28:7	69:2 183:22	110:3 154:3 161:3	49:18 61:24 68:12
48:6,13,18,22	<b>old</b> 202:23 226:4	163:14,18,25	91:12 113:18
50:25 52:2 54:16	276:21	168:16,25 169:18	128:22 148:8,9,10
60:5 61:6 68:2	omitted 236:6	181:20 187:8,10	160:25 194:6
72:8 75:7,21	omitting 171:1	187:13,24 188:5	244:25 261:9
79:20 84:8 87:24	onboard 17:4	188:16,18 191:8	<b>oral</b> 16:4,13 19:13
88:6 89:10 91:1	once 34:9 68:22	191:10,14 192:2,4	27:15 88:7 146:1
91:21 94:16 96:6	106:8 108:2,6	192:10,17,20	197:25 204:19
104:10 106:15	116:10,13 209:6	202:7 217:24	229:5 257:6
111:10 115:15	238:8 260:9	222:8,22 224:10	274:22
118:1 119:19	one's 30:5 250:5,6	232:9,14,16	<b>order</b> 16:15,17
120:18 129:20	ones 59:20 66:9	235:24 240:8,16	20:25 21:1,4,10
130:24 131:24	179:12 225:15	240:17 241:8	26:22 61:9 146:23
134:16 140:15	239:1 245:11	242:8,19 243:17	148:17,23 161:21
144:12,24 145:18	ongoing 18:20	244:12,13,16,24	162:18 164:12
145:23 149:8,21	21:4	245:15 246:13,13	165:1 166:19
149:23 155:10	<b>online</b> 220:24	247:2,7 248:20	167:5,15 170:7,24
159:2,13 160:13	<b>onset</b> 82:19	249:19 250:4	171:24 172:6
162:5,14 163:2	onus 251:22	254:25 259:12,14	173:14 174:10
167:9 170:21	<b>op</b> 209:8	260:4 267:8,16	177:3,8,9,22
174:20 175:2	open 51:13 129:17	268:6,8,13 269:3	183:25 186:2
180:3 192:7	273:2	opioids 84:25 85:1	194:11 195:4,5
193:14,17,18	operate 181:24	107:21 115:7	196:3,7,10 197:6
195:12 200:7,7,22	187:19	153:9 160:18	200:11 203:11,14
200:22 202:16	operating 206:24	182:16 192:17	204:4,5 206:21
204:18 205:19,21	240:22	207:9,9,18 222:11	258:1,2,4,5,18
205:25 206:17	operative 25:24	222:24 234:14	261:23 267:20
207:22 210:23	200:13,13	244:7	270:22 274:14,15
211:6 213:17,25	opiate 206:20	opium 214:14	orders 92:7
217:4,7 218:12,17	211:13	opportunity 20:8	165:18,19,21
219:8,10,20 227:6	opiates 206:5,20	36:13 69:19 99:18	195:10 271:19
227:7 228:20	208:12,17,18	104:15 107:7	ordinary 151:14
229:2 230:7,8	210:10,12 212:19	110:24 131:18	oregon 48:11,16
233:2,19 235:7	216:3,23	138:21 167:24	53:5 80:8 88:3
239:16,21,21	<b>opinion</b> 102:14	172:20 173:1	118:17
245:6 256:18	131:9 147:10	185:14 186:13,14	

	T	T	T
organizations	overprescribed	o'neill 9:3	<b>paper</b> 141:13
159:25	220:5	o'sullivan 13:12	papers 31:20
original 20:23	override 170:18	p	91:20,23 144:1
178:15 224:25	overrides 191:1,2	<b>p</b> 3:1,1 11:15	149:17 156:13
originally 23:21	overruled 48:5	15:14 16:1 52:15	160:12 173:9
ostriches 185:12	80:14 83:21	<b>p.m.</b> 224:5,24	227:15 228:22
<b>ought</b> 19:19	overstate 96:3	pa 8:12	229:1
ourself 25:6 28:20	overstated 87:6	page 28:20 29:6,7	paperwork 162:2
outcome 34:12	overstates 100:18	42:20 55:4,7,11	paragraph 33:15
68:14 98:11 103:6	<b>overton</b> 146:3,6	70:9 71:5 93:21	34:15 42:5 48:17
134:12 171:19	overview 22:1	98:17 99:8,19	77:10 83:9,10
186:22 274:7	26:24 27:3	100:3,17 101:14	86:8,11 97:18
outcomes 68:15	overwhelming	101:18,23 102:1	100:12 185:5,7,8
outlined 36:5	31:12 37:2 47:18	102:23 103:3,6	185:25 186:1,4
212:8	161:23 178:14	145:6 160:2	199:19 227:18
outrageous	overwhelmingly	185:13 223:3	paragraphs 83:16
216:17	44:9 82:22 94:19	pages 28:11 31:19	parallel 147:18
outreach 159:24	186:24 190:21	97:19 99:10	parens 87:5,6,10
159:24	overwritten	101:11 102:25	parent 32:14
<b>outset</b> 77:11	189:12	176:14 187:5	paris 14:6
104:16 122:10	<b>owe</b> 270:21	270:24	park 7:3 220:20
135:9 196:10	<b>owned</b> 259:1	paid 28:13,15	<b>parke</b> 24:14
<b>outside</b> 22:18 24:9	owner 223:5,8	32:15 57:16,17	parse 27:3
169:9 249:24	<b>owners</b> 76:19	69:1,3 211:2,4	<b>part</b> 17:10 18:3
outsiders 153:15	268:11	215:20 224:6,10	53:14 65:16 69:10
outstanding 180:5	<b>owning</b> 240:21	224:14 242:20	70:8 72:8 77:23
overall 87:20	oxycontin 161:6	pain 208:12 209:2	86:25 87:1 111:19
105:19 113:17	206:19 208:13,21	209:2,4,5,6,10,13	124:18 139:8
123:5 126:18	211:7,12,13	209:16,19,23	169:10 175:15
236:21	213:21 214:7	210:4,12,14,16,17	183:23 192:23
overarching	216:5 219:23	210:17 212:13	193:22 217:15
84:22 120:1	222:14,20 223:10	214:22 226:15,18	220:14 260:17
overbreadth	<b>ozment</b> 7:1,6	226:19	274:14
240:6	13:13 146:7,7,10	painful 35:1 47:20	partaking 138:20
overcome 97:13	147:5 148:6,23	painfully 41:2	partial 206:20
153:11	149:23,24,25	palle 74:2 122:11	partially 226:21
<b>overdo</b> 213:25	155:7,8 156:7,25	140:5	235:19
overlap 87:10	158:2 159:3,7,23	pamela 10:19	participant 231:1
88:20	160:14	15:3	participate 128:2
<b>overly</b> 27:11	ozment's 147:7,15	pandemic 151:25	128:2 129:22,25
259:2	149:19 160:6	218:25	133:1 136:9 138:4
overnight 16:17	o'neil 13:11	panel 147:25	142:8 143:23
21:17 240:4		169:11	167:24 185:15

participated	268:16 270:20	<b>patriae</b> 87:5,6,10	110:4 115:19
79:10 123:21	271:24 272:1	patrick 5:7 12:23	129:18,18 136:18
129:20 130:12	273:10,17,20	13:11 104:14	144:16 145:14
133:3 235:23	274:5,11,17,20,23	paul 6:3 8:14 9:1	146:5 151:9,12,13
participating	274.3,11,17,20,23	14:4,18 163:1	151:21,23 153:8
113:15 123:1,19	parties' 170:13	257:1	151.21,25 155.6
137:16 139:12	partner 35:5,6,6	pause 174:17	158:20,21 160:25
particular 59:20	223:5 224:24	184:10	161:3,12,17 162:8
71:18 87:19 88:24	partners 55:13	pay 40:15,19	165:15 204:20,21
105:8 106:21	57:5,12	46:24 47:7 153:17	204:23 207:2
107:4 108:19	partnership 46:25	153:17,18 182:1	204.23 207.2
110:3,7 112:11,12	parts 35:19	187:22 188:11	211:20 212:3
121:3 150:10	party 18:16 20:11	191:6,12,14	213:4,11,13 216:9
152:7 182:14	23:17,19 24:3,7	197:15,16 200:3	216:20 217:15,22
203:19 275:3	24:10,20 25:9	223:20 255:16	217:22,23 222:23
particularly 89:5	29:14 31:7,10,15	payers 41:20	225:15 226:9
112:7 115:7 121:5	32:6,8,13,23 35:2	paying 252:10,12	234:11 242:14
142:1 148:1 152:9	36:19,20,23 40:13	255:17,17	244:19 248:7
186:21 251:16	40:25 51:6,15,22	payment 220:7,24	251:5,18 260:22
parties 16:16,16	54:22 58:25 61:10	222:6 259:15	271:10
17:18 18:8 19:24	62:4 69:16,20	263:20,21	people's 119:24
20:6,10 21:2 23:4	92:11 104:19	payors 259:10	peradventure
24:22 30:10 31:10	119:25 121:21	pays 172:16	32:3
31:23 33:7 38:10	137:6 148:1 165:8	peace 35:8,9	<b>percent</b> 32:16
38:17 43:5 44:19	166:16 181:2	246:22 247:5	33:6 40:5,7 44:12
50:17,24 63:24	229:9 231:4,14,23	252:12,15 253:8	45:14 47:13 52:7
64:5 69:4 71:16	231:25 232:8,17	peacock 13:14	70:20 77:3 83:1,5
109:22 131:9	234:18,21 235:1,3	pediatric 41:19	83:11 96:16
133:12 147:5,9,24	235:8 238:15,25	peered 49:2	100:21,21,23,24
148:2 164:21	239:19 245:21,23	penalties 89:3	101:1,2 102:9
172:19 180:9	247:23 251:23	penalty 39:25	105:10,13,18,19
185:10 188:20	269:9	pending 57:8	105:20 106:13,21
224:22 226:17	party's 112:7	232:9	107:3,18 108:7
228:17 229:6,8,19	237:25	pennsylvania	109:11,12,12,13
230:4,21,24 231:9	pass 37:20 83:22	7:19 222:12	112:1 113:8 115:5
231:22 232:3	passed 37:19	penny 40:10	116:1 117:4,4
233:5 234:8,8	patch 214:5	pension 220:16	148:8 160:17
235:5,9,16 236:10	patches 214:4	people 18:8,21,21	180:20 188:23
240:15 242:17	patient 209:22	18:22 27:7,13,16	190:3,12 208:22
251:8 255:7	216:14	40:18 45:13,16	223:5
257:11,19 258:1,8	patiently 125:12	46:4 68:11 69:10	percentage 72:17
259:11 260:11,12	patients 216:9	75:8 77:23,23	83:17 262:2
260:13,15 266:20	_	78:4 98:17 108:25	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			

100.0	N 110.05	20.15	
percentages 100:9	personally 110:25	phrase 38:15	plaintivist 46:11
perception 132:4	148:3 175:23	187:17,18	<b>plan</b> 16:5,14,23
132:6	212:9 221:7 275:9	physical 160:16	18:14 20:8 21:6
perdue 126:25	perspective 116:8	<b>pi</b> 34:17 74:13	28:4 29:17,18
127:14,17 142:5	129:11 134:14	158:24 253:9	30:11,22,24 31:9
142:15 225:21,25	153:15 272:25	pick 23:25 26:16	31:24 32:23 33:11
238:15	persuade 129:12	26:22 32:25	34:20 37:12 38:7
<b>perdue's</b> 235:24	254:10,11,12	246:12 248:3	38:11,23 40:17,24
239:2	peter 10:1	picked 23:10	41:16 44:16,19,25
<b>perfect</b> 16:19 44:9	petition 222:15	25:19,22 247:14	45:17 46:3,12
96:13 130:2	250:24	248:9	47:17,21 49:3,3,8
264:22	petitioners 162:6	pickering 8:1	49:10,12 50:17
perfectly 185:9	petroleum 134:20	175:1	51:8,17 52:7,10
187:1 251:19	<b>pfizer</b> 32:13,15	picking 251:13	52:22 53:9,11,16
<b>perform</b> 121:24	59:9	<b>piece</b> 108:1,5	53:22 54:13 56:18
period 57:14	<b>pharma</b> 1:7 5:10	114:21,21 116:10	61:11 65:24 66:11
121:2 151:24	7:10 16:3,12	216:13	66:13 68:17 69:21
207:20 230:18	142:5 145:24	piercing 237:13	72:22 80:12 82:25
239:19 253:12,14	219:21 221:22	242:3 250:7 270:6	83:5,10 84:17
perjury 40:1	223:6 224:6,9	<b>pill</b> 216:11,12,12	86:8,25 87:2,20
permanent 25:1	225:21	<b>pills</b> 209:13 214:1	90:2,24 94:2,19
263:9	pharmaceutical	214:21	94:24,24 95:8,10
permissible 29:3	142:2 210:5	pillsbury 6:14	96:8,12,13,17,18
permission 19:15	211:18,25 214:11	pinhole 122:12	97:5,8,9,21 98:6
<b>permit</b> 137:8	224:9 231:1	<b>pis</b> 38:3 77:24	98:12,16,20,23
164:17 203:1	240:19,22	pittman 6:14	99:1,2,4,10,13,25
240:18	pharmaceuticals	pittsburgh 8:12	99:25 100:2,2,14
permitted 54:24	141:24	166:2,6	100:19 102:6,9,10
60:17	pharmacies 111:5	<b>place</b> 6:3 75:9	102:12,17,18
<b>perot's</b> 175:10	231:21	79:9,12 80:23	103:7,14,16,19,20
<b>person</b> 46:24 85:1	pharmacology	90:7 153:7 242:10	103:25 104:7,7
212:15 215:21	214:12	264:9	106:17 111:19,19
218:17 219:12,13	pharmacy 215:22	placement 131:25	111:20,21,21,21
243:22 244:25	238:15	<b>places</b> 70:19	112:10 113:15
245:18 247:25	<b>phase</b> 17:6 34:9	100:14 152:2	114:8 117:22,23
252:5 275:5	82:4	213:12	118:11 121:1,11
personal 40:11	<b>phi</b> 46:4 73:22	<b>plain</b> 30:1 136:15	121:14 122:13,23
64:21 67:9,22	<b>philip</b> 8:6 9:7	137:7	123:22 124:2,5,8
132:19 153:1	174:25	plains 1:14	124:8 125:10,17
155:13,16 156:13	<b>philips</b> 129:14	plaintiff 41:12	125:24 126:7,9,21
215:20 221:19,20	phillips 220:11	147:1 269:11	127:18,21 130:4
228:3 242:4,6	<b>phone</b> 165:15	plaintiffs 44:21	132:20 133:10,14
		86:19	133:23 134:11,13

[plan - polk's] Page 52

137:5,12,13 139:5	<b>plan's</b> 84:18	99:22 102:4,10	78:19 84:7 92:24
142:10,13,16	<b>planet</b> 76:19	103:13,13 105:13	112:22 119:25
143:8 147:9 148:4	<b>plans</b> 51:5 99:9	112:19 114:15	146:14 155:12,14
155:22 156:2,3	172:3 272:5	115:14,22 116:11	159:12 192:24
162:17 163:6,11	<b>plan's</b> 164:18	117:3,15 118:3,3	197:15 200:25
163:18,23 164:1,1	168:15	118:6 120:1,2	204:2,2 226:10
164:4,10,11,12,21	<b>play</b> 84:16	124:9,12,16,17	256:8 266:17
165:1,10,18,20	played 123:2	130:1 134:7	<b>poised</b> 65:5,7,9
166:4,17,21,22	<b>plead</b> 250:13	139:20 140:18	<b>police</b> 236:23
167:22 168:5,6,9	pleading 42:17	141:2,19 142:7,24	237:3 240:22
168:12,15 169:4	78:12 245:16,19	143:21 146:17	261:17 263:18
169:15,16,22	pleadings 78:14	149:2 150:4	policeman 85:2
170:4,6,11,14,23	79:16	152:17 153:5	policies 163:16
171:1,3,15,21,23	please 70:23	155:2 156:2,25	164:20,22 167:3
172:5,6,12 173:2	75:25 218:19,19	159:6 160:4	168:13,24 171:6
174:9,11 176:5,12	220:24	172:24 174:5	173:17 177:17,19
176:15,24 177:2,2	<b>pled</b> 79:8	176:10 177:8	180:16 182:14
177:7,7,11,13	plenty 250:21,21	178:24 179:23	188:7,9 189:1
178:9 181:21	plimpton 224:14	180:10 183:2	190:15,21 194:13
184:1,9 185:1,3	<b>plural</b> 193:4,9	184:23 185:17	194:14,21,21
186:1,24,25 189:8	199:4 204:13	188:15 190:5	202:4,6,25 227:13
193:23,24 194:6	<b>plus</b> 29:14 39:6,7	191:7 192:22	227:25
194:11,11 195:3,3	206:4	196:13 201:2	<b>policy</b> 163:13,25
195:9 196:3,5	<b>pm</b> 275:14	203:8,17 204:15	168:3 170:8
197:3 200:8,11	<b>podium</b> 18:25	204:16 205:2	179:10 181:25
201:6,7,13,15,23	76:17 84:4 166:25	206:13 210:22	182:1 183:7
202:5 203:3,10	228:19	211:16 215:10	187:20 191:2,14
204:4,21,22	podunk 212:4	221:15 226:7,13	192:9 194:24,25
205:10,14,16	<b>pohl</b> 13:15	227:16 229:7	201:14
206:15,18 211:24	poignant 162:9	233:10 237:11	<b>policy's</b> 168:16
217:10 218:6	<b>point</b> 21:8 27:10	241:19 245:21	political 98:6
225:17 226:17,25	27:16 31:20 43:6	248:16 257:12,17	101:5,5 107:7
227:10,20,21	44:4 45:7 49:20	259:8,20 260:8	110:16,21
228:4,6,7 229:4,9	50:7 51:19 53:24	262:24 264:1	<b>polk</b> 3:3 16:20
230:22 232:4	56:17 57:25 58:10	266:7 267:19	80:3 120:11 136:5
233:14,18 236:24	59:6,7,11,14,18	268:24 269:8	140:19 146:12
245:24 246:16,17	60:7,22,22 61:7	273:9	152:18 175:24
250:2 253:6	62:6,12,18 63:2,5	pointed 58:15	220:11 221:21,24
256:21,22 259:16	64:16 66:18,22	87:8,10 219:17	226:2,11 228:11
261:16,24 262:1,3	69:13 72:3 74:22	pointing 65:10	229:24 264:16
262:7 263:3,21	75:20 78:21 79:24	118:18	polk's 227:18
264:3,10,21 267:3	84:22 85:17 87:4	<b>points</b> 36:4 49:16	228:11
267:4 268:2	92:21 93:12,17	63:19 66:16 72:11	

[poor - prices] Page 53

	T		
<b>poor</b> 220:3	potentially 65:20	prejudice 229:13	preserved 164:7
population 37:7,8	139:6	preliminary	171:24 172:3
83:7,11 96:16	<b>power</b> 45:3 150:6	60:12 62:25 74:15	190:19
100:14,18,20	236:23 261:17	263:8 264:2	preserving 123:19
101:1,4,9,15,17	263:18	prelitigation	228:5 240:2
101:21 103:8,9,10	powerful 108:6	100:15 102:7,15	president 111:3
103:11,12 105:8	powerless 171:17	premised 230:10	presidential
105:10,11 108:7	<b>powers</b> 87:6 237:3	premises 157:11	175:10
108:10,19,22	practical 94:3	premium 35:8	presiding 221:2
109:3,9 111:14	153:14 160:24	253:8	<b>press</b> 13:17 125:9
212:25 213:13	161:9	prepare 53:25	pressing 156:19
populations 154:3	practices 56:25	prepared 176:10	presume 64:14
<b>porter</b> 13:16	57:3 207:7	176:16	268:9
portion 37:14	<b>pray</b> 207:25	preparing 89:15	presumed 125:11
267:5	<b>pre</b> 99:6 102:18	145:15	presuming 65:14
<b>position</b> 18:3 19:2	113:16	prepetition 85:5	139:7,10,13
44:11 140:1	precedent 109:7	164:3 189:4 203:1	presumption
156:11 191:22	174:11 176:1	preposterous 92:3	67:14 124:18
198:23 234:9,10	180:18 200:1	prerequisite 58:2	presupposing
245:1	201:18	prescribe 214:9	202:6
positions 31:11	preclude 180:22	219:24	<b>pretty</b> 25:2 28:9
possible 18:11	precludes 147:15	prescribed 211:20	32:21 96:14
31:5 69:23 111:24	precluding 85:24	216:19 219:25	103:25 111:23,23
118:22 138:3	predecessor 24:14	prescriptions	117:18 127:22
145:15 199:16	36:4 57:10 238:1	207:21	133:1 152:2 161:1
210:5 271:6	predicate 25:17	present 8:20	201:3 238:17
<b>possibly</b> 33:5 39:1	25:17 180:8,23	53:15,25 54:6	251:4 271:19
40:9 43:14,17	182:4 185:1 188:9	58:20	prevail 63:15
46:15 63:16 73:5	201:10,11,14	presentation	66:19 78:21,24
118:21	predict 39:1	93:13 145:4	79:2 92:13
<b>post</b> 21:10 65:15	129:21	199:12 234:1	prevailed 47:24
89:24 102:15,17	predominant	presentations	<b>prevent</b> 171:17
169:12 172:4,16	105:8	98:23	198:18 208:21
172:21,22 209:8	preemption 57:22	presented 54:18	209:14
263:1	preempts 188:24	54:18 127:6	prevented 60:11
<b>pot</b> 262:3,4	188:25 201:14	presenting 261:12	210:7
<b>potency</b> 222:25	<b>prefer</b> 31:21	presently 150:11	previous 207:23
<b>potent</b> 222:21	preferential 47:5	preserve 124:14	222:5 225:5
potential 18:4	prefers 100:2	135:20,21,21	previously 173:20
32:5 38:9 57:1	104:7 111:21	167:16 168:15	221:1,6
63:12 71:12 77:17	<b>preis</b> 8:25 79:6	169:7 170:25	<b>prey</b> 13:18
197:11 199:17	220:22 224:23	192:12 201:7	<b>prices</b> 46:19
254:23		202:24	

• • • • • • • • •	1 40 000 00	150 00 101 0 15	F ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
primarily 18:15	probation 200:20	172:23 184:8,16	56:4 61:23 66:7
61:3 198:13	problem 76:4	186:12 202:18	66:20,24 83:14
199:11	85:25 104:4,5	203:3,13 206:5	98:13 134:25
primary 60:22	108:14,23 110:1	272:18 273:3	146:21,24,25
<b>prime</b> 82:23 153:2	110:15,22 122:21	274:14	153:20 155:20
principal 31:12	123:4 132:1 161:3	produced 234:14	156:6,12 158:1,22
principally 176:8	162:7 184:22	produces 103:7	158:24,25 161:24
principle 105:16	213:15 215:12,13	<b>product</b> 160:19	192:6 215:21
123:10 128:14	242:13 243:16	190:24 226:14	<b>proofs</b> 39:25 57:6
165:17 198:4	244:12 252:8	249:2,3	57:7 126:24
200:17 236:25	problems 103:15	<b>production</b> 81:9	127:12 131:14
principles 196:19	111:16 214:3	products 142:2	153:8,11,22
<b>prior</b> 58:16	procedural 19:14	177:18 178:2	157:12 158:21,22
145:17 165:3	57:20,21	190:21 207:14	192:5
223:19 271:18	procedure 136:20	226:14 240:8,19	proper 80:16
priority 35:15	procedures 57:1	professional 34:2	82:17 89:13 99:21
63:15 89:8 91:7	93:6 138:5 160:23	34:7	198:1 207:16
<b>prison</b> 151:13,18	proceed 48:23	professionals 25:2	properly 69:18
151:18,19 159:24	51:25 75:25 88:6	program 137:17	81:3 90:6 169:10
160:1,25	186:20 261:22	137:20,24 138:6	198:8
prisoner 160:24	269:13	148:16,17,20	property 49:11
prisoners 152:7	<b>proceeding</b> 66:3	149:2 157:14	63:11,16 64:6
153:16 154:11	139:19 140:11	218:7 222:17	65:22 81:6
161:11	143:7,23 147:2,6	programs 37:6	proponent 16:24
<b>prisons</b> 151:22	152:18 154:19	138:18,20,22	52:22 117:22
152:1 160:7,17	164:15 165:12,21	212:24 215:25	132:20
pristine 251:2	168:20 184:5	217:10,15,18	proposal 112:14
private 39:22	198:5,7	prohibit 164:24	112:15 113:19
<b>privilege</b> 20:19	proceedings 1:12	<b>prohibited</b> 207:16	propose 173:24
<b>priya</b> 9:11	71:2 136:11 148:2	project 55:2	185:17
<b>pro</b> 8:16,18	165:18,23 168:1	projected 40:16	proposed 23:21
112:15 133:21	271:6 275:13	73:2	27:14 30:24 50:24
137:17 138:7	276:4	promissory	66:11,13 84:17
144:18 204:20	proceeds 35:18	151:16	86:25 97:8,10
205:8 218:15	45:24 163:17	promote 86:1	121:1 162:17
225:6	201:10	promptly 171:8	167:15 174:12
probably 19:1	process 16:25	273:13	179:6,15,19
23:24 24:21 104:6	93:3 98:10,14	<b>prone</b> 97:6	183:25 193:22,25
144:13 155:3	107:25 110:10	<b>prong</b> 269:4	195:19 197:6
159:10 160:18	123:1 129:13	pronouncing	199:8,11 204:9,14
174:20 200:16	132:24 133:10,10	205:7,22	233:14
215:8 219:1 247:8	150:20 157:6,9,25	<b>proof</b> 52:23 53:2	proposes 50:17
248:23 271:1	166:4 171:13,18	54:23,25 55:18	
		1014	

	I	I	
<b>proposing</b> 168:6	<b>providing</b> 160:9	159:15,18	pursuant 143:13
<b>proposition</b> 90:22	263:21	publicity 180:14	163:18 257:21
97:25	province 77:12	publicized 132:24	<b>pursue</b> 86:4 87:16
proprietary 87:9	provinces 267:19	publicly 154:6	123:3 163:16
prorata 113:21	provincial 142:21	<b>pulggari</b> 13:19	pursued 69:21
<b>prosecution</b> 137:6	proving 28:24	<b>pull</b> 135:11	pursuing 84:14
prospect 41:6	provision 49:6	<b>pullman</b> 4:1 261:6	269:7
<b>protect</b> 52:12,20	50:1 123:12	<b>pullo</b> 82:23 83:4	pursuit 29:14
170:4	170:11 182:2	151:7 152:4	62:15
protected 67:4	185:24 187:11	pullo's 83:6	<b>push</b> 127:10
238:13	191:13 196:21	<b>purdue</b> 1:7 5:10	<b>pushed</b> 208:14
protection 52:5	197:2 201:22	7:10 16:3,12	210:6
64:15 81:18,19,24	202:21 203:4	18:11 35:5 44:13	pushing 216:5
174:16 240:24	230:16 231:25	44:15 46:22,24	<b>put</b> 55:14 63:9
255:8 261:22	238:8 255:13	55:6 63:22 67:11	71:8 75:9 96:11
262:17	263:20 267:2,4,5	69:1,2,3 76:18	110:14 116:19
protections	267:7,15,16	78:4 79:7 84:15	124:4 152:5 157:5
262:13	provisions 109:19	107:1 113:16	167:5 183:24
<b>prove</b> 36:22 39:11	121:25 157:16	141:23 145:24	185:12 212:16
45:11 53:1 66:18	163:5 164:23	160:19 173:17	216:22 246:15
66:22 73:9 89:12	166:12 168:17	188:3 194:13,20	248:19 250:15
<b>proved</b> 42:21	170:9,25 172:7	194:24 207:8	258:17 262:4
154:1 163:21	173:18 177:15	208:13 219:21	264:5 267:22
proverbial 226:1	182:2 183:7	221:22 223:5,6,8	<b>puts</b> 22:21
provide 37:10	187:23 189:11	224:6,9 235:17	putting 114:4
112:10 113:12	190:14,15,16,17	248:19 253:20	216:7 217:14
163:14 167:22	195:20 199:20	259:14 261:18	251:22
168:24 174:15	201:14 202:7	267:6 269:17,18	puzzled 175:12
177:17 189:8	227:24 228:16	269:18,20 270:1,2	q
202:6 228:2	262:7	270:2	
provided 54:25	<b>proviso</b> 194:10	purdue's 68:23	quadruple 194:16
72:3 88:10 146:15	195:7	74:19	quadrupling 108:10
146:19 151:14	psychic 209:21	<b>purdue's</b> 190:23	
154:2 159:11,17	<b>public</b> 17:10 37:3	purports 82:9	qualification
159:20 167:18	39:19 46:7 81:16	<b>purpose</b> 52:11,18	116:20
177:6 194:17	81:22 105:16	163:15 168:4	qualified 196:13
203:14 262:18	127:21,23 129:15	171:6,11 236:3	qualitative 255:15
provides 44:16	131:16 132:25	261:20	<b>quality</b> 110:19
47:22 143:1	135:1 152:1	purposes 16:18	266:11
158:13 163:11	175:19 225:25	32:23,25 33:1	quantifiable
223:18 237:23	240:24	81:14 90:2 94:2	33:18
238:20 261:20	publication	125:22 135:16	quantified 56:2,7
	150:24 151:1,5	196:23 207:17	<b>quantify</b> 43:14
	,		56:3

quantitative	51:4 59:9 249:9	180:11 234:5,6	realigned 90:6
160:14	quigley's 32:13	<b>random</b> 111:15	realize 145:4,12
quantities 216:17	<b>quinn</b> 13:20	range 99:23	253:15 262:9
216:19	<b>quirk</b> 13:21	rata 112:15	274:6
quarropas 1:13	<b>quite</b> 19:4,22	133:21 137:18	realized 124:13
quarters 225:11	67:17 68:6 85:19	138:7	realizing 228:6
question 36:12	86:2 103:22	rate 41:20	reallocations 36:5
91:6 95:23 102:20	104:16 121:22	rational 34:13	really 18:14 19:25
129:11 131:7	127:20 138:3	47:15 101:6	20:20 23:25 24:2
134:12 135:9	148:14 154:18	103:21 107:15	26:2 29:10 32:20
136:13 158:10,11	164:17 207:5	108:13,23 116:17	33:16 51:21 52:20
159:22 175:15	217:5 233:25	128:9,16,17	63:5 67:9 68:16
178:25 182:8	262:24 272:4	132:21	70:13 78:8 79:5
189:2 190:13	275:6	<b>ray</b> 145:3	83:12 95:23 97:21
191:5,9 229:18	quixotic 33:19	raymond 4:9	100:1 102:12,15
233:11 235:6	<b>quote</b> 37:5 71:4	21:20 223:7 246:5	104:1 113:23
254:4 268:19	147:10 148:4	<b>rdd</b> 1:3	115:3 116:21
questioner 71:5	175:9 181:18	reach 83:7,15,18	121:19 124:1
questioning	r	103:17 131:8	127:5 130:5 133:1
248:12 250:17	r 1:21 3:1 5:14	181:1 186:17	134:19 135:13,14
questions 26:25	16:1 101:22	273:21 274:7	135:17 136:17
71:9 84:5 92:17	182:15 276:1	reached 86:16	137:4 142:25
95:20 102:22	race 38:16 139:20	131:13 181:19	143:20 150:7
143:25 149:18	races 39:3	183:15 227:9	170:19 172:10,25
154:20,23,25	rachael 13:25	264:4	174:15 185:5,17
155:7 166:24	raise 41:25 96:24	reaction 241:7	189:2 191:4,7,9
167:1,2 173:10	99:22 102:3 113:4	reactions 241:8	197:10,19,20
174:17,22 178:18	134:7 137:1	read 25:21 42:14	198:7 199:9,22
186:12 189:2	146:18 169:20	70:19 91:6 93:24	204:15 209:23
193:20 199:20	174:22 197:24	150:16 167:20	210:4,8,13,15,16
203:18 205:23	202:9 267:2	179:24 217:2	210:18 211:11,13
227:5 228:9,18	raised 43:24	220:23 241:7	212:6 213:4
230:8,25 232:25	48:14 60:6 68:9	259:24 270:18	214:24 218:11
237:2 260:25	95:7 98:5 99:12	274:17	221:19 237:16,19
quick 20:15 267:1	100:13 147:4	reading 20:2	238:3 244:20
quickly 106:18	148:24 149:3	49:25 75:24 206:6	247:1 249:4,10,19
109:17 135:11	198:10 202:2	reads 247:7	249:20,22 251:25
176:6 185:5 233:1	206:13 230:25	<b>ready</b> 206:9	266:12 275:9
267:13	232:6 233:11	242:25	reargue 203:24
quiet 165:13	240:5 243:10	real 56:12 57:1	rearrange 89:19
quigley 30:9	254:7 264:20	69:24 95:4 136:13	rearranged 90:1
31:18 32:1,11	raising 70:8	158:25,25 159:1	reason 39:19
33:5 49:22 50:15	147:15 175:14	180:8	49:15 74:7 80:24

[reason - regard] Page 57

96:17 104:25	163:12 221:18	116:11 133:7	36:24 39:1 45:8
107:18 114:17,18	received 67:1	145:3,24 146:12	49:18,18 60:25
116:25 141:21	83:18 100:8	160:5,11 173:12	61:4,12 62:3,16
148:12 164:4	124:10 126:23	174:6 181:8	65:19 66:20 73:6
169:13 171:4,20	138:15 147:23	182:10,18,18	76:7 100:9 128:13
171:24 185:19	221:6 230:21,22	183:7 184:6	131:18 132:22
186:3,17 236:6	233:14 269:10,16	186:16,20 189:15	137:13,14 139:8
263:16	receiver 40:17	189:15,22 190:1	153:10,16 201:9
reasonable 97:5	receives 156:5	190:10 193:5	216:21 263:3
98:16 100:1	recess 145:22	197:12 199:25	<b>red</b> 67:2
126:19 167:23	recharacterize	200:19 202:20	redline 111:19
172:19 181:21	93:13	203:17 204:12	redress 70:13
182:20 188:16	recipients 233:15	229:24 235:15	redressing 85:25
198:20	reckless 25:16	236:13 246:4,24	<b>reduce</b> 33:23 37:6
reasonableness	241:14 251:9	246:25 248:13	99:8 199:17
99:23 173:3	recklessly 241:13	252:21,22 267:22	reduced 34:21
184:13 191:24,25	251:24	271:11 276:4	reed 8:8,10 163:1
192:13	reclassified 95:1	records 158:5,12	<b>refer</b> 101:10
reasonably 41:5	reclassify 94:25	158:15,17 215:21	144:9
69:23 150:24	recognition 133:7	215:22	reference 125:2
reasoned 85:23	133:18 139:1	<b>recoup</b> 232:13	131:15 144:5
reasons 31:23	271:5	recover 31:2,3,6	171:23 179:17
33:19 34:24 43:22	recognize 59:8	33:11 34:22 37:15	199:23
44:4 69:3 80:15	105:4 109:4	39:12 40:10 42:1	referenced 173:13
83:20 87:18	252:20	43:18 45:5 53:1	184:11
100:25 104:8	recognized 128:6	55:3 62:3 66:22	references 69:14
107:22 141:21	150:20 151:2	66:24 69:19 76:18	177:19 204:10
168:21 176:1	recommended	81:13 99:17,18	230:13
rebuttal 36:18	212:16	122:6 127:16	<b>referred</b> 187:8,14
68:1 120:6,17	recommends	139:7 164:2	239:7
140:17 146:13	109:13	216:20,21	referring 106:1
149:7,18,21	recompact 101:21	recoverability	245:20 269:2
174:19,22 228:21	reconsideration	63:24	<b>refers</b> 90:14 144:8
recalibrating	225:20	recovered 163:17	refilled 46:15
18:10	<b>record</b> 16:20	recoveries 31:8	reflection 275:2
<b>recall</b> 97:16	22:10,19 32:14,18	32:5 33:17 34:1	reflects 35:8
receive 30:22 49:3	33:13 45:21 48:15	37:21 38:2,7,9,23	refused 147:21
49:4,9,13 53:8,9	54:3 57:23,25	45:24 51:15 79:13	regard 42:13
53:11,12,16,22	69:9 70:17 72:12	139:1 163:16	88:14 121:5
54:6,7,11,12,13	78:19 80:2 86:5	recovering 41:6	134:12,17 136:1
54:19,24 62:2,5	96:23 107:20	82:2,6	137:8 159:8,8
100:16 125:20,21	111:9,12,12,23	recovery 29:13	170:14 191:7
125:21 152:16	114:19 115:4	30:10 34:3,21	197:15 227:14

[regard - remotely] Page 58

250 22 260 2	100 17 10 101 0	247 22 249 22	157 10 160 0 22
259:23 260:3	188:17,18 191:8	247:23 248:22	157:18 160:9,23
272:22	191:11 192:2,20	250:1 253:2,12	161:8 178:17
regarding 129:15	230:24 231:5,12	254:24,25 255:5	198:18 208:12
155:12 160:6,22	232:14 234:7,8	255:16 257:11	<b>relieve</b> 158:19
173:22 202:2	235:5,9,16,17,24	266:24 268:1,4	233:17
229:14 231:20	237:24 240:10	released 22:24	relinquishing
232:7 260:6,7,9	244:24 245:15	50:24 61:11	206:8
regardless 104:17	249:20,22,23	177:20 230:15,18	relitigate 198:21
168:3	253:19 258:25	231:3,4,9,12,13	relitigating
regards 267:4	259:12,14 268:6	231:13,16 232:3	265:19
<b>regime</b> 142:3	relates 22:12 24:3	234:9 235:18,18	reluctantly 41:1
<b>regimes</b> 142:20	92:1 145:1 247:20	235:24 236:2,22	154:8
regulate 150:6	250:25 261:15,19	239:18 243:24	<b>rely</b> 58:6 150:25
211:10	relating 183:6	244:15,16 245:21	247:6
regulated 142:1	240:12	247:9 248:9 251:8	relying 210:9
207:13	relation 16:4	255:7,18 257:19	rem 35:15 42:7
regulating 67:10	53:11	259:11 260:11	remain 27:18
regulation 67:13	relationship 81:5	267:9 269:9	102:22 164:24
142:3,4	136:17 211:17	releasees 24:23	199:19 272:21
regulators 207:15	231:2,14	26:10,10,18	remained 21:12
regulatory 240:23	relative 34:8	releases 17:14	remaining 35:23
reinjury 210:2	relatively 68:5	18:2,16 19:2	100:23 144:19
reiterate 37:18	relatives 217:25	22:12,15,20 23:16	174:19 226:25
201:3	release 20:11	24:3 27:11 29:4	remains 118:6
<b>reject</b> 49:24 83:1	22:25 23:1,5,7,10	54:22 122:14	150:12
83:10 104:8	23:13,20 24:7,7	144:20 230:1,3,9	<b>remand</b> 249:10
rejected 49:22	24:22 25:2,3,4,5	230:22 231:23	remarks 120:4
55:23 56:2	27:6,8,9,10,18	232:1,7,17 233:12	187:12
rejecting 30:21	28:15 51:6 119:25	233:15 234:10	remedy 89:3
31:5,24 32:5	121:21 134:18,23	239:6,20 240:6,7	91:10
33:10 36:10 38:14	135:6 145:2,7	241:20 246:11,16	remember 19:7
39:11,15,17 40:21	165:20 168:12	257:9 258:25	25:14 58:15 71:3
40:22,22 43:13	186:9 204:15	260:9,12,20	75:23 175:10
44:6 45:4	226:24 229:9,12	releasing 23:4	182:21 214:20
<b>relate</b> 187:10	229:14,16 231:25	253:18 260:12,15	265:22
231:9 240:23	234:11,17,18,20	relevance 117:24	remembers 93:6
related 24:20	234:21 235:1,3,8	relevant 68:21	212:3
25:13 57:7 77:14	236:10 240:9,11	79:5 91:16 99:7	remind 53:3
77:17 84:25 85:1	240:15 242:7,12	133:18 148:2	74:15
85:11,25 86:4	242:19 243:6,16	208:6 228:16	<b>remote</b> 58:3,14
115:7 122:23	244:2,2,11,23	<b>relied</b> 212:16	102:17
171:25 181:20	245:12,14,15,17	relief 135:2,3,24	remotely 102:17
187:8,13,24 188:5	246:21 247:20,22	147:14 155:5	275:8

removed 24:19	<b>require</b> 34:6 82:9	226:21 272:23	responsive 25:13	
<b>rendel</b> 13:22	156:4 163:23	274:10	248:5	
<b>render</b> 173:22	168:22,24,25	resolves 226:18	rest 31:20 119:10	
rendered 77:19	171:2 190:17	234:1	144:1,10 149:6,17	
<b>reopen</b> 133:11	196:19 274:15	resolving 34:5,8	160:12 227:14	
reorganization	required 32:4	resource 107:23	228:22 229:1	
18:14 29:4 66:11	158:1 169:14	respect 41:11,25	restate 87:21	
94:3 171:13	178:13	49:7 70:16 72:10	restitution 152:12	
<b>repeat</b> 120:14	requirement	77:3 78:13 89:3,5	154:23	
228:10	157:12	91:24 107:1,13,19	restriction 126:19	
repetition 150:14	requirements	107:23 124:20	restructuring	
replayed 49:10	157:6	142:11,24 143:3,9	219:21 224:19	
replete 86:5	requires 28:12,21	143:20 144:20	225:3,21 271:20	
<b>reply</b> 86:8 120:16	28:22 30:9,21	146:14 149:1,17	result 34:25 47:23	
167:19 172:4	49:1 53:7 62:1	150:2,10 154:14	60:10 83:15,19	
174:1 227:17	72:1 150:20 165:3	156:21 157:15	98:20 139:5 140:3	
<b>report</b> 20:2 33:15	170:6,23	158:20 159:9	185:14 275:7	
34:24 36:17	res 196:23	160:22 179:9,19	resulted 153:4	
reporting 57:2	researching	182:14 188:25	results 37:10 83:8	
101:12,14	219:23	191:12 192:9	89:15,15 103:2,7	
<b>reports</b> 217:16	resemble 102:18	199:2 230:24	resuming 47:24	
represent 79:16	<b>reserve</b> 120:17	247:23 251:9	retain 49:13 50:22	
92:9 105:18	149:6 156:7 205:3	272:13	50:23 186:14	
137:19 147:6	260:5	respectfully 154:8	retained 49:10	
149:25 179:2,10	reserved 120:4	respectively 81:15	retaining 50:16	
189:18 272:15	204:20 226:22	81:21 228:13	retired 50:4	
representation	reserving 123:2	respects 88:20	return 56:8	
181:6	131:6 146:13	respond 27:17	revenue 85:11	
representations	149:20	50:13 74:2 92:21	review 20:8 229:3	
271:22	resolution 32:22	155:12 205:3	258:2	
representative	118:11 123:5	264:16	reviewed 154:22	
22:20	167:25 172:3	responders 88:17	205:10	
representatives	173:3 181:23	responding 91:18	revised 81:17	
207:3	187:19	response 49:20	89:24 179:5 203:4	
represented 44:20	resolve 19:24	71:9 72:5 76:15	204:4 272:1,25	
152:18 204:21	118:10 171:8	91:22 101:19	revision 231:19	
207:6	175:17 180:25	120:12 133:6	revisions 229:10	
representing 88:2	189:13 226:19	159:22 231:19	229:11,25 230:21	
represents 34:16	234:3 236:21	responses 172:1	revisit 152:21	
84:5 105:1	274:12	responsibilities	rewards 77:6	
<b>request</b> 16:5,13	resolved 102:23	142:21	rewrite 177:2	
21:6 46:23 51:8	173:4 180:19	responsible	rewriting 130:1	
204:3 205:1	185:16,23 226:20	159:25 208:15		

[rewrote - sackler's] Page 60

198:5,22 202:14 202:16 203:11	109:3	<b>ruled</b> 59:24	sackler's 223:16 223:21
196:18 197:12	rigorous 30:13	273:10	272:23
194:8 195:10	264:12	195:17 225:19	262:1 266:17
188:13 191:4	262:6 263:13	168:23,24 189:13	247:2,8 259:3
180:13 187:13	260:5 261:16	148:1 157:18	243:22 246:5
171:15 179:4,7	227:12,25 256:10	100:4 147:14	225:13,18 243:21
162:5,14 170:13	202:3,24 205:3	85:16,17,18 99:21	224:1,2,7,11,20
157:23 159:12	201:8,11,12,24	rule 21:5 84:1	223:7,10,14,16,25
153:3 156:8	198:6 200:10	rug 226:1	78:1 145:3 214:10
149:16,20,23	190:18 194:22	rubinstein 14:5	64:20,21 76:22
144:10,12 145:19	180:6 189:1,9	roxana 9:5	40:14 45:15 64:4
140:17 141:8	170.8,23 173.13	20:16 96:7	21:20 22:19 40:12
137:22 138:8	170:8,25 173:13	round 17:23	<b>sackler</b> 4:9 18:9
133:22 135:12	167:17 169:17	160:16,17	<b>s.ct.</b> 45:11
131:22 132:14	163:13,20 166:10	roughly 83:11	257:11,20
127.10 128.20,23	152:24 161:18	rothstein 14:4	193:9 220:15
127:16 128:20,23	147.8,13,10,23	ross 175:10	106:1,1 182:15
125:18 126:1,7	147:8,13,16,23	rosenbaum 14:3	16:1 52:15,15
117:5 119:18,21	132:20 135:20	rosen 14:2	12:22 14:4 15:21
110:22 114:13	123:2,19 124:15	rose 24:12 224:8	11:7,11,23 12:6
90:19 91:25 92:4	87:16 122:18	room 1:13 5:4	s 3:1 9:4 10:15
88:12 89:8 90:15	rights 50:17 79:11	137:13	S 2 1 0 1 10 15
76:16 79:6,7,20	270:11	20:22,22,23 84:16	
72:11 74:10,11	266:7,23 269:25	role 16:23 19:6,23	15:10 220:13
52:16,18 65:3	263:18 264:3	robinson 9:3	ryan 14:8,21
49:6 50:23 52:14	261:24 263:1,10	robin 94:14	ruth 12:16
25:25 28:21 29:15	259:10,19,25	robertson 14:1	russell 14:7
<b>right</b> 18:6,7 21:10	256:18 257:15	robert 1:22 10:17	rural 213:8
ridiculous 93:16	254:2,18 256:4,7	robbins 93:25	<b>running</b> 219:12
<b>richard</b> 14:15,16	250:12 252:5	276:21	rundlet 14:6
<b>rice</b> 13:24	248:14,18 250:1	<b>road</b> 190:9,9	217:22,23
ricarte 13:23	247:7,11,13,17	144:8	run 28:3 160:25
193:1,12 199:2	244:14 245:3,10	rms 143:11 144:5	168:10 195:10
192:6,9,12,14,22	242:24 243:2	<b>risks</b> 77:6	rulings 165:7
191:15,18,22,24	239:9,14,18,21	170:4 210:2	274:13
182:15,16 188:16	235:10,17 237:7	164:2 169:19,22	273:18,23 274:5
rhodes 48:12	234:23,24 235:4,7	risk 29:20 78:24	195:5 273:11,15
88:9 261:14	230:7 233:2	242:9	176:18 190:7
<b>rhode</b> 53:5 80:11	226:22 229:2	rise 56:25 216:2,4	173:5,22 174:2
175:15	219:19 226:6,10	<b>ringer</b> 13:25	<b>ruling</b> 159:9
rewrote 256:21,23 rhetorical 175:12	216:24 218:13	<b>riled</b> 205:12	130:1 196:16
		rigueur 98:7	<b>rules</b> 80:19,25

[sacklers - see] Page 61

sacklers 19:17	samuel 11:25	scenarios 36:8	181:14,16 183:2,3
23:14 26:17 31:7	san 81:20	72:16	193:2,11,15 197:4
34:22,23 37:15	sand 95:4 185:12	schedule 24:11	197:5 218:24
39:2,10,21 40:2	206:5 209:24	25:9 27:16 70:24	234:17 249:8,24
40:19,19 41:3,9	263:23	202:3	256:11 267:12
42:2 44:14,15,25	sandra 221:10	scheme 142:8,11	secondly 20:7
46:17,21,23,25	sara 9:15 15:5	schinfeld 14:11	85:14 87:8 137:7
47:6,21 54:25	satisfaction 169:8	schlecker 14:12	159:22
55:3,6,10 57:15	satisfied 52:8,24	schmidt 14:13	seconds 18:25
60:12,24 61:16,18	satisfies 96:12	scholarly 26:7	secret 200:20
61:23,24 62:20,21	satisfy 35:20 66:7	28:9	222:18
62:24 63:4,9	satisfying 153:22	school 117:8	secretary 207:2
65:12 66:2 68:23	satisfying 133.22 saval 14:10	133:4	section 29:23 30:8
68:25 69:2,4,11	sava 14.10 save 174:18	schwartzberg 9:1	51:4 52:4 67:4
73:15,18,23,24	saves 174.18 saves 99:2	256:25 257:1,3,15	80:20 97:9 122:22
74:5,7,23 75:10	saving 18:19	258:3,14,19,23	123:8,11 135:6,13
76:4,5,6,7,11,17	saw 161:9 176:25	259:7,17,20,23	135:19 136:3,16
77:14,17 78:5,21	saw 101.9 170.23 saying 54:17 64:4	260:1,3	136:22 143:3,7,10
121:7,11 122:11	73:9 74:22,25	scientific 222:23	143:13,16 150:7
121:7,11 122:11	78:16 94:22 115:2	scope 20:10	163:5,11,21 164:4
215:11,25 224:15	150:8,16 156:7	123:10 159:11	165:22 166:22
226:2,11 250:18	162:7 165:9,17	160:6 202:21	170:6,22 171:21
250:23 251:6,7,8	177:2 184:19	232:7	184:10 186:5
251:14 253:10		score 99:5	194:5 231:24
257:24 259:18	194:10 198:13,21 244:17,19 255:12	scott 3:8 11:5	232:2,4 237:23
265:23 268:11	′	scrambled 90:6	240:9 257:22
saddle 17:9	262:24 263:4,7,8		258:15 261:19
	264:23 265:4,8,11 265:23	screen 219:5,7 229:20	sections 33:16
<b>safety</b> 86:1 240:25 <b>saint</b> 6:3	says 29:25 49:6		81:23 130:18
salit 0.5 sake 22:10	112:10 125:17,17	script 207:24 se 7:19 8:16,18	see 17:11,20 18:21
sake 22.10 sale 56:19 81:9	135:13 138:12,12	204:20 205:8	34:24 45:11 61:22
139:11 206:19	145:12 173:24	218:15 225:6	95:13 109:20
234:14 251:1	180:4,7,8 186:6,6	search 250:19	117:1 126:24
	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		
<b>salesforce</b> 207:10	189:8 193:4 195:7 196:7 199:3	seattle 81:15	129:16 144:22 155:11 157:3
207:11,21		<b>second</b> 16:4,12 24:6 31:14 62:1	
salmons 220:17	219:13 232:3	80:22 82:19 98:9	174:21 187:4,15
<b>salwen</b> 14:9 <b>sam</b> 10:20	241:10 243:20 256:20 263:20	101:11 108:5	187:25 191:9,10 191:13 192:20
samantha 224:5	267:7 scenario 28:23	111:13 113:1	202:12 204:4,6 205:7 209:24
samhsa 106:3,4,5		116:10 135:11	
109:13	36:9 72:19 76:11	147:10,17,21	213:8,24 214:1
<b>samsa</b> 106:4	172:17	149:9,10 169:13	219:6 229:19
		169:25 172:8	242:11,18,22
		ral Calutions	

[see - shareholders] Page 62

244:7,11 245:9	sensitive 112:7	set 18:4 21:1	199:10 204:15
260:6 272:3	sent 224:25	29:22 45:6 46:24	227:9 231:20
275:11	sentence 176:15	48:25 80:20 85:5	244:9 245:15
<b>seeing</b> 116:22	176:15,17 178:24	87:2 113:10	253:5 266:17
123:2 129:2	179:25 180:4	120:13 123:18	271:22 272:23
seek 79:13 84:18	181:16,18 183:3	159:19 160:1	settlements 32:14
89:3 143:23 156:8	185:16 187:7,15	166:21 181:8	33:6 40:22 57:14
157:18 164:1	187:25 193:2,11	187:23 200:10	100:8 101:18,20
165:25 166:8	193:15	206:23 228:10	101:25 119:11
169:2 172:12	sentences 187:15	240:3 262:15	166:20 167:22
173:14 178:17	sentencing 152:21	<b>seth</b> 14:11	181:18 182:7
183:13,24 184:17	154:17,25	sets 34:24	187:8 192:10,11
184:21 186:2	sentiments 175:18	setting 92:12	198:8,19 227:20
201:5	separate 84:3	133:15 226:9	<b>settles</b> 164:21
seeking 86:21	89:16 90:1 128:6	settle 40:21 41:13	settling 19:9
121:16 156:20	130:3,4 132:21	69:3 168:17 172:7	57:11 204:5
164:25 165:6	135:22 141:20	182:1 187:22	256:20
167:4 184:14	142:3 238:11	188:12 189:11	settlors 64:11
191:17,21 192:9	239:10 240:16	190:14	<b>setup</b> 92:3,6
194:4 198:18	249:16 252:18	<b>settled</b> 59:17,23	seven 38:4 72:12
201:17 202:13,13	254:3,5,7,15,23	64:11,14,15 69:7	76:9 238:23
seemingly 28:17	255:3,24	76:25 108:15	<b>severe</b> 104:17
37:19 40:25 41:1	separately 82:21	113:16 177:20	severity 96:19
seen 19:10 129:2	87:14 89:1 109:24	197:21,21,22	101:8,12 104:23
177:11	140:25 149:10	223:9 274:15	105:12,12 111:8
<b>segment</b> 222:7,16	256:12 259:13	settlement 19:11	shannon 10:7
seismic 36:5	261:9 269:6	30:14 31:9 32:22	13:1
seized 98:14	separation 246:23	33:15 35:22 40:15	<b>share</b> 36:10 47:8
<b>self</b> 64:11,14,14	september 62:25	41:2,22 55:14	72:16,20 76:10
76:25	265:18	57:1,15,16 58:1,5	116:2 117:11
<b>sell</b> 213:21	<b>seq</b> 33:15	58:7,10,13 59:8	128:22 133:21
<b>selling</b> 207:18,19	series 105:2	60:3,9,16,18	137:18 138:6,7
sells 141:24	<b>serious</b> 42:19 47:5	86:16 99:22	230:6 262:4
207:14	seriously 20:23	100:10 101:24	272:16
<b>semi</b> 26:7	78:13 95:22	102:1,21,22	<b>shared</b> 47:11 93:1
sense 28:14 30:7	<b>serve</b> 37:8 111:3	113:14,18 119:10	257:18
56:10 91:17 101:9	137:12 153:11	121:25 122:1,12	shareholder 24:3
119:6 144:14	service 17:11	164:18 168:16	24:5 240:15 245:2
151:25 198:2	services 106:6	171:10 181:23	248:2 257:9,10,11
211:15 263:23	207:2 220:14	182:19 183:17	257:12,17,21
266:14	238:1	184:13 187:18	258:4
sensible 28:18	ses 144:18	188:16 191:10	shareholders
		192:14 198:1,14	41:16 71:16,17

271:21	97:11 116:23	180:6,23 184:4	skipped 185:8
sharing 72:22	127:21,22 129:15	190:7 192:11	skipping 185:25
<b>shaw</b> 6:14	178:13 180:15	262:11 275:2	skis 188:8
shepherd 14:14	182:4 214:17	sincerely 138:16	skorostensky
16:25	216:8,15 223:6,7	138:17	14:20
shepherded 272:2	225:6,8,13 242:14	sincerity 148:6	<b>slated</b> 46:1 158:25
<b>sheriff</b> 215:15	259:1	160:8	slaugh 14:21
<b>shield</b> 23:4 220:13	sides 115:22	<b>singer</b> 8:14 14:18	<b>slice</b> 126:16
shields 21:12	135:24 225:3	162:25 163:1,3	<b>slight</b> 181:15
225:18	<b>sight</b> 272:21 273:8	165:14,17 167:2,7	<b>small</b> 17:3 31:10
<b>shift</b> 52:24	signature 78:14	167:10 175:23	76:14 98:11
shifting 66:20	<b>signed</b> 78:12	176:9 184:11	100:16 106:20,22
<b>shira</b> 15:13	204:24 205:9	190:25 197:8	112:1 113:25
<b>shore</b> 7:14 8:21	257:22	218:24	116:8 117:8,15,24
14:15 34:16 72:25	significant 84:14	<b>singer's</b> 196:13	256:22,22 268:12
155:11,14,15	88:24 92:15 97:16	<b>single</b> 39:5 40:25	273:12
<b>short</b> 40:14,16	106:25 111:20	50:19 72:10	smaller 40:9
87:12 121:2	112:4	176:15	94:23
208:18 209:15	significantly	<b>sir</b> 116:20	<b>smith</b> 8:8,10
210:24 211:14	101:23	<b>sister</b> 73:22	163:1
238:12 248:15	silbert 14:16	sisters 225:22	sneak 135:23,23
shortsighted	<b>silences</b> 78:17,18	<b>sit</b> 196:14	193:24
87:17	similar 21:5 59:22	site 253:11,19	sneaky 32:21
<b>shot</b> 254:16	74:6 79:4 80:21	sitting 17:9	<b>snow</b> 162:1
should've 214:14	80:23 81:3,13	situated 24:23	snowball 209:21
215:8	90:15 142:11	45:6,14 69:16	social 152:2
<b>shouldn't</b> 173:22	215:16 231:7	70:4 115:12	socialize 273:24
187:25	237:22	124:21 153:8	<b>sold</b> 213:24
shoved 226:1	similarly 20:25	situation 37:24	<b>solely</b> 38:8 169:3
<b>show</b> 30:18 39:12	21:4 24:23 115:12	152:25 210:10	201:5,17
39:13 90:3 185:19	124:21 153:8	214:25 238:10	solicitation
251:23 252:21,22	simmonds 14:17	six 37:3 72:12,21	178:12 194:7
252:24 253:1	<b>simple</b> 92:23	76:8 128:20	solicited 178:8
255:10 265:9	102:20 112:15	197:25 274:21	solution 153:6
<b>showed</b> 265:17	143:7 230:16	sixth 124:8 128:9	212:12,19 216:6
<b>shower</b> 266:14	simplify 145:16	176:24	solutions 212:2,8
showing 42:10	simplistic 36:14	<b>size</b> 92:8 110:12	276:20
56:12 107:5	<b>simply</b> 24:4,12	137:25	<b>solve</b> 39:5 108:14
showings 158:16	26:15 61:17,20	sizeable 82:12	108:23 109:25
<b>shown</b> 175:14	63:2 69:15 80:17	<b>sizes</b> 92:15	110:15 142:22
<b>shows</b> 45:23 97:25	91:3,18 92:9	<b>skapof</b> 14:19	250:15 251:15,16
<b>side</b> 18:9 54:9,21	100:4 109:10	<b>skip</b> 153:5	solved 39:7
95:24 96:8 97:2	164:17 178:7		
		1014	

[solving - state] Page 64

	T		I
<b>solving</b> 110:22	sounded 206:3	203:18	<b>stacy</b> 10:2
somebody 23:17	<b>sounds</b> 232:16	specifically 82:3	<b>stage</b> 59:16
99:3 162:2 250:13	<b>source</b> 65:18	134:11 135:13	154:25 263:12
someday 37:15	228:2	143:1 168:14	264:4
someone's 248:25	sources 51:15	170:4 179:20	stages 246:1
somewhat 113:24	<b>southern</b> 1:2 52:3	181:6 189:8 234:8	staggering 38:20
152:10 154:8	59:25 131:16	241:5 270:16	<b>stake</b> 164:19
son 219:24 226:3	224:18	specificity 158:3	271:2,3
son's 219:25	sovereign 120:3,3	specified 230:23	stakeholders
sonya 2:25 276:3	123:14 136:6,14	speculated 76:22	16:24 17:4 18:12
276:8	136:22 137:9	speculating 43:18	34:11,12
sophistic 52:15	143:1,10,14,17,20	speculation 45:2	<b>stand</b> 148:7
sophisticated	144:9	speculative 32:10	standard 25:2
44:20	sovereign's	32:18 33:2 37:1	29:1 40:17 68:13
sophistry 69:14	134:23	38:9 44:1 55:19	99:21 100:4
70:5 73:7	sovereigns 135:22	58:3,13,22 66:6	116:14 251:25
sorokin 14:22	sovereignty 84:1	69:22 72:4	standing 86:10
<b>sorry</b> 29:6 37:22	136:2	<b>speed</b> 271:16	147:8 148:1,12
54:10 76:21	<b>speak</b> 74:3 113:6	<b>spend</b> 31:21	155:3 159:9
114:18 128:19	114:6 172:10	224:14 250:3	166:11,14 213:7
146:6 149:13	205:1,3,5,9 208:5	263:5	standpoint 118:12
151:19 152:24	217:25 218:10,15	spending 99:7	<b>stands</b> 39:18
170:2,17 201:1	speakers 207:23	103:1,5 104:4	55:12 189:25
210:23 228:25	speaking 44:6	spendthrift 64:8	standstill 60:15
233:8 234:16	93:12 162:23	<b>spent</b> 36:20 77:5	<b>staple</b> 70:23
249:7,21 252:22	163:7 165:16	105:4 127:19	stark 45:2 55:12
<b>sort</b> 16:23 30:10	167:21	157:9 212:3	105:20
58:1 67:13 73:12	speaks 208:1	224:21	<b>start</b> 16:10,22
76:21,21 79:14	253:6 266:8	spilled 220:8	95:18 106:19
91:7 92:24 93:11	special 41:21	spillover 46:7	176:5 182:4 209:9
120:1 130:17	77:24 131:12	<b>spirit</b> 23:19	243:3
161:13 198:14	163:4,4 165:6	<b>spoke</b> 181:5	started 51:14
236:6 251:5 272:1	223:20	183:16 233:19,20	132:2 134:4
sorted 18:3	specialty 8:2	272:16	186:12 220:6
sorts 35:25 51:15	<b>specific</b> 21:1 29:5	<b>spoken</b> 19:19 45:7	starting 202:22
213:6 216:21	32:4 34:3 49:5	spokesman 41:15	<b>state</b> 3:16 4:2 5:2
219:2	54:11 97:7 98:4,9	sponsored 22:6	5:4 6:1,2 25:18
<b>sought</b> 51:6 128:2	108:20 112:9	spouse 223:21	46:23 57:15,17
129:22 135:3	118:10,15 135:16	springer 14:23	62:10,19 64:24
155:5 165:4	136:15 159:24	squarely 55:22	67:11 69:1 73:2
183:17 184:9	166:13 172:10	stacey 146:3	74:4 75:24 78:20
195:21	173:8,10 182:13	149:25	81:12,12,12,15
	193:1 199:1		83:17 84:1,6,10

[state - stuff] Page 65

		I	
85:19 86:18 89:2	48:20 52:7 53:22	stating 222:3	<b>straight</b> 107:10,14
91:10 92:9 96:9	54:24 55:2 60:10	<b>status</b> 35:12	112:15
97:25 101:18	60:17,24,25 61:4	152:23 155:18,23	straightforward
103:14 104:17	62:8,20,23 63:8	statute 29:24,25	80:19 267:3
106:21,23 107:4,6	65:5,5,13,25 67:1	68:21 81:17,19	strategically 18:2
107:16,22 108:3,3	67:2,5,8 70:2,2,2	112:9 113:12	<b>strauss</b> 220:19
108:16,20,25	70:18,21 72:21	136:3 207:2	streamline 274:23
110:8 111:1 112:1	73:18,22 75:1	<b>statute's</b> 30:19,19	<b>street</b> 1:13 4:3
112:14 113:22,25	76:14 79:2,10,22	<b>statutes</b> 37:20,20	5:19 6:9,16
115:21 116:23	80:12,17 81:2	81:23,25 135:15	212:13
118:7,11 119:6	82:3,8,9,12,14,16	240:24	strength 39:9
124:24 125:3	82:20,20,25 83:2	statutory 29:23	60:24 76:2
129:5 132:10	83:5,10,14,21,22	74:17 147:13	stretch 67:17
137:23 140:23	84:18 85:15 87:5	148:9	203:5
143:3 151:19	87:7,13,15,21,25	stay 73:23 179:15	stretching 25:1
160:16 165:20,22	88:21,22,23,24	181:10 199:9	stricken 181:16
168:18 177:16	89:1,7,16 91:11	261:23 262:19	185:17 199:9
183:20 188:25	92:8,25 94:17,19	263:11 264:8	<b>strict</b> 206:23
212:1,3 221:13,13	94:21 95:3,9,24	265:19,21,22	strictly 30:12
221:16 236:22	95:25 96:2 97:25	266:1	243:11
240:23,24,24,25	98:2,10,11,14	<b>stayed</b> 186:19	<b>strike</b> 145:14
241:1,1,1,2,2	99:15,20 101:13	<b>stays</b> 83:2	181:22 183:2
255:10 256:1	103:23 105:4,5	steege 8:22	187:18 242:13
261:7 262:2,2	106:12,23 107:6	<b>steel</b> 14:24	255:8
265:12	108:14,16 109:19	<b>step</b> 106:16	strikeout 193:2
<b>state's</b> 116:2	111:25 112:8,17	stephanie 10:11	<b>striking</b> 190:2,6
<b>stated</b> 33:9 66:10	112:17 113:14,15	stephen 13:15	<b>string</b> 235:19
90:3 135:25 227:8	115:1,5,11,20	<b>steven</b> 12:1 15:19	251:5
statement 35:1	117:16 118:21	stipulation 64:2	<b>strong</b> 17:2 79:8
66:5 71:14 89:25	124:25 125:7	228:14	84:13 117:18
90:10 93:8 100:15	129:15 134:9	stockdale 175:9	strongest 42:6
106:18 148:23	135:3 140:21,22	stodola 14:25	52:5
154:13 182:15	140:25 142:3,5	stokes 224:5	strongly 18:9
226:13 227:3	143:12,13 152:12	<b>stone</b> 217:10	structure 92:12
240:3	153:2 154:17	<b>stop</b> 33:19 79:19	109:14 110:2
statements 99:6	162:20 173:15	207:18 230:18	133:20 172:13
205:11	217:13 222:20	239:19	structured 122:24
states 1:1,11 6:15	223:4,23 225:8	<b>stopped</b> 222:24	124:2
37:24 39:16,17,18	234:5 240:2	245:23	structures 172:15
39:20 40:3,6	261:12,16,25	<b>stories</b> 162:10	stuck 35:20
44:12,12,17 45:5	262:3,5,18 263:5	270:16	<b>stuff</b> 161:20
46:5,14 47:14,15	263:11 264:21	<b>story</b> 67:24 87:12	198:14 208:10,25
47:16,17 48:11,11	267:18 272:10		210:15 211:25

[stuff - swear] Page 66

244:3,5 249:20,23	subverted 264:12	suggestions 22:23	supports 76:5
249:23	succeed 33:20	suggests 94:20	89:1
<b>subject</b> 17:14,15	succeeded 151:10	115:4 199:12	<b>suppose</b> 134:19
24:15 26:11 65:15	success 77:16	<b>suing</b> 35:5 40:18	243:22
66:3 99:15 127:5	165:23	41:13 76:18 78:4	supposed 67:10
142:2 174:14	successful 60:13	78:4 245:23	209:14 216:14
195:1 229:4 270:7	163:17	251:18,23 270:1	225:7 246:12,14
272:22	successfully 41:6	<b>suit</b> 85:24 141:11	246:21
subjective 101:9	<b>sue</b> 73:18 74:4	242:13,15	supposedly 225:7
111:16	76:14,17 269:23	<b>suite</b> 5:19 7:19	supreme 45:10
submission	<b>sued</b> 69:2,2 238:6	276:22	249:10
211:17	248:17,21 251:20	<b>suits</b> 46:16 69:6	<b>sure</b> 16:7 17:12
submissions 208:7	252:16 269:9	255:8	51:3 52:1 56:10
212:9 215:17	sues 221:13	<b>sullivan</b> 5:9 227:2	60:4 62:19 63:20
<b>submit</b> 63:7 66:14	<b>suffer</b> 65:13	<b>sum</b> 92:9 103:20	65:6 67:22 79:23
66:23 92:2,16	suffered 44:24	157:8	105:24 109:17
154:8,9 254:16	79:3 84:15 217:24	sums 115:25	117:1 121:23
262:13,16	260:13	<b>super</b> 52:9 200:20	123:12 134:21
<b>submits</b> 123:14	suffering 151:23	supercomputers	139:3 141:5 144:6
submitted 36:16	214:22 216:15,15	72:23	158:18 159:5
41:9 229:17	<b>suffers</b> 209:23	superfund 253:11	165:2 178:22
submitting 121:24	<b>suffice</b> 79:11 84:1	253:19	197:17 201:1
274:14	sufficient 66:12	superior 44:16	218:24 227:22
subordinate	81:6 148:12	superpriority	234:1 236:25
67:15 73:1	159:15 174:16	35:12	238:6 239:5 261:5
subpoenas 233:16	274:17	superseded 85:17	262:24 265:25
subsequent 76:22	suggest 70:10	supervise 237:13	267:22 272:20
165:10	108:24 115:18	242:4 250:11	273:7,24 274:16
subsequently	119:13 122:13	supervision 251:2	275:6
131:6	123:9 127:7	251:3	surgeries 216:18
substance 106:5	137:17 144:16	supplement 156:3	surgery 216:20
273:17	267:15	194:12	surprise 17:12
substantial 37:14	suggested 52:25	supplements	20:4 85:12 197:10
84:15 98:24	176:11 178:9	156:3	surprising 87:14
127:11 218:5	181:10	support 29:5	110:6
228:2	suggesting 122:12	42:20 44:19 79:17	surprisingly
substantially	178:15 190:8	86:8 87:19 89:23	85:14
18:15 80:21 81:3	262:25	95:10,11 104:12	survival 86:12
90:15 227:10	suggestion 23:3	153:19 160:5	survived 55:15
substantiate	38:18 87:15 118:4	supported 55:20	57:19 208:17
158:6,17,22	143:4 178:17	74:16,20	susceptible 63:11
substantiated	201:16	supporting	<b>swear</b> 76:17
158:1		137:12	
		1014	

[swingle - thank] Page 67

swingle 15:1	takes 30:4 78:14	tech 219:13	173:17 181:25
sworn 35:2 46:8	96:18 158:5	technically 121:7	194:12,19 195:3
<b>symbiotic</b> 211:17	241:18 261:24	255:25	250:20 271:2,2,3
symmetry 28:4	270:15	tele 1:12	273:16
system 45:9 109:9	talk 24:6 68:20	telephone 221:25	terrible 33:20
109:10 211:18	70:16 179:5	telephonically 3:8	45:18
systems 220:15	182:11 206:2	3:9,10,11,12,13	terribly 44:8
t	215:11,25 243:4	3:20 4:6,13,20 5:7	terrific 42:19
	272:6	5:14,22 6:6,12,19	territories 83:4,13
t 11:10 14:7 52:15	<b>talked</b> 36:14	7:6,14,22 8:6,14	test 28:16,24
220:15 276:1,1	222:3 271:23	8:16,18,20	29:22,23 30:3,12
<b>table</b> 76:9	talking 106:22,25	television 159:18	38:22 43:24 48:24
tabulation 126:11	116:1,8,9 134:19	222:7,17	50:22 52:8,11,18
126:12,13,14	134:20 136:16	tell 26:7 59:4 71:7	52:24 53:14 62:1
<b>tactic</b> 109:11	160:20 162:4	154:14 172:11	66:8,21
tailor 18:16	188:12 195:18	189:17 214:21	testified 37:5
tailoring 17:13	201:23 203:25	215:18 270:16	53:17 55:1 71:13
take 19:23 20:22	209:2 215:19	telling 42:14	71:23 76:21 82:23
20:22 22:1 25:24	235:1,2 238:16	47:17 253:17	83:4 97:17 101:7
26:8 32:11 45:23	242:16 243:17	tells 222:13	108:12 111:14
46:19 67:6 69:21	258:24 267:11	temporary 196:8	116:12 131:12
70:1,25,25 78:18	talks 222:11	ten 41:5 106:12	137:25 148:19
95:22 96:20 100:9	tapley 15:2	tennessee 86:15	151:8 159:23
112:16 114:14	targeted 142:16	255:11	215:12
115:13 124:16	task 60:20 105:16	tens 34:16 37:25	testify 72:4,23
144:14 152:14,22	212:20 217:21	78:3 79:3,3	114:23
153:7 154:16,20	tautologies 69:14	tentative 21:8	testimony 35:3,4
155:25 156:13	tautology 70:5	86:16	35:7 36:14 41:25
157:1 158:24	tax 22:23,24,25	tenth 218:24	55:7,11 63:23
169:19,22 179:8	23:2 67:1,6 85:11	term 23:23,25	64:7 66:23 71:1
188:2 199:18	145:7,13,13	26:6 165:5 188:9	77:7 79:14 96:15
209:4,16 210:12	taxes 46:24 66:25	210:4 222:24	97:3,12,13,14,19
210:13 211:3	67:12,14 82:13	232:8,15 249:11	99:10 101:10
238:23 241:9,17	145:12	249:11 257:10	112:2,3 142:14
246:6 250:10	taxing 23:1	259:4	152:4,6 160:1
254:15 257:4	taxpayer 46:25	terminal 45:25	208:19 248:11
261:10 262:3	tdp 156:5,16,17	terms 30:1 51:8	253:7 257:18
taken 71:19	157:13,13,16,21	63:13 65:12	tests 45:10
114:24 124:16	158:7,9,13,23	100:10 103:3	texas 103:8,8
142:14 203:6	tdps 155:13,24	104:1 126:15,18	thank 16:9 21:19
208:16,25 241:10	156:2,24 157:3,11	126:20 134:25	27:20,24 68:2,3
241:11 242:8	159:8	135:5,16 137:7	84:8,9 87:23 88:6
248:1 250:20		161:24 168:3	92:18,19 93:18
			<u> </u>
	Veritevt I ed	gal Solutions	

[thank - think] Page 68

95:13,18 104:9	204:7 208:4	216:21 217:3	128:2,4,5,19,19
111:10,21 118:1	theodore 15:18	219:2 237:14	129:1,12,20 130:2
119:20,21 120:7	theories 81:13	242:1,6 243:8	130:13 131:10,25
120:19,21 140:16	251:12	244:3 270:17	132:6 133:5,7,11
140:17 141:10	<b>theory</b> 67:16	271:15,17,25	133:24 134:13,14
144:2,11,12	79:15 89:23	272:18	135:7,8,16,18,18
145:18 149:22,24	108:23 243:10	<b>think</b> 17:1 18:5,16	135:24 136:13,21
155:8 159:2	therapy 220:15	18:21,22 19:1,11	137:4 138:10,13
162:14,14 163:3	<b>thereof</b> 181:12	19:19 21:21 22:10	140:3,8,13 141:1
167:8,10 174:23	theresa 223:16	22:17 24:2,17	141:13 142:24
174:25 175:3	224:2	25:1,21 26:1,6	143:19 144:1,2,7
193:19 200:6,14	thereunder 195:3	27:13 29:1,8,15	144:18,20 146:8
200:21,22 202:16	there's 157:22	29:21 30:6 35:20	149:15 150:6,9,15
204:8,17 205:17	162:7 165:23	41:23 42:5,18	152:4 154:5,23,24
205:21 206:17	172:25 180:24	43:6,6 45:14 48:7	154:25 155:2,6,20
207:22 217:8	185:4 192:24	48:13,23 49:15	156:3,23,24 158:3
218:9,12 219:3	193:6 196:22	50:5,14 51:4,13	161:10,17 162:16
226:5,6 227:7	198:16	51:19 52:6 53:23	162:22 165:13
228:20 233:2,22	they're 190:17	59:22,24 60:22	167:1,5 170:16
239:23,25 256:17	194:3 195:17	62:6,9,12,21	171:18,19 172:2
257:3,15 258:19	198:13,16,18	63:19 64:4,11,22	174:7,20 175:11
271:7 272:8	they've 168:14	65:23 67:2,8,9,18	175:13,25 176:7
274:20,25 275:11	179:15 194:16	68:4,7 71:20 73:6	176:18 177:10,19
thanks 16:10 48:6	198:10 203:9	73:9,17 74:21,25	177:20,22,24
87:24 104:10	205:9	75:11,14 76:1	179:13,15 180:12
174:24	thing 18:15 34:12	77:22 78:10,16,17	180:16,18 183:10
that's 146:11	77:25 93:10 134:9	87:24 91:1,16	184:4 185:7,8,18
149:14 154:9	138:11 150:15	94:8,22,23 95:8	185:19,24 188:15
155:8 157:9,20	198:21 204:19	96:5 98:25 99:6	188:23 189:15,20
158:8 159:12	213:19 266:12	102:14 103:16,17	189:21,22 190:4
161:3 168:21	270:12 271:14	104:11,18,23	191:18 192:8,10
169:5,5 170:20	<b>things</b> 16:22	106:5,17 107:10	193:3,14 194:3
171:19,20 173:3	17:24 18:24 19:19	108:5 109:16	195:9 196:2,20
179:6 181:11,11	22:4,11,13 25:22	111:13,14 113:16	197:12,14,19,19
183:20 185:16	35:19 41:22 45:11	114:3,12,20 115:8	198:4 199:8,9,14
189:5,16,21,25	47:11 62:17 68:5	115:9,21 116:21	199:23,23,24
190:19 192:18	68:6,20 69:7	116:21 117:17,18	200:2,4,8,19
193:1 194:14	77:13 82:13 109:7	117:23 118:4,15	201:3 202:8,12,17
195:24 196:18,18	132:11 144:21	119:22 120:2,25	202:19 203:5,8,21
196:24 197:12,18	145:16 149:4	121:22 122:19	203:21 204:1,22
199:5,24,25	161:19,25 177:24	123:7,10 124:17	205:3,14 206:14
200:12 201:20	182:11 186:10	125:25 126:11,15	207:1,5,7 209:3
202:15 203:4	199:14 215:16	126:23 127:5,25	210:6,14,21 211:6

[think - topic] Page 69

211 1 6 2 1 6 7 7	160.01.166.5		4	
211:16 216:7,7	163:21 166:5	throw 95:4 260:18	timing 158:10	
217:2,2,20 218:2	171:4 180:18	throwing 101:6	<b>tired</b> 29:7	
218:4,17 226:4,9	187:7,14,16,17	thurmond 15:3	<b>titanic</b> 143:11	
226:12 228:23	229:9 231:23,25	<b>thwart</b> 147:9	144:5,8	
229:3 230:2,10	232:17 234:18,21	tie 251:5	title 49:14 262:8	
231:8,18 233:23	235:1,2,8 237:25	<b>tied</b> 37:3 107:20	<b>tobacco</b> 101:25	
234:25 236:6,12	238:14 239:19	204:15 231:10	110:14	
236:14,16,17,24	242:17 259:11	251:25 269:5	tobak 3:13 15:4	
236:25 237:2,5,9	268:16	<b>time</b> 16:15 19:10	19:8 120:7,9,11	
238:7,11,24	thomas 3:17 9:3	20:23 21:9 27:6	120:11 140:18,19	
239:10,11,14,17	thompson 222:12	27:14,15 31:21	141:8,10,14,17,19	
241:18,25 243:24	222:20,22,24	36:20 37:18 75:23	146:11,12 149:11	
243:24 245:8,9,10	thoroughly 23:15	79:25 91:4 94:4	149:14,17,22	
245:12 246:2,10	23:15	104:3 106:9,9	today 27:13,14,15	
246:15 248:15,16	thought 16:9	110:21 116:22	44:6 87:3 104:15	
248:21,23 249:18	22:18 23:7 42:22	120:4,6,17 121:2	105:1 107:10	
249:24 250:2	42:25 43:3 54:10	127:5 144:20	110:25 124:3	
251:25 252:2,4,14	60:2 70:13 77:25	146:13 149:4,6	153:21 154:1	
252:17,23 253:25	124:6 153:24	150:17 153:7	155:19,21 156:20	
254:13,20 255:7	157:5 177:25	160:24 161:21	183:19 184:7	
255:15 256:7,13	178:3,19 209:25	173:9 174:19	199:12 201:23	
257:23 259:4	216:4 221:18	175:9 176:25	208:5 248:9	
260:4 264:2,21	236:13	177:8,12 196:7	264:22	
266:8,9 268:1,24	thoughtful 31:17	199:7 204:19	today's 16:18 27:7	
269:22 270:20,24	266:13	205:13 209:16	79:21 93:9	
272:5,14 273:17	thoughts 17:16	213:3 214:4 215:3	<b>told</b> 33:1 34:17,19	
thinking 69:6	thousands 34:5,17	218:5,11 226:22	91:7 140:12	
189:19	37:25 39:4,4,6,22	233:20,25 250:3	221:13 273:9	
thinks 72:3	40:8 43:20,24	251:22 253:16	274:18	
<b>third</b> 18:16 20:11	78:3 79:3 266:2	256:17 262:10	tolerance 209:17	
24:3,7,9 25:9	270:23,23	272:20 274:17,19	209:19,19	
28:17,25 29:1,14	threads 273:6	<b>timely</b> 133:2	ton 162:2	
29:15 31:7,9,15	threat 150:12	153:11 157:7,20	tones 79:8	
32:6,8,13,23 33:7	three 17:4 31:12	204:22 205:5	tong 221:12	
38:10,17 40:12	36:8 39:15 43:6	218:15	tonnesen 15:5	
44:3 50:17,24	43:23 44:23 63:8	times 17:4 40:4	<b>tool</b> 166:3	
51:6,15,22 54:22	72:16 77:22 86:18	45:18 47:4 68:22	tools 171:20	
61:10 62:4 68:13	128:19,19 144:13	103:11 141:2	top 97:24 98:15	
69:16,20 71:15	144:21 146:22	157:15 166:6	127:19 199:13	
72:19 111:16	148:7 150:2	215:5,6 254:18	topic 22:21 79:21	
119:25 121:21	200:22 209:7,7	266:10	95:6 119:22 146:1	
137:6 147:23	212:7 225:11	timestamp 146:21	162:16 261:9	
148:1 160:4		-		
Veritext Legal Solutions				

[topics - tweak] Page 70

<b>topics</b> 16:15	189:5,8 190:13	<b>tricky</b> 176:2	trusts 41:11,24
torn 106:18	197:13 201:10,12	<b>tried</b> 22:5 23:9	42:3,6 63:10,14
tort 44:21 86:4	268:2 269:10,21	25:12 32:20 36:21	64:7,8,10,14,15
90:18 93:23	269:22 270:3	56:3,3 109:18	76:24,25 123:22
163:20	transferee 67:3	211:16 213:19	123:23 138:1
<b>total</b> 38:6 40:16	268:18,21	244:10 254:14	139:12 223:4,24
58:16 71:21	transferee's 47:5	tries 130:18	<b>trust's</b> 172:19
totality 52:13	transferred	trigger 25:18	<b>truth</b> 57:2
88:23	167:17 168:7	<b>trillion</b> 40:3,4	<b>try</b> 17:11,20 19:24
<b>totally</b> 34:3 93:11	173:16 228:1	73:1,2,3	21:22 26:7,8 38:8
94:8 161:21	transfers 47:6	<b>troop</b> 6:19 8:23	101:15 129:10,12
<b>touched</b> 162:12	translate 103:4	272:3,8,9	130:22 138:24
272:19	<b>trauma</b> 215:9	trouble 208:9	179:8 188:22
tower 220:19	traumatized	<b>true</b> 35:1 37:21	191:19 200:9
towns 86:15	215:7	44:17 58:4 61:9	207:25 210:23
toys 101:22	<b>treated</b> 75:3 90:24	86:24 122:15	245:8 254:16
<b>tpps</b> 41:20	99:20 110:4	226:11 275:7	<b>trying</b> 18:11 39:5
track 32:14,18	124:11 153:22	276:4	42:10 76:10 93:15
57:23,25 69:9	treating 21:13	truly 74:12	106:2 107:13
tracking 243:17	205:15	237:20 254:23	108:14 153:3
trade 8:3	treatment 82:2	272:12 274:4	188:14 202:11
trades 18:4	99:13,16 100:7,7	<b>trump</b> 136:15	207:21 212:10
traditional 172:14	103:3 110:19	262:17	215:18 220:6
tragedies 221:20	112:11,13,15	<b>trumps</b> 136:3	225:14 236:21
tragedy 78:23	113:12,18 116:22	trust 63:7,15,22	243:5 245:4 248:3
220:9 221:20	116:24 119:4,5	64:22 65:18 82:6	248:4,5,5 250:15
<b>trail</b> 274:24	126:4 130:4,15,15	121:12 125:22	251:12,13,15
<b>trained</b> 214:12	132:25 140:7	133:20 139:9	252:2 254:12
trainor 220:17	155:13 156:8,20	158:24 160:20,22	255:19 260:10,19
transactions	217:14,17	163:12 167:4	263:25 270:9
227:20	tremendous 78:13	172:13,14,15,16	tsai 15:6
transcribed 2:25	226:14	180:16,21 189:5	tugging 162:9
transcript 28:11	trial 36:14 75:25	194:23,24 223:4,9	turn 18:25 21:15
35:7 55:4 71:4	86:20,20 197:25	223:11,12,13,15	21:16 60:14 84:4
160:2 273:15	203:12 207:12	223:15,17,18,24	166:25 183:20
276:4	265:5,9 274:21	224:1 225:12	243:19
transfer 42:8	trials 265:24	228:2 261:25	turned 129:21
63:23 163:15	266:2	264:5	248:19
167:3 170:8	tribal 139:9	trustee 223:12,13	turner 15:7 33:24
173:16,21,23,25	tribes 39:20 41:19	223:18	turning 226:16
174:4 179:9,20	125:21,23 127:8	trustee's 257:1	tweak 176:11,11
180:5,21,22	130:6,7,12 138:1	trustees 223:20	176:17 178:9
184:11,12 189:2,2			
		1014	

[tweaks - unique] Page 71

tweaks 182:12	u	underlying	undertaking
tweed 4:8	<b>u.s.</b> 1:23 83:3,11	164:20 171:6	94:12
<b>twice</b> 96:17	83:13 121:8,9	198:4	underwood 5:22
two 16:22 19:13	123:22,23 125:5,7	undermine	120:2,5,8,10,19
19:19 20:15 32:10	125:23,23 127:8	164:18	120:20,21,22,22
32:17,17 34:2,2	128:8,25 129:23	underneath	121:17,18 122:2,7
36:8 43:5 47:16	132:4,8 134:24	141:15	122:9 125:14,18
50:17 60:12 63:19	139:8 140:5	underscores	126:6,8,10 127:4
67:12 70:6 72:15	224:17 257:1	103:16	128:4 129:1,7,9
74:11 78:19 80:14	ubiquitous 85:18	understand 18:21	130:21,25 131:2,5
81:24 83:16 96:25	ucc 41:17 77:9,24	20:18 52:21 56:11	131:22,25 132:14
98:4,4 109:7,8	93:7	56:16 62:18 63:20	132:17 133:24
110:10 113:15	ultimate 92:13	65:1,1 67:16 84:6	134:17 137:1
126:2 130:5	134:8 223:5,8	90:12 91:5 103:13	138:10 139:3,22
136:17 144:13	ultimately 51:3	106:7 111:18	139:25 140:7,16
146:5,5,14 155:14	94:17 107:22	112:1,13 113:11	141:25 144:4,7
155:23 158:2,3	109:5 125:11,12	115:22 118:8,20	266:23 267:1,12
159:12 160:4	131:14 132:3	129:7,9 131:18	268:3 269:2
171:25 182:11,11	134:2,6 136:1,2,6	136:19 137:3	underwood's
185:4 187:15	136:13 140:4,8,13	139:22,25 170:10	119:24 120:15
189:2 192:24	152:20,21 154:24	174:4 188:19	undisclosed 23:12
197:25 202:18	177:12 228:6	193:15 195:8,14	23:22
204:1,22 217:9	245:17	196:12 197:18	undiscovered
241:8 246:1	unabated 261:22	198:23,24 199:14	23:11,22 239:7
265:12 272:16	unassailable	204:23 210:21	253:11
274:22	44:10 73:14	211:12 248:16	<b>unfair</b> 56:24 96:8
<b>type</b> 23:17 25:17	unavailable 38:11	255:14 264:1	123:7 130:15
57:23,24 61:20	uncertain 34:3	understanding	175:14
64:17 137:24	156:16	123:11 161:20	unfavorable
212:14 242:12	unclear 155:18	164:14 169:16	155:24
252:5 268:13	unconscious	206:12,18,21	unfortunate
<b>types</b> 42:21 57:10	210:17	215:23 224:23	152:9
91:12 128:13	unconstitutional	230:3,6 235:14	unfortunately
238:3 242:1 254:7	186:7	267:13	20:7 121:10 275:4
255:15 270:7	uncontestable	understands 41:1	unfounded
<b>typical</b> 101:17	33:22	193:8 273:25	203:13
163:19 168:18	uncontested	understood 125:8	unicorn 110:6
175:20	33:21	235:14 254:19	unidentified
typically 172:15	uncontroverted	255:23 256:2,3	259:7
189:17 223:25	36:6	267:23 269:24	unified 88:10
<b>tyson</b> 64:13	undergoing	undertakes	unique 69:19
	224:19	244:25	115:5 116:24
	/		151:25 156:1

[unique - violates] Page 72

157:1 172:13	151:5 220:18	<b>valium</b> 214:18	veritext 276:20
uniquely 214:11	225:4	valuable 87:16	vermont 48:12
<b>unit</b> 143:17	unsurprisingly	<b>value</b> 31:8 32:4,8	53:6 80:11 88:10
213:19	239:17	32:13,22 33:9,21	versus 56:15
<b>united</b> 1:1,11	unthinkable	33:23 36:4 37:7	85:21
124:25 134:9	44:25 93:3	37:11,12 40:16	vested 42:7
135:3 140:22	<b>untied</b> 273:7	44:16 45:25 46:11	<b>vesting</b> 173:16
142:3,5 152:12	untimely 148:15	47:22 49:11 55:5	veteran's 220:3
154:16 240:1	218:20	55:15 61:11 62:11	<b>veto</b> 171:14
267:18	untoward 267:19	71:8,12,21 72:13	vicarious 237:13
universal 55:9	unusual 82:5	73:21 98:24,25	242:3 243:8
174:13	updated 24:11	126:18,19,19,20	vicariously
universe 61:15	upended 156:16	137:20,25 139:10	243:11
73:5	<b>upfront</b> 130:10	139:11 140:4	vice 175:10
university 55:9	<b>upset</b> 109:24	163:24 167:16	<b>vicious</b> 209:21
unkindly 74:13	usa 212:4	168:6 169:1,23	<b>victims</b> 7:9 34:11
unknowable 32:6	usage 209:10	173:2 201:8 228:2	34:11,17 48:4
33:12 34:12 73:15	use 40:21 60:14	228:6 245:22	70:12 148:11
150:23	138:22,22 154:3	valued 60:15	152:11,12,13,24
unknown 1:25	160:18 161:3	valuing 172:25	153:1 154:3,7,23
146:16 151:6	164:18 171:7,13	van 15:8	155:16 225:12
159:15	190:8 212:10	variables 39:6	272:15,16
unlawful 25:25,25	217:24 222:10,24	variation 81:12	<b>video</b> 1:12
26:1 230:14,15	225:14	varied 32:23	vietnam 220:3
237:16	utilized 101:18	variety 69:3 135:2	view 27:11 29:11
unliquidated 57:4	utterly 38:13	168:23 169:20	30:13 36:15
59:9 126:22	<b>uzzi</b> 4:13 19:1,16	230:21	117:24 133:25
unmuting 218:20	19:18 20:13 21:16	various 62:16	168:10 203:4
218:20	21:19,19 27:20,23	71:15 87:7,7	220:24 238:4
unpunished	144:25 145:3,11	94:10 97:25	viewed 66:18
103:24	145:20 239:6	112:17 178:5	120:25 181:17,19
unquantifiable	242:23 243:4	218:25 223:17	182:12 192:23,25
33:12	246:4,4 247:4,12	233:24	193:7 198:25
unquestionably	247:19 261:2	vary 61:19 83:12	views 17:2 44:5
136:8	V	vast 105:10 121:7	156:21 189:20
unreasonably	v 26:15 64:13	123:6	275:3
268:12	128:10 147:11	veil 237:13 242:2	vincent 9:6
unrelated 233:13	150:19	250:7 270:6	vindicate 74:19
unresolved 93:10	valid 39:21 61:20	venditto 15:9	violate 172:6
272:22	62:19 87:13	vendors 132:9	237:17
unsecured 74:17	validity 39:9 76:3	veracity 44:10	violated 183:6
81:5 90:19,20,24	173:25	verdicts 86:21	violates 168:16
91:13 148:10	113.23		170:12

[violation - way] Page 73

violation 97:8	269:1,24	walk 122:13 230:4	wants 152:22	
261:21	vonnegut's 234:1	<b>wall</b> 101:7	156:7 218:15	
violations 89:3	<b>vote</b> 41:16 79:24	<b>walter</b> 220:16	265:23 272:6	
261:23	91:9,15 113:3	<b>want</b> 17:7 19:6	wardwell 3:3	
violence 85:25	133:16 162:6	25:7 27:16 28:5	16:21 220:11	
virginia 5:1,3	176:12 178:16	29:22 37:18 63:20	221:22,24 226:3	
79:23 86:19 96:14	206:9,14,15	66:17 67:9 88:14	229:24	
96:15,19 97:3	225:22	92:21 94:18,20	warfare 39:3	
98:3,5,12,15	<b>voted</b> 52:13 82:25	95:18 96:3 115:20	43:20	
99:12 100:5,12,13	82:25 83:1,2,5	118:3,5,12,14	<b>warp</b> 271:16	
100:18,25 103:10	94:19 110:7	119:13,17 127:4	warrants 67:13	
103:11,12,15,24	112:23 126:7,16	133:24 134:6	176:3	
104:3,6,11,20,22	126:21 133:14	146:13 149:8	washington 3:18	
110:6 113:4	169:16 178:14	152:17 159:5,11	7:20 37:19 48:12	
115:13 116:7,23	186:24 206:7	162:1 174:5,22	48:16 53:6 75:24	
117:6,11,14	<b>voters</b> 34:18	180:8,23 186:11	80:8 81:15,17,19	
222:16	89:25	187:17,23 190:3	83:8,15 88:3 89:2	
<b>virginia's</b> 95:8,11	votes 31:11 89:18	192:11,25 193:1,6	103:7 118:17	
103:25 111:6	89:21 90:5,11	193:21 197:17	220:12	
112:14	91:16 92:2,11	198:18 201:3,21	wasn't 175:12	
virtual 84:4	<b>voting</b> 44:12	202:5,19 205:4,8	181:10	
virtually 40:25	52:10 83:10 89:15	210:24 211:2	waste 91:4 127:4	
70:4 104:19,23	92:13 93:24 94:2	212:5 213:25	wasting 161:21	
124:7 225:7	94:9 126:11 148:8	217:9 219:4,5,6	254:18	
virtue 245:1	161:18 206:1,7	228:13 233:8,8	way 25:10 32:25	
vis 34:9,9 69:18	vulnerable 64:12	236:1 237:9	45:12 46:14 70:11	
69:18	64:17 214:22	242:11 243:4,15	70:12 82:22 84:2	
vitiates 164:10	w	249:18 251:5,19	88:16 92:14 99:7	
180:22 201:13	w 14:8	253:8 265:4,24	110:22 115:2	
<b>voice</b> 198:10	<b>w.r.</b> 99:16,19	266:9 267:2,22	120:25 122:17,23	
218:10	wagner 4:20	268:5,15 271:7	132:7 135:18,19	
voided 72:25	15:10 95:13,14,18	272:11 273:3,23	136:2,4 146:25	
volumes 266:8	96:7 111:11,22	274:16,20,25	160:9 170:12	
voluntary 69:5	112:21 113:1,6	wanted 51:10	175:12 177:3	
volunteer 192:16	114:2,6,10,14,20	111:1 120:2 136:9	189:13,23 190:7	
volunteers 161:13	115:8 117:3,11	136:9 145:16	191:11,19 195:16	
vonnegut 3:11	<b>waited</b> 89:18	162:12 187:6	207:19 208:11,21	
229:20,23,24	125:12	213:18 236:19,20	209:13,20,20	
230:8 232:21	waiting 86:21	247:5 253:8 257:4	211:8 212:23	
233:3,10,23 234:3	waive 256:9	257:8,12,17	219:11 226:17	
236:15 237:10	waived 194:2	258:13 270:15,25	236:4 244:11	
239:11,15,17	waiver 123:8	wanting 75:13	245:10 247:6	
247:21 268:23	143:24 184:20		254:6,22 264:22	
Varitant Lagal Colutions				

[way - worried] Page 74

271:6 272:21	77:9 101:16 145:8	155:15 223:3,23	wondering 264:20
273:3,14 274:11	166:5 176:12,14	<b>wholly</b> 232:17	<b>won't</b> 167:20
ways 68:10	178:12 187:1	wilamowsky	worcester 5:9
114:12 210:5	194:6,14 197:3	15:19	227:3
we've 20:20 22:5	214:6 215:9 234:6	<b>wild</b> 45:2	word 25:24 26:1
23:5,9 24:11,18	275:9	wiles 32:25	49:14,25 50:19,22
25:16 26:22 73:9	west 5:1,3 6:16	willful 23:24	51:11 98:8 145:14
88:11 93:4 106:11	79:23 86:19 95:7	24:20 26:5,8	167:20,20 200:15
109:18 111:5	95:11 96:14,15,19	william 14:7	206:23 207:5
116:15 140:10	97:3 98:3,5,12,15	15:14 221:12	words 26:22
217:3 227:19	99:12 100:5,12,13	225:16,17	29:24 30:14 81:10
230:9 231:7,24	100:18,25 103:11	willing 19:23	114:4 145:6
232:2,25 233:23	103:12,15,24,25	134:15 208:4	181:17 192:23,25
246:21 249:3	104:2,6,11,20,21	226:3	194:17 198:24
254:14 259:10	110:5 111:6	<b>wilmer</b> 8:1 175:1	208:1 264:25
264:20,25 265:2	112:14 113:4	win 38:5 67:23	work 17:13 20:10
265:17 267:10	115:13 116:7,23	76:6,6	44:13 78:3 109:18
271:12	117:6,11,14 175:5	windsor 129:4	117:16 140:1,13
<b>wealth</b> 40:11 41:3	220:17 222:15	winning 76:4	154:9 201:19
47:21 121:8,9	<b>we'll</b> 149:17	winthrop 6:14	208:7 224:7,15
<b>weber</b> 15:11	162:21 198:24	<b>wiped</b> 33:25	230:11 236:17
webster's 117:8	we're 150:16	wipeout 38:6	237:8 273:4 274:2
<b>wedded</b> 251:16	160:20 161:8,17	<b>wipes</b> 52:11	<b>worked</b> 17:5 24:1
wedding 175:5	162:4,5,7,13	<b>wisdom</b> 181:12	48:3 70:21 93:6
week 87:2 124:8	186:5 189:19	wish 73:23 132:25	95:19 105:5
161:10 203:12	191:18 195:18	wished 149:1	118:21 238:19
207:13 230:9	196:6 197:17	wishes 155:12	265:3 270:18
270:13	199:6 200:2 201:4	withdrawal 174:8	working 17:9,20
weeks 50:18 202:8	202:10	199:24 200:4	18:23 203:25
weigh 42:10	we've 155:19	204:11	208:10 233:15
270:18	195:20 197:25	withdrawn 174:5	270:18 271:13
weighing 44:14	201:3,23 202:20	179:17 181:3	274:23
weinberg 15:12	whatsoever 81:11	witness 71:6 97:1	workplace 240:25
weiner 15:13	95:5 107:15	97:3 98:15 108:11	works 258:22
weintraub 15:14	what's 182:3	witnesses 96:25	world 8:3 20:21
weis 15:15,16	187:7 193:25	203:12	26:18 43:17
weiss 15:17	196:5	wolf 15:20	151:13,15,15
welcome 20:3,10	whereabouts	wolff 88:2	152:6 153:15
145:20	150:23,24	woman 141:7	161:25 212:23
wells 15:18 wendy 15:12	whichever 270:21 whitaker 222:11	165:13 229:1 women 154:4	worms 51:14 worried 195:9
TTTOTA CITY   5 . 1 / 1			

[worry - à] Page 75

worry 219:2	y	Z
258:10 267:11	y 199:7	<b>z</b> 14:23
worse 44:8 104:5	yards 4:10	<b>zabel</b> 15:21
133:19 197:22	yeah 21:7 59:20	<b>zeevi</b> 15:22
214:19 218:25	114:14 141:9,12	<b>zero</b> 36:3,8 72:17
worst 45:18	170:16 219:17	72:17,18 73:24,24
worth 45:12 46:5	241:5 243:13	73:25 104:20
68:7 94:13 172:18	268:18	157:8
would've 119:6	year 32:14 34:6	<b>zoom</b> 27:14
126:21 129:21,23	44:24 58:11 106:8	204:24 218:25
133:3 212:14,15	106:9 147:3	228:19 232:15
213:19	148:22 224:3	272:5 275:4
<b>wouldn't</b> 151:17	225:12	zooms 271:10
191:16 195:24	year's 275:7	zylberberg 15:23
201:19	years 35:5 39:2	,
<b>write</b> 220:6	40:18 43:19 44:13	100 157 11
<b>written</b> 154:13	60:12 74:11 77:5	<b>'92</b> 175:11
163:6 207:25	77:22 79:19 97:17	à
215:14,16 223:19	105:4 109:4	à 34:9 69:18
wrong 37:22 43:8	110:12 111:6	
43:10,11 47:14	142:14,15 151:2	
87:18,25 118:12	208:16 210:9	
179:14 243:5	212:11 213:11	
256:10	214:6,15 223:10	
wrongdoers	225:24 265:3,13	
236:22	yell 165:13	
wrongdoing	yesterday 153:24	
23:25 237:15	york 1:2 3:6 4:11	
238:12 239:10	4:18 5:12 6:10,17	
wrongful 56:24	7:12 8:4 57:15	
56:24 237:20	69:1 85:21,22,24	
251:6	86:19 103:9,10	
wrote 150:18	129:5 183:21	
197:3 222:1 224:5	220:20,20 224:18	
wv 5:5	you'd 167:21	
wyoming 41:24	you'll 200:16	
X	you're 149:20	
<b>x</b> 1:4,10 24:11	155:10 156:17	
39:7 198:16 199:6	161:21 187:4,11	
257:10,19 258:24	188:10 190:6	
258:25 269:16	you've 188:11	
230.23 209.10	203:21 207:12	
	203.21 207.12	